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SECOND DIVISION
May 7, 2002

JUSTICE McBRIDE delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff Karen Bianchi appeals the dismissal of a second citation to discover the assets ofher former employer, defendant Savino Del Bene International Freight Forwarders, Inc. Savino, anIllinois corporation based in Elk Grove Village, sent Bianchi to work in Italy for a year butterminated her employment after eight months. Bianchi's citation was based upon an Italian laborcourt's judgment, which determined that Bianchi's employment had been improperly terminated. Theorder provided that Bianchi's former employer pay her "back wages" or "matured salary" betweenthe dates of the termination and her reinstatement. Bianchi initiated the citation proceedings (735ILCS 5/2-1402 (West 1998)) to enforce the Italian judgment and, on the same day, filed a complaintto recognize the Italian judgment pursuant to the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments RecognitionAct (735 ILCS 5/12-618 through 12-626 (West 1998)) (Recognition Act).

Savino's motion to dismiss the citation proceedings was granted after the trial court foundthat the Italian judgment did not state a specific amount of money as required by the supplementaryproceedings statute, section 2-1402(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure. (735 ILCS 5/2-1402(b) (West1998)). On appeal, Bianchi contends that the foreign judgment was sufficiently final, conclusive,and enforceable where rendered and, therefore, was entitled to recognition and enforcement inIllinois pursuant to the Recognition Act.

The record discloses the following facts. Savino's parent company is headquartered inScandicci, Italy. Savino hired Bianchi, an American, to work in Italy as its sales representativebetween March 1995 and March 1996 at an annual salary of $38,000. The parties' written contractspecified these terms. It also provided that all questions concerning "the validity or construction"of the contract would "be determined in accordance with the laws of Illinois," and that if Bianchi'semployment was terminated by Savino before the expiration of the contract, Savino would pay herthree months' severance and "have no further obligation." After the parties reached this agreement,Bianchi moved to Florence, Italy, into a company-provided apartment and began working out of theparent company's offices. However, in November 1995, an employee of the parent company verballyterminated her employment and Savino followed up with a letter indicating that her sales positionhad been eliminated.

Bianchi filed suit in the Florence labor courts on June 13, 1996, seeking reinstatement anddamages from Savino and the parent company. After a trial on the merits, the Italian court rendereda decision on February 12, 1998, finding that the parties' written contract was "null and void,"Bianchi's verbal termination was "null and void," and the letter terminating her employment wasineffective.

The court ordered Savino to pay Bianchi's "back wages" or her "matured salary," "beginningfrom [the date of her improper termination] until the readmittance to her own work, in addition tomonetary revaluation and legal interest based on individual credit matured until settlement; *** [and]the costs of the proceedings, liquidated in the amount of Italian Lire 7,485,500." The court did notspecify a wage or salary figure, and it did not order Savino to reinstate Bianchi, leaving the amountof Bianchi's award undetermined.

Savino did not rehire Bianchi or pay her any damages, and on November 12, 1999, she fileda complaint to recognize the foreign judgment in the circuit court pursuant to the Recognition Act. Bianchi attached the Italian judgment and an authenticated English translation of the same as exhibitsto her complaint. She simultaneously filed a citation to discover Savino's assets pursuant to thesupplementary proceedings statute, specifying that the foreign judgment was for "Italian Lire187,778,011 plus interest and costs."

On December 10, 1999, Savino filed a "motion to vacate [the] foreign judgment,"arguing thatthe foreign order should not be recognized in Illinois because (1) Bianchi had waived any legalclaims by accepting three months' severance pay shortly after her termination, (2) the Italian courthad rejected the parties' choice of law clause and applied Italian law, rendering a decision that was"repugnant" to Illinois public policy, and (3) the Italian decision was not sufficiently certain. Thismotion does not appear to have been ruled upon by the trial court and is not the subject of thisappeal.

Savino also moved to dismiss the citation proceedings, arguing that the Italian judgment was"facially invalid" and did not meet the requirements of the supplementary proceedings statute,because it did not award a specific amount of damages and was contingent upon Bianchi'sreinstatement. Bianchi responded that Savino's reliance on the supplementary proceedings statutewas misplaced, and she directed the trial court's attention to the Recognition Act. She stated that theforeign decision was "final and conclusive and enforceable where rendered," and therefore entitledto enforcement in Illinois pursuant to the Recognition Act. Bianchi, however, did not provide anyItalian statutes or case law to support her conclusion that the Italian courts would construe thedecision as final, conclusive, and enforceable. Instead, she argued that under section 12-620 of theRecognition Act (735 ILCS 5/12-620 (West 1998)), a "foreign judgment *** is conclusive betweenthe parties to the extent that it grants or denies recovery of a sum of money," and she argued that theItalian judgment was conclusive because it contained an "exact formula" for determining "recoveryof a sum of money." She also argued that damages would accrue until Savino formally offered toreinstate her, but she did not provide any Italian legal authority to support this conclusion.

On December 29, 1999, the trial court dismissed the citation, finding that the Italian judgmentwas "not enforceable because it does not specifically state the amount of judgment as required by735 ILCS 5/2-1402(b) [(West 1998)]." The trial court quoted the portion of the order indicating thatBianchi is to be paid "the matured salary beginning from [the date of her improper termination], untilthe readmittance to her own work, in addition to monetary revaluation and legal interest based onindividual credit entries matured until settlement," and held, "This provision is so ambiguous thatthis court cannot conclude that plaintiff's damage calculation is supportable." The trial court pointedout that the term "matured salary" was never defined and that the parties' employment contractproviding for Bianchi's $38,000 annual salary had been "declared null and void by the Italian court." Based on these deficiencies, the trial court concluded, "The amount of the judgment cannot, at thistime, be determined."

On January 26, 2000, Bianchi filed a new set of pleadings consisting of an amendedcomplaint to recognize a foreign judgment and a second citation to discover assets.

The amended complaint was similar to her prior complaint but added an "Intimation ofPayment," (intimation) in its original Italian form and an authenticated English translation of theintimation. Bianchi stated that the intimation was "issued on June 18, 1998," and, in a footnote,explained, "Under Italian civil law, an Intimation of Payment is a notification to the other party ina legal proceeding that presents the computation of damages resulting from the formula presentedin the court's judgment." Although Bianchi referred to "Italian civil law," she did not plead anyspecific Italian statute supporting her statement about the intimation and did not plead what therequired form and contents of an intimation were under Italian law. She also failed to plead when,where, how, or if Savino received the intimation she had "issued" four months after the Italian courtreached its decision, and she gave no indication of what additional rights an intimation creates withinthe Italian legal system. She concluded, however, that the order and intimation were "in full forceand effect [because] no action has been taken in the rendering court to set [them] aside ***, and noappeal *** is pending."

In the intimation, Bianchi warned Savino that if it did not pay certain sums within 10 daysof service, Bianchi would commence enforcement proceedings. She sought Italian Lire 155,456,00,indicating this was her gross salary between February 7, 1996 and June 7, 1998, based upon anexchange rate of $1 to Italian lire (L) 1,753.30. Bianchi did not indicate why she used theseparticular dates for her calculations, and we note that they do not coincide with Bianchi's verbaltermination on November 7, 1995, her written termination on November 14, 1995, thecommencement of her lawsuit on June 13, 1996, or the judgment date of February 12, 1998. UsingBianchi's exchange rate, her salary demand was $88,665. She also sought L3,295,430 ($1,880) for"Monetary revaluation from February 1996 to May 1998," and what appear to be attorney fees andlitigation expenses, including L1,100,000 ($627), L40,000 ($23), and L160,000 ($91) for "Expensesliquidated," "collection of authentic copies," and "consultation." The non-salary amounts totaledL24,836,511 ($14,166), and brought the intimation's overall total to L180,292,511 ($102,830). Theintimation stated, however, that Bianchi was reserving "the right to ask for the further payments ofgross salaries from 7 June 1998 on." The document was signed by Bianchi and her Italian counsel.

Bianchi's amended complaint to recognize a foreign judgment concluded with a prayer forjudgment "in accordance with 735 ILCS 5/12-620 [(West 1998)]," the section of the Recognition Actindicating that a foreign judgment is conclusive between the parties to the extent that it grantsrecovery of a sum of money.

Bianchi's second citation to discover assets specified that the Italian judgment was for "ItalianLire 187,778,011 plus interest and costs," however, we note that L187,778,011 ($107,099) is actuallythe sum of Bianchi's intimation (L180,292,511 or $102,830) and the foreign court's award of aspecific amount of costs (L7,485,500 or $4,269).

Savino moved to dismiss Bianchi's second citation, again arguing that the Italian judgmentwas "facially invalid" because it did not state a specific amount of damages and was contingent uponSavino reemploying Bianchi. Savino argued that the intimation added nothing to the proceedingsbecause there was no indication it had been served upon Savino and it was "only Plaintiff's counsel'sopinion as to what damages Plaintiff would assert at a prove-up hearing - it is clearly not a judgmentof the Italian Court." At the conclusion of a hearing on February 7, 2000, the trial court dismissedBianchi's second citation, finding that the addition of the intimation did not cure the problemsidentified in the first dismissal order.

On March 7, 2000, Bianchi filed a motion for reconsideration arguing that section 12-621(a)of the Recognition Act (735 ILCS 5/12-621(a) (West 1998)), permitted the trial court to denyenforcement of a foreign judgment only when the foreign system lacked due process or when therendering court lacked personal or subject matter jurisdiction, but since none of these three specificconditions applied to the order at issue, the circuit court should have construed the Italian judgmentas final, conclusive, and enforceable where rendered, pursuant to section 12-619 of the RecognitionAct (735 ILCS 5/12-619 (West 1998)).

She argued the order was conclusive between the parties because it granted recovery of a sumof money, in accordance with section 12-620 of the Recognition Act (735 ILCS 5/12-620 (West1998)). She indicated that she had "tendered" the intimation to Savino seeking a specific sum, "asprovided by the Italian Code of Civil Procedure," but believed that the trial court had "failed to makedue inquiry about the enforcement of judgments under the Italian Code of Civil Procedure," andtherefore it did not understand the significance of the intimation.

In order to "assist" the trial court, Bianchi offered a letter to the court from two Italianpractitioners that discussed remedies for unfair dismissal under Italian labor law and procedures forenforcing a judgment in the Italian courts, and that provided their interpretation of the order at issue. Although the practitioners discussed specific Italian statutes, they did not provide the actual statutesor verify the authenticity of the provisions they purported to translate.

Bianchi cited the letter and argued that under Article 474 of the Italian Code of CivilProcedure, a money judgment is enforceable when the amount can be determined with only amathematical operation. She contended that Savino's obligation could be determined with the simplemathematical operation of "multiplying [her] monthly salary by the number of months before[Savino] complies with the judgment of the Italian labor court."

She also cited the letter to support her contentions that Article 480 of the Italian Code ofCivil Procedure specifies the contents of an intimation, and that pursuant to Article 615 of the ItalianCode of Civil Procedure, a losing party may contest the prevailing party's right to commenceenforcement proceedings and may contest the amount specified in the intimation.

Bianchi also argued that the trial court had "failed to make due inquiry [into] whetherDefendant was served with the Intimation of Payment or whether Defendant contested the Intimationof Payment in accordance with the provisions of Article 615."

Although Bianchi apparently believed that knowledge of the parties' compliance with theintimation process was essential to the trial court's decision whether to recognize and enforce theItalian judgment, Bianchi did not provide these factual details to the court. Bianchi only stated thatshe had "tendered" the intimation. She did not indicate whether Savino had been "served" with orcontested the intimation in the Italian courts.

Bianchi also argued in her motion for reconsideration that the principle of comity requiredthe trial court to respect the Italian court's substantive and procedural laws and to recognize andenforce a judgment based upon those laws.

The trial court denied Bianchi's motion on May 24, 2000, and on June 21, 2000, Bianchi filedthis appeal, essentially repeating the theories of her motion for reconsideration.

Our first consideration is the appropriate scope of our review. Savino contends that (1) theorder dismissing Bianchi's original citation without prejudice was final and appealable underSupreme Court Rule 304(b)(4) (134 Ill. 2d 304(b)(4)), (2) Bianchi's failure to take an interlocutoryappeal prior to amending her pleadings rendered the order the "law of the case," (3) Bianchi's appeal,therefore, cannot present arguments "identical" to the ones she presented in the unsuccessful defenseof her original citation, and thus, (4) our consideration is limited to arguments that were newly raisedafter the dismissal of the original citation, specifically, to arguments related to the intimation. Wedisagree.

Supreme Court Rule 304(b)(4) and the cases that Savino relies upon, Illinois Brewing &Malting Co. v. Ilmberger, 155 Ill. App. 417 (1910), and J. Eck & Son, Inc. v. Reuben H. DonnelleyCorp., 188 Ill. App. 3d 1090, 545 N.E.2d 170 (1989), do not support Savino's claim that a dismissalwithout prejudice in a section 2-1402 proceeding is final and appealable. The rule states that finaljudgments or orders entered under section 2-1402 proceedings may be appealed without a specialfinding by the trial court. 134 Ill. 2d R. 304(b)(4). Illinois Brewing indicates that an order requiringa judgment debtor to pay a judgment is a final and appealable order. Illinois Brewing, 155 Ill. App.417. J. Eck & Son indicates that an order dismissing a complaint without prejudice is not final andthus not appealable. J. Eck & Son, 188 Ill. App. 3d at 1093. Generally, the dismissal of a complaintis not final and appealable unless the order states that it is with prejudice or in some other wayindicates that the litigation is terminated and the plaintiff will not be permitted to replead. Sutherland v. Illinois Bell, 254 Ill. App. 3d 983, 987, 627 N.E.2d 145 (1993). Because Bianchi wasallowed to replead, the order dismissing the original citation was not final and appealable. Thiscause became final and appealable, and subject to our review, when the dismissal of the secondcitation was entered. Thus, neither the rule nor the case law supports Savino's initial claim. Nor hasSavino cited any authority whatsoever discussing the law of the case doctrine or indicating thattheories which were unsuccessful at the trial level may not be reasserted on appeal.

Supreme Court Rule 341 requires the parties to an appeal to provide legal authority for theircontentions (177 Ill. 2d Rs. 341(e)(7), (f)), and the failure of a party to provide such authority resultsin waiver of the argument (Estate of Strocchia v. City of Chicago, 284 Ill. App. 3d 891, 901, 672N.E.2d 919 (1996)). We therefore find that Savino's unsupported argument is waived.

Contrary to Savino's unsupported argument, a reviewing court is not required to defer to thetrial court's judgment on a motion to dismiss and reviews the matter de novo. T&S Signs, Inc. v.Village of Wadsworth, 261 Ill. App. 3d 1080, 1084, 634 N.E.2d 306 (1994). In other words, we arereviewing the record, not the theories of counsel or those relied on by the court below. Swift & Co.v. Dollahan, 2 Ill. App. 2d 574, 599, 120 N.E.2d 249 (1954) (legal sufficiency of pleading is decidedon basis of record, rather than on theories of counsel or those indulged by court below). Therefore,we will consider the theories presented by Bianchi in her appellate brief.

In its motion to dismiss the second citation, Savino argued that the foreign judgment was"facially invalid," but did not specify whether dismissal was sought under section 2-615 or section2-619(a)(9) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-615, 2-619(a)(9) (West 1998)). Whenasked about this omission during oral arguments, Savino indicated that neither statute was pertinent.

Although review of a dismissal under either section is de novo, the analysis differs. A section2-619(a)(9) motion assumes a cause of action has been stated, but asserts that the claim is defeatedby affirmative matter. Barber-Colman Co. v. A & K Midwest Insulation Co., 236 Ill. App. 3d 1065,1068-74, 603 N.E.2d 1215 (1992). A motion to dismiss under section 2-615 motion attacks defectsapparent on the face of the complaint and is based on insufficiency in the pleading rather than on theunderlying facts. Barber-Colman, 236 Ill. App. 3d at 1068. Thus, it is apparent that in arguing thatthe citation was "facially invalid," Savino was asserting a section 2-615 argument.

Illinois is a fact-pleading jurisdiction, and a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to bring herclaim within the scope of the cause of action being asserted. Anderson v. Vanden Dorpel, 172 Ill.2d 399, 408, 667 N.E.2d 1296 (1996). In opposing a motion to dismiss under section 2-615, aplaintiff cannot rely on mere conclusions of law or fact unsupported by specific factual allegations. Anderson, 172 Ill. 2d at 408. If, after disregarding any legal and factual conclusions, the complaintdoes not allege sufficient facts to state a cause of action, the motion to dismiss should be granted. Lake County Grading Co. of Libertyville, Inc. v. Advance Mechanical Contractors, Inc., 275 Ill. App.3d 452, 457, 654 N.E.2d 1109 (1995).

In reviewing a section 2-615 dismissal, we must determine whether the allegations of thesecond citation, when interpreted in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, sufficiently set forth acause of action upon which relief may be granted. Brock v. Anderson Road Ass'n, 287 Ill. App. 3d16, 20, 677 N.E.2d 985 (1997). Because we find that Bianchi's pleadings are defective under boththe supplementary proceedings statute (735 ILCS 5/2-1402(b) (West 1998)) and the RecognitionAct (735 ILCS 5/12-618 et seq. (West 1998)), we affirm.

Before addressing the sufficiency of Bianchi's second citation, we feel it necessary to pointout a procedural defect in the proceedings below. As pointed out above, Bianchi simultaneouslyinitiated recognition and enforcement proceedings. When she did so, Savino filed motions to "vacate[the] foreign judgment" and to dismiss the citation proceedings. For reasons not apparent on therecord, the motion to dismiss the citation was heard first. We question whether Bianchi couldproperly initiate Illinois enforcement proceedings under section 2-1402 before having the foreignjudgment recognized in Illinois. During oral argument, Bianchi indicated that recognition of aforeign country's order is not a prerequisite to its enforcement, because requiring her to duplicate theItalian proceedings in Illinois would defeat the purpose of the Recognition Act. This argument blursthe distinction between her wrongful termination action and a recognition action. A wrongfultermination claim such as the one that Bianchi pursued in the Italian labor courts, which focuses onthe propriety of the employer's conduct, is distinct from a recognition action, which focuses on thepropriety of the foreign proceedings. See, e.g., Ingersoll Milling Machine Co. v. Granger, 833 F.2d680 (7th Cir. 1987) (analyzing, among other things, whether Belgian court which awardedemployment termination properly exercised subject matter and personal jurisdiction, and affordeddue process). Therefore, a recognition proceeding would not require Bianchi to relitigate herunderlying claim. While certain facts could be relevant to both proceedings, those facts would beanalyzed under different legal principles, and would not change the fact that each proceeding has adifferent focus and purpose. Therefore, Bianchi's argument that a recognition action would requireher to relitigate her termination action is factually incorrect and unpersuasive.

Although our research has not disclosed any Illinois decision specifically addressing whethera foreign country's judgment must be recognized before enforcement proceedings can be initiated,there is authority suggesting this interpretation of section 12-620 of the Recognition Act. See Pinillav. Harza Engineering Co., 324 Ill. App. 3d 803, 755 N.E.2d 23 (2001) (indicating that court shoulddetermine whether foreign judgment is capable of recognition before determining whether foreignjudgment is capable of enforcement).

There is authority from other jurisdictions, however, indicating that before a party canenforce a judgment from a foreign country, the party must first have the foreign judgment recognizedby the state in which he or she will be seeking enforcement. Matusevitch v. Telnikoff, 877 F. Supp.1, 2-3 (D.C. 1995) (before a party can enforce a foreign country judgment, the Recognition Actrequires a proceeding to determine whether the court should recognize the judgment); Marks v.United States, 15 Cl. Ct. 609, 612 (1988) (until a foreign country judgment is recognized, the holderof the judgment does not have a legally enforceable right); Lenchyshyn v. Pelko Electric, Inc., 281AD.2d 42, 49, 723 N.Y.S.2d 285, 291 (2001) (after court recognizes foreign country judgment andconverts it to local judgment, judgment creditor might pursue in personam or in rem enforcementdevices). Therefore, Bianchi's citation proceedings could have been dismissed as prematurelycommenced. However, because Savino has not raised this procedural defect, we will address thesufficiency of Bianchi's second citation.

We begin by noting that a citation to discover assets "is a method by which a judgmentcreditor may proceed against a judgment debtor or third parties to discover and recover the judgmentdebtor's assets for the purpose of applying the property in satisfaction of the judgment." Pontikesv. Perazic, 295 Ill. App. 3d 478, 484, 692 N.E.2d 712 (1998). Citation proceedings, also known assupplementary proceedings, are not available to a creditor until after a judgment capable ofenforcement has been entered in their favor. State Bank of Piper City v. A Way, Inc., 135 Ill. App.3d 1010, 482 N.E.2d 620 (1985). Supreme Court Rule 277, which specifies the form and proceduresfor conducting citation proceedings, indicates that citation proceedings may be commenced at anytime with respect to a judgment that is subject to enforcement. 134 Ill. 2d R. 277. Thesupplementary proceedings statute indicates that the judgment creditor or her attorney shall certifythe name of the court, the number of the case, the date or revival date of the judgment, the amountof the judgment and the balance due. 735 ILCS 5/2-1402(b) (West 1998).

Moreover, the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act provides that a recognizedforeign country's judgment "is subject to the same procedures, defenses and proceedings forreopening, vacating, or staying as a judgment of a circuit court for any country of this State and maybe enforced or satisfied in like manner." 735 ILCS 5/12-652 (West 1998); Pinella v. Harza, 324 Ill.App. 3d 803, 755 N.E.2d 23 (2001) (once a foreign country's judgment is recognized, it is subjectto enforcement procedures). Therefore, local and foreign judgments are subject to the sameenforcement and satisfaction mechanisms and standards.

Bianchi never addresses the section 2-1402 requirements in her brief on appeal, nevertheless,she proceeded under this statute and was bound to comply with these requirements, including thestatutory provision the trial court specifically relied on in dismissing Bianchi's citation, whichrequired Bianchi or her counsel to certify the amount of the judgment. 735 ILCS 5/2-1402(b) (West1998). Our research has not disclosed any authority interpreting the "amount of judgment" languageof section 2-1402(b), however, we construe this language to limit citation proceedings to judgmentsthat are certain and that state a specific monetary amount.

Thus, the question we address is whether the second citation is based upon a judgmentawarding a specific amount of money. Although Bianchi's Illinois attorney certified that the amountof the foreign judgment was for the specific sum of "Italian Lire 187,778,011," this allegation wascompletely negated by the Italian judgment, which states that Savino is to pay the "back wages" or"matured salary" that accrue between the date of Bianchi's improper termination and the date she isreinstated. When an exhibit is attached to a complaint it becomes part of the complaint (Brock, 287Ill. App. 3d at 21), and when the allegations in the complaint differ from those shown in the exhibitattached to the complaint, the exhibit controls (Baker v. Daniel S. Berger, Ltd., 323 Ill. App. 3d 956,963, 753 N.E.2d 463 (2001)). Our review of the Italian labor court's order indicates that a specificmonetary amount was never determined because it was contingent upon reinstatement, an event thathas not occurred. Moreover, the judgment does not provide any mechanism for Bianchi'sreinstatement. Therefore, since the order does not provide a specific amount of money, Bianchi'scitation fails to meet the requirements of the supplementary proceedings statute. 735 ILCS 5/2-1402(b) (West 1998). We further conclude the judgment is not capable of enforcement underSupreme Court Rule 277. 134 Ill. 2d R. 277.

We also disagree with Bianchi's conclusion that the Italian order provides a formula forcalculating the specific sum of "back wages" or "matured salary" that she requested from the Illinoiscourt. The Italian judgment voids the parties' written employment contract, which was the onlydocument specifying Bianchi's compensation level, and does not state any other wage or salaryfigure. Furthermore, the order provides that Bianchi's wages or salary will accrue until Bianchi isreinstated, but as pointed out above, the Italian court did not provide any steps to bring about herreinstatement, and it is undisputed that Bianchi has never been reinstated. Because the order doesnot indicate the amount or duration of payments to be used in the calculating Bianchi's award, it isimpossible to calculate any sum of money owing. Thus, we conclude the Italian labor court's orderis not certain, does not state a specific monetary amount, and is not capable of enforcement underthe supplementary proceedings statute and Supreme Court Rule 277. 735 ILCS 5/2-1402(b) (West1998); 134 Ill. 2d R. 277.

Moreover, if Bianchi believed that Italian statutes or case law would have closed the gaps inthe foreign judgment's "formula," she should have pled those facts. While Illinois statutes providethat Illinois courts may take judicial notice of the laws of sister states and of the United States (735ILCS 5/8-1003 (West 1998)), an Illinois court cannot take judicial notice of the laws of foreigncountries (735 ILCS 5/8-1007 (West 1998)). Therefore, in Illinois, the laws of foreign counties mustbe pled and proven as any other fact. Vrozos v. Sarantopoulos, 195 Ill. App. 3d 610, 618-19, 552N.E.2d 1093 (1990) (judgment allowing registration and enforcement of Canadian judgment vacatedwhere plaintiff neither pled nor proved relevant Canadian law); In re Estate of Glenos, 53 Ill. App.2d 283, 292, 202 N.E.2d 833 (1964) (Greek laws would be required to prove what document was).

We also disagree with Bianchi's contention that the intimation somehow cures the uncertaintyof the Italian judgment. To begin with, Bianchi has never pled any Italian statutes or case lawsupporting this conclusion -- she has never established that an intimation has any significance in theItalian courts. She has never factually pled the required form and contents of an intimation, and thather intimation met those minimum requirements. She has never factually pled why she used certaindates in the calculations in her intimation or why she performed the calculations when she did, fourmonths after the Italian judgment was issued. Bianchi's dates did not coincide with her verbaltermination, written termination, commencement of her lawsuit, or the judgment of the court, andthus appear to be randomly chosen. Furthermore, as Savino points out, there is no indication theintimation was ever served, and according to Bianchi, service triggers Savino's right to contest theamount of the intimation or contest Bianchi's right to pursue enforcement proceedings. Therefore,Bianchi's allegations that the intimation was "issued" and was "in full force and effect" areconclusions unsupported by facts that the intimation finalized Bianchi's right to the monetary amountspecified in her citation. We are not required to accept conclusions of law or fact unsupported byspecific factual allegations. Anderson, 172 Ill. 2d at 408. Finally, the intimation was prepared andsigned by Bianchi and her Italian counsel -- it is not a judgment of any court. In short, theintimation, as presented, does not support Bianchi's conclusion that the intimation renders the Italiancourt's order certain and enforceable in Illinois.

Because Bianchi's second citation to discover Savino's assets did not factually allege that theunderlying judgment was for a specific monetary amount, as required by the supplementaryproceedings statute (735 ILCS 5/2-1402(b) (West 1998)), it did not sufficiently set forth a cause ofaction upon which relief could be granted, and was properly dismissed (Lake County Grading, 275Ill. App. 3d at 457 (motion to dismiss should be granted if pleading does not allege sufficient factsto state a cause of action)).

Bianchi contends, nonetheless, that the controlling statute is the Recognition Act. Wedisagree, but also determine that Bianchi's second citation fails to sufficiently set forth a cause ofaction under the Recognition Act. The recognition and enforcement of money judgments renderedby courts outside of the State of Illinois are governed by the Recognition Act and the UniformEnforcement of Foreign Judgments Act ( 735 ILCS 5/12-650 et seq. (West 1998)) (EnforcementAct).

The Recognition Act applies to money judgments of foreign states, that is, to any judgmentof a governmental unit other than the United States or any of its states, districts or territories,granting or denying recovery of a sum of money. 735 ILCS 5/12-618 (West 1998). The RecognitionAct provides that "any foreign judgment that is final and conclusive and enforceable where rendered"(735 ILCS 12-619 (West 1998)) is "enforceable in the same manner as the judgment of a sister statewhich is entitled to full faith and credit"(735 ILCS 5/12-620 (West 1998)).

The Recognition Act does not define "final and conclusive and enforceable," but specifiesthat a foreign judgment "is conclusive between the parties to the extent that it grants or deniesrecovery of a sum of money" 735 ILCS 5/12-620 (West 1998)), and is "inconclusive" if the foreignlegal system lacked due process, or the rendering court lacked personal or subject matter jurisdiction,735 ILCS 5/12-621(a) (West 1998)).

The Recognition Act specifies six other potential grounds for nonrecognition, including thatthe cause of action on which the judgment is based is repugnant to the public policy of Illinois (e.g.,a judgment to enforce a gambling debt (Marina Associates v. Barton, 206 Ill. App. 3d 122, 563N.E.2d 1110 (1990)); and that proceeding in the foreign court was contrary to an agreement betweenthe parties that the dispute was to be settled other than by proceeding in that court (735 ILCS 12-621(b) (West 1998)).

Bianchi contends that unless a foreign judgment suffers from one of the nine defectsenumerated in the Recognition Act (735 ILCS 5/12-621 (West 1998)), the foreign judgment mustbe recognized in Illinois. We disagree. As indicated above, the Recognition Act is limited tojudgments that grant or deny recovery of a sum of money (735 ILCS 5/12-618 (West 1998)). Therefore, if Bianchi's second citation, and amended complaint which the citation is based upon, didnot plead facts indicating that the foreign judgment granted recovery of a sum of money, herpleadings would be defective as a matter of law, and the trial court's dismissal of the citation wouldbe proper under the Recognition Act.

Bianchi complains that the trial court failed to examine the judgment under the law of thejurisdiction in which the judgment was rendered. She contends that the foreign judgment containsa "precise formula" for damages and that the intimation "tendered" to Savino sought a specific sumof money in accordance with Italian law, therefore, the judgment is conclusive. She also contendsthat the trial court did not reach this conclusion because it failed to conduct "due inquiry" into Italianenforcement procedures, specifically Articles 474, 475, 480 and 615 of the Italian Code of CivilProcedure. Finally, the trial court erred by "not considering the contents of the opinion letter by theItalian attorneys" as to the conclusiveness of the judgment. We disagree.

We find that the second citation and the amended complaint to recognize a foreign judgmentdid not factually plead that the foreign judgment grants recovery of a sum of money. As indicatedin the section 2-1402 discussion, Bianchi's claim for a sum of money was negated by the Italiancourt's award of "back wages" or "matured salary" that would accrue between Bianchi's terminationand reinstatement. Baker v. Daniel S. Berger, Ltd., 323 Ill. App. 3d 956, 963, 753 N.E.2d 463(2001) (when allegations in complaint differ from those in attached exhibit, attached exhibitcontrols).

Furthermore, even if Bianchi were to factually establish that this foreign country's judgmentwas sufficiently final, conclusive, and enforceable where rendered and therefore entitled torecognition, it is conclusive under the Recognition Act only when it grants recovery of a sum ofmoney. The Italian labor court's judgment did not grant the recovery of a sum of money. It is nota judgment for an amount of money, for all the reasons discussed above. Although there is noIllinois authority directly on point, other jurisdictions have declined to enforce foreign judgmentsunless the foreign judgment determined the actual amount of money owed. See Farrow MortgageServices Pty. Ltd. v. Singh, 3 Mass. L. Rptr 552 (1995) (Massachusetts court determining thatAustralian judgment for $388,941.55 Australian dollars plus costs recognizable and enforceableunder Recognition Act only to the extent that it granted judgment for $388,941.55 Australian dollars,and not enforceable to the extent that it awarded undetermined costs); Everson v. Everson, 494 Pa.348, 431 A.2d 889 (1981) (Pennsylvania court construing Arizona judgment and indicating thatordinarily a judgment for the payment of money will not be enforced in another state unless it is afinal judgment for a specific amount of money); Wisconsin ex rel. Stromberg v. Stromberg, 1Neb.C.A. 526 (1992) (Wisconsin judgment requiring payment of military allotment was uncertainand unenforceable in Nebraska after discharge from military service); Cockle v. Cockle, 204 Neb.88, 90-91, 281 N.W.2d 392, 393-94 (1979) (indicating that Nebraska court could not ascertainamount due on California judgment without resorting to facts outside the record of the Californiacourt and therefore should deny registration of California judgment); Coane v. Girard Trust Co., 182Md. 577, 35 A.2d 449 (1944) (Maryland court construing Pennsylvania judgment and indicating thatfull faith and credit clause applies to final judgments which are unconditional and certain);Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws