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SIXTH DIVISION
December 21, 2001

Plaintiff, Chicago Journeymen Plumbers' Local Union 130, U.A. (Union), brought thiscomplaint for relief pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (Act) (5 ILCS 140/1 et al. (West2000)). Plaintiff requested that the defendants, the Illinois Department of Public Health and itsdirector, John Lumpkin (Department), disclose the names and addresses of all individuals that theDepartment had licensed as plumbers and apprentice plumbers. The Department replied that itwould release the names of all licensed plumbers and plumbing apprentices, but that it would notrelease their home addresses. The Department claimed that the home addresses of the licensedplumbers constituted "personal information" specifically exempt from disclosure under the Freedomof Information Act (Act).

The trial court concluded that under the reasoning of Lieber v. Board of Trustees of SouthernIllinois University , 176 Ill. 2d 401 (1997), home addresses did not constitute "personal information" exempt from disclosure under the Act and granted the Union's motion for summary judgment. TheDepartment appeals from that order and argues that the home addresses of licensed plumbers andapprentice plumbers are exempt from the disclosure requirements of the Act. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

In October 1999, the Union requested the names and addresses of all plumbers and plumbingapprentices licensed in the state of Illinois. The Department replied that it maintained homeaddresses of licensed plumbers and plumbing apprentices, but that it did not maintain their businessaddresses. Relying on section 7(1)(b)(iii) (5 ILCS 140/7(1)(b)(iii) (West 2000)) of the Act, theDepartment took the position that this information constituted personal information exempt fromdisclosure under the Act and for that reason denied the Union's request regarding the addresses. TheDepartment, however, offered to provide a list to the Union of the names of all licensed plumbersand apprentice plumbers. The Union then filed an appeal with the Department. In this appeal, theUnion limited its request to the names and addresses of licensed plumbers and plumbing apprenticesin Cook and Will Counties. The Department did not respond to the Union's appeal.

On March 27, 2000, the Union filed a verified complaint under the Act. The Union allegedthat the "home mailing addresses of plumbers and apprentice plumbers licensed in Illinois by the[Department] do not constitute exempt personal information about licensed plumbers or apprentice plumbers." The Union sought injunctive relief directing the Department to release the names andmailing addresses of licensed plumbers and apprentice plumbers in Will and Cook Counties. TheDepartment answered the complaint and asserted section 7(1)(b)(iii) of the Act as an affirmativedefense. The Department claimed that the addresses of licensed plumbers fall within a per seexemption under the Act and are not required to be disclosed under the terms of the Act.

The Union moved for summary judgment. Relying on Lieber v. Board of Trustees ofSouthern Illinois University, 176 Ill. 2d 401(1997), the Union argued that the Act required theDepartment to disclose the names and addresses of licensed plumbers and apprentice plumbers. Inresponse, the Department filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. Consistent with itsaffirmative defense, the Department argued that the requested addresses constituted "personalinformation" and the addresses were exempt from disclosure under section 7(1)(b)(iii) of the Act. The Department also claimed that the Union was seeking information for a commercial purpose. The trial court found that Lieber controlled, granted the Union's motion for summary judgment, anddenied the Department's motion for summary judgment. This appeal followed.

ANALYSIS

Summary judgment shall only be granted if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions,together with the affidavits, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving partyis entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 2000). We review the trialcourt's grant of summary judgment de novo. Anderson v. Alberto-Culver USA, Inc., 317 Ill. App.3d 1104, 1110 (2000).

The Act implements the public policy of this state to provide its citizens with full access toinformation regarding the affairs of government. 5 ILCS 140/1 (West 2000); Lieber, 176 Ill. 2d at407. Under the Act public records are presumed to be open and accessible. Lieber, 176 Ill. 2d at407. Upon receiving a proper request for information, a public body must comply with that requestunless one of the exemptions apply under the Act. 5 ILCS 140/7 (West 2000); American Federationof State, County & Municipal Employees (AFSCME) v. County of Cook, 136 Ill. 2d 334, 341 (1990). If the public body denies disclosure under an exemption within section 7, it must provide writtennotice of which exemption it is invoking. 5 ILCS 140/9(b) (West 2000). If the party seekingdisclosure challenges the public body's decision in the circuit court, "the public body has the burdenof proving that the records in question fall within the exemption it has claimed." Lieber, 176 Ill. 2dat 408.

Section 7(1) of the Act provides, in part, the following exemptions to the disclosurerequirements of the Act:

"(1) The following shall be exempt from inspection andcopying:

***

(b) Information that, if disclosed, would constitute a clearlyunwarranted invasion of personal privacy, unless the disclosure isconsented to in writing by the individual subjects of the information. The disclosure of information that bears on the public duties of publicemployees and officials shall not be considered an invasion ofpersonal privacy. Information exempted under this subsection (b)shall include but is not limited to:

(i) files and personal information maintained with respect toclients, patients, residents, students or other individuals receivingsocial, medical, educational, vocational, financial, supervisory orcustodial care or services directly or indirectly from federal agenciesor public bodies;

(ii) personnel files and personal information maintained withrespect to employees, appointees or elected officials of any publicbody or applicants for those positions;

(iii) files and personal information maintained with respect toany applicant, registrant or licensee by any public body cooperatingwith or engaged in professional or occupational registration, licensureor discipline[.]" 5 ILCS 140/7(1)(b) (West 2000).

The specifically listed exemptions within subsection 7(1)(b) constitute per se exemptions. Lieber, 176 Ill. 2d at 408. Once the public body proves that the requested information falls withinone of these per se exemptions, the court conducts no further inquiry and must uphold the publicbody's decision. Lieber, 176 Ill. 2d at 408. The per se rule applies to the specific exemptions under7(1)(b) of the Act which pertains to "information that, if disclosed, would constitute a clearlyunwarranted invasion of personal privacy," just as it applies to other section 7 exemptions. Lieber,176 Ill. 2d at 408. Section 7(1)(b) also contains a general exemption that applies when the publicbody asserts that the requested information constitutes a clearly unwarranted invasion of personalprivacy. Lieber, 176 Ill. 2d at 408. If the public body asserts this general exemption, the court mustevaluate the requested information on a case-by case basis. Lieber, 176 Ill. 2d at 409; see alsoGibson v. Illinois State Board of Education, 289 Ill. App. 3d 12 (1997) (court should conduct abalancing test if the public body relies on the general exception as a basis for nondisclosure).

In Lieber, plaintiff, the owner of an apartment building, filed a request for disclosure underthe Act with defendant, a nearby university. Plaintiff sought the names and addresses of admittedfreshmen who had contacted the university about off-campus housing. Invoking the exemption ofsection 7(1)(b)(i), the university denied the request. Specifically, the university claimed that therequested information constituted personal information it maintained for students receivingeducational services from a public body. 5 ILCS 140/7(1)(b)(i) (West 2000). The trial court grantedsummary judgment in favor of the defendant. Applying a balancing test pursuant to Margolis v.Director of the Department of Revenue, 180 Ill. App. 3d 1084 (1989), the appellate court reversed. Lieber v. Southern Illinois University, 279 Ill. App. 3d 553, 561 (1996).

The supreme court first rejected the appellate court's use of a balancing test. The courtdetermined that because the university claimed that the requested information fell within a specificexemption of section 7(1)(b), the appellate court was "wrong to make an individualized assessmentof whether disclosure of the information would invade anyone's personal privacy." Lieber, 176 Ill.2d at 409. The court noted that if the requested information fell within a specific exemption, itwould, by definition, constitute "[i]nformation that, if disclosed, would constitute a clearlyunwarranted invasion of personal privacy" (5 ILCS 140/7(1)(b) (West 2000)) and be automaticallyexempt. Lieber, 176 Ill. 2d at 409-10.

The court, nevertheless, affirmed the appellate court's conclusion that exemption fromdisclosure under section 7(1)(b)(i) did not apply to the information requested by Lieber. The courtfirst concluded that section 7(1)(b)(i) did not apply because Lieber was not requesting informationabout students. Lieber, 176 Ill. 2d at 410. Section 7(1)(b)(i) applied to personal informationmaintained with respect to students. 5 ILCS 140/7(1)(b)(i) (West 2000). The court reasoned thatthe plaintiff requested information about individuals not yet enrolled in the university and not yetreceiving educational services, and thus these individuals were neither students nor receiving aservice from the university. Lieber, 176 Ill. 2d at 411.

The court additionally found that the names and addresses of these individuals did notconstitute "personal information" as contemplated by the Act. The court stated, "Although namesand addresses are unquestionably personal in the sense that they are specific to particular persons,the statutory reference to 'personal information' means more than simply that." Lieber, 176 Ill. 2dat 411. The court pointed out that subsections 7(1)(b)(i), (1)(b)(ii), and (1)(b)(iii) (5 ILCS140/7(1)(b)(i), (1)(b)(ii), (1)(b)(iii) (West 2000)) exempt "personal information" whereas subsections 7(1)(b)(v), 7(1)(c)(iv), and 7(1)(u) (5 ILCS 140/7(1)(b)(v), (1)(c)(iv), (1)(u) (West2000)) explicitly exempt information concerning the "identity" of a person. Relying on thatdistinction, the court noted that where the legislature intended to exempt a person's identity fromdisclosure, it did so explicitly. "For example, the exemption in section 7(1)(b)(v) refers to'information revealing the identity' of certain persons providing information to administrative,investigative, law enforcement or penal agencies; section 7(1)(c)(iv) speaks of the 'identity of aconfidential source'; and section 7(1)(u) exempts from disclosure information regarding a university'sadjudication of grievance or disciplinary cases to the extent that disclosure would 'reveal the identity'of the person involved." 5 ILCS 140/7(1)(b)(v), 7(1)(c)(iv), 7(1)(u) (West 1994); Lieber, 176 Ill. 2dat 412.

Construing the statute as a whole, the court interpreted "personal information" exempt fromdisclosure under subsections (i), (ii), and (iii) to mean private, confidential information, but notinformation that revealed a person's basic identity. Lieber, 176 Ill. 2d at 412. "Where the legislatureintended to exempt a person's identity from disclosure, it did so explicitly." Lieber, 176 Ill. 2d at412. The supreme court's interpretation of section 7 in Lieber undermines the Department'sargument in this case. The Lieber court characterized its finding that the names and addresses of theprospective students did not constitute personal information as an "equally fundamental[]impediment" to the university's reliance on exemption under section 7(1)(b)(i). Lieber, 176 Ill. 2dat 411.

Gibson v. Illinois State Board of Education, 289 Ill. App. 3d 12 (1997), followed Lieber. Ray Gibson, a reporter, and the Chicago Tribune requested the names and addresses only of studentsawarded scholarships by state legislatures. The Gibson court discussed the holding in Lieber thatthe names and addresses requested by the landlord from the university did not constitute personalinformation exempt from disclosure under the Act because the information requested "was not'confidential' or 'private.' " Gibson, 289 Ill. App. 3d at 21. The court in Gibson then distinguishedLieber because the plaintiffs in Gibson were seeking the names and addresses, not of all students,but only of those students receiving legislative scholarships. Gibson, 289 Ill. App. 3d at 21. Thecourt found that names and addresses of students receiving legislative scholarships were exemptfrom disclosure under the Act. Gibson, 289 Ill. App. 3d at 21.

However, the court was careful to point out that the exemption from disclosure appliedbecause disclosure would reveal more than merely names and addresses of students.

"By the very nature of the category of names and addresses sought,disclosure would reveal that these people are 'receiving ***educational [and] *** financial *** care or services directly orindirectly from *** public bodies.' [Citation.] We believe the receiptof financial aid or scholarship information is intensely 'confidential'and 'private.' [Citation.] Therefore, the information requested byplaintiffs is personal information under section 7(1)(b)(i). Since thenames and addresses requested by plaintiff are personal informationby virtue of their category, and the General Assembly scholarshiprecipients are receiving educational and financial service from theirrespective legislators, the information plaintiffs request is exempt perse from disclosure under section 71(b)(i)." Gibson, 289 Ill. App. 3dat 21.

In this case, the Union is requesting the addresses and names of all plumbers and apprenticeplumbers licensed by the Department in Cook and Will Counties. The Union's request, therefore,only seeks information that would disclose basic identification of a plumber not private, confidentialor personal information and is similar to the plaintiff's request in Lieber. Nothing more than namesor addresses would be revealed. Unlike Gibson, there is no category at play here which would causeconfidential or private information to be released. If disclosed, the Union would receive the basicidentification of the licensed plumber or plumbing apprentice. Applying the holdings of Lieber andGibson, section 7(1)(b)(iii) does not exempt this information from disclosure under the Act because,in the context of this request, names and addresses do not constitute "personal information." Thetrial court correctly applied the statute.

We are mindful that names and addresses are unquestionably personal because they arespecific to a particular person; however, we also recognize that personal information under the Actmeans more than simply basic identification. Lieber, 176 Ill. 2d at 411-12. As recognized by thecourt in Lieber, when considering the Act as a whole, the term "personal information must have beenintended by the legislature to be understood not in the sense of basic identification, but in the senseof information that is 'confidential' or 'private.' " Lieber, 176 Ill. 2d at 412.

We recognize that under some circumstances names and addresses may constitute personalinformation exempt under the Act depending on the category of the names and addresses sought. The Gibson court found that the requested names and addresses of the scholarship recipientsconstituted personal information because the very nature of the category of names and addressessought would disclose confidential or private information. Gibson, 289 Ill. App. 3d at 21. Gibsonis significant for recognizing that Lieber did not foreclose the possibility that addresses and namesmay constitute personal information exempt from disclosure under the Act, depending on thecircumstances or category of information sought. We, therefore, conclude that the substance of therequest must be considered in context in determining whether the personal information requestedis nonexempt basic identification subject to disclosure or information of a confidential and privatenature exempt from disclosure under the Act.

The Department further argues that Lieber supports only the disclosure of names and not thedisclosure of home addresses of individuals. We note parenthetically that had the Departmentrequired the work addresses, rather than home addresses, disclosure would be limited to the workaddresses for the licensed plumbers and plumber apprentices. The Lieber court made no distinctionbetween addresses and names. The supreme court's reasoning is based on the public's right toreceive information about the basic identity of public officials and those individuals that a publicbody licenses. Lieber, 176 Ill. 2d at 411. We decline to depart from this interpretation of the Act. Thus, we conclude that the trial court properly followed the holding of Lieber in ordering theDepartment to disclose the names and addresses of the licensed plumbers and apprentice plumbers.

In an effort to persuade this court that we need not abide by Lieber's interpretation of whatconstitutes personal information under section 7(1) of the Act, the Department argues that theportion of the Lieber opinion interpreting personal information is only dictum. We disagree. A courtexpresses dictum when it offers an opinion not necessary to the disposition of the litigation. American Country Insurance Co. v. Cline, 309 Ill. App. 3d 501, 510 (1999). In the context of thespecific request at issue in Lieber, the court regarded the proper construction of the term "personalinformation" under the Act as an equally fundamental impediment to accepting the argument of theuniversity that the names and addresses requested were exempt from disclosure. In discussing themeaning of the term "personal information" under the Act, the Lieber court specifically recognized: "There is another, equally fundamental, impediment to theUniversity's reliance on section 7(1)(b)(i). The University claims thatthe names and addresses of accepted freshmen constitute 'personalinformation' within the meaning of the statute. Although names andaddresses are unquestionably personal in the sense that they arespecific to particular persons, the statutory reference to 'personalinformation' means more than simply that. This is apparent when oneconsiders the provision as a whole. For example, sections 7(1)(b)(ii)and 7(1)(b)(iii), which follow the provision at issue here, employ thesame term. They exempt from disclosure 'personal information' aboutelected officials and licensed professionals. If the University'sconstruction were correct and 'personal information' embraced evenbasic identification, the public would have no right to learn the namesof officials they had placed in office, and, under this statute, a personcould not confirm that the doctor who was about to perform surgeryon him was actually licensed to practice medicine. We do not believethe General Assembly intended such absurd results." Lieber, 176 Ill.2d at 411.

Regarding the specific information requested by the landlord from the university, Lieber heldthat names and addresses were not exempt from disclosure as constituting "personal information"under the meaning of that phrase as it is used in section 7(1)(b)(i) of the Act. Lieber, 176 Ill. 2d at411-12.

"Accordingly, taken in context and considering the statute as a whole,the phrase 'personal information' must have been intended by thelegislature to be understood not in the sense of basic identification,but in the sense of information that is 'confidential' or 'private.' Thevery purpose of section 7(1)(b), after all, is to protect 'personalprivacy.' " Lieber, 176 Ill. 2d at 412. Therefore, in Lieber, disclosure was required, not only because the information withheld did notrelate to enrolled students, but because the requested names and addresses did not constitute personalinformation as contemplated by the Act. Lieber, 176 Ill. 2d at 411. The fact that the supreme courtrelied on separate reasons for defeating a litigant's argument did not reduce the court's holding todictum.

In Lieber, the court undertook the task of interpreting the term "personal information" inaddressing the university's claim that the names and addresses of accepted freshmen constitutedpersonal information exempt from disclosure under the Act. Significantly, the supreme court inLieber found its interpretation of "personal information" was an equal impediment to the university'sclaim of a per se exemption to disclosure. Lieber, 176 Ill. 2d at 411. We therefore reject theDepartment's suggestion that we treat the supreme court's interpretation in Lieber of what constitutespersonal information under section 7(1)(b) as dictum.

We further note that the Gibson court did not consider Lieber's interpretation of the term"personal information" to be dictum, but rather recognized that interpretation as an important partof the Lieber court's holding. Regarding the holding in Lieber, the Gibson court stated:

"More importantly, the [Lieber] court also held that the informationrequested [names and addresses] was not 'personal information'because it was not 'confidential' or 'private.' " Gibson, 289 Ill. 2d at21, citing Lieber, 176 Ill. 2d at 412.

If the supreme court's discussion of section 7(1)(b) was judicial dictum, we would still findit persuasive. There are two types of dictum. Obiter dictum is "a remark or opinion uttered by theway," which is "not binding as authority or precedent within the stare decis rule." Cates v. Cates,156 Ill. 2d 76, 80 (1993). Judicial dictum refers to a remark or opinion that is deliberately passedupon by the court, though not essential to the disposition of the case. Cates, 156 Ill. 2d at 80. Judicial dictum, unlike obiter dictum, is generally entitled to weight and should be followed unlessfound to be erroneous. Cates, 156 Ill. 2d at 80.

We further note that the appellate court has no authority to overrule or modify a supremecourt opinion. Rickey v. Chicago Transit Authority, 98 Ill. 2d 546, 551 (1983). In Lieber, thesupreme court analyzed the Act as a whole and concluded that names and addresses in the contextof the specific request made in that case did not constitute "personal information" because theinformation requested would only reveal basic information regarding a person's identity. The courtdiscussed each subsection of section 7 that uses the term "personal information," includingsubsection 7(1)(b)(iii). Lieber, 176 Ill. 2d at 411-12. The court recognized that if the term "personalinformation" exempted from disclosure even basic identification, "the public would have no rightto learn the names of officials they had placed in office, and, under this statute, a person could notconfirm that the doctor who was about to perform surgery on him was actually licensed to practicemedicine." Lieber, 176 Ill. 2d at 412. For the reasons previously discussed, we decline to departfrom the Lieber court's interpretation of the Act.

The Department alternatively argues that if the home addresses of the plumbers and plumberapprentices do not fall within the per se exemption from disclosure of section 7(1)(b)(iii), we shouldremand this case to the circuit court so that the court may determine if the home addresses fall withinthe general exemption of section 7(1)(b). The problem with this argument, however, is that theDepartment never claimed in its pleading or motions before the circuit court that the generalexemption applied. The Department's affirmative defense only raised the specific per se exemptionof section 7(1)(b)(iii).

In Lieber, the court explained that the general exemption of section 7(1)(b) applies "[w]herea public body asserts an exemption for information that is not specifically included on the list andtherefore not exempt per se." Lieber, 176 Ill. 2d at 409. The Lieber court found that the appellatecourt erred in applying a balancing test because the public body only claimed that the informationfell within a specific exemption. Lieber, 176 Ill. 2d at 408. Consistent with that finding, in Gibson,the court determined that the balancing test is appropriate "only where an agency seeking to withholdcertain records cites the general exemption and claims that disclosure of the information containedin the requested documents would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy eventhough the information does not fall within the framework of a specific exemption." Gibson, 289Ill. App. 3d at 20.

In this case, the Department never claimed before the circuit court that the requestedinformation fell within the general exemption or cited the general exemption in its affirmativedefense or motions. The Department also never specifically asked the circuit court to apply thebalancing test. Therefore, we reject the Department's argument that we should remand.

For the reasons previously discussed, the information requested by the Union, was as a matterof law, not exempt from disclosure under the Act. The Union is entitled to summary judgment asa matter of law. Therefore, the trial court properly granted the Union's motion for summaryjudgment and properly denied the Department's motion for summary judgment.

We affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County.

Affirmed.

BUCKLEY and O'BRIEN, JJ., concur.