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FIRST DIVISION
APRIL 26, 2004

In this permissive interlocutory appeal taken pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 306 (155Ill. 2d R. 306), defendants, Illinois Central Railroad, Richard Stickler and David Hendrix, appealfrom the circuit court's order denying their motion to transfer this case based on the doctrine offorum non conveniens. Defendants sought to transfer this case from the circuit court of CookCounty to the circuit court of DuPage County. Defendants claim that the trial court erred inrejecting their affidavit, in that the rejection was contrary to Illinois law and inconsistent withSupreme Court Rule 187 (134 Ill. 2d R. 187). Defendants further claim that the trial courtabused its discretion in denying the motion to transfer this case to the circuit court of DuPageCounty because the private and the public interest factors heavily weigh in favor of transfer. Although plaintiff has not filed a brief in this court, we will consider the appeal pursuant to theprinciples set forth in First Capitol Mortgage Corp. v. Talandis Construction Corp., 63 Ill. 2d128, 345 N.E.2d 493 (1976). For the following reasons, we reverse the order of the trial court.

BACKGROUND

On November 11, 2000, plaintiff, a resident of DuPage County, was injured when he wasstruck by a train while lying between the rails of the train track. The accident occurred near "westNorth Avenue" in Addison, DuPage County. On October 31, 2002, plaintiff filed a lawsuitagainst defendants, Illinois Central Railroad Company (hereinafter referred to as IC), RichardStickler, and David Hendrix in the circuit court of Cook County. In his complaint, plaintiffalleged the train that struck him was owned by IC and operated by Stickler and Hendrix. Plaintifffurther claimed that defendants were negligent in failing to keep a proper lookout, failing toengage the emergency brake in a timely manner, failing to sound the train's whistle in a timelymanner, failing to operate the train at a safe speed and failing to properly supervise and trainemployees.

On December 12, 2002, defendants filed a motion to transfer the case from the circuitcourt of Cook County to the circuit court for the Eighteenth Judicial Circuit, DuPage County,based upon Supreme Court Rule 187 and the doctrine of intrastate forum non conveniens. Defendants argued that the circuit court of DuPage County was the more convenient forum for allparties. Defendants further argued that both the private interest and the public interest factorsweighed heavily in favor of the case being decided in the circuit court of DuPage County. Insupport of their contention that the private interest weighed heavily in favor of a transfer,defendants filed a memorandum of law and an uncontested affidavit executed by a representativeof codefendant, Illinois Central Railroad Company. In support of their contention that the publicinterest factors weighed heavily in favor of a transfer, defendants filed an exhibit showing the timelapse between the date of filing to the date of verdict for cases filed in the circuit court of CookCounty and those filed in the circuit court of DuPage County.

The affidavit filed in support of the private interest factors was executed by Donald E.Corp, the risk manager for IC and Chicago, Central and Pacific Railroad (hereinafter referred toas CCP). The affidavit stated that as part of Mr. Corp's job responsibilities he was required toinvestigate claims asserted against IC and CCP. As a result, he arrived at the scene of theaccident, conducted an investigation at the accident site and at the hospital, and revieweddocuments kept in the ordinary course of business relating to plaintiff's claim. Based on thisinvestigation, Corp stated he was familiar with plaintiff's claim. However, none of the documentsCorp relied on were authenticated or attached to the affidavit.

The affidavit recited that the train in question was owned by CCP, a corporate affiliate ofIC with headquarters in Waterloo, Iowa, and was operating on a track owned by CCP. The crewoperating the train consisted of Hendrix, the engineer, and Stickler, the conductor, each of whomwork for CCP. Both Stickler, who resides in LaPorte City, Iowa, and Hendrix, who resides inCedar Falls, Iowa, reported to work at CCP's terminal in Waterloo, Iowa. At the time of theaccident, the train was heading westbound to Waterloo, Iowa.

The affidavit stated that the train involved in the accident was equipped with an eventrecorder, which electronically records information concerning the operation of the train. Following the accident, the supervisor of the train engineers, Doyle Cowles, downloaded theinformation from the event recorder. Cowles resides in Hudson, Iowa, and works for CCP at itsWaterloo terminal.

The affidavit further stated that three police officers from the Addison police departmentin DuPage County responded to the accident: C. Pope, Scott Sullivan and Angelo Denofrio. Officers Pope, Sullivan and Denofrio investigated the accident and made written reports of theirinvestigation, which are maintained by the department at its office in Addison located in DuPageCounty.

Additionally, the affidavit outlined that plaintiff was attended to at the scene byparamedics from the Villa Park fire department located in DuPage County. The paramedics thentransported plaintiff to Good Samaritan Hospital located in Downers Grove in DuPage County. He was treated at the hospital by doctors on the hospital staff, including Dr. Satarno. Uponrelease from the hospital, plaintiff received follow-up treatment from Dr. Steven S. Louis ofHinsdale Orthopaedics in Hinsdale located in DuPage County.

Lastly, the affidavit stated that, "based on his review of the records," the affiant believedthat aside from plaintiff, the persons identified in the affidavit had knowledge of the facts relatingto the accident and would be called to testify at any trial of this case, and that the affiant was notaware of any witnesses who resided in Cook County or of any physicians who provided treatmentto plaintiff in Cook County. The affidavit went on to state that CCP would incur "significantlymore expense" if this matter was tried in Cook County versus DuPage County and that it wouldbe more convenient for CCP, the witnesses, and even plaintiff, if the case were tried in DuPageCounty.

With their motion to transfer the case, defendants included a time lapse exhibit to supporttheir argument that the public interest factors also favored a transfer of the case to DuPageCounty. More specifically, the time lapse exhibit showed the statistics from the AdministrativeOffice of Illinois Courts for the year 2000. However, we note that the trial court, in its opinion,provided the statistics from the Administrative Office of Illinois Courts for the year 2001. The2001 statistics showed that there were 535 jury verdicts for over $50,000 in Cook County, withan average time from filing to verdict of 38.1 months. In contrast, DuPage County had 49 suchcases with an average time from filing to verdict of 28.2 months.

On December 20, 2003, the parties in this case appeared before the trial court ondefendants' motion. The trial court inquired whether defendants required written discovery priorto the ruling on the motion, but defendants advised that the motion was being submitted "as is." Therefore, the trial court advised plaintiff that a formal response to the motion would not benecessary.

On January 10, 2003, the trial court issued its order denying defendants' motion withoutbenefit of a response or affidavit from plaintiff as to whether the contentions raised by defendantsin support of transfer were in dispute. In denying the motion, the trial court ruled that Corp'saffidavit did not meet the requirements of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 191(a). Official ReportsAdvance Sheet No. 8 (April 17, 2002), R. 191 (a), eff. July 1, 2002. In that regard, the courtstated that Corp relied on documents kept in the ordinary course of business; however, no suchdocuments were authenticated and attached to the affidavit. Therefore, the court concluded, anyaverments set forth in the affidavit were based upon hearsay documents and would not beadmissible statements even if Corp was called as a witness. As a consequence, the trial courtconcluded that defendants failed to provide any evidence supporting their motion to transfer. Alternatively, the trial court ruled that even if Corp's affidavit were considered, defendants hadstill failed to show that the balance of private interest and public interest factors favored a transferto DuPage County.

On February 10, 2003, defendants filed a petition for leave to appeal the decision of thetrial court denying the motion to transfer. This court granted the petition for leave to appealpursuant to Supreme Court Rule 306 (166 Ill. 2d R. 306).

On appeal, defendants contend that the trial court abused its discretion in denying themotion to transfer based on the doctrine of forum non conveniens.

ANALYSIS

Sufficiency of Affidavit

Defendants first contend that the trial court abused its discretion by imposing arequirement for affidavits filed in support of a motion to transfer based on the doctrine of forumnon conveniens that is contrary to Illinois law and inconsistent with Supreme Court Rule 187 (134 Ill. 2d R. 187). In this regard, the trial court found that the affidavit submitted by defendantsdid not meet the requirements set forth in Supreme Court Rule 191(a) (Official Reports AdvanceSheet No. 8 (April 17, 2002), R. 191 (a), eff. July 1, 2002) and, thus, the affidavit should bedisregarded. We agree with defendants' position that this finding was improper.

Supreme Court Rule 191(a) provides in pertinent part:

"Affidavits in support of and in opposition to a motion for summary judgmentunder section 2-1005 of the Code of Civil Procedure, affidavits submitted inconnection with a motion for involuntary dismissal under section 2-619 of theCode of Civil Procedure, and affidavits submitted in connection with a motion tocontest jurisdiction over the person, as provided by section 2-301 of the Code ofCivil Procedure, shall be made on the personal knowledge of the affiants; shall setforth with particularity the facts upon which the claim, counterclaim, or defense isbased; shall have attached thereto sworn or certified copies of all papers uponwhich the affiant relies; shall not consist of conclusions but of facts admissible inevidence; and shall affirmatively show that the affiant, if sworn as a witness, cantestify competently thereto." Official Reports Advance Sheet No. 8 (April 17,2002), R. 191 (a), eff. July 1, 2002.

Thus, by its own terms, Supreme Court Rule 191(a) is applicable only to affidavits under sections2-1005, 2-619, and 2-301(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1005, 2-619, 2-301(West 2002)) (hereinafter referred to as Code) and does not apply to affidavits filed in conjunctionwith any other type of civil proceedings. See Marquette National Bank v. B.J. Dodge Fiat, Inc.,131 Ill. App. 3d 356, 362, 475 N.E.2d 1057, 1061 (1985) (finding that an affidavit filed insupport of a creditor's security interest in property did not invoke the requirements of SupremeCourt Rule 191(a)); People v. Frieder, 90 Ill. App. 3d 116, 121, 413 N.E.2d 432, 437 (1980) (theaffidavit filed in an action by one landowner against an adjoining land owner could not be judgedby the affidavit requirements of Supreme Court Rule 191(a)). Notably, Rule 191(a) omits fromits scope affidavits filed in support of forum non conveniens motions pursuant to Supreme CourtRule 187. Generally, in these and other types of civil proceedings not encompassed under Rule191(a), there is a more relaxed standard for judging the sufficiency of affidavits. See MarquetteNational Bank, 131 Ill. App. 3d at 362, 475 N.E.2d at 1061; see also Frieder, 90 Ill. App. 3d at121, 413 N.E.2d at 437. For instance, the standard is met in certain civil cases if the affidavitmerely sets forth facts within the personal knowledge of the affiant. Marquette National Bank,131 Ill. App. 3d at 362, 475 N.E.2d at 1061; Frieder, 90 Ill. App. 3d at 121, 413 N.E.2d at 437.

Supreme Court Rule 187, which, as noted, specifically pertains to affidavits filed insupport of forum non conveniens motions, provides in pertinent part:

"Hearings on motions to dismiss or transfer the action under the doctrine of forumnon conveniens shall be scheduled so as to allow the parties sufficient time toconduct discovery on issues of fact raised by such motions. Such motions may besupported and opposed by affidavit. In determining issues of fact raised byaffidavits, any competent evidence adduced by the parties shall also be considered.The determination of any issue of fact in connection with such a motion does notconstitute a determination of the merits of the case or any aspect thereof." 134 Ill.2d R. 187.

As is the case with other non-191(a) affidavits, affidavits filed under Rule 187 are determined by adifferent standard than the sufficiency of those affidavits required under Rule 191(a) for motionsfor summary judgement (section 2-1005), involuntary dismissal ( section 2-619), or jurisdictionover a person (section 2-301(b)). See Walker v. Iowa Marine Repair Corp., 132 Ill. App. 3d 621,630, 477 N.E.2d 1335, 1341 (1985); see also Haring v. Chicago & North Western TransportationCo., 103 Ill. 2d 530, 533, 470 N.E.2d 288, 289 (1984). Both federal and state courts agree thatthe sufficiency of affidavits filed in support of a forum non conveniens motion is measured by theextent to which it allows the trial court to balance the private and public interest factors, whichwill be discussed in detail below. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 257 102 S. Ct. 252,266, 70 L. Ed .2d 419, 436 (1981);Moore v. AT&T Latin America Corp., 177 F. Supp. 2d 785,790-91 (N.D. Ill. 2001); Gasda v. Indian Harbor Belt R.R. Co., No. 98 C 8371 (N.D. Ill. August2, 1999); Countryman & Lee v. Stein Roe & Farnham, 681 F. Supp. 479, 483-84 (N.D. Ill. 1987);Walker, 132 Ill. App. 3d at 630, 477 N.E.2d at 1341; Haring, 103 Ill. 2d at 533; 470 N.E.2d at289. These cases do not require that the information contained in the affidavit necessarily bebased upon first-hand knowledge, as long as the affidavits are factually sufficient. See Walker,132 Ill. App. 3d at 630, 477 N.E.2d at 1341; see also Haring, 103 Ill. 2d at 533, 470 N.E.2d at289. The courts agree that, based upon the difference in the stage of litigation which invokes theissue of summary judgment and that which invokes forum non conveniens, an affidavit filed insupport of a forum non conveniens motion requires less specificity and less detail. See PiperAircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 258, 102 S. Ct. 252, 266, 70 L. Ed.2d 419, 437 (1981)(finding that at the forum non conveniens stage of the litigation some leeway in specificity of anaffidavit must be given); Walker, 132 Ill. App. 3d at 630, 477 N.E.2d at 1341 (holding that solong as the affidavit can show that information and witnesses necessary to the trial are located incounties far more convenient to the action, no more specificity is required). This distinctionwhich the courts have drawn between forum non conveniens and summary judgment motions asto specificity and level of detail is consistent with the fact that the affidavits filed under Rule 187are omitted from the prerequisites set forth in Rule 191(a). Official Reports Advance Sheet No. 8(April 17, 2002), R. 191 (a), eff. July 1, 2002. Accordingly, we are not convinced that affidavitsshould be considered insufficient even if they contain elements of hearsay. Piper Aircraft Co. v.Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 257, 102 S. Ct. 252, 266, 70 L. Ed .2d 419, 436 (1981); Walker, 132 Ill.App. 3d at 630, 477 N.E.2d at 1341; Haring, 103 Ill. 2d at 533, 470 N.E.2d at 289; accordButcher v. Gerber Products Co., No. 98 CIV 1819 (RWS) (S.D.N.Y. August 3,1998) (findingthat one affidavit including a general statement of the nature of witness testimony is sufficient andthe plaintiff need not procure an affidavit from each individual witness outlining his or her specifictestimony).

We further note that, although the sufficiency of affidavits under Rule 187 was consideredand tested in Cotton, Haring and Walker, none of these cases invoked a hearsay exclusion withrespect to those affidavits. See Cotton v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 14 Ill. 2d 144, 152, 152 N.E.2d 385, 389 (1958); see Haring, 103 Ill. 2d at 533, 470 N.E.2d at 289; see also Walker,132 Ill. App. 3d at 630, 477 N.E.2d at 1341. All three cases involved the question of how muchdetail was required in an affidavit filed in support of a forum non conveniens motion. In Cotton,the court, in denying the transfer, found that the defendant had not satisfied its burden of proof. Cotton, 14 Ill. 2d at 168, 152 N.E.2d at 389. The failure of the defendant to give the names ofwitnesses, to indicate what their testimony would be and to show how vital the testimony wouldbe furnished a reasonable basis for the trial court to find that the defendant had not met the burdenof proof. Cotton, 14 Ill. 2d at 168, 152 N.E.2d at 389. However, in Haring, the defendantaverred names and addresses of postaccident witnesses along with names and addresses ofmedical witnesses. Haring, 103 Ill. 2d at 533, 470 N.E.2d at 289. The supreme court in Haringfound the contents of that affidavit were sufficient to demonstrate that there were witnessesnecessary to the trial whose testimony could be more conveniently produced in the alternateforum. Haring, 103 Ill. 2d at 533, 470 N.E.2d at 289. For that same reason in Walker, the courtfound that an affidavit that named the employees and their county of residence, the port engineerand his county of residence, the medical center where plaintiff received treatment, the location ofemployment records and the location of the defendant's representatives familiar with the case wassufficient to warrant a transfer. Walker, 132 Ill. App. 3d at 630, 477 N.E.2d at 1341.

The affidavit in support of defendants' motion in this case did not contain the type ofgeneral allegations found to be deficient in Cotton, 14 Ill. 2d at 152, 152 N.E.2d at 389. Instead,this case resembles Haring and Walker, in that the Corp affidavit set forth names and addresses ofCCP employees present at the scene of the accident, names and addresses of police officers whoreported to the scene of the accident, names and addresses of medical witnesses who treated orexamined plaintiff as a result of the injuries, and the location of employment records. See Haring,103 Ill. 2d at 533, 470 N.E.2d at 289; see also Walker, 132 Ill. App. 3d at 630, 477 N.E.2d at1341. Therefore, the contents of the Corp affidavit sufficiently demonstrated that there werewitnesses and information necessary to the trial of this case that could be more convenientlyproduced if the case was tried in the suggested alternate forum, rather than in Cook County. These contents meet the exact criteria for affidavits in support of forum non conveniens motionsset forth by the Illinois Supreme Court. Haring, 103 Ill. 2d at 533, 470 N.E.2d at 289; see PiperAircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 257, 102 S. Ct. 252, 266, 70 L. Ed .2d 419, 436 (1981).

Moreover, even though we have concluded that under Supreme Court Rule 187 hearsaydoes not vitiate the affidavit, we note that it is not clear that the Corp affidavit in fact is built uponhearsay. We make reference to paragraphs 2 and 9 of the affidavit. In paragraph 2 Corp states"as part of my job responsibilities as Risk Manager, I am required to familiarize myself with claimsasserted against IC & CCP. As a result, I am familiar with the claim that has been assertedagainst IC by plaintiff Jamie Botello and have reviewed the documents kept in the ordinary courseof business relating to Mr. Botello's claim." Corp goes on in paragraph 9 to state that he went tothe scene immediately following the accident and to Good Samaritan Hospital while plaintiff wasbeing treated. These statements demonstrate that his affidavit was not based on hearsay, but onhis own investigation. Paragraphs 2 and 9 were included in Corp's affidavit to establish the factthat Corp had personal knowledge of the location and details of the accident. They were notincluded to establish the truth of any statements made by CCP staff, hospital representatives,Addison police officers or anyone else other than the affiant, Corp. People v. Carpenter, 28 Ill.2d 116, 121, 190 N.E.2d 738, 741 (1963) (finding that hearsay rests on the credibility of someoneother than the in-court asserter). The value of those statements, therefore, does not hinge uponthe credibility and veracity of anyone other than Corp. Only Corp can be held liable for perjury ifthe statements contained in the affidavit are untrue. R. Hunter, Trial Handbook for IllinoisLawyers, Civil