Catania v. Local 4250/5050 of the Communications Workers

Case Date: 08/17/2005
Court: 1st District Appellate
Docket No: 1-04-1685 Rel

Third Division
Filed: August 17, 2005





 

No. 1-04-1685


 

DOREEN B. CATANIA, f/k/a DOREEN LAUDANI,

                                      Plaintiff-Appellee,

                                      v.

LOCAL 4250/5050 OF THE COMMUNICATIONS WORKERS OF
AMERICA and STEVEN TISZA, individually, and as President of
Local 4250/5050 of the Communications Workers of America,

                                      Defendants-Appellants.

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Appeal from the
Circuit Court of
Cook County.

No. 01 CH 17375



Honorable
Barbara J. Disko,
Judge Presiding.



JUSTICE HOFFMAN delivered the opinion of the court:

Following the termination of her employment, the plaintiff, Doreen Catania, filed a complaint against her employer, Local 4250/5050 of the Communications Workers of America (Local 4250), and Steven Tisza, the president of Local 4250 (referred to collectively as "the defendants"), asserting claims for retaliatory discharge, tortious interference with a contract, and violations of the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act (Wage Payment Act) (820 ILCS 115/1 et seq.) (West 1998). After a jury trial, the trial court entered a judgment on the jury's verdict in favor of the defendants on the retaliatory discharge and tortious interference counts, and against the defendants in the amount of $81,000 on each of the two counts predicated on the Wage Payment Act. Subsequently, the plaintiff was awarded attorneys' fees in the sum of $96,500 and costs in the amount of $942.80. The defendants now appeal from the trial court's orders: denying their post-trial motion seeking a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, in the alternative, a new trial or a remittitur; awarding the plaintiff attorneys' fees and costs; and denying them leave to file a bill of costs with respect to the counts on which they prevailed. For the reasons which follow, we affirm in part, reverse in part, vacate in part, and remand the matter for a new trial.

Due to our ultimate disposition of this case, we need not set forth the facts in great detail. Generally, the plaintiff was hired in 1992 as the office manager for Local 4250, a division of the Communication Workers of America union which represented AT&T employees. According to the plaintiff, she was given the same benefits that union members received under a collective bargaining agreement between Local 4250 and AT&T. During the course of her employment, the plaintiff became privy to certain financial information contained in Local 4250's petty cash account and, in 1996, she accused Tisza of misappropriating funds from that account. The following year, the plaintiff's employment was terminated. She claimed that she was fired because of the accusations that she made against Tisza; whereas, Tisza maintained that her employment was terminated for other work-related reasons. Thereafter, the plaintiff sought certain employment benefits from Local 4250 which she asserted were due to her pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement. Upon the denial of her request for benefits, the plaintiff filed the instant action.

In count I of her complaint, the plaintiff asserted a claim for retaliatory discharge against Local 4250. Count II charged that Local 4250 violated the Wage Payment Act by failing to pay the plaintiff "final compensation" in the amount of $12,652.08. Count III alleged that Tisza, as an agent of Local 4250, was individually liable to the plaintiff for the final compensation that was owed to her because he knowingly permitted Local 4250 to violate the provisions of the Wage Payment Act. Finally, in count IV, the plaintiff charged Tisza with tortious interference with her employment contract.

Following trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendants on counts I and IV, and against the defendants in the amount of $81,000 on each count (counts II and III) predicated on the Wage Payment Act. The trial court entered judgment on the jury's verdict.

The defendants then filed a post-trial motion seeking a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, alternatively, a new trial or a remittitur. With respect to the judgment notwithstanding the verdict, they argued that: there was no credible evidence to support a verdict against them on counts II and III; the jury, by returning verdicts in the amount of $81,000 on each of these counts, essentially allowed the plaintiff to recover "twice for the same wrong"; and the plaintiff failed to prove that Tisza "wilfully" violated the Wage Payment Act. As for their motion for a new trial, the defendants asserted that a new trial was warranted because, inter alia, counts II and III were improperly tried before a jury. The defendants also maintained that the damage award was excessive and that a remittitur should have been entered reducing the award from $81,000 to $0 or from $81,000 to $18,807.04, the amount claimed by the plaintiff at trial. Following arguments, the trial court denied the defendants' post-trial motion.

After the denial of the defendants' post-trial motion, the plaintiff filed a petition for attorneys' fees. The trial court awarded her $96,000 for attorneys' fees and costs in the amount of $942.80. The court also denied the defendants' request for costs for the counts on which they prevailed. This timely appeal followed.

On appeal, the defendants contend that the trial court erred in denying their motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, in the alternative, a new trial or a remittitur. They also argue that the trial court erred in awarding the plaintiff attorneys' fees and costs, and denying them leave to file a bill of costs. For reasons which will become clearer later in this opinion, we first address the defendants' argument raised in their motion for a new trial; namely, that the matter should be remanded for a bench trial because there is no right to a jury trial under the Wage Payment Act.

The Illinois Constitution provides that "[t]he right of trial by jury as heretofore enjoyed shall remain inviolate." Ill. Const. 1970, art. I,