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SECOND DIVISION
September 14, 2004

No. 1-03-0840
 

Plaintiff John Castello appeals from an order of the circuit court grantingdefendant Olga Kalis' motion for summary judgment in plaintiff's negligenceaction against defendants. On appeal, plaintiff contends that the trial courterred in holding that the claims against Kalis⁽¹⁾ were time barred as a matter oflaw under the applicable statute of limitations. For the reasons set forthbelow, we affirm.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

In 1988, Vivianne Castello began receiving routine gynecologic andobstetrical care from Dr. Joseph Capezio, Dr. Robert Turner and the practicegroup of Women's Health Specialists. In January and November 1992, Vivianne'spap smear slides were forwarded to Cytology Unlimited (Cytology) and reported asnormal. Likewise, in September 1993, Vivianne's pap smear slide was forwardedto Cytology, and defendant, a cytotechnologist employed by Cytology, interpretedand reported the slide to be within normal limits. In April 1996, Vivianne hadanother pap smear taken and the slide was again reported by Cytology as normal.

In July 1996, Vivianne experienced bleeding following sexual intercourse. In August, she contacted Women's Health Specialists regarding the bleeding, andexpressed to Drs. Capezio and Turner her concern that the bleeding was indicativeof cervical cancer. Vivianne was repeatedly reassured by her doctors that shewas not a candidate for cervical cancer and that cancer was not the source of herirregular bleeding. By January 1997, Vivianne's symptoms were becoming moresevere, and she was experiencing bleeding with other activities, such as heavylifting. Vivianne complained regularly to Capezio and Turner that she wasconcerned that she might have cervical cancer based on various medical books shehad read regarding abnormal bleeding. Vivianne had another pap smear taken inearly 1997 and Cytology once again reported that the slide was normal. Thephysicians repeatedly told Vivianne to stop worrying about the possibility ofcervical cancer, noting that she was too young for cervical cancer and that herprior pap smears contained normal results.

Finally, Turner recommended that Vivianne undergo a cervical biopsy onFebruary 27, 1997. On March 3, Turner advised Vivianne that the biopsy showedthat she had cervical cancer and he recommended that she see Dr. James Dolan, anoncologist. In response to subsequent interrogatories, Vivianne stated thatMarch 3, 1997, was the date that she "became aware of the alleged malpracticestated in [her] Complaint."

Vivianne followed up with Dr. Dolan the very next day. Dolan told Viviannethat she had a four-centimeter lesion on her cervix, which "[wa]s basically theentire cervix." Dolan informed her that she had a very aggressive, fast-growingcancer, estimated that her life expectancy could be as little as 30 months andquestioned why the biopsy had not been given sooner. Thereafter, Vivianne hadto undergo a radical hysterectomy.

On April 2, 1997, Vivianne requested copies of her entire medical file fromWomen's Health Specialists. Vivianne also requested that Dr. Turner call herregarding a rereading of her previous pap smears. Vivianne subsequently allegedin an eight-page statement dated May 1997 that, when Turner returned hertelephone call on April 2, he told Vivianne's husband, plaintiff John Castello,that another physician, Dr. Taxi, had reviewed one or more of Vivianne's previouspap smear slides and had determined that "[her] previous pap's [sic] showedcancer." In a subsequent deposition, plaintiff corroborated Vivianne's statementconcerning Turner's telephone call.

When Vivianne called the Women's Health Specialists office on April 8,1997, the nurse informed her that there were no written confirmations of Dr.Taxi's alleged findings. When Vivianne arrived at the office later that day toretrieve her medical records, the nurse told Vivianne that she had spoken withDr. Turner and that Turner had denied telling plaintiff that Taxi had reread thepap smear slides. Vivianne was then told that her slides had not been reviewed.

In April 1997, Vivianne and plaintiff retained an attorney. In a laterdiscovery deposition, plaintiff was questioned as to why he and his wife soughtlegal counsel. Plaintiff responded, "[I]t goes back to the slides, that we weretold they were fine and [subsequently] learned that they had cancer on them[.]" On April 22, Vivianne's attorneys requested her pap smear slides from Cytology. Vivianne's January 1992, November 1992, September 1993, April 1996 and January1997 slides were produced by Cytology on April 30, 1997.

In May 1997, Vivianne drafted an eight-page statement regarding her case,in which she stated:

"I feel that [Turner and Capezio] should havetaken me a little more seriously since I had all thewarning signs of Cervical Cancer [sic]. Everything Iread in medical books suggested cervical cancer. *** Icontinually questioned them about the possibility ***but was continually assured that I had nothing to worryabout. They should have done the proper testing such asan earlier pap smear. Due to the controversy about thereliability of pap smears, a biopsy should have beendone at an earlier date ***. *** By their failure todiagnose sooner, I have had to undergo surgery with manyside effects at a young age."

On the Fourth of July weekend in 1997, Vivianne and her family were on vacationwhen Vivianne casually met Dr. Stephen Cruikshank, a gynecologist, who criticizedthe medical care she had received leading up to her diagnosis of cancer. Cruikshank thought that she should have had a biopsy much sooner, and ultimatelytestified as an expert witness at trial.

On April 17, 1998, Vivianne filed a complaint against Turner, Capezio andWomen's Health Specialists, alleging that Turner and Capezio were negligent infailing to properly and thoroughly investigate her repeated complaints of vaginalbleeding from August 1996 to February 1997 and that, as a result of theirnegligence, she suffered "a significant delay in the diagnosis [of] cervicalcancer."

In July 1998, Vivianne traveled, with all of her pap smear slides, toreceive treatment from M.D. Anderson Cancer Center in Houston, Texas. While atthe cancer center, Dr. Ruth Katz, a pathologist, reported to Vivianne that her1996 pap slide showed atypical cells and that the 1997 pap smear slide indicatedcervical cancer. It is unclear from a review of the record whether Vivianne wasgiven any information concerning her 1992 and 1993 pap smear slides. Althoughthe report from the M.D. Anderson Cancer Center shows that the pap smear slidesfrom 1992, 1993, 1996 and 1997 were present and inventoried, under theidentification numbers for the slides from 1992 and 1993, the report contains theinformation "no diagnosis rendered" as to the 1992 and 1993 slides. Also, underthe identification number for the 1993 slide, the report states, "See comment." The comment on the bottom of that page states, "There are a few cells that showfeatures of atypical immature metaplasia."

On October 20, 1998, Vivianne filed a first amended complaint, adding asdefendants Cytology and Dr. Anthony Dombrowski, a pathologist employed byCytology. Vivianne alleged that Dombrowski was negligent in failing to detector diagnose atypical cells in her 1996 pap smear and squamous cells in her 1997pap smear and in incorrectly reporting that the 1996 and 1997 smears were withinnormal limits. On February 17, Vivianne filed a second amended complaint, addingas a defendant Rena Levy, a cytotechnologist employed by Cytology. Viviannealleged that Levy was negligent in failing to detect or diagnose atypical cellsin her 1996 pap smear and in incorrectly classifying the 1996 pap smear as withinnormal limits. Vivianne also alleged that, as a result of Dombrowski and Levy'sactions, she suffered a "significant delay in the diagnosis [of] cervicalcancer."

On November 10, 1999, Vivianne died from cancer. On February 17, 2000, athird amended complaint was filed to reflect Vivianne's death, naming plaintiffas special administrator of her estate and adding claims of wrongful death,survival, and loss of consortium against all defendants.

In June 2000, in an apparent attempt to establish a baseline in preparationfor trial, plaintiff's pathology expert reviewed the 1993 pap smear slide. Theexpert subsequently provided plaintiff's counsel with a report, stating that the1993 slide, among other things, "demonstrated atypical immature metaplasia." OnJuly 12, plaintiff filed a fourth amended complaint, alleging claims of wrongfuldeath, survival, and loss of consortium against defendant, the cytotechnologistwho read and interpreted the 1993 slide. Plaintiff alleged that defendant wasnegligent in, inter alia, failing to identify or appreciate the significance ofatypical immature metaplasia in the 1993 pap smear and in incorrectly classifyingthe smear as within normal limits. Plaintiff further alleged that, as a resultof defendant's negligence, Vivianne suffered "a significant delay in thediagnosis [of] cervical cancer." Plaintiff also alleged that he did not discoverdefendant's negligence until June 2000.

On August 31, 2000, defendant filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff's fourthamended complaint, arguing that the claims against her were time barred by thestatute of limitations. Defendant also argued that plaintiff had failed toallege any facts supporting that the date of discovery of the injury and itswrongful cause was June 20, 2000, or denying that the discovery date could nothave been at an earlier date.

On January 16, 2001, a hearing on defendant's motion to dismiss was heldbefore Judge Philip Bronstein. During the hearing, the following colloquyoccurred:

"MS. KAVENY [Plaintiff's attorney]: *** [I]t wasinconceivable [to Vivianne] that she had had the cancerin 1993, and it had never been diagnosed.

The slide wasn't read in that context.

We were looking at the 1996 slide and the 1997slide because there was a complaint filed against those.

THE COURT: Yes, for all of [the slides].

Did you not receive all of [the slides]?

MS. KAVENY: We did receive all of them.

THE COURT: That was back in 1997.

***

THE COURT: This thing runs indefinitely.

'Well, we looked at the 1997, we asked for all theslides, apparently we only looked at the latest slide.'

Who would do such a thing?

MS. KAVENY: [Y]our Honor, we did first raise thispathology case and first examined the slides and firstsue [sic] people based upon these slides in October of1998.

THE COURT: Right, and you say it was in October*** but that's not what you claim. You claim shedoesn't have knowledge until June of 2000.

All I'm suggesting is that the facts here sayyou're wrong. You didn't plead any earlier date. Itcan't be.

***

You sued Cytology. How could it be that yourcause of action didn't accrue where you asked for theslides, and you actually felt that they were theculpable party.

***

THE COURT: I asked you when you alleged thediscovery rule, and you told me June of 2000.

***

It can't be June, 2000."

Thereafter, the trial court granted plaintiff's motion for leave to file anamended complaint to allege a new discovery date, and, in so doing, did notaddress defendant's argument that plaintiff's claims against her were time barredas a matter of law.

On January 30, 2001, plaintiff filed a fifth amended complaint. Plaintiffalleged that Vivianne first discovered that the 1996 and 1997 pap smear slideshad been incorrectly classified as within normal limits during the week of July13, 1998, and that, on or about June 20, 2000, plaintiff's counsel received awritten expert's report stating that the 1993 pap smear slide exhibited cancerouscells. On February 13, defendant again moved to dismiss plaintiff's complaintbased on the statute of limitations. At a hearing on defendant's motion,plaintiff argued that he "allege[d] several dates [in his complaint] which maytrigger the discovery rule," and that the determination of the discovery date wasa question of fact. On March 26, the trial court (Judge Martin Agran) denieddefendant's motion.

The case was set for trial on January 2, 2003. On November 13, 2002,defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the statute oflimitations barred plaintiff's claims against her because the discovery date, atthe very latest, was some date prior to November 10, 1997, exactly two yearsbefore Vivianne's death. After a hearing on the motion, the trial court (JudgeDavid Lichtenstein) granted defendant's motion. On December 26, plaintiff filedan emergency motion for assignment of the case to a trial judge instanter and fora rehearing on defendant's motion for summary judgment. The motion was enteredand continued for hearing once the case was assigned to a trial judge.

On January 2, 2003, the case was assigned to a trial judge and plaintifffiled a sixth amended complaint to reflect claims dropped against certainsettling defendants. The trial court (Judge James Quinlan), after conducting arehearing on defendant's motion for summary judgment, stated:

"I have come to the conclusion that the statute oflimitations started to run and that the *** decedent ***knew or should have known that--well, she knew she hadcancer definitely on March 3rd, 1997. Is there anydoubt about that? It's sort of uncontested.

And I think that she knew or should have knownthat it was wrongfully caused at some time and maybe atall times between that time and her conversation withDr. Cruikshank in July of that year.

I mean, we've got her statement *** in which sherecites a history of what she knew or what she thought. And we've got her interview or meeting with Cruikshankin July of '97.

So I think the statute started to run no laterthan that meeting with Cruikshank. And therefore, I'mgoing to sustain the [defendant's] motion."

The case then went to trial against the remaining defendants.

This appeal followed.

ANALYSIS

Plaintiff contends that the determination of when the statute oflimitations period commenced for plaintiff's claims against defendant was aquestion of fact, and, as such, the trial court erred in granting defendant'smotion for summary judgment. Plaintiff argues that the trial court's rulinggranting defendant's motion wrongly focused upon Vivianne's discovery of herinjuries arising out of the negligence in 1996 and 1997, and not her discoveryof her injury in 1993. Plaintiff therefore argues that a genuine issue ofmaterial fact existed as to when Vivianne should have known about the 1993 injuryand its wrongful causation, thereby precluding the granting of summary judgment.

Defendant contends that the undisputed facts established, as a matter oflaw, that plaintiff's claims were time barred. Defendant argues that there wasonly one injury here, which was a delay in the diagnosis of cervical cancer, andthat Vivianne knew her injury was wrongfully caused before November 9, 1997, twoyears prior to her death. Defendant further argues that, even though plaintiffcontends that Vivianne did not know that defendant's alleged negligence inreading the 1993 pap smear slide contributed to Vivianne's injury, the term"wrongfully caused" does not include knowledge of a specific defendant's conduct,i.e., defendant's conduct. Defendant maintains that once Vivianne knew that herinjury was wrongfully caused, she had a duty to investigate all possible theoriesof liability which may have flowed from the delay in diagnosing cervical cancer,and that this included a duty to investigate her previous pap smear slides.

Summary judgment is a drastic means of disposing of litigation and, assuch, the right of the moving party to obtain summary judgment must be clear andfree of doubt. Jackson Jordan, Inc. v. Leydig, Voit & Mayer, 158 Ill. 2d 240,249, 633 N.E.2d 627 (1994). Summary judgment "shall be rendered without delayif the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with theaffidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material factand that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." 735ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 2002). In deciding whether a ruling for summary judgmentis appropriate, we construe the record strictly against the movant and liberallyin favor of the nonmoving party. Espinoza v. Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Ry. Co.,165 Ill. 2d 107, 113, 649 N.E.2d 1323 (1995). The trial court's decision togrant a motion for summary judgment is reviewed de novo. Friends of Parks v.Chicago Park District, 203 Ill. 2d 312, 319-20, 786 N.E.2d 161 (2003).

Plaintiff's claims for wrongful death, survival and loss of consortiumagainst defendant will lie only if Vivianne's death occurred prior to theexpiration of the statute of limitations period. See Beetle v. Wal-martAssociates, Inc., 326 Ill. App. 3d 528, 533, 761 N.E.2d 364 (2001) ("Illinoiscourts interpreting the [Wrongful Death] Act have long found that a wrongfuldeath action will lie only where the deceased had a claim that was not time-barred on or before his death"); 735 ILCS 5/13-209(a)(1) (West 2000) (withrespect to survival claims, if a person entitled to bring an action dies beforethe expiration of the statute of limitations for that action, an action may becommenced by the representative before the expiration of that time or within oneyear from the decedent's death, whichever date is the later); 735 ILCS 5/13-203(West 2002) (actions for damages for loss of consortium shall be commenced withinthe same period of time as actions for damages for injury to such other person). Section 13-202 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/13-202(West 2000)), the applicable statute of limitations in this case, states that anaction for damages based on an injury to the person must be commenced within twoyears after the cause of action accrued. 735 ILCS 5/13-202 (West 2002). Thus,as the parties here concede, the question on appeal is whether we can determine,as a matter of law, that the two-year statute of limitations, as applied toVivianne, began to run against defendant before November 10, 1997, exactly twoyears prior to Vivianne's death.

The "discovery rule" applies to section 13-202 of the Code and has theeffect of postponing the commencement of the statute of limitations "until theinjured plaintiff knows or reasonably should know that he has been injured andthat his injury was wrongfully caused." Golla v. General Motors Corp., 167 Ill.2d 353, 360-61, 657 N.E.2d 894 (1995). See also Witherell v. Weimer, 85 Ill. 2d146, 156, 421 N.E.2d 869 (1981); Hoffman v. Orthopedic Systems, Inc., 327 Ill.App. 3d 1004, 1008, 765 N.E.2d 116 (2002); Saunders v. Klungboonkrong, 150 Ill.App. 3d 56, 59 501 N.E.2d 882 (1986). The discovery rule was created toalleviate the harsh consequences that would follow from the general rule that acause of action for personal injuries "accrues" when the plaintiff suffers aninjury. Golla, 167 Ill. 2d at 360. In most instances, the time at which aplaintiff knows or reasonably should have known both of the injury and that itwas wrongfully caused will be a disputed question of fact. Witherell, 85 Ill.2d at 156. However, "[w]here it is apparent from the undisputed facts *** thatonly one conclusion can be drawn, the question becomes one for the court[,]" andcan be resolved as a matter of law, making summary judgment on statute oflimitation grounds appropriate. Witherell, 85 Ill. 2d at 156. See also Hoffman,327 Ill. App. 3d at 1008; Saunders, 150 Ill. App. 3d at 61.

"The phrase 'wrongfully caused' does not mean knowledge of a specificdefendant's negligent conduct or knowledge of the existence of a cause ofaction." (Emphasis added.) Young v. McKiegue, 303 Ill. App. 3d 380, 388, 708N.E.2d 493 (1999). See also Knox College v. Celotex Corp., 88 Ill. 2d 407, 415,430 N.E.2d 976 (1981); Saunders, 150 Ill. App. 3d at 60; Hoffman, 327 Ill. App.3d at 1011. Rather, the term refers to when an injured party "becomes possessedof sufficient information concerning his injury and its cause to put a reasonableperson on inquiry to determine whether actionable conduct is involved." KnoxCollege, 88 Ill. 2d at 416. See also Young, 303 Ill. App. 3d at 388. Statedanother way, "[t]he limitations period begins to run when the plaintiff becomesaware that the cause of his problem stems from another's negligence and not fromnatural causes." Saunders, 150 Ill. App. 3d at 60. The law is well-settled thatonce a party knows or reasonably should know both of his injury and that it waswrongfully caused, "the burden is upon the injured person to inquire further asto the existence of a cause of action." Witherell, 85 Ill. 2d at 156. See alsoKnox College, 88 Ill. 2d at 416; Nolan, 85 Ill. 2d at 171 (stating the aboveproposition and adding that, "once it reasonably appears that an injury waswrongfully caused, the party may not slumber on his rights").

In Wells v. Travis, 284 Ill. App. 3d 282, 672 N.E.2d 789 (1996), thedecedent had been admitted to a hospital on February 7, 1991, after beingreferred by his family physician to Dr. Karim Valika. Wells, 284 Ill. App. 3dat 284. On February 8, Valika diagnosed the decedent as suffering from, amongother things, diabetes mellitus. Wells, 284 Ill. App. 3d at 284. The decedentdied in the hospital on February 10 from "multiple complications." Wells, 284Ill. App. 3d at 284. The plaintiff filed an action for medical negligenceagainst the decedent's family physician on February 3, 1993, alleging that he wasnegligent in "fail[ing] to diagnose and treat diabetes mellitus that resulted indecedent's death." Wells, 284 Ill. App. 3d at 284. Attached to the plaintiff'scomplaint was a written health professional's report, dated August 21, 1992,which indicated that the plaintiff's expert had reviewed the decedent's treatmentrecords " 'from 1983 through the time of his death, including his stay in ***[the] [h]ospital[,]' " and criticized the family physician's departure from goodmedical care in failing to diagnose the decedent before his hospitalization onFebruary 7, 1991. Wells, 284 Ill. App. 3d at 284. The report also stated thatthere was no malpractice involved in the decedent's care "once he was admittedto the hospital since he [had] developed complications that [could have]occur[red] despite the best of treatment [at the hospital]." Wells, 284 Ill.App. 3d at 284.

In depositions taken on December 22 and 24, 1994, the family physician'sdefense experts each criticized the medical care rendered by Valika, claimingthat he had deviated from the standard of care in his treatment of the decedentwhile at the hospital. Wells, 284 Ill. App. 3d at 285. Following thedepositions, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint on January 19, 1995, addingValika as a defendant and alleging that the dates of the December 1994depositions were the first dates that she knew or reasonably should have knownthat Valika wrongfully caused the decedent's death. Wells, 284 Ill. App. 3d at285. Thereafter, Valika filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the applicabletwo-year statute of limitations barred the plaintiff's claim, which the trialcourt granted. Wells, 284 Ill. App. 3d at 284.

On appeal, the plaintiff argued that she had no reason to know of her claimagainst Valika before the December 1994 depositions, particularly in view of theexpert's report, which exonerated all personnel who treated the decedent in thehospital, including Valika. Wells, 284 Ill. App. 3d at 286. Thus, the plaintiffcontended that her complaint was timely filed within two years of the December1994 depositions. Wells, 284 Ill. App. 3d at 286. The Wells court affirmed thetrial court's dismissal of the plaintiff's claim against Valika, stating:

"The essence of plaintiff's position is that aperson is not charged with knowledge sufficient totrigger the running of the limitations period as to anyparticular defendant until the person knows orreasonably should know that the injury was wrongfullycaused by the negligence of that defendant. The supremecourt has expressly disavowed any such interpretation ofthe discovery rule[.] ***

Knowledge that an injury has been 'wrongfullycaused' does not mean knowledge of a specificdefendant's negligent conduct. [Citations.] We believethat the rejection of this fundamental principle, asurged by plaintiff ***, would represent an unwarranteddeparture from existing precedent.

The injury complained of in this case is the deathof decedent. It is evident that plaintiff had reason toknow of the death and that actionable conduct might beinvolved when plaintiff received the August 21, 1992,report of [the expert] implicating [the familyphysician] and, after reviewing records of decedent'shospital treatment, exculpating Valika as a negligentparty. As a matter of law, therefore, the limitationsperiod commenced on that date. ***

***

[P]laintiff cannot be heard to argue that she didnot possess sufficient knowledge on August 21, 1992,concerning the death and its cause to put a reasonableperson on inquiry to determine whether actionableconduct was involved, when it is undisputed that she wasin possession of the report of her own expert concludingthat the conduct of [the family physician] departed fromacceptable medical standards. *** [S]uch knowledge must*** be presumed from plaintiff's awareness of her ***expert's report criticizing departures from the properstandard of medical care, regardless of whom the expertidentified as a responsible party. The plaintiff hadtwo years from the date of her expert's report toconduct her inquiry to determine whether, and againstwhom, a lawsuit could be filed. If plaintiff wasunsatisfied that [the expert] had correctly identifiedall persons responsible for the alleged malpractice, shehad two years to conduct further inquiry or to consultany other expert." Wells, 284 Ill. App. 3d at 287-89.

In Hoffman, the plaintiff underwent back surgery on September 27, 1995,after being told that the procedure was to be "fairly simple." Hoffman, 327 Ill.App. 3d at 1006. When the plaintiff awoke after the surgery, she was told that" 'everything that could go wrong went wrong' " and that she had liver failure,kidney failure, gastrointestinal bleeding, pneumonia, a heart arrhythmia andsepticemia. Hoffman, 327 Ill. App. 3d at 1006. When the plaintiff asked for anexplanation as to her condition, she was given " 'a different story fromeverybody.' " Hoffman, 327 Ill. App. 3d at 1007. Approximately four to sixmonths after her surgery, the plaintiff asked her attorney to investigate whetherthere was "any doctor malpractice" involved in the surgery. Hoffman, 327 Ill.App. 3d at 1007.

On April 23, 1998, the plaintiff returned to the same hospital for kneesurgery and was told by her anesthesiologist that an internal hospitalinvestigation had been conducted regarding her September 27 surgery and theinvestigation found that the operating table upon which she had been positionedcaused the complications during her 1995 surgery. Hoffman, 327 Ill. App. 3d at1007. The plaintiff, after learning that her injuries were caused by theoperating table, filed a lawsuit on May 7, 1998, against the manufacturer of thetable, alleging that the table was not reasonably safe in design or manufacture,and the surgeon and the hospital, alleging that they both failed to properlyposition and monitor her on the table. Hoffman, 327 Ill. App. 3d at 1008.

On November 22, 2000, the manufacturer of the operating table filed amotion for summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiff's action was time-barred,which the trial court granted, finding that "the lawsuit was filed beyond theapplicable [two-year] statute of limitations." Hoffman, 327 Ill. App. 3d at1008. The plaintiff appealed, arguing that summary judgment was improper becausethe statute did not begin to run until the "claimant [wa]s aware of the injuryand its source" and a genuine issue of material fact existed as to when she knewor should have known that her injury was wrongfully caused. Hoffman, 327 Ill.App. 3d at 1008.

On appeal, the Hoffman court stated:

"[For purposes of commencing the statute oflimitations period, the plaintiff's] own reportedconversations with medical personnel and her retentionof an attorney to investigate demonstrated that she knewshe had suffered an injury and that the injury may havebeen wrongfully caused. *** Although her suspicion ofwrongful causation was limited to an investigation as towhether medical malpractice was committed, rather thanwhether a product liability action existed, as the caseshold, the term, 'wrongfully caused,' does not meanknowledge by plaintiff of a specific defendant'snegligent act ***. ***

Plaintiff's failure to pursue a more thoroughinquiry to find the cause of her injuries does notexcuse her from failing to comply with the statute oflimitations." Hoffman, 327 Ill. App. 3d at 1010-11.

Thus, although never expressly specifying an exact date, the Hoffman court foundthat, when considering the circumstances surrounding the plaintiff's surgery, hersubsequent conversations and the retention of an attorney, the statute oflimitations commenced, at the very latest, six months after her 1995 operation. Accordingly, the Hoffman court held that the trial court did not err in grantingthe manufacturer's motion for summary judgment.

In the instant case, the injury complained of was "a significant delay inthe diagnosis [of] cervical cancer," which resulted in Vivianne having a four-centimeter lesion on her cervix, necessitated a radical hysterectomy andultimately resulted in Vivianne's death. The undisputed facts show that Viviannereceived several pap smears during the course of her treatment at Women's HealthSpecialists and that each of the pap smear slides were reported as within normallimits, even though Vivianne began experiencing bleeding in July 1996. By late1996, Vivianne was experiencing severe bleeding, complained regularly to herdoctors and repeatedly expressed her fears that the bleeding was indicative ofcervical cancer, yet Vivianne's doctors and pap smear results continued tocontradict her symptoms and fears. The record further shows that, as late as thebeginning of 1997,⁽²⁾ Vivianne had another pap smear taken, which was reportedagain as within the normal limits. Then, after her February 1997 biopsy,Vivianne was told on March 3, 1997, that she had cervical cancer, and, on thefollowing day, she was told that she had a four-centimeter lesion on "basicallythe entire cervix" and that, due to her advanced state of cervical cancer, herlife expectancy could be as little as 30 months. There can be little doubt that,at this time, Vivianne knew, or reasonably should have known, that she hadsuffered an injury and that this injury was wrongfully caused. Moreover,Vivianne's interrogatories reveal that Vivianne knew, subjectively, on March 3that she had suffered an injury and that the injury was wrongfully caused becauseVivianne stated that March 3 was the date that she "became aware of the allegedmalpractice stated in the complaint."

Further, a review of the record reveals that, by November 9, 1997 (theagreed last date for when the statute of limitations could have begun to runregarding plaintiff's claims), Vivianne had requested her entire medical filefrom Women's Health Specialists. Additionally, Vivianne contended that plaintiffhad spoken to Dr. Turner over the telephone during which Turner admitted that the"previous pap's [sic] showed cancer." Thereafter, Vivianne and plaintiffretained an attorney, and plaintiff, when asked in a deposition why he andVivianne sought an attorney, responded that "it [went] back to the slides, thatwe were told that they were fine and [later] learned that they had cancer onthem." Also, Vivianne's attorney had requested and received all of the pap smearslides from Cytology; Vivianne had written an eight-page statement criticizingthe conduct of Drs. Capezio and Turner and acknowledging "the controversy aboutthe reliability of pap smears"; and Vivianne had spoken to Dr. Cruikshank, duringwhich Cruikshank criticized the medical care she had received leading up to herdiagnosis of cancer.

Like the plaintiff in Wells, the essence of plaintiff's position here isthat Vivianne should not have been charged with knowledge sufficient to triggerthe running of the limitations period as to any particular defendant until sheknew or reasonably should have known that her injury was wrongfully caused bythat defendant. As stated in Wells, our supreme court has expressly disavowedany such interpretation of the discovery rule. Similar to the plaintiff inWells, plaintiff here cannot be heard to argue that Vivianne did not possesssufficient knowledge by November 9, 1997, concerning her injury and its cause toput a reasonable person on inquiry to determine whether actionable conduct wasinvolved in light of the fact that it is undisputed as to how the above eventsunfolded. Such knowledge must be presumed from the timing and facts surroundingVivianne's diagnosis of cervical cancer on March 3, 1997, her statementacknowledging her awareness on March 3 of alleged malpractice, her statementsclaiming that Dr. Turner told her husband that the previous pap smear slidesshowed cancer, her requests for her medical files and pap smear slides, herretention of an attorney and her statement concerning the reliability of papsmear slides. Like the Wells court, we find that this knowledge must be presumedregardless of whom Vivianne identified as the responsible party. Like theplaintiff in Wells, if Vivianne had not been satisfied that all persons had beencorrectly identified as contributing to her injury, she had two years to conductfurther inquiry as to the sources of her injury.

Additionally, we find that, even if Vivianne's initial inquiry was limitedto an investigation of wrongful conduct by Drs. Turner and Capezio, rather thanan investigation into the results of the pap smear slides, as Illinois caseshold, the term "wrongfully caused" does not mean knowledge by a plaintiff of aspecific defendant's negligent act. Vivianne's failure to pursue a more thoroughinquiry to find the cause of her injury, like the plaintiff in Hoffman, does notexcuse her failure to comply with the statute of limitations. See Hoffman, 327Ill. App. 3d at 1011. Thus, we conclude that, as a matter of law, the statuteof limitations began to run by November 9, 1997, because, at this point, Vivianneknew or should have reasonably known that she suffered an injury and that theinjury was wrongfully caused. Stated another way, the limitations period beganto run, as a matter of law, by November 9 because Vivianne was aware by that datethat the cause of her problems stemmed from another's negligence and not fromnatural causes. Thus, by November 9, Vivianne had the burden to inquire furtheras to the existence of her cause of action. The two-year statute of limitationsexpired by November 10, 1999, and plaintiff did not file his claims againstdefendant until July 12, 2000. Accordingly, we find that plaintiff's claims werebarred by the statute of limitations, and, therefore, that the trial courtproperly granted defendant's motion for summary judgment.

We briefly note that plaintiff devotes a significant portion of hisargument to contrasting situations in which there was a sudden traumatic eventcausing an injury with situations in which there was an aggravation of a physicalproblem, which may naturally develop absent negligent causes, and maintains thatHoffman is distinguishable because that case involved a sudden traumatic event. Plaintiff argues that, because Vivianne's injury was an aggravation of a physicalproblem which may have naturally developed absent negligent causes, she shouldnot have been expected to immediately know of either its existence or itspotential wrongful cause.

Contrary to plaintiff's argument, the mere fact that the injury in Hoffmancould have been classified as a sudden traumatic event does not mean that thereasoning in Hoffman does not apply in our case. As the court stated in Clarkv. Galen Hospital Illinois, Inc., 322 Ill. App. 3d 64, 748 N.E.2d 1238 (2001),

"the classification of an injury as traumatic ornontraumatic, alone, is of no significance. [Citations.] The only benefit to be derived from such aclassification would be in determining when theplaintiff discovered, or should have discovered, thatthe injury was caused by wrongful conduct. [Citations.]The more obvious the injury, the more easily a plaintiffshould be able to determine its cause." Clark, 322 Ill.App. 3d at 72.

See also Pszenny v. General Electric Co., 132 Ill. App. 3d 964, 966, 478 N.E.2d485 (1985) (stating that "[t]he classification of an injury as 'traumatic' or'nontraumatic' merely aids in the determination of when the plaintiff discovered,or should have discovered, that the injury was caused by the wrongful conduct ofa defendant"). Thus, regardless of how Vivianne's injury is classified here,such an obvious injury--being told of a four-centimeter lesion and thepossibility of having as little as 30 months to live after being told recentlyand repeatedly that there was no possibility of cervical cancer--makes it easierto determine that by November 9, 1997, at the very latest, Vivianne knew, orreasonably should have known, that her injury was wrongfully caused.

We also note that, during oral argument, plaintiff argued that ourdecisions in Young and Clark, are controlling in the instant case and impliedthat a finding for defendant here would be inconsistent with that precedent. However, we find no inconsistencies between Young and Clark and the instant case. In Young, the decedent, who was suffering from pneumonia, had been hospitalizedfor 10 days and died purportedly due to complications from pneumonia on September4, 1993. Young, 303 Ill. App. 3d at 382-83. Subsequent to the decedent's death,the plaintiff, the decedent's wife, ordered an autopsy because she " 'suspected[that] inappropriate medical care may have contributed to [her husband's] death.'" Young, 303 Ill. App. 3d at 383. The autopsy reported that the cause of thedecedent's death was pulmonary edema brought about by pneumonia (Young, 303 Ill.App. 3d at 383), thereby suggesting that the death was from natural causes. Theplaintiff subsequently contacted her attorney and then requested a copy of themedical records on October 20, 1993. Young, 303 Ill. App. 3d at 384. InDecember 1993, the plaintiff received the medical records and retained herattorney. Young, 303 Ill. App. 3d at 384. The plaintiff's attorney sent themedical records to two medical experts. Young, 303 Ill. App. 3d at 384. On orabout August 17, 1994, the plaintiff's attorney received the first physician'swritten report, which concluded that "the physicians caring for [the decedent]deviated from the standard of care by not recognizing that his increasingrespiratory distress *** was in nature." Young, 303 Ill. App. 3d at 384.

On March 3, 1995, the plaintiff filed a wrongful death action against thehospital and several of its doctors based on medical malpractice. Young, 303Ill. App. 3d at 385. The plaintiff later filed amended complaints on July 24 andNovember 6, 1996, and February 13, 1997, adding as defendants two otherphysicians and their employer (collectively "the defendants"). In consolidatedmotions, the defendants filed motions to dismiss the claims against them basedon the two-year statute of limitations applicable to medical malpractice actions,which the trial court granted. Young, 303 Ill. App. 3d at 385. The plaintiffappealed, and the defendants argued that the plaintiff knew or should have knownthat her husband's death was wrongfully caused in December 1993 when, after beingsuspicious of the care given to her husband, she received the hospital's medicalrecords and retained a lawyer for purposes of investigating a lawsuit. Young,303 Ill. App. 3d at 388. The defendants also argued alternatively that theplaintiff knew or should have known her husband's death was wrongfully caused inAugust of 1994 when her lawyer received the first physician's written report. Young, 303 Ill. App. 3d at 389.

The Young court held that the plaintiff knew or should have known that herhusband's death was wrongfully caused no later than August 17, 1994, when herattorney received the first physician's written report, which clearly stated thatthe physicians caring for the decedent deviated from the standard of care. Young, 303 Ill. App. 3d at 389. Thus, the court held that, as a matter of law,the two-year statute of limitations commenced to run no later than when the firstexpert physician's report was received on August 17, 1994. Young, 303 Ill. App.3d at 389. Accordingly, the Young court dismissed the plaintiff's claims againstthe defendants who were added as parties on November 6, 1996, and February 13,1997. After dismissing these two defendants, the Young court then addressedwhether it could determine, as a matter of law, that the plaintiff knew or shouldhave known that her husband's death was "wrongfully caused" before August 17,1994, for purposes of determining whether the claims against the defendant addedon July 24, 1996, could be dismissed based on the statute of limitations. Young,303 Ill. App. 3d at 390. The Young court found that even if the plaintiff"suspected" that the decedent may have received inappropriate medical care,retrieved the medical files from the hospital and retained an attorney, it couldnot say as a matter of law that the statute of limitations began to run at thatpoint; the plaintiff had also been told that the decedent had died fromcomplications from pneumonia, i.e., natural causes, and an autopsy report hadconfirmed this. Young, 303 Ill. App. 3d at 383, 390. Thus, the Young courtconcluded that an issue of fact still remained as to whether the plaintiffpossessed the requisite knowledge that the injury was "wrongfully caused" beforeshe received the physician's report on August 17, 1994. Young, 303 Ill. App. 3dat 390.

The facts of Young are distinguishable from the facts of the instant case. In Young, although the plaintiff knew that she had suffered an injury (thedecedent's death), it could not be stated that, as a matter of law, she knew orshould have reasonably known that the injury was wrongfully caused because thedecedent was reported to have died merely from complications from pneumonia andthe plaintiff only "suspected" that the decedent may have received inappropriatecare. In the instant case, as stated above, there can be no doubt that whenplaintiff was told she had a four-centimeter lesion and as little as 30 monthsto live, after being told less than two months earlier that she had nothing toworry about, she knew or reasonably should have known that she suffered an injuryand that the injury was wrongfully caused.

Clark is similarly distinguishable, i.e., the plaintiff was told that herbaby died from natural causes. More specifically, in Clark, the court found thatit was reasonable for the plaintiff mother to originally believe that the injury,her premature baby's death at the hospital, was due to nonnegligent causes,especially since she was told that her child died due to complications from itspremature status. Thus, the Clark court could not find, as a matter of law, thatthe statute of limitations began to run on the date of the child's death. Clark,322 Ill. App. 3d at 66.

Lastly, we note that plaintiff here asks us to focus not on "Vivianne['s]discovery of her injuries arising out of the negligence in 1996 and 1997," but,rather, to focus on the discovery of "her injuries suffered in 1993." Plaintiffargues that there were separate and distinct injuries in the instant case. However, plaintiff has cited no case law, nor has our research revealed any, thatsupports such an argument as it relates to the facts of this case. Like theWells court, we believe that accepting plaintiff's argument would require us toreject the fundamental principle that knowledge that an injury has been"wrongfully caused" does not mean knowledge of a specific defendant's negligentconduct, and would represent an unwarranted departure from existing precedent.

Moreover, we believe plaintiff's argument, that the 1993 injury wasseparate and distinct from the injuries that occurred in 1996 and 1997, isflawed. Notwithstanding plaintiff's arguments to the contrary, there was but oneinjury--a delay in the diagnosis of cervical cancer--which ultimately resultedin Vivianne's death. When plaintiff asks us to consider the alleged misreadingof the 1993 pap smear as a separate and distinct event from the events in 1996and 1997, plaintiff mistakenly focuses, not on the injury here, but on theseparate acts of negligence that ultimately contributed, in one way or another,to Vivianne's injury. However, for purposes of determining when the statute oflimitations period commenced, we are not concerned with the separate acts ofnegligence leading up to a plaintiff's injury, or to when those acts ofnegligence occurred, but, rather, are concerned with plaintiff's injury and whenplaintiff learned that the injury was wrongfully caused. See Turner v. Nama, 294Ill. App. 3d 19, 25, 689 N.E.2d 303 (1997) ("the distinction between the [statuteof] repose period and the [statute of] limitations period is that the reposeperiod is triggered by defendant's wrongful act or omission that causes theinjury whereas the limitations period is triggered by the patient's discovery ofthe injury" (emphasis added)).

In summary, because the undisputed facts in the instant case show that thestatute of limitations period commenced, at the very latest, by November 9, 1997,the two-year statute of limitations expired by November 10, 1999, and plaintiffdid not file his claims against defendant until July 12, 2000, we find that thetrial court did not err in granting defendant's motion for summary judgment sinceno genuine issue of material fact existed precluding summary judgment. SeeWitherell, 85 Ill. 2d at 156 ("Where it is apparent from the undisputed facts ***that only one conclusion can be drawn, the question becomes one for the court[,]"making summary judgment on the statute of limitations grounds appropriate).

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of CookCounty.

Affirmed.

CAHILL and WOLFSON, JJ., concur.

1. Kalis is the only defendant who is a party to this appeal and isidentified hereinafter as defendant.

2. The record does not include the exact date of this pap smear.