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PRESIDING JUSTICE McBRIDE delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff-appellant, Zofia Biel, independent administrator ofthe estate of Jan Biel, brought an action to recover againstdefendants, City of Bridgeview and William Hamman, and defendants-appellees Lyons Electric Co., Inc. (Lyons), and Pinner Electric,Inc. (Pinner),⁽¹⁾ when Jan Biel he was struck and killed by a carwhile crossing the street. Plaintiff claims that defendants'negligence caused a streetlight to be inoperable which, ifoperable, would have illuminated the location where Jan Biel waskilled. Such negligence, according to plaintiff, was acontributing proximate cause of Jan Biel's death. Defendants movedfor summary judgment on the basis that the inoperable streetlightonly created a condition and could not have proximately caused theaccident as a matter of law. The summary judgment motion wasoriginally denied, but based on a motion to reconsider, the trialcourt reversed itself and entered summary judgment in favor ofdefendants. Plaintiff now appeals the trial court's summaryjudgment ruling.

Two issues are raised on review: whether the trial courtproperly granted summary judgment in favor of defendants on theground that the nonfunctioning streetlight was only a condition andnot a proximate cause of the accident; and whether the trial courtabused its discretion by allowing defendant's motion to reconsiderthe denial of summary judgment in their favor. We state thefollowing background facts.

Defendants are electrical contracting companies. Plaintiff'sfirst amended complaint alleged the Village of Bridgeviewcontracted with defendants to make repairs on particularstreetlights within the Village. Prior to August 21, 1995,defendants repaired streetlights on 79th Street west of HarlemAvenue, Bridgeview, Illinois.

On August 21, 1985, at approximately 11 p.m., Jan Biel waskilled when he was struck by a car driven by William Hamman. Atthe time of the accident, Hamman was traveling westbound on 79thStreet just past the intersection of 79th Street and Harlem Avenue,Bridgeview, Illinois. Hamman testified that he knew that onestreetlight was out which provided illumination over the medianarea of 79th Street. He also stated that the marquee signs andparking lot lights of surrounding stores, including a K mart, wereturned off. As he was driving approximately 30 miles per hour on79th Street, just past the intersection of 79th Street and HarlemAvenue, Hamman stated that he moved into the left-hand lane. Atthat point, something hit the windshield. Hamman pulled to theside of the road, called his wife, told her he may have hitsomeone, and ran down to where the accident had occurred. Hammansaid that he noticed that Biel's clothing was dark. After theaccident, Hamman told police that he never saw Jan Biel prior tothe collision.

Plaintiff's first amended complaint alleged that the City ofBridgeview contracted with defendants to manage, maintain, andcontrol "a certain light post which was intended to providesufficient lighting to that portion of 79th Street *** near itsintersection with Harlem Avenue." The complaint further allegedthat it then became defendants' duty to manage, maintain, andcontrol "the aforementioned light pole so as to provide sufficientlighting to that portion of 79th Street *** near its intersectionwith Harlem Avenue." Notwithstanding this duty, the complaintstated that defendants were guilty of the following negligent actsor omissions:

"(a) carelessly and negligently failed toinspect said light pole at allreasonable times;

(b) carelessly and negligently failed tomaintain said light pole;

(c) carelessly and negligently failed tocreate and implement procedures toinspect that aforementioned lightpole;

(d) otherwise carelessly and negligentlyowned, operated, managed, maintainedand controlled said light pole."

At all relevant times, the complaint alleged that theaforementioned light post was not illuminated. As a direct andproximate result of the defendants, "in failing to illuminate thesaid light post," the complaint stated the motor vehicle driven byHamman struck and killed Jan Biel as he crossed 79th Street.

Glenn Jendrzejewski, an eyewitness to the accident, testifiedthat he was familiar with 79th Street and that he lived in atrailer apartment at 7858 South Harlem Avenue, Bridgeview,Illinois. When he saw the accident, he was sitting on a whitechair in front of his apartment. The accident occurred on a clear,dark night at approximately 11 p.m. He indicated that thestreetlight in the vicinity of the accident was "out" and that ithad been out for approximately a year. In the area where theparticular light was not illuminated, the area was dark. Theclosest crosswalk was at the intersection of 79th Street and HarlemAvenue. According to Jendrzejewski, the accident occurred about ahalf a block west of this crosswalk on 79th Street.

Jendrzejewski testified that, prior to crossing 79th Street,Jan Biel stumbled and fell over a chain-link fence and then fellseveral more times on the sidewalk. He stated that Biel appearedto be drunk or on heavy medication. According to Jendrzejewski,Biel was wearing a dark green shirt, green pants, and dark socks. Biel then went over to a light pole that had a 40-mile-per-hourspeed limit sign affixed to it. For a short time, Biel leanedagainst the pole. Jendrzejewski testified that Biel began crossing79th Street. As Biel crossed, he was wobbling back and forth as hemade it half way across the street. Biel then stood in the middleof the street for about 10 seconds. A car approached, andJendrzejewski said that he saw Biel get hit by the front end of thevehicle on the driver's side. Biel flew about five feet into theair. At that time, Jendrzejewski ran inside and dialed 911. Priorto impact, Jendrzejewski said the car did not slow down.

Herman Caldwell, also an eyewitness to the accident, testifiedthat he lived in a trailer at 7858 South Harlem Avenue, Bridgeview,Illinois. He lived in the same double trailer as GlennJendrzejewski. He stated that he was very familiar with 79thStreet west of Harlem Avenue. On the night of the accident,Caldwell stated he witnessed the accident while sitting in a lawnchair next to Jendrzejewski. He testified that it was a nicesummer evening, visibility was clear, and the streets were dry. Caldwell further stated that all of the streetlights on the northside of 79th Street were working on the evening of the accidentwith the exception of one, the light pole with the 40-mile-per-hourspeed limit sign. Caldwell testified that the light had been outfor at least a few months.

According to Caldwell, he was sitting in front of Jendrzejewski's trailer when he first saw Biel. Biel appearedvery drunk. He said that Biel kept falling over a chain-link fenceand onto the sidewalk. Caldwell said he saw Biel stumble and fallat least four or five times. Biel then leaned on the lamppost withthe burned out streetlight and the 40-mile-per-hour speed limitsign. Caldwell said he asked Biel after he fell if he would liketo sit down for a few minutes and if Biel would like a ride home. Biel who was slurring his words, responded no thank you. Bielwaited at the lamppost for about 20 seconds.

Caldwell testified that Biel began crossing 79th Street at thelight pole with the 40-mile-per-hour speed limit sign on it. Priorto crossing, Caldwell said, Biel looked east toward Harlem Avenuefor oncoming traffic. He then began staggering into the street. When Biel had moved about four feet into the street, he was hit bya fast moving on-coming vehicle. Biel's body flew high into theair and landed near the double yellow line next to the left-handlane. After the accident, Caldwell said, he ran out into thestreet to block traffic. According to Caldwell, the left frontheadlight on the vehicle was out prior to the accident.

Caldwell also said that there were no crosswalks at the placewhere Biel was crossing. However, he did testify that he hadnoticed other people crossing 79th Street where the accidentoccurred. He also stated that he had crossed the street there andthat he observed others crossing at that location daily.

James O'Donnell, a doctor of pharmacy and expert in alcoholeffects, testified that he examined documents related to thealcohol levels in the decedent, Jan Biel, at the time of theaccident. O'Donnell opined that Biel was severely intoxicated onAugust 21, 1995, with a blood-alcohol level of .258. O'Donnellbased his opinion on the "alcohol test" taken from Biel at ChristHospital and the testimony of the eye-witnesses who saw himstumbling prior to the accident. He further stated that a personwith a blood-alcohol level of .258 would be severely impaired andwould have difficulty walking.

In her complaint, plaintiff alleged that defendants werenegligent because they carelessly and negligently failed toinspect, maintain, and illuminate the streetlight, and thesenegligent acts were a proximate cause of Jan Biel's death. Asnoted by plaintiff, defendants initially filed motions in the trialcourt for summary judgment on the ground that failure to repair thestreetlight at issue was only a condition and not a proximate causeof Jan Biel's death. The motions were stricken by Judge PhilipBronstein in an order entered June 4, 1999, because counsel fordefendants failed to appear. Defendants then filed a second motionfor summary judgment on the "cause vs. condition analysis." Thesecond summary judgment motion was denied by Judge Sophia Hall onDecember 6, 1999.

On August 3, 2000, defendants sought leave to file a motion toreconsider Judge Hall's ruling entered on December 6, 1999. On thesame day, leave was granted to file the motion, but Judge DonaldO'Brien limited the motion to the issue of, " 'cause vs. condition'and the applicability of [First Springfield Bank & Trust v. Galman,188 Ill. 2d 252, 720 N.E.2d 1068 (1999)] and other cases on theissue subsequent to 12/6/99." Also on August 3, 2000, defendantsfiled their motion to reconsider the December 6, 1999, order on twogrounds: that the trial court ruled on summary judgment without thebenefit of the supreme court's decision in Galman, cited above; andthat Caldwell's and O'Donnell's depositions were not available forthe court's consideration in defendants' prior motion for summaryjudgment. On September 20, 2000, Judge Sophia Hall granteddefendants' motion to reconsider on the ground that she hadmisapplied the law and entered summary judgment in defendants'favor. Plaintiff appeals the entry of the motion to reconsider andthe summary judgment order in favor of defendants. We firstaddress whether the trial court properly entered summary judgmenton the basis that the inoperable streetlight was only a conditionand not a proximate cause of Biel's death. The supreme court hasstated:

"Summary judgment is *** proper only when theresolution of a case hinges on a question oflaw and the moving party's right to judgmentis clear and free from doubt. [Citation.] Inconsidering a motion for summary judgment, thecourt must consider the affidavits,depositions, admissions, exhibits, andpleadings on file and has a duty to construethe evidence strictly against the movant andliberally in favor of the nonmoving party.[Citation.] If the court finds that therecord contains any material issues of genuinefact, the motion for summary judgment must bedenied. A triable issue of fact exists wherethere is a dispute as to material facts orwhere the material facts are undisputed butreasonable persons might draw differentinferences from those facts. [Citation.] Asin all cases involving summary judgment, wereview the evidence in the record de novo." In re Estate of Hoover, 155 Ill. 2d 402, 410-11, 615 N.E.2d 736 (1993).

The supreme court has also held: "To recover damages basedupon a defendant's alleged negligence, a plaintiff must allege andprove that the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff, thatdefendant breached that duty, and that the breach was the proximatecause of the plaintiff's injuries. [Citation.]" Galman, 188 Ill.2d at 256. In the instant case, plaintiff's first amendedcomplaint alleges the elements set forth above. In grantingsummary judgment, however, the trial court found that defendants'failure to replace the inoperable streetlight was, as a matter oflaw, a condition as opposed to a proximate cause of Biel's injury.

In Galman, the supreme court held: "Illinois courts draw adistinction between a condition and a cause." Galman, 188 Ill. 2dat 257. The court further stated:

"Indeed if the negligence charged does nothingmore than furnish a condition by which theinjury is made possible, and that conditioncauses an injury by the subsequent,independent act of a third person, thecreation of the condition is not the proximatecause of the injury. Briske v. Village ofBurnham, 379 Ill. 193, 199 [, 39 N.E.2d 976](1942); Merlo v. Public Service Co., 381 Ill.300, 316[, 45 N.E.2d 665] (1942); see alsoThompson [v. County of Cook,] 154 Ill. 2d[374,] 383[, 609 N.E.2d 290] (1993)]. Thetest that should be applied in all proximatecause cases is whether the first wrongdoerreasonably might have anticipated theintervening efficient cause as a natural andprobable result of the first party's ownnegligence. [Citation.]" Galman, 188 Ill. 2dat 257.

The Galman court also identified a second test for determiningproximate cause which was established in Lee v. Chicago TransitAuthority, 152 Ill. 2d 432, 455, 605 N.E.2d 493 (1992). Specifically, it stated:

"In Lee the court held that the term'proximate cause' describes two distinctrequirements: cause in fact and legal cause.[Citation.] Cause in fact exists where thereis a reasonable certainty that a defendant'sacts caused the injury or damage. [Citation.] A defendant's conduct is a cause in fact ofthe plaintiff's injury only if that conduct isa material element and a substantial factor inbringing about the injury. [Citation.] Adefendant's conduct is a material element anda substantial factor in bringing about aninjury if, absent that conduct, the injurywould not have occurred. [Citation.] 'Legalcause,' by contrast, is essentially a questionof foreseeability. [Citation.] The relevantinquiry here is whether the injury is of atype that a reasonable person would see as alikely result of his or her conduct.[Citation.]" Galman, 188 Ill. 2d at 257-58.

The court noted that the parties in that case were under themistaken impression that the two tests were incompatible. Instead,the supreme court held that although Briske, Merlo, and Thompsonemployed a different vocabulary than Lee, all of the cases askedthe same question: "Was defendant's negligence a material andsubstantial element in bringing about the injury, and, if so, wasthe injury of a type that a reasonable person would see as a likelyresult of his or her conduct?" Galman, 188 Ill. 2d at 259. Itwent on to conclude that, "[f]ar from conflicting Briske, Merlo,Thompson, and Lee uniformly embrace the traditional proximate causetest that has governed Illinois for the better part of thiscentury. [Citation.]" Galman, 188 Ill. 2d at 258-59.

With the above standard in place, we must determine whetherthe requirements of proximate cause, specifically cause in fact andlegal cause, have been satisfied in the instant case.

Based upon the pleadings and depositions in this record, wefind that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whetherdefendants' conduct in failing to replace the streetlight was amaterial element and a substantial factor in Jan Biel's death. Wenote that, "[w]here reasonable minds could differ, whether thedefendant's conduct was of such a substantial factor in bringingabout the plaintiff's injury is for the jury to decide." Lee, 152Ill. 2d at 455. At the very least, from the testimony presented,it can be inferred that Biel's death would not have occurred butfor an inoperable streetlight above the accident location, and thatBiel may have avoided the accident in the event the streetlight wasilluminated. Further, Jendrzejewski and Caldwell both testifiedthat the streetlight was inoperable where Biel elected to cross. They also said that the lights of the K mart and other surroundingbusiness were turned off and that the area where Biel crossed 79thStreet was dark. Based upon these facts, we conclude that agenuine issue of material facts exists as to whether defendants'conduct was a material element and a substantial factor in bringingabout Biel's death.

We also find that a material question of fact exists as towhether defendants' failure to repair, maintain, and illuminate thestreetlight in question was the legal cause of Jan Biel's death. As we noted above, legal cause is essentially a question offoreseeability. Galman, 188 Ill. 2d at 258. "The relevant inquiryhere is whether the injury is of a type that a reasonable personwould see as a likely result of his or her conduct." Galman, 188Ill. 2d at 258.

Here, defendants suggest that they could not have reasonablyforeseen that "allowing an inoperative streetlight to exist on 79thStreet mid block would likely result in plaintiff's decedent JanBiel: (1) failing to utilize nearby crosswalks; (2) deciding tocross the street mid block; (3) at a location where the streetlightwas out; (4) wearing dark clothing; (5) being extremelyintoxicated; (6) staggering and not able to control his ownmovement; and (7) standing in the middle of 79^th Street in such acondition for at least 10 seconds." According to defendants, as amatter of law, the independent acts of Jan Biel were not reasonably foreseeable. We disagree.

While Jan Biel's conduct may have been contributorilynegligent, we cannot say as a matter of law that Biel's death wasnot foreseeable to defendants which failed to maintain, repair, andilluminate the streetlight at the location where Biel crossed 79thStreet. As we noted above, Jendrzejewski and Caldwell bothtestified that the streetlight was "out" where Biel elected tocross. There seems to be no dispute that defendants had contractedwith the City of Bridgeview to maintain the streetlight at issue. Additionally, Jendrzejewski said that the light had been out forapproximately one year. Caldwell testified that the light had beenout for at least a few months. Both Jendrzejewski and Caldwellsaid that the lights of surrounding businesses had been turned off,making the area very dark. Further, Caldwell testified that hecrossed 79th Street where Biel crossed and that he had seen otherpedestrians using the exact same location to cross almost daily. Based upon the testimony presented, we conclude that a question offact exists as to whether Biel's injury was foreseeable todefendants.

Further, we are not persuaded by the city ordinances and statelaws relied upon by defendants in this case. The statutes reliedupon by defendants concern a pedestrian's duties to yield todrivers under certain conditions and to remain alcohol and drugfree upon a street, highway, or public place. These statutoryviolations relate to the issue of Jan Biel's contributorynegligence and not to whether it was foreseeable to defendants thatthe inoperable streetlight could have resulted in an injury toBiel.

In Lee, cited above, an intoxicated pedestrian entered aChicago Transit Authority (CTA) right-of-way at the intersection ofKedzie Avenue and the Ravenswood railway line in Chicago. Theright-of-way was posted with signs warning of danger and electriccurrent. Also, the CTA had laid uneven-edged boards, approximatelysix inches apart, called "jaws" in order to inform pedestrians thatthe area was restricted. Despite these warnings, the pedestrian,who had a blood-alcohol level of 0.341, urinated on the third railof the CTA railway and sustained fatal injuries. On review, thesupreme court held that, despite the fact the pedestrian wasintoxicated, the "decedent's intoxication was properly aconsideration only with respect to his contributory negligence." Lee, 152 Ill. 2d at 454. In this case, Biel's conduct in violatinglocal ordinances is a consideration in regard to his contributorynegligence, not to whether it was foreseeable to defendants thatthe inoperable streetlight could have caused Biel's injury.

Defendants claim that the facts in this case are analogous tothose in Galman and that, therefore, the disposition in both casesshould be the same. In Galman, Howard Dobson drove a tanker truckfor ADM Trucking, Inc. (ADM). At about 3 p.m. on Tuesday, November21, 1989, Dobson parked his truck mid block on the north side ofLawrence Avenue, 41 feet from the intersection of English Street inSpringfield, Illinois. Parking was prohibited on the north side ofLawrence Avenue between the hours of 7 a.m and 6 p.m, Mondaythrough Saturday. After Dobson parked his truck, May Phillippart,an 18-year-old French foreign exchange student, began walking southon English Street. At the intersection of English Street andLawrence Avenue, Phillippart did not use the marked crosswalk. Instead, she walked 41 feet from the intersection plus the fulllength of Dobson's truck before deciding to cross Lawrence Avenue. At the front of Dobson's truck, Phillippart entered Lawrence Avenueand waited for traffic to clear. After taking 1 1/2 slow stepsinto the center of the westbound lane of Lawrence Avenue, she beganrunning across the street. At about the center line of LawrenceAvenue, Phillippart was struck by the front passenger's side of acar driven by Amanda Galman. She died from her injuries. Section80.04 of the City of Springfield Code provided: " 'Pedestriancrossings between intersections shall be prohibited in the interestof public safety, except where there may be a marked crosswalk.' " Galman, 188 Ill. 2d at 255.

Following Phillippart's death, the National Health Service ofFrance (NHSF) paid her estate $452,794.82 as compensation formedical expenses. First Springfield Bank & Trust, acting on behalfof her estate, sued Galman, Dobson, and ADM for negligence. Italso sued ADM for violating section 5 of the Public Nuisance Act(Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch.100