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                                                                                                                                        SECOND DIVISION
                                                                                                                                        DECEMBER 06, 2005

No. 1-04-0444

PRESIDING JUSTICE GARCIA delivered the opinion of the court.

On March 17, 1997, the plaintiff, Terri Brax, as the motherand next friend of minor Jonathon Brax (Jonathon), filed acomplaint against the defendants, Michael Kennedy, M.D. (Dr.Kennedy), and Surgical Specialists, Ltd. The plaintiff'scomplaint alleged negligence against both defendants (counts Iand III), and sought expenses from both defendants pursuant tosection 15 of the Rights of Married Persons Act (750 ILCS 65/15(West 2002)) (counts II and IV).

On March 5, 2003, a jury returned a verdict in favor of thedefendants. The plaintiff appeals, arguing the trial court erredwhen it (1) instructed the jury using the long form of IllinoisPattern Jury Instructions, Civil, No. 12.05 (1995), (hereinafterIPI Civil (1995), No. 12.05); (2) failed to instruct the jury asto increased risk of future harm; and (3) allowed Dr. Kennedy toprovide an undisclosed opinion in violation of Supreme Court Rule213 (see Official Reports Advance Sheet No. 8 (April 17, 2002)). We affirm the judgment below.

BACKGROUND

On August 21, 1995, Jonathon began to feel sick withcomplaints of a sore throat and stomach pain. Over the course ofthe next 24 hours, he suffered from nausea and vomiting and hisabdominal pain worsened.

On August 22, Mrs. Brax took Jonathon to Northwest CommunityHospital's Urgent Care Center (Northwest) in Schaumburg,Illinois. At Northwest, Jonathon was treated by Dr. Bijan Farah,a board-certified emergency room physician. Dr. Farah diagnosedJonathon with appendicitis⁽¹⁾. Following his diagnosis, Dr. Farahspoke with Jonathon's pediatrician and coordinated with Dr.Kennedy to transfer Jonathon to the Hoffman Estates MedicalCenter (Hoffman Medical) for a surgical consultation.

At Hoffman Medical, Dr. Kennedy examined Jonathon in theemergency room. Dr. Kennedy found Jonathon had a soft abdomen,with tenderness in the right-lower quadrant, a sign ofappendicitis. Dr. Kennedy also interviewed Mrs. Brax andJonathon to get an accurate picture of Jonathon's symptoms. Dr.Kennedy was made aware Jonathon suffered from nausea, vomiting,severe abdominal pain, poor appetite, and fever. However,Jonathon's complaints of abdominal pain lessened while beingexamined by Dr. Kennedy. Tests revealed that Jonathon had anelevated white blood cell count of 180,000. In Dr. Kennedy'sexperience with appendicitis, the white blood cell counttypically ranges from 10,000 to 15,000, while a more elevatedwhite blood cell count did not provide for a specific diagnosis. Based on Jonathon's symptoms, Dr. Kennedy determined thatJonathon was suffering either from gastroenteritis⁽²⁾ or from acuteappendicitis. Dr. Kennedy specifically noted that Jonathon'svomiting and nausea, prior to his abdominal pain, led him to leantoward a diagnosis of gastroenteritis.

To determine the cause of Jonathon's symptoms, Dr. Kennedyordered a lower GI series⁽³⁾, which included a barium enema. Inhis deposition, Dr. Kennedy described a barium enema as aradiographic contrast study wherein contrast is introducedthrough a small rubber catheter inserted through the anus andinto the rectum. The contrast goes around the entire length ofthe colon to the right side of the lower abdominal region, to theappendix. Dr. Kennedy testified that with a barium enema, thereare three findings that suggest appendicitis: (1) non-visualization of the appendix, (2) inflammatory change on thececum⁽⁴⁾, and (3) irritation and displacement of the surroundingsmall intestinal loops. Dr. Kennedy relied on the lower GIseries to rule out appendicitis as the cause of Jonathon'sabdominal pain.

Dr. Timothy Tully, a radiologist, interpreted the results ofthe barium enema in real time, as the contrast was fillingJonathon's abdomen, and in photographs taken of the process. Although the appendix could not be seen in the photographs takenof the barium study, Dr. Tully was able to visualize the entireappendix during the procedure. Dr. Kennedy received Dr. Tully'sreport, which indicated that the colon had filled with barium andthe appendix appeared normal.

Based upon the normal barium study and Jonathon's decreasedpain, Dr. Kennedy sent Jonathon home with his parents, who wereadvised to return with him to the hospital if his symptomsworsened.

On August 23, 1995, Mrs. Brax called Jonathon'spediatrician's office and spoke with Dr. Greg Gorski. Mrs. Braxtold Dr. Gorski that Jonathon had developed diarrhea. Dr. Gorskispoke with Dr. Kennedy and then told Mrs. Brax that Jonathon hadthe flu.

On August 24, 1995, Mrs. Brax again called Jonathon's pediatrician's office, spoke with Dr. Lori Sielski, and tookJonathon in for a consultation. Dr. Sielski examined Jonathonand found he had abdominal pain and was toxic looking. Dr.Sielski believed Jonathon had a ruptured appendix and wassuffering from dehydration. Dr. Sielski planned to admitJonathon to the hospital, give him antibiotics, and get asurgical consultation. Dr. Sielski spoke with Dr. Kennedy, whoagreed with the plan, examined Jonathon, found abdominal pain,and ordered a CT scan⁽⁵⁾ of Jonathon's abdomen, which conclusivelydemonstrated that Jonathon's appendix had ruptured.

Following the CT scan, Dr. Kennedy performed surgery onJonathon. Jonathon did not recover as expected and wastransferred to Children's Memorial Hospital, where he was seen byDr. Grant Geissler. During surgery, Dr. Geissler discovered thatJonathon suffered from a malrotation⁽⁶⁾ of the bowel and haddeveloped a mid-gut volvulus.⁽⁷⁾

On March 17, 1997, a medical malpractice complaint was filedagainst Dr. Kennedy and Surgical Specialists, Ltd., alleging thatDr. Kennedy had deviated from the standard of care in histreatment of Jonathon and that the alleged negligence was theproximate cause of Jonathon's injuries.

It was plaintiff's position at trial that Dr. Kennedy wasnegligent in not diagnosing Jonathon with appendicitis on August22, 1995. Specifically, the plaintiff contended that Dr. Kennedyshould have performed a CT scan on Jonathon on August 22, 1995. The plaintiff surmised that as a result of Dr. Kennedy'snegligence, Jonathon developed a mid-gut volvulus and requiredsubsequent surgeries.

During their opening statement, the defendants contendedthat (1) Jonathon's conditions met the criteria of bothappendicitis and gastroenteritis; (2) Dr. Kennedy reasonablyrelied on the barium study, which showed no evidence ofappendicitis; and (3) Jonathon's malrotation was a congenitalcondition, regarding which there was no testimony that Dr.Kennedy should have known about or suspected, and the malrotationcaused the mid-gut volvulus, which later surgeries were requiredto repair.

The plaintiff's medical expert, Dr. Jon Morris, and thedefendants' medical expert, Dr. Barry Newman, disagreed regardingwhether Dr. Kennedy adhered to the standard of care by sendingJonathon home with his parents on August 22. There was alsodisagreement regarding whether Dr. Kennedy should haveadministered a barium enema on August 22 or should have ordered aCT scan. There was further disagreement regarding whenJonathon's appendix ruptured and whether that rupture contributedto Jonathon's mid-gut volvulus.

On March 5, 2003, the jury returned a general verdict infavor of Dr. Kennedy and Surgical Specialists, Ltd. The instantappeal followed. Additional pertinent facts will be discussed inthe context of the issues raised in this appeal.

ANALYSIS

I. Sole Proximate Cause Instruction

The plaintiff first complains that the trial court abusedits discretion in refusing to give the short form of IllinoisPattern Jury Instructions, Civil, No. 12.04 (hereinafter IPICivil (1995) No. 12.04). The plaintiff specifically contends,"[i]n the present case, there was evidence of severalcontributing causes to Jonathon's injuries, but there was noevidence of any outside person or thing that was the only cause." (Emphasis in original.) The plaintiff argues that there wasevidence from which the jury could infer that Jonathon's parentscontributed to his injuries or that Dr. Tully incorrectly readthe barium enema study he performed on Jonathon.

The defendants contend that throughout trial they presentedthe theory that Jonathon's mid-gut volvulus was the result of apreexisting congenital condition of malrotation, and not anynegligence on Dr. Kennedy's part or on the part of any otherperson.

At the initial jury instruction conference, the plaintifftendered the short form of IPI Civil (1995) No. 12.04, whichstated:

"More than one person may be to blamefor causing an injury. If you decide that adefendant was negligent and that hisnegligence was a proximate cause of injury tothe plaintiff, it is not a defense that somethird person who is not a party to the suitmay also have been to blame." IPI Civil(1995) No. 12.04.

In arguing for the proposed jury instruction, the plaintiff'sattorney stated, "there is evidence in this case from which thejury might infer that someone other than the defendant might havedone something wrong, and there's no evidence that anyone otherthan the defendant could be a sole proximate cause." The trialcourt countered, "I think there was a suggestion off of therecord that the parents might be blamed somehow here; but I don'tthink that anybody is adopting that position." The plaintiff'sattorney agreed, but stated, "I'm not necessarily worried aboutit directly. But there's already evidence out there. The jurycould be thinking, well, they were told to bring him back." Thetrial court then emphasized that Jonathon's parents did, in fact,bring him back to the hospital when his condition worsened; "andall the doctors testified that the parents did absolutely nothingwrong here. *** And so, there really isn't any evidence in therecord to suggest - unless it's another doctor here, I think. Ijust assumed that you were going to try to put this on Dr. Tullyor something. I don't know, but it doesn't appear to be thecase. So the instruction that I tend to think is moreappropriate is [IPI Civil (1995) No.] 12.05."

The parties then discussed the instruction tendered by thedefendants, the long form of IPI Civil (1995) No. 12.05, whichstates:

"If you decide that a defendant wasnegligent and that their negligence was aproximate cause of injury to the plaintiff,it is not a defense that something else may also have been a cause of the injury.

However, if you decide that the soleproximate cause of the injury to theplaintiff was something other than theconduct of the defendant, then your verdictshould be for the defendant." IPI Civil(1995) No. 12.05.

The trial court noted that the plaintiff's attorney had a strongobjection to the proposed instruction and invited his argument. The plaintiff's attorney began by noting that "[t]he long form isdesigned for when there's specific evidence of a specific causeor instrumentality or person *** other than the defendant'snegligence." The defendants' attorney responded that "there isample evidence, and it's part of our defense that the patient'scondition of appendicitis *** and the pre-existing congenitalcondition of the malrotation and the volvulus which flowedtherefrom was the sole cause of all the damages to JonathonBrax." The plaintiff's attorney responded that "the volvulus isonly one part of Jonathon's injuries. And I believe instructingthe jury with the long form would tell them that if they believethat the volvulus is not related to the negligence, then theyshould find for the defendant without considering these otheraspects of the injury." The trial court concluded that althoughit was reserving ruling on the issue, the long form of IPI Civil(1995) No. 12.05 allowed the jury "to either conclude that ***the harm was a result of a congenital birth defect that hadnothing to do with negligence, or in the alternative that thereis no sole proximate cause to this [and] the doctor contributedto the injury."

The plaintiff's attorney then made a "conditional tender." "If the [trial] Court is inclined to give [IPI Civil (1995) No.]12.05 the long form, then I would tender the first paragraph tosay, 'it is not a defense that something or someone else may havealso been a cause of the injury.'" The proposed jury instructionwas described as an "[IPI Civil (1995) No.] 12.04 hybrid with[IPI Civil (1995) No.] 12.05."

The trial court found that there was sufficient evidence forthe jury to properly consider that something or someone otherthan Dr. Kennedy may have been the sole proximate cause ofJonathon's problems following the surgical removal of hisappendix. As a result, the trial court subsequently ruled thatit would give the hybrid, long-form version of IPI Civil (1995)No. 12.05, as proposed by the plaintiff.

The plaintiff now contends the giving of this instructioninstead of IPI Civil (1995) No. 12.04 was error.

We need not address this specific contention because thetrial court issued the hybrid jury instruction at the behest ofthe plaintiff. See McMath v. Katholi, 191 Ill. 2d 251, 730N.E.2d 1 (2000). "'It is fundamental to our adversarial processthat a party waives his right to complain of an error where to doso is inconsistent with the position taken by the party in anearlier court proceeding.'" McMath, 191 Ill. 2d at 255, quotingAuton v. Logan Landfill, Inc., 105 Ill. 2d 537, 543, 475 N.E.2d817 (1984). Moreover, a party cannot complain of an error whichit induced the trial court to make or to which he consented. McMath, 191 Ill. 2d at 255. "Waiver is particularly pertinentwhere the conduct of a party before the trial court induced thecourt to rule as it did." People v. McAdrian, 52 Ill. 2d 250,254, 287 N.E.2d 688 (1972).

As clearly set forth in the transcript quoted above, at theconference on the proposed jury instructions the trial courtcommented on the plaintiff's reasons for promoting the short formof IPI Civil (1995) No. 12.04. Specifically, the trial courtstated that there was no merit to plaintiff's assertion that thejury might blame (1) Jonathon's parents, as all the expertstestified that the parents were not at fault and had acted inaccordance with Dr. Kennedy's instructions, that is, theyreturned Jonathon to the hospital when his condition worsened; or(2) Dr. Tully, for misreading the barium report, as Dr. Kennedyasserted that he and Dr. Tully were within the standard of carein using the barium enema to discern whether Jonathon hadappendicitis.

The plaintiff asserts that when it became clear that thetrial court was leaning toward giving the defendants' proposedjury instruction, the plaintiff made the conditional tender aboutwhich she now complains. In her reply brief, the plaintiffargues that in offering the conditionally tendered juryinstruction, she was acting in a proactive manner when the trialcourt ruled that it would give the long form of IPI Civil (1995)No. 12.05. Accordingly, she "attempted to mitigate the damage bypreparing a modified combination of 12.04 and 12.05. [But she] inno way waived her objection to 12.05 or the long form of 12.04 or12.05."

We find that the plaintiff cannot now distance herself fromthat conditionally tendered instruction, as the trial courtissued the conditionally tendered jury instruction as theplaintiff requested.

As the transcript makes clear, at the jury instructionconference the trial court did not determine whether to give IPICivil (1995) No. 12.04 or IPI Civil (1995) No. 12.05, but insteadreserved its ruling on the sole proximate cause instruction. Instead of giving the trial court the opportunity to consider thematter, the plaintiff immediately presented a hybrid proposal andencouraged the trial court to accept the proffered juryinstruction. It was then, only after considering the three juryinstructions proposed by the parties, that the trial courtdetermined it would give the hybrid instruction as proposed bythe plaintiff.

The plaintiff has presented us with no authority thatsupports her position that proposing a modified combination ofIPI Civil (1995) No. 12.04 and IPI Civil (1995) No. 12.05 tomitigate damage from the possible rejection of the use of IPICivil (1995) No. 12.04 somehow precludes our finding that shewaived her objection. Moreover, we have found no such authorityto exist. As such, we find that the plaintiff has waived anyclaim of error regarding the trial court's decision to give thehybrid jury instruction, as tendered by the plaintiff.

A review of the hybrid instruction itself also fails tosupport the plaintiff's claim of error. "Each party has the rightto have the jury clearly and fairly instructed upon each theorythat was supported by the evidence." Nassar v. County of Cook,333 Ill. App. 3d 289, 297, 775 N.E.2d 154 (2002), citing Leonardiv. Loyola University of Chicago, 168 Ill. 2d 83, 100, 658 N.E.2d450 (1995). It is within the trial court's discretion todetermine what issues are raised by the evidence and whether aninstruction should be given. Nassar, 333 Ill. App. 3d at 297. To determine the propriety of a tendered instruction, we considerwhether the jury was fairly, fully, and comprehensively informedas to the relevant principles considering the instructions as awhole. Nassar, 333 Ill. App. 3d at 297.

The long form of IPI Civil (1995) No. 12.05 is appropriate"where there is evidence tending to show that the sole proximatecause of the occurrence was something other than the conduct ofthe defendant." IPI Civil (1995) No. 12.05, Notes on Use, at 62. If the jury was presented with some competent evidence tending tosupport the defendants' theory that Jonathon's malrotation causedthe mid-gut volvulus requiring further operations, then theinstruction was proper. See Nassar, 333 Ill. App. 3d at 297.

As emphasized by the defendants, the plaintiff did notallege that Dr. Kennedy caused Jonathon's appendicitis, nor didthe plaintiff allege that if Dr. Kennedy had diagnosed Jonathon'sappendicitis on August 22, instead of on August 24, Jonathonwould not have had to have any surgery. Instead, the plaintiff'scontention appears to be that Jonathon's condition following theremoval of his appendix, and the subsequent surgeries herequired, were caused by Dr. Kennedy's not diagnosing Jonathon'sappendicitis in a timely manner. The defendants maintain thatDr. Kennedy's diagnosis was proper and Jonathon's subsequentproblems were caused solely by Jonathon's preexisting congenitalmalrotation. The plaintiff's expert testified that Dr. Kennedy'sdelay in diagnosing Jonathon directly contributed to thedevelopment of the mid-gut volvulus. The defendants and theirexpert testified that Jonathon had a malrotation not caused byJonathon's appendicitis or by Dr. Kennedy's actions. Thedefendants' expert also stated that a volvulus was something thathappens because of a malrotation, but was unable to say for surewhat caused Jonathon's mid-gut volvulus. In this case, thedefendants presented some competent evidence that the subsequentoperations preformed to repair Jonathon's malrotation and mid-gutvolvulus were necessary for reasons not associated with theaction or inaction of Dr. Kennedy. Therefore, we find that ingiving the hybrid long form of the jury instruction the trialcourt did not abuse its discretion.

II. Future Harm

The plaintiff additionally contends that the trial courterred when it refused to instruct the jury on Jonathon'sincreased risk of future harm as provided by the holding inDillon v. Evanston Hospital, 199 Ill. 2d 483, 771 N.E.2d 357(2002). The plaintiff acknowledges that generally errorsconcerning the extent of damages are not reversible where thejury finds the defendant was not liable. But, the plaintiffargues, the error here was so "pervasive and prejudicial" thatthere is a likelihood it may have affected the jury's decisionregarding liability. In support of her contention thatreversible error occurred here, she relies on general citationsto Hall v. Dumitru, 250 Ill. App. 3d 759, 620 N.E.2d 668 (1993),and Mulvey v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 53 Ill. 2d 591, 294N.E.2d 689 (1973).

In Mulvey, the plaintiff contended that defense counsel'sclosing arguments, which pertained to the extent of damages,required reversal and a new trial. Mulvey, 53 Ill. 2d at 599. While noting that generally errors concerning the extent ofdamages are not reversible where the jury finds the defendant notliable, our supreme court in Mulvey recognized an exception where"errors which go to the question of damages may be so pervasiveand prejudicial as to create the likelihood that they may haveaffected a jury's decision on the issue of liability." Mulvey,53 Ill. 2d at 599-600. In examining the facts in Mulvey, oursupreme court concluded the claimed errors going to the questionof damages were not so of such a nature as to have affected thejury's decision regarding liability. Mulvey, 53 Ill. 2d at 599-600.

In contrast, the Hall court was persuaded by the plaintiff'sargument that the trial court error in allowing the defendant toargue that the plaintiff's failure to mitigate her damages byundergoing a second surgery may have affected the jury's decisionon the issue of liability. Hall, 250 Ill. App. 3d at 766. Thecourt specifically stated that Hall was a case where the claimederrors "which go to the question of damages [were] so pervasiveand prejudicial as to create the likelihood that they may haveaffected [the] jury's decision on the issue of liability." Hall,250 Ill. App. 3d at 766. In its analysis of the issue, the Hallcourt set out very clearly the plaintiff's arguments of thepervasive and prejudicial nature of the multiple references tothe plaintiff's failure to undergo the second surgery to mitigateher damages.

"Plaintiff argues that the admission ofevidence of the medical recommendation thatplaintiff undergo another tubal ligationshifted the jury's attention away from theseparate question of defendant's liability. Because of the emphasis on the proposedsecond ligation surgery, the jury mighteasily have begun to perceive the plaintiffas the wrongdoer. Defendant argues that theadmission of evidence of medicalrecommendations made to plaintiff could nothave confused the jury. We disagree. Itwould not be unreasonable or surprising thata juror would take the duty improperlyimposed on plaintiff to suffer the secondligation surgery and relate it directly tocausation and fault. It would not beunreasonable for a jury to believe that butfor plaintiff's failure to have the secondligation surgery performed plaintiff wouldnot have experienced the unwanted 1988pregnancy or the ectopic pregnancy of 1990,thereby shifting the jury's attention awayfrom the defendant's alleged malpractice. Webelieve that this error with respect todamages was so pervasive and prejudicial asto have affected the jury's decision onliability." Hall, 250 Ill. App. 3d at 766-67.

Here, however, we are presented with no explicit argumentsetting out the claim of "pervasive and prejudicial" error basedon the failure of the trial court to instruct the jury on therisk of future harm so as to have affected the jury's decision onliability. We are presented with no argument how the jury mighthave been confused on the issue of liability based on the absenceof a risk of future harm instruction. Accordingly, we find noreason the general rule that errors concerning the extent ofdamages are not reversible where the jury finds the defendant notliable should not control the outcome here. See Mulvey, 53 Ill.2d at 599 (issue of damages never reached where the jury foundthe defendant not liable). Because the jury found for thedefendants on the issue of liability, any alleged error infailing to instruct on the risk of future harm to the plaintiff'sminor is not grounds for reversal.

III. Undisclosed Opinion

Finally, the plaintiff asserts that the trial court abusedits discretion by allowing Dr. Kennedy to present evidence notdisclosed in his Rule 213 responses, and relies on Regala v. RushNorth Shore Medical Center, 323 Ill. App. 3d 579, 752 N.E.2d 443(2001). In Regala, an expert physician called by the defendantstated in his deposition and on cross-examination at trial thatthe plaintiff's son would have been born without neurologicaldamage if delivery had occurred earlier. On redirectexamination, the expert stated that the neurological damage wouldhave occurred even if the child had been delivered earlier,expressing that opinion for the first time. On appeal, a newtrial was ordered because the expert's testimony was foundinadmissible as he had exceeded his previously disclosedopinions. Regala, 323 Ill. App. 3d at 585.

"[T]he purpose of Rule 213 is to avoid surprise and permitlitigants to ascertain and rely upon the opinions of expertsretained by the opposing party." Scassifero v. Glaser, 333 Ill.App. 3d 846, 860, 776 N.E.2d 859 (2002); see Official ReportsAdvance Sheet No. 8 (April 17, 2002), R. 213, Committee Comments,eff. July 1, 2002. In relevant part, Rule 213(f)(3) provides:

"(3) Controlled Expert Witness. A'controlled expert witness' is a persongiving expert testimony who is the party, theparty's current employee, or the party'sretained expert. For each controlled expertwitness, the party must identify: (i) thesubject matter on which the witness willtestify; (ii) the conclusions and opinions ofthe witness and the bases therefor; (iii) thequalifications of the witness; and (iv) anyreports prepared by the witness about thecase." Official Reports Advance Sheet No. 8(April 17, 2002), R. 213(f)(3), eff. July 1,2002.

The defendants' supplemental Rule 213 disclosures, datedJune 4, 2001, state:

"Dr. Kennedy will testify consistentlywith his discovery deposition and medicalrecords. In particular, he will testifyconcerning his opinions disclosed in hisdiscovery deposition concerning his care andtreatment of Jonathon Brax as well as hisopinions with respect to the standard of careand causation. Dr. Kennedy will testify thathe possessed and applied the knowledge andused the skill and care of a reasonably well-qualified surgeon in his treatment ofJonathon Brax. Further, that he did notcause or contribute to cause any injury toJonathon Brax."

In his discovery deposition, Dr. Kennedy was asked, interalia:

"[Plaintiff Attorney Burke]: Do you havean opinion Doctor, based upon your experienceas to whether the CT study with contrast wasa better diagnostic tool compared to thebarium enema for appendicitis?

[Dr. Kennedy]: When?

[Plaintiff Attorney Burke]: All right,let's take both time periods, '95 and thepresent.

[Dr. Kennedy]: In 1995, no. Certainly[we had] more experience with barium enema we[we]re very confident with barium enema atthat time. I think the literature iscurrently suggesting that the *** CT scan isa preferable study.

* * *

[Defense Attorney Collins]: Doctor, isit your opinion based upon a reasonabledegree of medical certainty that the bariumenema study you performed - that you hadperformed on Jonathon Brax in August of 1995was a reasonable and appropriate test to workhim up for a possible diagnosis ofappendicitis?

[Dr. Kennedy]: Yes.

[Defense Attorney Collins]: Doctor, isit your opinion based upon a reasonabledegree of medical certainty that you compliedwith the acceptable standard of care withregard to all of your care and treatment ofJonathon Brax?

[Dr. Kennedy]: Yes."

At trial, defense counsel elicited the following testimonyfrom Dr. Kennedy:

"[Defense Attorney Collins]: In 1995,was the CT scan a better test for thediagnosis of appendicitis than a lower GI?

[Dr. Kennedy]: That was not establishedat that time, no.

[Defense Attorney Collins]: Is there anyreason to think if the CT scan had been doneat that time that the findings would havebeen any different than they were for thelower GI that was actually done?

[Dr. Kennedy]: There's no reason tobelieve that.

[Plaintiff Attorney Lumb]: Objection,213." The plaintiff's reliance on Regala is misplaced. "Theadmission of evidence in a trial is within the sound discretionof the trial court and will not be reversed absent an abuse ofdiscretion." Skubak v. Lutheran General Health Care Systems, 339Ill. App. 3d 30, 36, 790 N.E.2d 67 (2003). An abuse ofdiscretion exists where no reasonable person would agree with theposition of the trial court. Skubak, 339 Ill. App. 3d at 36.

Here, the record shows that during pretrial discovery, thedefendants disclosed the general opinions that Dr. Kennedy wouldtestify to. More specifically, in his deposition, Dr. Kennedytestified that in 1995, a barium enema and a CT scan wereconsidered equally acceptable methods for identifyingappendicitis. During his deposition Dr. Kennedy also agreed thatwhen he examined Jonathon Brax in 1995, a barium enema was areasonable and appropriate test to diagnose appendicitis, and hewas acting within the standard of care in relying on the resultsof that test. Although Dr. Kennedy was not specifically askedduring his deposition whether, if the CT scan had been done in1995, the findings as to Jonathon Brax would have been differentthan they were for the barium enema, the subject of a CT scan wasraised during Dr. Kennedy's deposition. We find that theparticular question and answer complained of at trial werepermissible as an elaboration on, or a logical corollary to, theoriginally revealed opinion. See Skubak, 339 Ill. App. 3d at 39;Scassifero, 333 Ill. App. 3d at 860 (witnesses are allowed toelaborate or give logical corollaries to Rule 213 disclosures). Thus, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court'sallowance of the testimony.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the trial courtis affirmed.

Affirmed.

WOLFSON and SOUTH, JJ., concur.

1. "Appendicitis" is defined as "inflammation of thevermiform appendix characterized by usu. right-sided abdominalpain and sometimes by nausea and vomiting." Webster's Third NewInternational Dictionary 104 (1986).

2. "Gastroenteritis" is defined as the "inflamation of thelining membrane of the stomach and the intestines." Webster'sThird New International Dictionary 939 (1986).

3. "GI" stands for "gastrointestinal." Webster's Third NewInternational Dictionary 955 (1986).

4. "Cecum" is defined as "the blind pouch in which the largeintestine begins and into which the ileum [the last division ofthe small intestine] opens from one side." Webster's Third NewInternational Dictionary 358, 1125 (1986).

5. "CT" is an abbreviation for "computed tomography." Stedman's Medical Dictionary 343 (24th ed. 1982).

6. "Malrotation" is "failure during embryonic development ofnormal rotation of all or any portion of the intestinal tract." Stedman's Medical Dictionary 830 (24th ed. 1982).

7. "Volvulus" is "a twisting of the intestine causingobstruction." Stedman's Medical Dictionary 1570 (24th ed. 1982).