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THIRD DIVISION
October 24, 2001

On the afternoon of December 14, 1993, Lydia Carillo was stopped at a red light in Hammond, Indiana. She was in a 1991Ford Explorer. A car being driven by Kevin Gaczkowski at about60 miles per hour plowed into the rear of the Explorer. Theforce of the impact caused Lydia's seatback to flatten. She wasthrown into the rear seat of the car, fracturing two vertebrae inher back. She is paralyzed from the chest down as a result ofthe injuries she sustained in the accident.

Lydia and her husband, Angelo, filed suit against the Ford Motor Company and Gaczkowski. Their product liability claimagainst Ford alleged that the design of the Explorer's seat wasunreasonably dangerous. They alleged the seat was not strongenough to withstand the force of the collision, causing theseatback to collapse at impact, in turn causing Lydia's injuries. Their suit against Gaczkowski sounded in negligence. He was heldin default before trial. The jury returned a verdict againstFord. It awarded Lydia $14 million in damages. Angelo wasawarded $500,000 in damages on his loss of consortium claim. Thetrial court entered judgment on the verdicts.

Ford raises several issues on appeal, including the trial court's rulings excluding some of Ford's evidence, but it aimsits heaviest guns at a pattern jury instruction the court refused to give.

We affirm the trial court's judgment.

FACTS

The three-week trial in this case included testimony fromnumerous lay and expert witnesses. Neither party disputes thefacts surrounding the accident itself or the extent of Lydia'sinjuries. The heart of the dispute in this case is found in theexpert testimony offered by each side. Ford's contentions didnot focus on whether Lydia was injured to the extent she claimedor the facts of the accident itself -- it disputed the theoriesoffered by her experts, who said her injuries were caused by theunreasonably dangerous design of the Explorer seatback.

Plaintiffs' experts said the seatback design wasunreasonably dangerous in rear-impact collisions in which a highrate of force acts on the seat as a result of the impact.

Doctor Joseph Burton, the first of plaintiffs' experts totestify, was the chief medical examiner for DeKalb County,Georgia. He was an accident reconstruction specialist. Dr.Burton testified that when Gaczkowski hit the Explorer, Lydia'scar was pushed into the car in front of her. The right side ofLydia's car rotated and hit the back of another car. The carsLydia hit were pushed into other cars in front of them. Lydiawas driving the Explorer and her son, Anthony, was in thepassenger seat. Both seats were in a reclined position after theaccident. Lydia's body was stretched across her seat, and herfeet were around the steering wheel or dash board. Anthony wasfound on the front floorboard. Lydia's and Anthony's seat beltswere still buckled.

According to Dr. Burton, it would take somewhere between1,000 and 2,000 pounds of compressive force to break thevertebrae that Lydia broke during the accident. Dr. Burtondiscussed the role that the reclined seatback played in causingLydia's injuries. When her seatback reclined, Lydia was pushedup the seatback. Lydia's shoulder was driven into the rear seat,resulting in her injuries.

Dr. Burton identified this type of movement as "ramping." Seats can be designed to minimize or prevent "ramping." Thecontour of the seat could be changed, the seat could be made froma different material, the angle or inclination of the seat couldbe changed, and restraints could be used to prevent this type ofmovement in rear-impact collisions. The force with which theExplorer was hit caused Lydia to have injuries that others mightnot have in similar, but less forceful, rear impact accidents.

Dr. Burton described the goals of a seat and seatback inrear end collisions as "part of the safety package to protect theindividual." Lydia's seat "did not do what the seat would beexpected to do" to prevent her from sustaining an injury. Thetype of collision involved in this case was reasonablyforeseeable.

Sterling Gee testified he worked for Visteon Automotive, adivision of Ford. Gee was responsible, in part, for the designof the seatback in the Explorer model Lydia was driving at thetime of the accident. Gee testified the seatback strength forthat model Explorer was tested to make sure it complied withgovernment standards. Ford's policy included testing it at aforce 30 percent above what the government required. The seatwas tested using a "static pull" test.

Gee testified the yielding seat design used in the Explorerwas meant to absorb some of the force from an impact if anaccident occurred. Gee said a rigid seat would transfer all ofthe energy of an impact to the occupant.

Robert Mezzadri testified he was a seat system technicalspecialist for Ford. He worked for Ford for 31 years. Themajority of his work was in the area of seat design or seatsystem design. The seat that was in the 1991 Ford Explorer was aseat that was designed for the 1989 Ford Ranger. The "seatcushion pan" was the same in that design as it was in the designfor the Ford Aerostar. The seatback strength for the Aerostarwas similar to that of the Explorer. The differences between thetwo were primarily stylistic. Mezzadri discussed the design ofthe seat in detail. Mezzadri also was asked about the standardtests run on the Explorer seat. He said the seat had been testedup to a 400 pound load. This exceeded Federal standards forperformance.

Mezzadri testified it was possible to design a seat in 1991that would deform less than the Explorer seat did in a rear-impact collision. He agreed that a seatback was part of therestraint system in a rear collision.

Doctor Kenneth Saczalski testified he had a doctorate inengineering mechanics. His work experience included researchthat allowed him to gain an understanding as to how humansrespond to impact loads. He also had done a number of studiesfocused on injury tolerance levels. Dr. Saczalski prepared anaccident reconstruction of the collision that resulted in Lydia'sinjuries.

Dr. Saczalski determined that when Lydia's Explorer was hitfrom the rear by Gaczkowski's car, the Explorer was shovedforward into the car in front of it at about 30 miles per hour. According to Dr. Saczalski, Gaczkowski's car was moving at about58 to 60 miles per hour when it hit the Explorer. About 20 g'sof force were exerted on the Explorer in the collision. Based ontests carried out on a seat similar to the one that was inLydia's Explorer, her seat could carry only about 7 g's of loadforce before it collapsed rearward. This means the seatcollapsed before the Explorer had reached its top speed after thecollision. Though Lydia was in a "normal seated position" beforethe impact occurred, once the seat collapsed after the impact,Lydia "was laying there exposed to any shoving or intrusion thatwould take place."

Dr. Saczalski said he also tested a Chrysler Sebring seat. That seat had an integrated seat belt. The 1991 Explorer seatbelt was not integrated. The Sebring seat could withstand ahigher force load than the Explorer seat. Based on the tests heperformed, Dr. Saczalski felt Lydia would have been safe in aseat like the Sebring seat. There was nothing about thetechnology of the Chrysler seat that would not have made itfeasible for the design of the 1991 Explorer.

Dr. Saczalski said Lydia's seat did not perform well. TheExplorer seat was not safe because it lacked sufficient strengthand height. The seat left Lydia "vulnerable in a very low loadsituation to a foreseeable crash event." Dr. Saczalski testifiedabout a number of crash tests that exemplified this weakness inthe Explorer seat. He described two tests he performed for othercases. Those tests showed the stronger seat performed better inaccidents like Lydia's. He did not believe the Federal standardfor seat loads provided a sufficient level of safety. There wereseat designs in existence at the time that Lydia's Explorer wasbeing produced that would have protected Lydia. He identified aBMW seat, a Mercedes seat, and the Sebring seat.

Ford's experts told the jury that yielding seats, like theExplorer's, were reasonably safe. They said they believedyielding seats prevented injuries in the majority of accidents. They claimed accidents like Lydia's are rare; if they designedseats to perform safely in accidents like Lydia's, safety wouldbe compromised in the majority of rear-impact collisions whichoccur at a lower rate of force.

Philip Majka testified he was an independent automotiveconsultant who does research on accidents. He was employed byFord as a product development engineer for 30 years before heretired in 1998. Majka described how a seat was designed forFord. Majka discussed the evolution of seat design. Majka saidthe 1991 Explorer seat was primarily based on the Escort seat. Some components also were used in the Aerostar and Ranger.

Majka discussed yielding and rigid seats. The Explorer seatwas a yielding seat. The advantage of a yielding seat is itabsorbs some of the energy in an impact. He was aware of onlytwo cars in production in 1991 that had a seat as stiff as Dr.Saczalski recommended. Ford seats generally are two to threetimes stiffer than the Federal requirement.

Majka said he did not believe it would be safe to use a seatas stiff as Saczalski recommended because if the occupant wereout of position in the seat, the seat could cause seriousinjuries. The stiffer seat would cause more "rebound" in itsoccupants in the case of a rear-impact collision. The yieldingseat would provide the greatest benefits for the majority ofpeople.

Andrew Levitt testified he was a research engineer withCollision Research & Analysis, Inc. in California. CollisionResearch analyzes automobile accidents. He discussed theevolution of seat design. Researchers found rigid seats have atendency to store energy, which he identified as problematic. Hebelieved the yielding seat performed well, particularly whencoupled with a seat belt, and that there was a very low incidenceof injury with those seats.

Levitt discussed the static pull test of the Explorer seat. The seat did not yield until it reached 800 pounds of force. Levitt said 99.9 percent of the vehicles on the road in 1991 hadseats with the same strength range as the Explorer.

Carl Savage testified he was a consulting engineer whofocused on vehicle crashworthiness. Savage described componentsof the Explorer seat. Statistically speaking, a person's chancesof being in an accident as severe as Lydia's were very slim. Savage described how the Explorer seat would respond in a rear-impact collision. In order for the Explorer seat to have stayedupright in Lydia's accident, it would have had to have been"extremely stiff."

Doctor Priyanvanjan Prasad testified he was a safetyengineer with Ford's Advanced Vehicle Technology Department. Hisdepartment was responsible for advanced safety research anddevelopment. This group developed the acceptance criteria forsafety tests and determined how components "should behave duringa crash." His educational background and training included anemphasis on head and spinal injuries.

Dr. Prasad said he had conducted sled tests with stiffened,rigid and yielding seats. He ran those tests with crash testdummies in both normal positions and "out of position." He foundthe rigid seats and stiffer seats increased the "loading" in theneck of the dummies. This meant that an increase in seatrigidity would result in a higher number of whiplash injuries. He also found that the "shear forces" in the lumbar spine wouldincrease with the more rigid seats. The more rigid seats couldresult in a higher number of fractured vertebrae in the base ofthe neck. These injuries could occur at lower speeds, accordingto Dr. Prasad, and could therefore become more common in carswith more rigid seats.

The jury was shown a video of a sled test performed by Dr.Prasad that showed how a crash test dummy performed in a rigidseat when the dummy was out of the ideal sitting position. Thetest was run at 15 miles per hour. Dr. Prasad said that testshowed that when the dummies were out of position, the loads ontheir necks were always higher in the more rigid seat. In rigidseats there is a danger of "rebounding" in rear-impact collisionsso that the occupant could spring forward and hit the roof, thesteering system, or the instrument panel. A yielding seat likethe Explorer's protects against these injuries by absorbingenergy. Dr. Prasad also discussed a video showing a sled testwith a yielding seat. In severe rear-impact collisions, a seatlike the Explorer's would yield. The incidence of rear impactfatality is very low in cars with seats like the Explorer's. Hebelieved the Explorer seat was reasonably safe.

Ford rested after Dr. Prasad testified. However, as anoffer of proof Ford called Roger Burnett to testify to a sledtest that the court would not allow in evidence. Burnett was adesign analysis engineer for Ford. Burnett testified heconducted a sled test with a Sebring driver seat in an Explorerbody. The sled test was done after Ford carried out the crashtest for this case.

Burnett said they used a crash test dummy in the test thatwas as close to Lydia's height and weight as possible. TheSebring seat was strengthened so that it was stronger than itnormally would be. Burnett said the neck loads experienced bythe dummy exceeded the "injury criteria."

Ford completed the offer of proof by saying it would havecalled Dr. Harry Smith as a witness. Dr. Smith would havetestified he reviewed the results of the sled test discussed byBurnett. Dr. Smith would have said using a seat like the Sebringseat would cause neck injuries to an occupant in a collision likethe one in this case.

At Ford's request, the court submitted a specialinterrogatory to the jury: "Was the seat design on the 1991Explorer unreasonably dangerous?" During deliberations, the jurysent out a question: was it to consider whether all 1991Explorers had an unreasonably dangerous condition or was it toconsider only whether Lydia's Explorer was unreasonablydangerous? The court answered the question by saying the juryhad received its instructions and to continue to deliberate.

The jury decided in plaintiffs' favor. In answer to thespecial interrogatory, it said the seat design was unreasonablydangerous. The jury awarded Lydia $14 million, and found Fordwas 30 percent liable and Gaczkowski was 70 percent liable. After some confusion about its verdicts, the jury found forAngelo and against Ford. It awarded Angelo $500,000 in damagesand found Ford 30 percent liable and Gaczkowski 70 percentliable.

Ford filed a post-trial motion, which the trial courtdenied.

DECISION

Jury Instructions

IPI Civil No. 400.07

Ford contends the jury did not receive adequate instructions on the issue of defective design. It does not complain about the instructions that were given. It claims the trial court's refusal to give the jury Illinois Pattern Jury Instruction,Civil, No. 400.07 (2000 ed.)(hereinafter IPI Civil No. 400.07)imposed on Ford an incorrect standard of absolute safety, thusmaking the instructions that were given incomplete andmisleading.

The jury received Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Civil,Nos. 400.01 and 400.06 (2000 ed.)(hereinafter IPI Civil Nos.400.01 and 400.06). That is,

"In their complaint against Ford Motor Company, theplaintiffs claim Lydia Carillo was injured when using the1991 Explorer vehicle and that there existed in the vehicleat the time it left the control of defendant *** a conditionwhich made the vehicle unreasonably dangerous in thefollowing respect: The driver's seat was designed withinadequate strength.

***

Under Count I plaintiffs have the burden of provingeach of the following propositions:

First, that the condition claimed by theplaintiffs as stated to you in these instructionsexisted in the vehicle.

Second, that the condition made the vehicleunreasonably dangerous.

Third, that the condition existed at the time thevehicle left the control of the defendant.

Fourth, that the plaintiffs were injured.

Fifth, that the condition of the vehicle was aproximate cause of plaintiffs' injuries.

***

When I use the expression 'unreasonably dangerous' Imean unsafe when put to a use that is reasonably foreseeableconsidering the nature and function of the vehicle." IPICivil Nos. 400.01 and 400.06.

The trial court refused Ford's request to tell the jury: "Itis the duty of an automobile manufacturer to furnish a productwhich is in a reasonably safe condition when put to a use thatwas reasonably foreseeable considering its nature and intendedfunction." IPI Civil No. 400.07.

Ford's primary complaint is that the "unreasonablydangerous" definition given to the jury, standing alone, does notexplain that the design must be only "reasonably safe," notabsolutely safe, since Ford did not have a duty to design aproduct incapable of causing an injury. Much of Ford's experttestimony was aimed at persuading the jury that yielding seats,like those in the Explorer, prevented injury in most accidents,and that adopting the design urged by plaintiffs' experts wouldcompromise safety in the majority of rear-impact collisions,which occur at a lower rate of force.

Ford points to the jury's question -- should it considerwhether all Ford Explorers were unreasonably dangerous orconsider only whether Lydia's Explorer was unreasonably dangerous-- as evidence of confusion.

We do not find support for Ford's position in the reported Illinois decisions or in the comments to IPI Civil Nos. 400.01and 400 06.

Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182(1965), brought strict liability theory to Illinois tort law.  Suvada relied heavily on Section 402(A) of the Restatement(Second) of Torts (1965). Suvada, 32 Ill. 2d at 619. The phrase "unreasonably dangerous" came from section 402(A), was adopted inSuvada, and has appeared in our reported decisions ever since. See Lamkin v. Towner, 138 Ill. 2d 510, 528, 563 N.E.2d 449 (1990).

Some writers have suggested the term "not reasonably safe" would be preferable to "unreasonably dangerous," but our supremecourt has not adopted that suggestion. See Dunham v. Vaughn & Bushnell Mfg. Co., 42 Ill. 2d 339, 343, 247 N.E.2d 401 (1969). In Dunham, the court approved Dean Prosser's statement that "the product is to be regarded as defective if it is not safefor such a use that can be expected to be made of it ***." (Emphasis added.) Dunham, 42 Ill. 2d at 343.

In Rios v. Niagra Machine and Tool Works, 59 Ill. 2d 79, 83,319 N.E.2d 232 (1974), the court found no difference between "unreasonably dangerous" and "not reasonably safe": 

"However, to establish liability in strict tort it isnot sufficient that the plaintiff prove the product wasdangerous; he must prove that it was unreasonably dangerous,or in other words not reasonably safe." Rios, 59 Ill. 2d at83.

The pattern instructions reject "not reasonably safe":

"However, the Restatement, and Suvada, and all itsprogeny, furnish persuasive authority that the jury shouldbe instructed that it is the 'unreasonably dangerous'condition of the product which leads to liability." Commentto IPI Civil No. 400.01 at 607.

IPI Civil No. 400.06 adopts Dean Prosser's "not safe"formulation by using the word "unsafe." It is used "to expressthe concepts of 'dangerous' and 'defective' used in the Dunhamdefinition." Comment to IPI Civil No. 400.06 at 620.

We have found no Illinois decision that requires IPI CivilNo. 400.07 be given to juries in design defect cases. Nor do wesee how giving 400.07 would address Ford's concern that the jury focused only on Lydia's seatback, not on all the other Explorerseatbacks. No witness, plaintiff or defense, suggested such an approach. All of the testimony dealt with the design of allExplorer seatbacks. We believe using "unreasonably dangerous" and "unsafe" in one instruction and "reasonably safe condition"in another would invite juror confusion. Instructions should be "sufficiently clear to avoid misleading the jury, while fairlyand correctly stating the law." Baier v. Bostitch, 243 Ill. App. 3d 195, 207, 611 N.E.2d 1103 (1993).

We decline to speculate on why the jury sent out thequestion it did. We do note the plaintiff presented evidence oftwo other similar occurrence collisions, each causing severeinjury to the witnesses who testified to those events.

We have another problem with IPI Civil No. 400.07 in thissetting. It uses the word "duty." We have suggested the wordshould be avoided in strict liability instructions because "itmay tend to blur the distinction between negligence and strictliability in tort." Lundy v. Whiting Corp., 93 Ill. App. 3d 244,253, 417 N.E.2d 154 (1981).

There is no Comment to IPI Civil No. 400.07. The Notes onUse give little guidance to the question of when it should beused. We note the bracketed portions of the instruction applyonly to duty to warn cases, where plaintiffs are required toplead and prove the manufacturer knew or should have known of thedanger that caused the injury. Woodill v. Parke Davis & Co., 79Ill. 2d 26, 35, 402 N.E.2d 194 (1980). IPI Civil No. 400.07 isthe only failure to warn instruction in the products liabilitysection of the Pattern Jury Instructions. We do not believe itis intended to apply to defective design cases.

Ford should not be held to a standard of absolute safety. It does not have to design a product that is totally incapable ofcausing injury, but "it must design the product so that the user is not subject to an unreasonable risk of harm." Baier, 243 Ill.App. 3d at 203.

IPI Civil No. 400.06 told the jury a product is unreasonablydangerous only when put to a use that is reasonably foreseeable. See Winnett v. Winnett, 57 Ill. 2d 7, 11, 310 N.E.2d 1 (1974). Ford was free to argue and did argue that Lydia's accident was ofa rare type. Both sides presented lengthy and conflictingtestimony from a long list of experts. The jury made itsdecision.

We conclude the instructions given the jury in this case "fully, fairly and comprehensively informed the jury of therelevant legal principles." Carey v. Lazzara, Inc., 277 Ill.App. 3d 902, 906, 661 N.E.2d 413 (1996). The trial court did notabuse its discretion when it refused to give IPI Civil No.400.07.

IPI Civil No. 600.02

Ford also contends the trial court erred in refusing totender a jury instruction on allocation of fault. Ford submitteda modified version of Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Civil,No. 600.02 (2000 ed.) which took into account the finding ofnegligence against Gaczkowski.

It would not have been error for the trial court to instructthe jury in the manner Ford requested, but its failure to do sois not an abuse of discretion. The instructions given to thejury adequately outlined the procedure for apportioning fault tothe two defendants.

Trial Court's Exclusion of Evidence

Ford contends the trial court erred in excluding thefollowing evidence: (1) accident and injury statistics derivedfrom a government database; (2) the sled test Roger Burnettdiscussed, where Ford used a stiffer Sebring seat in an Explorerbody to show Lydia would have been likely to suffer injury evenif the seat had been more rigid, and; (3) evidence thatGaczkowski was under the influence of illegal drugs at the timeof the accident. The trial court granted plaintiffs' pre-trialmotion in limine which sought to bar this evidence.

The trial court's determination of admissibility of evidencelies within its sound discretion. First Midwest Trust Co. v.Rogers, 296 Ill. App. 3d 416, 426, 701 N.E.2d 1107 (1998). Areviewing court will not reverse the trial court's decisionabsent an abuse of that discretion. First Midwest, 296 Ill. App.3d at 426.

Ford sought to enter statistics from a national databaseshowing the number of injuries suffered in rear impacts involvingvehicles using a yielding seat design similar to the 1991 FordExplorer. While the statistics themselves were not admitted intoevidence, Ford was allowed to ask its experts whether they reliedon the statistics. Ford's experts repeatedly testified to whatit claims those statistics showed -- that the overall number ofinjuries in rear-impact collisions involving yielding seats islow. While the jury did not see the actual statistics, it heardtestimony about them several times. We do not find that thetrial court's refusal to admit the statistics into evidence wasan abuse of discretion.

Nor do we find the trial court erred in refusing to allowthe evidence concerning the sled test. The admissibility of thistype of experiment is dependent upon whether the conditions ofthe experiment were substantially similar to the actualcircumstances of the accident. First Midwest, 296 Ill. App. 3dat 426. In this case, while defendant's experts claimed theconditions of the experiment were similar, plaintiffs' expertsclaimed they were not. Plaintiffs' experts said the crash pulseand timing of the sled test differed from the actual accident,while defendant's experts said they were substantially similar. Given these conflicting claims, we do not find the trial courtcommitted an abuse of discretion in refusing to admit the sledtest.

Ford contends the trial court's ruling was inconsistent withits decision to allow plaintiffs to present testimony concerningother accidents. Over defense counsel's objections, plaintiffspresented testimony from two women who had injuries similar toLydia's as a result of rear-impact collisions. Deborah Newmantestified she was driving a Ford Aerostar in May 1993 when shewas hit from the rear while stopped behind a car waiting to makea left turn. Newman's seat also collapsed and she was throwninto the rear floorboard. Newman lost the use of her legs as aresult of the accident.

Sandy Hensler was driving a 1987 Ford Aerostar in June 1997when she was rear-ended while she was stopped waiting to make aturn. Hensler was not wearing her seat belt because she had ashoulder injury. Her seat reclined during the impact. Henslerhas limited use of her arms and legs as a result of the injuriesshe sustained in that accident.

According to Ford, plaintiffs' failure to show that thecrash pulses were the same in the Hensler and Newman accidentsshould have precluded their admission. Ford says this evidencewas "emotionally charged" and served only to inflame the jury. We do not agree.

This was not a reenactment of the accident. Whether thecrash pulse was the same in the Newman and Hensler accidents doesnot have the same implications it would for a sled test thatpurportedly shows what Lydia's injuries would have been had shebeen sitting in a different seat.

No one contends the Hensler and Newman accidents occurred ata faster speed with a higher force or crash pulse than Lydia'saccident. The parties appear to acknowledge that Lydia'saccident was more severe because of the speed with whichGaczkowski hit her. However, in both Newman and Hensleraccidents the drivers were hit from behind and were sitting inseats that the experts concede were similar to the seat Lydia wassitting in. In both accidents, the seats yielded completely andthe occupants suffered injuries similar to Lydia's. We do notfind the trial court's admission of these accidents was error. See Gowler v. Ferrell-Ross Co., 206 Ill. App. 3d 194, 202, 563N.E.2d 773 (1990)(other accidents need not be identical toaccident at issue).

Finally, Ford contends the trial court erred in refusing toadmit evidence of Gaczkowski's drug impairment. Outside thepresence of the jury, the trial court allowed Stevens to testifythat Gaczkowski appeared to be under the influence of drugs oralcohol when he interviewed him. Stevens said he asked thehospital to do a blood test on Gaczkowski to screen for drugs andalcohol. The screen was positive for cocaine and PCP. As aresult of the test, Gaczkowski was charged with driving a motorvehicle while under the influence of a controlled substance. Ford claims the jury should have been allowed to consider thistestimony.

This evidence had no relevance to the only question at issuein this trial -- whether the Ford Explorer seat was unreasonablydangerous. Gaczkowski's negligence was not at issue during thetrial -- the parties conceded his negligence. Evidence showingGaczkowski was driving under the influence would have no bearingon the question of whether Ford's design of the Explorer seat wasunreasonably dangerous. See Wade v. City of Chicago Heights, 295Ill. App. 3d 873, 886, 693 N.E.2d 426 (1998)(evidence ofintoxication relevant to show driver's negligence).

Special Interrogatory

Ford contends the trial court erred in refusing to submitthe following special interrogatory to the jury:

"Was the negligence of Kevin Gaczkowski the sole proximate cause of the injuries to Lydia Carrillo?"

The record shows Ford submitted three interrogatories forapproval:

"(1) Was the seatback design on the 1991 Explorerunreasonably dangerous?

(2) Did the seatback design on the 1991 Explorerproximately cause the injuries to Lydia Carrillo?

(3) Was the negligence of Kevin Gaczkowski thesole proximate cause of the injuries to LydiaCarrillo?"

The trial court approved the first and secondinterrogatories, with the understanding that the second would bechanged to read "Was the seatback design on the 1991 Explorer aproximate cause of the injuries to Lydia Carrillo?" The trialcourt did not approve the third.

Ford chose to use only the first interrogatory, withdrawingthe second.

Under section 2-1108 of the Code of Civil Procedure, a partymay submit a special interrogatory to the jury. 735 ILCS 5/2-1108 (West 1998). "When a special interrogatory is in properform and relates to a material issue of ultimate fact, the trialcourt must submit it to the jury." Santos v. Chicago TransitAuthority, 198 Ill. App. 3d 866, 869, 556 N.E.2d 607 (1990).

A special interrogatory should not be repetitive,misleading, confusing, or ambiguous. Snyder v. Curran Township,281 Ill. App. 3d 56, 59, 666 N.E.2d 818 (1996). BecauseGaczkowski's negligence was not at issue, the jury was requiredto make only one proximate cause finding -- whether the allegeddesign defect in the Explorer seat was a proximate cause ofLydia's injuries. The trial court approved a specialinterrogatory that would have served as a check on the jury'sproximate cause finding -- it ruled Ford could ask the jurywhether the seatback design of the Explorer was a proximate causeof Lydia's injuries.

To submit the third interrogatory, which asked whetherGaczkowski was the "sole proximate" cause of the injuries, wouldhave been repetitive and could have confused the jury. Insteadof each of the interrogatories serving as a check on the jury'sgeneral verdict, Santos, 198 Ill. App. 3d at 869, the thirdinterrogatory would have served as a check on the second. Thisis not a recognized purpose of an interrogatory, and would nothave been appropriate. We find the trial court's refusal of thethird interrogatory was not in error.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, we affirm the judgment ofthe trial court.

Affirmed.

CERDA, and SOUTH, JJ., concur.