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Fifth Division
Filed: 11/09/00

No. 1-98-3709

The Thomas Jefferson Charter School Foundation (the Foundation) sought toestablish a charter school within Community Consolidated School District No. 59(District 59). Pursuant to the Charter Schools Law (105 ILCS 5/27A-1 et seq. (West1996 and 1997 Supp.)), the Foundation submitted its charter proposal for approval. District 59 rejected the proposed charter based upon a determination that the proposalcontained inadequate financial and facility plans. The Foundation thereafter soughtreview by the Illinois State Board of Education (State Board). Following review andrecommendations by a Staff Appeal Panel, the State Board issued a final administrativedecision which reversed the decision of the local school board for District 59. District 59thereafter sought administrative review in the circuit court of Cook County. The circuitcourt affirmed the decision of the State Board, and District 59 brought the instant appeal. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the State Board's decision.

The relevant facts established by the administrative record reflect that on February6, 1998, the Foundation submitted a charter school proposal to District 59, seeking toestablish the Thomas Jefferson Charter School pursuant to the Act.⁽¹⁾ In accordance withthe Act, the proposal included the 15 factors which are mandated in the statute. 105ILCS 5/27A-7(a)(1 through 15) (West 1996 and 1997 Supp.). After holding two publicmeetings to allow community input and to obtain additional information from theFoundation, District 59 denied the Foundation's proposal at its March 23, 1998, meeting. Specifically, District 59 determined, inter alia, that the proposal did not conform withthe Act because it (1) lacked an adequate budget demonstrating that the terms of theproposed charter were economically sound, and (2) failed to identify two sites that werepotentially available as a charter school facility by the time the school was to open. TheFoundation filed a timely appeal of this decision to the State Board.

On May 18, 1998, the Staff Appeal Panel for the State Board heard argumentsregarding the Foundations' appeal. Upon consideration of this appeal, the panel issuedits written findings. In those findings, the Staff Appeal Panel rejected each of theconcerns raised by District 59. Specifically, the Staff Appeal Panel determined that theproposal met the minimum statutory requirement because it contained a description ofand address for at least two locations that were potentially available for the schoolfacility. In addition, the panel rejected the district's assertion that the proposal did notinclude an adequate budget demonstrating that the terms of the proposed charter wereeconomically sound for both the school and the district. Although the budget containedin the proposal covered only four of the five years in the proposed charter, the StaffAppeal Panel concluded that the proposal was in substantial compliance with thestatutory requirement.

The Superintendent for the State Board subsequently adopted the findings of theStaff Appeal Panel in their entirety. The Superintendent concluded that the proposalsubstantially complied with the Act, and he recommended that the charter be granted aslong as the Foundation submitted a viable facility plan and an updated budget. TheSuperintendent also found that if these two conditions were met, the issuance of thecharter would be in the best interests of the students it was intended to serve. The StateBoard accepted the conclusions and recommendation of the Superintendent and reversedthe decision of District 59 on condition that the Foundation submitted a viable facilityplan and an updated budget 30 days prior to the opening of the school.

District 59 filed a complaint for administrative review, and the circuit courtaffirmed the ruling by the State Board. District 59 thereafter filed the instant appeal,challenging the final administrative decision by the State Board.

On appeal, District 59 contends that (1) the State Board lacked statutory authorityto conditionally reverse the denial of the Foundation's charter proposal, and (2) thedecision of the State Board was against the manifest weight of the evidence.

In deciding the first issue, we examine the power conferred upon the State Boardin the Charter Schools Law (the Act) (105 ILCS 5/27A-1 et seq. (West 1996)). Purelylegal issues, such as statutory construction, are reviewed de novo. Board of Education ofCommunity High School District No. 155 v. Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board,247 Ill. App. 3d 337, 344, 617 N.E.2d 269 (1993). Where the authority of anadministrative body is in question, the determination of the scope of its power andauthority is a judicial function which is decided as a matter of law. People ex rel.Thompson v. Property Tax Appeal Board, 22 Ill. App. 3d 316, 321, 317 N.E.2d 121(1974). Accordingly, we review de novo the question of whether the State Board had thestatutory authority to reverse the decision of District 59.

The purposes and goals of the Act include encouraging innovative and alternativemeans of education in Illinois' public schools, increasing learning opportunities for allpupils, providing parents and pupils with expanded choices within the public schoolsystem, and encouraging parental and community involvement with public schools. 105ILCS 5/27A-2(b) (West 1996). The Act specifically provides that its provisions are to beinterpreted liberally to support the findings and goals of the Act. 105 ILCS 5/27A-2(c)(West 1996).

Under the Act, a group wishing to form a charter school must submit a proposal tothe local board of education, setting forth all of the details of the proposed charter school. 105 ILCS 5/27A-7 (West 1996). The proposal must identify at least two sites that arepotentially available as a charter school facility by the time the charter school is to open. 105 ILCS 5/27A-7(a)(3) (West 1996). In addition, the proposal must contain a proposedbudget, evidencing that the terms of the charter are economically sound for both thecharter school and for the local school district. 105 ILCS 5/27A-7(a)(9) (West 1996). After holding a public hearing, the local board votes to grant or to deny the charter. 105ILCS 5/27A-8 (West 1996).

If a local board denies the proposed charter, the charter school proponents mayappeal the decision to the State Board. 105 ILCS 5/27A-9(e) (West 1996). The StateBoard may reverse the local board's decision if the State Board finds that the charterschool or charter school proposal is in compliance with the Act and is in the best interestsof the students it is designed to serve. 105 ILCS 5/27A-9(e) (West 1996). Finaladministrative decisions of the State Board may be appealed to the courts. 105 ILCS5/27A-9(e) (West 1996).

Administrative agencies, such as the State Board, exercise purely statutory powersand possess no inherent or common law powers. Newkirk v. Bigard, 109 Ill. 2d 28, 37,485 N.E.2d 321 (1985); Schalz v. McHenry County Sheriff's Department Merit Comm'n,113 Ill. 2d 198, 202, 497 N.E.2d 731 (1986). Therefore, any authority the agency has toact must arise either from the express language of the Act, or by fair implication andintendment from those express provisions, as an incident to achieving the objectives forwhich the agency was created. Albazzaz v. Illinois Department of ProfessionalRegulation, 314 Ill. App. 3d 97, 104, 731 N.E.2d 787 (2000); City of Chicago v. IllinoisCommerce Commission, 294 Ill. App. 3d 129, 136-37, 689 N.E.2d 241 (1997). Expresslegislative grants of powers or duties to administrative agencies include the power to doall that is reasonably necessary to execute those powers or duties. Lake County Board ofReview v. Property Tax Appeal Board, 119 Ill. 2d 419, 427, 519 N.E.2d 459 (1988);Smith v. Department of Professional Regulation, 202 Ill. App. 3d 279, 289, 559 N.E.2d884 (1990). Where the legislature has granted to the State Board the authority, expressand implied, necessary to effectively carry out and accomplish the objectives of the Act,the provisions of the Act should be construed accordingly. See Phoenix Bond andIndemnity Co. v. Pappas, 309 Ill. App. 3d 779, 784, 723 N.E.2d 280 (1999); O'Grady v.Cook County Sheriff's Merit Board, 260 Ill. App. 3d 529, 535, 632 N.E.2d 87 (1994).

In the instant case, the authority of the State Board to reverse the decision ofDistrict 59 may be implied from the terms of the Act. See Gersch v. Illinois Departmentof Professional Regulation, 308 Ill. App. 3d 649, 658-59, 720 N.E.2d 672 (1999);O'Grady, 260 Ill. App. 3d at 536. The purposes and goals of the Act include encouraginginnovative and alternative means of education in Illinois' public schools, increasinglearning opportunities for all pupils, providing parents and pupils with expanded choiceswithin the public school system, and encouraging parental and community involvementwith public schools. The Act specifically provides that its provisions are to beinterpreted liberally to support its findings and goals.

Liberal statutory construction signifies an interpretation which produces broadercoverage or more inclusive application of statutory concepts. See Petition of K.M., 274Ill. App. 3d 189, 194, 653 N.E.2d 888 (1995). Liberal construction is ordinarily onewhich makes a statute apply to more things or in more situations than would be the caseunder strict construction. Petition of K.M., 274 Ill. App. 3d at 194. "'[L]iberalconstruction' means to give the language of a statutory provision, freely and consciously,its commonly, generally accepted meaning, to the end that the most comprehensiveapplication thereof may be accorded, without doing violence to any of its terms." Petition of K.M., 274 Ill. App. 3d at 194-95, quoting Maryland Casualty Co. v. Smith, 40S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931). Statutes should be interpreted so that themanifested purpose or object of the statute can be accomplished. Petition of K.M., 274Ill. App. 3d at 195; citing Pullman Co. v. Cummins, 10 Ill. 2d 454, 463, 140 N.E.2d 713(1957). Thus, a statute is liberally construed when its letter is extended to includematters within the spirit or purpose of the statute. Petition of K.M., 274 Ill. App. 3d at195, citing Zelkovich v. Industrial Commission, 8 Ill. 2d 146, 150, 133 N.E.2d 300(1956); In re Estate of Abell, 395 Ill. 337, 346, 70 N.E.2d 252 (1946); Karlson v.Murphy, 387 Ill. 436, 443, 56 N.E.2d 839 (1944).

We review the State Board's action in light of the express statutory mandate thatthe provisions of the Act be given a liberal construction to support its findings and goals. The provisions of the Act must be construed to vest the State Board with the authoritynecessary to effectively carry out and accomplish the objectives of the Act. As notedabove, the Act was enacted to encourage innovative and alternative means of educationin Illinois' public schools, increase learning opportunities for all pupils, provide parentsand pupils with expanded choices within the public school system, and encourageparental and community involvement with public schools. To that end, the Act gives theState Board the explicit power to reverse the decision of a local school district upon afinding that the charter proposal is in compliance with the Act and is in the best interestsof the students it is designed to serve. 105 ILCS 5/27A-9(e) (West 1998).

We find that, by fair implication and intendment from that express provisionwhich must be construed liberally, the Board is authorized to reverse the denial of acharter upon a finding that the proposal substantially complies with the Act and that theapproval of the charter would be in the best interests of the students if certain conditionsare met within a specified time period. Accordingly, we hold that the State Board hadthe statutory authority to reverse the decision of District 59 on condition that theFoundation submit a viable facility plan and an updated budget.

District 59 also seeks reversal of the State Board's decision, arguing that it wasagainst the manifest weight of the evidence. However, in accordance with the supremecourt's decision in City of Belvidere v. Illinois State Labor Relations Board, 181 Ill. 2d191, 204, 692 N.E.2d 295 (1998), we find that the appropriate standard of review iswhether the Board's decision was clearly erroneous. Where review of an administrativeagency's findings present a mixed question of law and fact, the appropriate standard iswhether the decision was clearly erroneous. City of Belvidere, 181 Ill. 2d at 205. Thisstandard falls between the standard that applies to pure questions of law and thatapplying to pure questions of fact, "so as to provide some deference to the [agency's]experience and expertise." City of Belvidere, 181 Ill. 2d at 205.

In the instant case, review of the State Board's decision involves a mixed questionof fact and law. The Board's finding is, in part, factual because it requires considerationof whether the establishment of a charter school by the Foundation is in the best interestsof the students it is intended to serve. Yet, the Board's finding also concerns a questionof law because it requires consideration of whether the terms of the proposal weresufficient to establish compliance with the Act. Consequently, we must determinewhether the State Board's reversal of District 59's decision was clearly erroneous. City ofBelvidere, 181 Ill.2d at 205.

Under this standard, we must accept the administrative agency's findings unlesswe are " 'left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.' " Concrete Pipe & Products of California, Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust,508 U.S. 602, 622, 124 L. Ed. 2d 539, 563-64, 113 S. Ct. 2264, 2279 (1993), quotingUnited States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395, 92 L. Ed. 746, 766, 68 S.Ct. 525, 541-42 (1948).

In the case at bar, there is no dispute that the proposed charter containedsatisfactory information regarding 13 of the 15 factors mandated in the Act. As to theremaining two factors, the facility location and the updated budget, the State Boarddetermined that the Foundation had presented sufficient information to comply with theAct and to establish that the issuance of the charter was in the best interests of thestudents it was intended to serve.

Specifically, the board concluded that the Foundation had named at least two sitesthat were potentially available as a charter school facility by the time the charter schoolwas to open, as required by section 27A-7(3) of the Act. 105 ILCS 5/27A-7(3) (West1998). The evidence which supported this conclusion was derived from the proposedcharter which identified four sites which were being marketed for sale or lease that couldbe renovated and leased by the charter school. In addition, the board found that theFoundation had established that the financial terms of the charter proposal wereeconomically sound for both the charter school and the school district. 105 ILCS 5/27A-9 (West 1998). The evidence supporting this finding included documentary evidence inthe form of a budget, which would be updated 30 days prior to the opening of the school,as well as testamentary evidence regarding spending assumptions for goods and serviceswhich would be different from, and more flexible than, those employed by District 59.

Upon careful consideration of the administrative record, we hold that the StateBoard was not clearly erroneous when it found that the charter proposal satisfied therequirements of the Act and was in the best interests of the students it was intended toserve.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County isaffirmed.

AFFIRMED.

BUCKLEY, J., and O'BRIEN, J., concur.

1. 1 This was the third proposal submitted by the Foundation. District 59 haddenied the prior two proposals, and the State Board upheld those decisions.