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SECOND DIVISION
JUNE 29, 2004

JUSTICE GARCIA delivered the opinion of the court.

The defendant, the Retirement Board of the Fireman's Annuityand Benefit Fund of Chicago (Board), appeals from a circuit courtorder reversing the Board's decision denying plaintiff, IdellaBertucci, a widow's duty-related annuity benefit pursuant tosection 6-140 (40 ILCS 5/6-140 (West 2000)) of the IllinoisPension Code (Pension Code) (40 ILCS 5/1-101 et seq. (West2000)). We affirm.

BACKGROUND

The plaintiff's husband, James J. Bertucci, became a firefighter with the City of Chicago (City) in February 1969. InSeptember 1991, James was injured while on duty. James's injurystemmed from a fall from a fire-truck ladder. As a result of hisfall, James suffered a spinal-compression fracture of the L-1lumbar vertebra. In August 1992, James filed an application fordisability benefits with the Board. In October 1992, the Boardgranted James duty-related disability benefits. 40 ILCS 5/6-151(West 1992).

In December 1994, January 1997, and March 1998, James wasexamined by a physician for the Board, Dr. George S. Motto. James's reexaminations were statutorily prescribed; "however[,]such annual examination may be waived by the Board if theappointed physician certifies in writing to the Board that thedisability of the fireman is of such a nature as to render himpermanently disabled and unable ever to return to service." 40ILCS 5/6-153 (West 1992). In his March 1998 written report tothe Board, Dr. Motto determined there was "no way [James] couldimprove." Also in the March 1998 report Dr. Motto found James"permanently disabled due to prior injury," and opined that Jameswould "never return to work." James, in fact, did not return towork as a fire fighter and continued to receive duty-relateddisability benefits until his death from metastatic⁽¹⁾ lung cancerin April 2001.

In May 2001, the plaintiff, relying on section 6-140 of thePension Code (40 ILCS 5/6-140 (West 2000)), filed an applicationfor a widow's duty-related annuity benefit with the Board.

In June 2001, the Board held a hearing on the plaintiff'sapplication. The plaintiff testified she and James were marriedin 1964 and remained married until his death. Dr. Mottotestified that in March 1998, "[James] was permanently disableddue to [James's] lower-back pain," which stemmed from a spinal-compression fracture due to James's 1992 fall from the fire-truckladder. Dr. Motto also testified that cancer was the cause ofJames's death and that the cancer was not caused by an act ofduty. The Board denied the plaintiff's application for a widow'sduty-related annuity benefit under section 6-140 of the PensionCode (40 ILCS 5/6-140 (West 2000)). However, the Board grantedthe plaintiff a widow's non-duty-related annuity benefit undersection 6-141.1 of the Pension Code (40 ILCS 5/6-141.1 (West2000)) based on its finding that James did not die in theperformance of an act of duty because he died from lung cancer. The Board also granted James's disabled adult son a child'sannuity (40 ILCS 5/6-147, 6-148 (West 2000)); the child's annuityaward is not at issue.

In July 2001, the plaintiff filed a complaint foradministrative review of the Board's decision with the CookCounty circuit court. In September 2002, the circuit court heardargument and reversed the Board's decision based on section 6-140of the Pension Code (40 ILCS 5/6-140 (West 2000)) and thiscourt's holding in Tonkovic v. Retirement Board of the Firemen'sAnnuity & Benefit Fund, 282 Ill. App. 3d 876, 668 N.E.2d 1126(1996). This appeal followed.

ANALYSIS

I. Standard of Review

We review the decision of an administrative agency, not thatof the circuit court. Swoope v. Retirement Board of thePolicemen's Annuity & Benefit Fund, 323 Ill. App. 3d 526, 529,752 N.E.2d 505 (2001). Generally, "[a]n administrative agency'sfindings of fact are deemed prima facie true and correct." Swoope, 323 Ill. App. 3d at 528-29, citing City of Belvidere v.Illinois State Labor Relations Board, 181 Ill. 2d 191, 204, 692N.E.2d 295 (1998); 735 ILCS 5/3-110 (West 2000). Further, if therecord contains any evidence to support the agency's decision itshould be affirmed. Abrahamson v. Illinois Department ofProfessional Regulation, 153 Ill. 2d 76, 88-89, 606 N.E.2d 1111(1992). However, an administrative agency's conclusions of laware afforded less deference and are reviewed de novo. Swoope,323 Ill. App. 3d at 529, citing City of Belvidere, 181 Ill. 2d at205.

The circuit court characterized the issue before it as oneof law, "[w]hether or not the Board appropriately interpreted thesection 40 ILCS 5/6-140 and the Tonkovic case, which *** gave ananalysis of that particular provision." The circuit courtapplied a de novo standard of review. The Board, whilechallenging the circuit court's ruling, does not contest that theissue turns on the "interpretation of its own statute." Nonetheless, the Board contends that the appropriate standard ofreview is the clearly erroneous standard because it is entitledto deference based on its experience and expertise. The facts,however, are not in dispute. Thus, the resolution of this casedepends, not upon evidence heard by the Board or even theapplication of those facts to the law (a mixed question of factand law to which a clearly erroneous standard should apply), butupon the purely legal question of the proper interpretation ofthe statutory provisions governing annuity benefits for thewidows of fire fighters. See City of Belvidere, 181 Ill. 2d at 205; 40 ILCS 5/6-140, 6-141.1 (West 2000). This is a question oflaw and therefore, our review of the Board's decision is de novo. See Shields v. Judges' Retirement System, 204 Ill. 2d 488, 492,791 N.E.2d 516 (2003).

II. Interpretation

The Board contends that the Tonkovic decision, which theplaintiff maintains controls the outcome here and upon which thecircuit court based its reversal of the Board's denial of duty-related benefits, is at odds with its interpretation of thecontrolling statute and should not be followed. Instead, theBoard asserts we should follow the Swoope decision. In its replybrief, the Board asserts that the statute at issue in Swoope (40ILCS 5/5-144 (West 1998)) and the statute at issue here (40 ILCS5/6-140 (West 2000)) "are nearly identical with exactly the sameintent," and therefore, should be interpreted similarly.

A. Sections 5-144 and 6-140

We agree with the Board that the legislative purpose behindsections 5-144 and 6-140 is to compensate the widows of policeofficers and fire fighters killed or permanently injured in theline of duty and therefore, the statutes should be interpreted ina similar manner. 40 ILCS 5/5-144, 6-140 (West 2000).

In comparing section 5-144, at issue in Swoope, to section6-140 at issue in this case and in Tonkovic, we find that theyare nearly identical. 40 ILCS 5/5-144 (West 1998); 40 ILCS 5/6-140 (West 2000). For instance, the widow of a police officer ina city with over 500,000 people who dies in the line of duty isawarded an annuity equal to 75% of the police officer's salary(40 ILCS 5/5-144(a) (West 1998)); however, if the police officerdies while still working, but not in the line of duty or after hehas retired, the widow's annuity is equivalent to 50% of thepolice officer's pension annuity (40 ILCS 5/5-136.1 (West 1998)). Similarly, the statutory provision regarding the benefits to thewidow of a fire fighter in a city of over 500,000 residents is75% of the fire fighter's salary when the fireman dies in theline of duty (40 ILCS 5/6-140 (West 2000)), but only 50% of thefire fighter's pension annuity if he dies while still working orafter he has retired (40 ILCS 5/6-141.1 (West 2000)).

B. The Swoope Decision The Swoope court was presented with a question similar tothe one before us, whether the widow of a police officer who wasdeemed permanently disabled, found unable to return to work, andreceiving duty-related disability at the time of his death, wasentitled to a duty-related annuity benefit. In Swoope, thepolice officer received duty-related disability benefits stemmingfrom injuries he received in an on-duty automobile collision. Swoope, 323 Ill. App. 3d at 527-28. The police officer continuedreceiving duty-related disability benefits until his death from aheart attack. Swoope, 323 Ill. App. 3d at 528. In its holdingthe Swoope court stated, "it is the officer's injury, and not hisdeath, which establishes whether the officer would be able tosubsequently, and at some point, resume his duties with thepolice department." Swoope, 323 Ill. App. 3d at 531. We findSwoope instructive and agree with the Board that Justice Theis'sanalysis in Swoope is applicable here. Because we agree with thereasoning and analysis in Swoope, we borrow liberally fromJustice Theis's succinct opinion.

The question we address is whether a fire fighter who ispermanently disabled in the course of his duties, and who dieswithout returning to work, should be treated like a fire fighterwho dies in the line of duty or from injuries received directlyin the line of duty. We hold that an affirmative answer to thatquestion is consistent with not only the language of thecontrolling statute, but also with its purpose and aim. 40 ILCS5/6-140 (West 2000).

Section 6-140 provides for the payment of a compensationannuity when "the performance of an act or acts of duty resultsdirectly in the death of a fireman, or prevents him fromsubsequently resuming active service in the fire department." 40ILCS 5/6-140 (West 1998). Much like in Swoope, "[b]oth partiesagree that [the plaintiff] must establish either of the twoconditions listed in section [6-140] in order to receive acompensation annuity. Further, it is undisputed that [James's]death was not a direct result of the injury he sustained in theperformance of an act of duty. The dispute, therefore, involvesthe interpretation of the second phrase, [the performance of anact or acts of duty that prevents him from subsequently resumingactive service in the fire department]." Swoope, 323 Ill. App.3d at 529.

We begin our examination of this language with the Board'sadmission that the two statutes, one dealing with police officers(section 5-144) and the other with fire fighters (section 6-140),"are nearly identical with exactly the same intent." "Statutoryconstruction requires courts to ascertain and give effect to theintent of the legislature." Shields, 204 Ill. 2d at 493-94,citing In re C.W., 199 Ill. 2d 198, 211, 766 N.E.2d 1105 (2002). Where statutory language is clear, it must be applied as written(Shields, 204 Ill. 2d at 494); however, "[l]egislative intentmust be ascertained from a consideration of the entire act, itsnature, its object, and the consequences resulting from differentconstructions" (Shields, 204 Ill. 2d at 494, citing Fumarolo v. Chicago Board of Education, 142 Ill. 2d 54, 96, 566 N.E.2d 1283(1990)).

In addressing the legislative intent behind section 5-144,the Swoope court stated that the "section is intended to provideextra compensation, above the regular annuity determined in theprevious sections, to this select group of widows." Swoope, 323Ill. App. 3d at 530. We find a similar legislative intentpresent in section 6-140. 40 ILCS 5/6-140 (West 2000).

The first paragraph of section 6-140 specifically includes"the widow of a fireman whose death results from the performanceof an act or acts of duty." 40 ILCS 5/6-140 (West 2000). Consequently, the resolution of this issue involves theinterpretation of a phrase contained in the third paragraph ofsection 6-140, that "performance of an act or acts of duty ***prevents him from subsequently resuming active service in thefire department." 40 ILCS 5/6-140 (West 2000). As in Swoope, wefind the third paragraph of section 6-140 to be "a narrowexpansion of this section, allowing widows of [fire fighters]whose injuries were of such character as to prevent them fromsubsequently resuming service as [fire fighters] to also receivethis extra compensation." Swoope, 323 Ill. App. 3d at 531.

"When interpreting the phrase at issue, we look to the plainand ordinary meaning of the terms." Swoope, 323 Ill. App. 3d at531, citing Lulay v. Lulay, 193 Ill. 2d 455, 466, 739 N.E.2d 521(2000). The court in Swoope looked to the meaning of"subsequently" to support the "narrow expansion" of the benefitsprovided by section 5-144. Swoope, 323 Ill. App. 3d at 531; 40ILCS 5/5-144 (West 1998). "The plain and ordinary meaning of theterm 'subsequently' is 'following in time: coming or being laterthan something else.'" Swoope, 323 Ill. App. 3d at 531, quotingWebster's Third New International Dictionary 2278 (1986). "Thus,the provision refers to an injury incurred in the performance ofan act of duty which prevents the [fire fighter] from resumingservice as a [fire fighter] subsequent to, or following, thatinjury. If, at anytime after the injury, the [fire fighter] canor could possibly resume his duties as a [fire fighter], hiswidow is excluded from receiving compensation or supplementalannuities. Because the statute does not define an ending pointto this time period, we interpret the phrase to mean that theinjury was so severe, and of such a character, as to prevent the[fire fighter] from ever resuming service as a [fire fighter]." Swoope, 323 Ill. App. 3d at 531.

Thus, the phrase at issue means that the duty-related injurypermanently prevents a fire fighter from resuming active dutywith the fire department. It is therefore the fire fighter'sinjury, and not his death, which establishes whether the firefighter may subsequently resume his duties with the firedepartment. See Swoope, 323 Ill. App. 3d at 531. "[T]he focusis whether the fire fighter is injured due to an act or acts ofduty and then dies without having returned to active service." Tonkovic, 282 Ill. App. 3d at 880.

Therefore, in conformity with the Swoope court, "we holdthat, under [section 6-140's third paragraph], a widow mustestablish with medical evidence and testimony that her husband'sinjury, but for his death, would have prevented him fromsubsequently, or ever, resuming service with the [fire]department." Swoope, 323 Ill. App. 3d at 531. Although inSwoope the matter was remanded to the Board for an evidentiaryhearing to allow the Board to make such a determination, underthe facts presented here, there is no question but that theplaintiff made such a showing.

In the case sub judice, James fell from a fire-truck ladder,injured his spine, and received duty-related disability as aresult of that fall. The cause of James's death was unrelated tothe fall, as he died from metastatic lung cancer; however, thefall from the fire-truck ladder left James "permanently disabled"according to the Board's physician, Dr. Motto. Specifically, inhis written report to the Board in March 1998, Dr. Mottodetermined (1) there was "no way [James] could improve," (2)James was "permanently disabled due to his prior injury," and (3)James was "never to return to work" as a fire fighter. Dr. Mottoalso testified before the Board verifying his March 1998 findingsand reiterating that James's duty-related injury, i.e., his fallfrom the fire-truck ladder, had left him "permanently disabled." Therefore, the plaintiff has shown that James's injuries werepermanent.

C. Reconciling Tonkovic

Relying on the principle that deference is owed to anagency's interpretation of its own statute based on itsexperience and expertise, the Board claims the Tonkovic ruling isinconsistent with its interpretation of section 6-140 andtherefore is "not controlling precedent." The Board continues tocontend there is a "causation requirement" in section 6-140 thatlimits its application "to those widows whose husbands' deathwere 'directly' caused by an act of duty." As a fallbackargument, the Board seeks to limit the Tonkovic holding to thefacts of that case; the Board argues that in Tonkovic, "evidenceexisted *** for the court to conclude that it was thearteriosclerotic heart disease, cased by smoke inhalation duringthe performance of an act of duty, that prevented Mr. Tonkovicfrom ever resuming active service." Whereas, "[i]n [James's]case, it was lung cancer which resulted in his death andultimately prevented him from resuming active service as a firefighter, not his back injury."

Once again we reject the Board's contention that there is a"causal connection" component in section 6-140 between the deathof the fire fighter and his cause of death that must beestablished before a widow's duty-related annuity may be paid. As Justice Theis made clear in Swoope, "it is the officer'sinjury, and not his death, which establishes whether the officerwould be able to subsequently, and at some point, resume hisduties." (Emphasis added.) Swoope 323 Ill. App. 3d at 531. Here, while it is true that James's lung cancer was not relatedin any way to the performance of an act or acts of duty, it wasnot the lung cancer that served as the basis for Dr. Motto'sconclusion in March 1998 that James was "permanently disabled dueto his prior injury." Contrary to the Board's assertion, it wasthe duty-related injury that prevented James from subsequentlyresuming active service. Thus, we find the Board's concernsmisplaced as the interpretation of section 6-140 set out by thiscourt in Tonkovic is consistent with Swoope.

In Tonkovic, a fire fighter suffered a heart attack in April1980, while fighting a fire. Tonkovic, 282 Ill. App. 3d at 877. The fire fighter was awarded duty-related disability benefitsbased on the fact he was disabled as a result of an act of duty. Tonkovic, 282 Ill. App. 3d at 878. Specifically, the doctor inthat case prescribed that the fire fighter "should not performthe duties associated with the position of a fire fighter." Tonkovic, 282 Ill. App. 3d at 878. In April 1994, the firefighter suffered another heart attack and died. Tonkovic, 282Ill. App. 3d at 878. The decedent's widow applied to the Boardfor duty-related annuity benefits under section 6-140 of thePension Code. 40 ILCS 5/6-140 (West 1994). The Board denied thewidow's request based on testimony that decedent's 1980 heartattack did not contribute to his death; however, the Boardgranted the widow ordinary, i.e., non-duty-related, annuitybenefits under section 6-141.1 of the Pension Code. Tonkovic,282 Ill. App. 3d at 878; 40 ILCS 5/6-141.1 (West 1994). Thecircuit court reversed and on appeal the reversal was affirmed. In pertinent part, the Tonkovic court found that the Boardignored the fact that the fire fighter's heart attack had kepthim from being able to return to work as a fire fighter.

"[T]he plain language of the second clause[of section 6-140] provides that a survivingspouse is eligible for duty death benefits ifthe decedent fire fighter's performance of anact or acts of duty prevented him fromresuming active service until his or herdeath *** [T]he focus is whether the firefighter is injured due to an act or acts ofduty and then dies without having returned toactive service." (Emphasis added.) Tonkovic,282 Ill. App. 3d at 880; 40 ILCS 5/6-140(West 1994). As in Tonkovic, where the Board's doctor found that the firefighter was permanently disabled and could not perform the dutiesassociated with his previous position (Tonkovic, 282 Ill. App. 3dat 878), and Swoope, where the factor determining whether awidow, whose husband died while receiving duty-related disabilitybenefits, was eligible for a widow's duty-related annuity benefitwas whether the husband's disability was permanent (Swoope, 323Ill. App. 3d at 531), we find that a widow must demonstrate thepermanency of her husband's duty-related disability in order tobe eligible for an enhanced widow's duty-related annuity benefit. The widow's duty-related annuity benefit is meant to address therisks and the accompanying injuries that may befall fire fightersin the course of carrying out their duties. The widow's duty-related annuity benefit is not meant to serve as a life-insurancepolicy covering all manners of death to a fire fighter. Thenexus between the widow's duty-related annuity benefit and thedeath of a fire fighter is the permanent injury or death causedin the line of duty. If there is no connection between the deathor permanent injury of a fire fighter and the carrying out of hisduty, then there is no duty-related annuity benefit provided to awidow under section 6-140.

To highlight its concern over an expansive reading ofsection 6-140, the Board asserts "that every widow of a firemanwho at the time of his death was in receipt of duty disabilitybenefits would be entitled to receive the increased widow'sbenefit provided by section 6-140. *** Yet the widow of afireman who worked thirty years and died of lung cancer whilestill on the job would not be entitled to such increasedbenefits." The Board states, "[s]uch a conclusion plainly wasnot contemplated by the legislature in enacting the language ofsection 6-140." We agree with the Board that such a conclusion"plainly was not contemplated" as the statute does not providefor a duty-related annuity benefit for "every widow of a firemanwho at the time of his death was in receipt of duty disabilitybenefits." Once again, as made clear by Swoope and Tonkovic, itis the character of the injury, and not merely receiving duty-related disability benefits, that determines whether a duty-related annuity benefit is owed to a widow upon the death of afire fighter receiving duty-related disability benefits. Asapplied to this narrower subset of widows, those whose husbandswere found to have sustained "permanent injury" and were, thus,unable to return to work as fire fighters, the Board fails to setout a persuasive argument regarding why this group was "plainly"not one intended by the legislature to receive the additionalduty-related annuity benefit.

Contrary to the Board's prediction that under theinterpretation mandated by Tonkovic, "the widow of a fireman whoeven slightly injured his shoulder and was on disability and wholater killed himself *** would also receive the duty[-related]death benefits." The widow's duty-related annuity benefit ispayable only if the duty-related disability is one of a permanentnature. If a fire fighter slightly injures his shoulder, unlessthere is persuasive medical testimony that the slight injuryturned into one that "prevents him from subsequently resumingactive service," the annuity shall not be paid. 40 ILCS 5/6-140(West 2000); Swoope, 323 Ill. App. 3d at 531.

In other words, it is not true, as the Board asserts, that"any widow whose husband dies while in receipt of a duty[-related] disability benefit would be entitled to the increased[duty-related annuity] benefit regardless of the nature of theinjury that led to the disability." We agree with the Board'sdeclaration that "the mere fact that a fireman is on disabilityand does not return to work[] does not automatically entitle thewidow to receive the greater benefits." But we find that some ofthe widows of fire fighters who fall in that category shouldreceive the greater benefits. Consistent with the holdings ofTonkovic and Swoope, those widows are the widows of fire fighterswhose duty-related injuries, though not directly the cause oftheir deaths, were of such a nature that the fire fighters werepermanently prevented from subsequently resuming active service. Swoope, 323 Ill. App. 3d at 531.

In response to the Board's many examples that it contendssupport its contrary position, we present the following exampleof why our position wins out. Relying on the Board's own factscenario of a "fireman who dies three weeks after suffering fromburns over the majority of his body" as a situation warranting awidow's duty-related annuity benefit (fire fighter 1), we ask,what of a fire fighter in the very same situation that does not"die three weeks later" but is permanently injured because of hisburns, never able to return to active duty, receives duty-relateddisability benefits, and dies 10 years later of a heart attack(fire fighter 2). By assumption, fire fighter 1 and fire fighter2 suffered the same injuries. Fire fighter 1's family is clearlymeant to receive duty-related annuity benefits which amount to75% of an active fire fighter's income. However, according tothe Board, at the death of fire fighter 2 his family must make doon less, or 50% of an active fire fighter's income.(2) Thisexample suggests that the comparison should not be with firefighter 1, but to fire fighter 3. Fire fighter 3 sustains duty-related injuries, but the character of the injury is not such asto prevent the fire fighter from returning to work afterrehabilitation. Fire fighter 3 nonetheless dies before returningto work. The question becomes who is fire fighter 2 more like:fire fighter 3, whose injuries do not preclude him from returningto work, or fire fighter 1, who dies from his duty-relatedinjury? It seems consistent with the intent and language of thestatute that fire fighter 2 should be treated like fire fighter1, as both were permanently injured (however short that period oftime may have been for fire fighter 1 before his death) andunable to resume active duty.

To the extent that a bright-line rule must be drawn, howeverarbitrary that line may appear, it should be drawn in such a wayas to benefit more, rather than fewer, families of fire fightersinjured on the job. The pension statutes must be liberallyconstrued in favor of the pensioner. Shields, 204 Ill. 2d at494.

As further basis to reject the Board's argument thatTonkovic was wrongly decided, the Board is confronted with theTonkovic decision being established law without change from thelegislature. The legislature was presented with an opportunityto address the Tonkovic holding in its 2001 amendment to section6-140; however, the legislature chose not to do so. 40 ILCS 5/6-140 (West Supp. 2001).

We do not accept the Board's position that "[t]he last paragraphof section 6-140, which is the provision the Tonkovic court focused onexclusively, limits the preceding language in the provision thatgrants the annuity for the widow of a fireman whose death results fromthe performance of an act or acts of duty." We find the Tonkoviclanguage both clear and consistent with the aim and purpose of thestatute as a whole. Therefore, we interpret the language at issue inthe third paragraph of section 6-140, "acts of duty *** prevent[] himfrom subsequently resuming active service in the fire department" (40ILCS 5/6-140 (West 2000)), to mean that a widow must establish withmedical evidence and testimony that her husband's injury, but for hisdeath, would have permanently prevented him from resuming service withthe fire department. See Swoope, 323 Ill. App. 3d at 531.

The financial drain on the Board does not appear to be sogreat that fewer families should receive the widow's duty-relatedannuity benefit as the benefit is only paid to a fire fighter whosuffers such a duty-related injury that "prevents him fromsubsequently resuming active service in the fire department." Tothe extent such injuries are permanent, his wife should beentitled to receive a duty-related annuity benefit upon the firefighter's death and prior to his reaching the age of retirement. It appears certain that the longer the period of permanentdisability, the greater the direct relation between the firefighter's duty-related injury and the benefit that should bepaid. This finding does not "undermine and make less significantthe sacrifice of those who actually die in the line of duty orfrom a cause directly related to the injury suffered while onduty." Rather, it reinforces the sacrifices of those who areseverely injured and unable to return to work because of theirinjuries. The families of fire fighters who are injured while onduty, permanently disabled, and unable to return to work shouldreceive the same benefits upon the death of the fire fighter asthe families of fire fighters whose deaths are directly caused bytheir act or acts of duty. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the plaintiff is entitled to anenhanced widow's annuity. 40 ILCS 5/6-140 (West 2000). Weaffirm the circuit court's order reversing the Board's decision.

Affirmed.

WOLFSON, P.J., and CAHILL, J., concur.

1. Dr. Motto testified, "Metastatic means that the cancer inquestion has come from another source. A different source. Adifferent organ."

2. When each fire fighter would have reached the age ofmandatory retirement, the families will be treated identically,each receiving 50% of his active salary. 40 ILCS 5/6-141.1 (West2000). Thus, the added financial burden on the Board spans theyears from the fire fighter's death to the time he would havereached mandatory retirement age. When the fire fighter dieswhile on duty disability after reaching mandatory retirement age,no additional widow's annuity benefit is paid.