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FIRST DIVISION
June 28, 2004

JUSTICE GORDON delivered the opinion of the court:

Defendant, the Board of Education of Cicero School District 99 (District 99 or district),appeals the trial court's order granting plaintiff, Marie Bill's motion for summary judgment onthe grounds that District 99 failed to give Bill statutory notice that she would not be rehired forthe 2000-01 school year. As a result of the judgment, Bill was awarded damages equal to whatwould have been her salary for the contested school year, prejudgment interest, costs andattorney fees. District 99 contends that Bill's action was barred by the doctrine of laches or, inthe alternative, that she received sufficient notice she would not be rehired. The district furthercontends that Bill was not entitled to attorney fees under the Attorney's Fees in Wage ActionsAct (705 ILCS 225/0.01 et seq. West 2002). Because we find there are issues of fact yet to bedetermined, we reverse and remand for trial.

BACKGROUND

On November 4, 1998, after the school year had begun, plaintiff, Marie Bill, was hired asa full-time probationary⁽¹⁾ English-as-a-second-language (ESL) teacher by District 99 for theremainder of the 1998-99 school year. Bill's employment contract for the 1998-99 school yearwas dated February 11, 1998, and provided "[t]his contract is null and void in June of 1999." The following school year (1999-2000), Bill was again hired to fill an ESL position after theschool year began. She began teaching on October 18, 1999, and her employment contract, datedNovember 4, 1999, again stated, "[t]his contract is null and void in June of 2000." At the end ofthe 1999-2000 school year, Bill had not received an assignment for the 2000-01 school year.

Bill stated during her deposition that because she had not yet received a job assignmentfor the 2000-01 school year in July or August of 2000, she began looking for a teaching job. Sheretrieved her teacher's certificate from District 99 and on August 8, 2000, she sent a letter toCindy Mosca, the ESL coordinator for District 99. The letter expressed an interest in obtainingan ESL teaching position in District 99 for the approaching school year. Subsequently, onAugust 31, 2000, Bill faxed a letter to Dr. Edward Aksamit, assistant superintendent for District99, expressing her interest in working for the district and informing him that she had received noresponse to her August 8 letter to Mosca. Bill reportedly also interviewed for a teaching job atDowners Grove North High School during the summer.

On September 5, 2000, Bill telephoned Tom Smith, a representative for Local No. 571 ofthe Illinois Federation of Teachers (the union). Bill told Smith about the letter she faxed toAksamit and stated that she never received notice of her termination the year before. Smithadvised Bill that the district was required, under section 24-11 of the School Code (105 ILCS5/24-11 (West 2002)), to provide her with written notice 45 days prior to the end of the 1999-2000 school year, advising her whether she would be reemployed for the 2000-01 year. Becauseshe had not received such notice, the Code provided Bill with the right to a teaching position inDistrict 99 for the 2000-01 school year. Bill testified in her deposition that she was surprised toget this information, as she was unaware of her rights under the School Code. That same month,Bill telephoned Aksamit and informed him that she never received any notice regarding whethershe would be rehired for the 2000-01 school year. She stated that, thereafter, she relied on Smithto contact the district on her behalf.

In the fall of 2000, Smith spoke with Dr. Anthony Scariano, superintendent of District 99,and Aksamit, who told Smith that the terms of Bill's 1999-2000 contract, which provided that thecontract would be null and void as of June 2000, sufficiently notified Bill that she would not beemployed as a teacher in District 99 in the 2000-01 school year. Although Smith argued toScariano that the contract's "null and void" language did not satisfy the School Code'snotification requirement and requested that Bill be given a teaching position immediately,Scariano refused.

On March 14, 2001, Smith wrote a letter to Scariano stating the union's position andurging the district to reemploy Bill. The district refused in writing in April. The union's attorneythen sent a legal opinion to the district on August 17, 2001, and the district's attorney respondedwith its legal opinion on November 6, 2001. The opinions addressed the issue of notice undersection 24-11 of the School Code (105 ILCS 5/24-11 (West 2002)).

On November 16, 2001, Bill filed a complaint against the district. Count I alleged thatDistrict 99 failed to provide her with the required statutory notice under section 24-11 of theSchool Code regarding whether she would be employed for the 2000-01 school year. She arguedthat as a result of this failure, the district was required to reemploy her. She therefore requestedher salary as if she had been reemployed for the 2000-01 term and argued she should bereemployed for the remainder of the 2001-02 term. Under this count, Bill further requestedrecovery for the costs of the litigation and reasonable attorney fees pursuant to the AttorneysFees in Wage Actions Act (705 ILCS 225/0.01 et seq. (West 2002)). In count II, Bill requestedreenrollment in the district's health insurance program.

In response, District 99 filed a motion to dismiss count I of Bill's complaint for failure tostate a cause of action (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2002)). The district argued that Bill's complaintwas barred by the doctrine of laches because it was filed almost 19 months after she wasallegedly notified of her rights by her union representative. It further argued that Bill receivedproper notification she would not be reemployed for the 2000-01 school year due to the terms ofher one-year employment contract. The trial court granted the motion only as to any claimsbeyond the 2000-01 school year, including reinstatement. The court denied the motion in allother respects, including a rejection of the laches doctrine. District 99 thereafter filed a motionfor partial summary judgment as to the attorney fees requested pursuant to the Attorneys Fees inWage Actions Act in count I of Bill's complaint. The district asserted that a proper writtendemand for such fees was not made pursuant to the Act. This motion was also denied.

Bill subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment as to the undismissed allegationsin count I of her complaint, arguing that she was denied statutory notice under section 24-11 as amatter of law. She argued that Aksamit's deposition contradicted the district's contention that the"null and void" language in Bill's contract provided her with sufficient notice that she would notbe reemployed for the 2000-01 school year. In this regard, Aksamit testified at his depositionthat the section 24-11 letters, notifying teachers whether they would be retained for the followingschool term, were generally sent to all probationary teachers. He stated that to his knowledge, allof the other probationary ESL teachers, aside from Bill, received written notice not later than 45days before the end of the 1999-2000 school year whether they would be rehired for the nextschool year. He stated that although only teachers who were hired after the school year beganreceived contracts with the "null and void" language, such teachers normally would still receivenotice before the end of the school year that they were going to be rehired where theirperformance had been acceptable. Moreover, teachers whose performance was not acceptable,would get "an evaluation that says they did not meet the standards and they're not going to berehired." Aksamit stated that Bill did not receive any notice whatsoever. In addition, Aksamitspecifically testified to the following:

"Q. When Ms. Bill signed the contract in October of '99 for the '99-2000school year *** would she have known if she was going to be re-employed or notre-employed *** at that time?

A. At that time?

Q. Yes.

A. No.

Q. Okay. Nor did you, correct?

A. Correct.

* * *

Q. *** [A]t the end of the '99-2000 school year, there would have been aBoard meeting which took up questions of which teachers would or would not bere-employed?

A. It's in March.

Q. Okay. In March. Okay. And would that have been - the Marchmeeting, the March 2000 meeting, would that have been the meeting that the issueof Ms. Bill would have been brought up whether or not she would be re-employedor not?

A. Yes.

Q. And do you attend the Board meetings?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you recall specifically that the issue of Miss Bill being brought up?

A. No.

Q. Now, but that would have been the meeting where the determinationwould have been made that she would not be re-hired, correct?

A. That would have been the meeting to determine whether or not shewould have not been rehired, correct.

* * *

Q. Now, the letter that teachers receive, a probationary teacher wouldreceive telling them that they would not be rehired or they were going to berehired, is that a letter -- [is] that type of notice signed by the president of theBoard of Education?

* * *

A. *** [I]t's usually signed by the Board president.

* * *

Q. Okay. It has to be Board action?

A. Yes.

* * *

Q. *** [W]ould a similar letter go out to teachers who are not going to beretained for the next school year?

A. Similar.

* * *

Q. And typically it's the March meeting of a school year where decisionsare made to hire or not or to retain or not retain a given probationary teacher?

A. That's correct."

In response to Bill's motion for summary judgment, District 99 first contended thatsection 24-11 did not require notice independent of that provided by the "null and void" languagein Bill's contract; second, it reasserted the affirmative defense of laches.

On June 30, 2003, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Bill on count I. The court found that Bill was not provided with proper notice that she would not be reemployedfor the following school year, pursuant to section 24-11 of the School Code. It furtherdetermined that the doctrine of laches did not bar Bill's complaint for being untimely as Smithhad been attempting to negotiate with the district and convince the district to reemploy Bill. Thecourt awarded Bill $27,164, the salary she would have earned had she been reemployed for the2000-01 year. She was further awarded 5% per year prejudgment interest pursuant to section 2of the Illinois Interest Act (815 ILCS 205/2 (West 2002)), totaling $3,732.20, and costs in theamount of $804.70. On June 17, 2003, the trial court further awarded Bill attorney fees pursuantto the Attorneys Fees in Wage Actions Act (705 ILCS 225/0.01 et seq. (West 2002)), amountingto $16,517.50. Bill voluntarily dismissed count II of her complaint.

On appeal, District 99 contends that the trial court improperly granted summary judgmentin Bill's favor, as the doctrine of laches barred her complaint and the "null and void" language inher employment contract properly notified her that she would not be reemployed for the 2000-01school year. The district further contends that the trial court erred in granting Bill's petition forattorney fees. We reverse and remand.

ANALYSIS

Summary judgment is properly granted where the pleadings, depositions, admissions andaffidavits show there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled tojudgment as a matter of law. 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 2002). In considering a motion forsummary judgment, the motion and supporting documents must be viewed in a light mostfavorable to the nonmoving party. Pyne v. Witmer, 129 Ill. 2d 351, 358, 543 N.E.2d 1304, 1308 (1989). Although the nonmovant need not prove his case at this stage, he must present factswhich, if believed, would arguably entitle him to judgment. Robidoux v. Oliphant, 201 Ill. 2d324, 335, 775 N.E.2d 987, 994 (2002). The granting of a motion for summary judgment isreviewed de novo. Crum & Forester Managers Corp. v. Resolution Trust Corp., 156 Ill. 2d 384,390, 620 N.E.2d 1073, 1077 (1993).

The defendant district first argues that the court improperly granted Bill's motion forsummary judgment because the doctrine of laches barred her cause of action. The lachesdoctrine is defined as " 'the neglect or omission to assert a right which, taken in conjunction witha lapse of time and circumstances causing prejudice to the opposite party, will operate as a bar toa suit.' " Lee v. City of Decatur, 256 Ill. App. 3d 192, 195, 627 N.E.2d 1256, 1258 (1994),quoting People ex rel. Heavey v. Fitzgerald, 10 Ill. App. 3d 24, 26, 293 N.E.2d 705, 707 (1973). A plaintiff must have knowledge of his right but fail to assert it in a timely manner for laches toapply. Sundance Homes, Inc. v. County of Du Page, 195 Ill. 2d 257, 270, 746 N.E.2d 254, 262(2001). Laches is an affirmative defense, requiring a two-prong analysis, which addresseswhether the employer was prejudiced by the delay, as stated above, and whether the plaintiff hasdemonstrated a reasonable excuse for the delay. Long v. Tazewell/Pekin ConsolidatedCommunications Center, 236 Ill. App. 3d 967, 970, 602 N.E.2d 856, 857-58 (1992).

In this case, defendant cites to Schultheis v. City of Chicago, 240 Ill. 167, 88 N.E. 563(1909), for the employment of a per se six-month laches rule developed specifically for casesinvolving the termination of a public employee. In Schultheis, the plaintiff, a terminatedpoliceman, brought a petition for mandamus against the City of Chicago, requesting that hisname be restored to the police payroll. The supreme court determined that "a member of theChicago police force claiming to have been wrongfully removed would be barred by laches fromhis right to have the record of the civil service commissioners reviewed by certiorari if hedelayed more than six months in beginning his suit, unless the delay was satisfactorily explainedby the petition for the writ." Schultheis, 240 Ill. at 170, 88 N.E. at 564.

This general proposition originated in City of Chicago v. Condell, 224 Ill. 595, 79 N.E.954 (1906), where the Illinois Supreme Court determined that a public servant's delay in filing apetition for common law writ of certiorari is deemed unreasonable not merely due to the lapse oftime, but where a detriment or inconvenience to the public results. Condell, 224 Ill. at 598, 79N.E. at 956. Where a public servant delays in filing his action, a detriment to the publicinherently results because the restoration of the plaintiff to his prior position confers upon himthe right to require the payment of his salary up to that date. Condell, 224 Ill. at 599, 79 N.E. at956. Therefore, "a party is required to act speedily in making his application and anyunreasonable delay will warrant the refusal of the writ." Condell, 224 Ill. at 598-99, 79 N.E. at956. The specific six-month rule later emerged in Clark v. City of Chicago, 233 Ill. 113, 84 N.E.170 (1908). At the time Clark was decided, there existed a statutory method to review judgmentsof justices of the peace by writ of certiorari, which carried with it a six-month statute oflimitations. Clark, 233 Ill. at 115, 84 N.E. at 171. The Clark court analogized such review to thereview of an order of removal of a police officer by the civil service commission; it therebyinstituted the six-month laches rule for police officers, requiring presentation of a petition forwrit of certiorari within six months of the entry of the order to be reviewed unless the officerprovided a reasonable excuse for the delay. Clark, 233 Ill. at 115, 84 N.E. at 171.

Since Schultheis, Condell and Clark, the six-month rule has been employed in variousother public employee cases, including Summers v. Village of Durand, 267 Ill. App. 3d 767, 643N.E.2d 272 (1994), Lee and Coleman v. O'Grady, 207 Ill. App. 3d 43, 565 N.E.2d 253 (1990). In Summers, the chief of police filed an action for breach of contract against the defendant,seeking back pay and lost benefits. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint,asserting, among other things, that the action was barred by the laches doctrine. The trial courtdismissed the action. In reversing the dismissal, the reviewing court held:

"Courts have devised a rule to be used in applying the doctrine of laches tocauses of action brought by discharged public sector employees seekingreinstatement and/or back pay. The rule is that a delay of longer than six monthsfrom the date of termination to the filing of suit is per se unreasonable and willjustify dismissal on the ground of laches if: (a) the plaintiff can show noreasonable excuse for the delay; and (b) the employer would suffer prejudice byhaving to pay both a replacement worker's salary and a successful plaintiff's backwages during the period of delay." Summers, 267 Ill. App. 3d at 771, 643 N.E.2dat 276.

Although the plaintiff in Summers waited longer than six months to file his action and offered noexplanation for the delay, the court stated that there was no indication the defendant had hired areplacement worker. Therefore, there was no indication of prejudice from the face of thecomplaint, and the cause of action was improperly summarily dismissed based on laches. Summers, 267 Ill. App. 3d at 771, 643 N.E.2d at 276.

In Lee and Coleman, a fire fighter and police officer, respectively, sued their formeremployers for reinstatement and back pay. In both cases, the courts determined that the suitswere barred by the laches doctrine, as the plaintiffs waited more than six months after theirdismissal to file their actions. The court further determined that the delays were prejudicial tothe defendants because they had already hired replacement workers. Neither defendant offered areasonable excuse for his delay. Lee, 256 Ill. App. 3d at 198, 627 N.E.2d at 1260; Coleman, 207Ill. App. 3d at 46, 565 N.E.2d at 254. Quoting Kadon v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners,45 Ill. App. 2d 425, 430, 195 N.E.2d 751, 753-54 (1964), the Coleman court reiterated thereasoning behind the rule:

" '[I]n civil service cases, where prolonged delay may easily prejudicegovernmental bodies, impair orderly procedures and work to the disadvantage ofthird parties, time is an essential factor. The most stringent requirement timewiseis in those cases brought by civil service employees to compel reinstatement andpayment of back salaries after discharges alleged to be illegal. A rule has beenestablished that if these cases are not brought within six months of the dischargethey will be barred on the ground of laches, unless a reasonable explanation canbe given for the delay.' " Coleman, 207 Ill. App. 3d at 47, 565 N.E.2d at 255.

Defendant contends the plaintiff's action here was barred by this six-month laches rule, asit was an action for wrongful termination and back wages by a public employee. Althoughplaintiff urges, for the reasons discussed below, that the six-month laches rule should not applyto cases such as this one involving the dismissal of a nontenured teacher under the School Code,we disagree and see no reason to differentiate teachers from policemen, firefighters and hospitalworkers, as the same reasoning discussed above applies to all civil servants.

Plaintiff first contends that the laches doctrine is not applicable in this case because it isan equitable doctrine, which cannot be used to bar an action for monetary damages. Thisargument has been previously rejected on a number of occasions. While we agree thattraditionally, statutes of limitation were generally applied to legal actions and the laches doctrinewas applied to those actions based in equity, such "mechanical" applications are no longerfollowed. See Sundance Homes, Inc., 195 Ill. 2d at 270-71, 746 N.E.2d at 262-63. Courts haveapplied laches to "equity-like" actions, such as mandamus, to quasi-equitable suits, to actionswhere equitable considerations are at the heart of a claim actually based in law, as well as topurely legal claims. 27A Am. Jur. 2d Equity