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Plaintiffs, Charles Benedict and Frederick J. Hanifan, appeal the circuit court's dismissalwith prejudice of their second amended complaint for failure to state a cause of action. Plaintiffsfiled a one-count complaint for breach of contract based upon whole life insurance policies soldto them by defendant, Federal Kemper Life Assurance Company, d/b/a Zurich Kemper Life(Kemper). Plaintiffs allege that they purchased Kemper life insurance policies with theunderstanding that they would pay out-of-pocket annual premiums for five years and, thereafter,the policy would accumulate a "cash value" to cover future premium payments. This feature isknown as a "vanishing premium." Plaintiffs allege that Kemper breached the life insurancepolicies when it continued to require the insured to pay premiums out-of-pocket after five years. The circuit court concluded that the Kemper policy was not ambiguous and Kemper did notbreach its contract with plaintiffs. The issues on appeal are (1) whether the Kemper lifeinsurance policy is ambiguous so that parol evidence may be considered in determining whetherKemper did in fact breach the contract and, if so, (2) whether the statute of limitations barsplaintiffs' claim. For the reasons stated below, we affirm the decision of the circuit court.

SUMMARY OF ALLEGATIONS

The named plaintiffs, and those they purportedly represent, purchased life insurancepolicies from Kemper from 1980 forward. The second amended complaint alleges that Kemperentered into life insurance contracts with its policyholders which contained "vanishingpremiums." The plaintiffs allege that Kemper agents used sales illustrations to sell policieswhich showed that after a stated number of years, the obligation of the insured to make out-of-pocket premium payments would vanish.

Facts Pertaining to Charles Benedict

The complaint alleges that in 1984, Kemper contacted named plaintiff Charles Benedictand persuaded him to purchase a $50,000 whole life insurance policy based on illustrationsshowing premium payments "vanishing" after five years. The complaint further alleges that thesales agent provided an illustration generated by Kemper which promised that, after five years,Benedict would not have to make another out-of-pocket premium payment for the life of thepolicy. Benedict paid a premium on his policy for five years, and in the sixth year, he receivedanother premium bill. Benedict has continued to pay premiums out-of-pocket.

Facts Pertaining to Frederick J. Hanifan

The complaint alleges that named plaintiff Frederick J. Hanifan was contacted by Kemperand persuaded to purchase a $100,000 whole life insurance policy based on a sales illustrationsimilar to the one shown to Benedict. The complaint alleges that Hanifan was also shown a salesillustration which indicated that his out-of-pocket payments would "vanish" after five years. Hanifan paid premiums for five years. Kemper sent a sixth premium bill to Hanifan and Hanifansubsequently surrendered his policy.

The second amended complaint contains one count for breach of contract. The plaintiffsallege that the Kemper policies promised that out-of-pocket premium costs to plaintiffs wouldvanish at a certain point. According to the complaint, Kemper breached these contracts bydemanding that plaintiffs pay additional out-of-pocket premiums beyond the dates originallyagreed to or risk having their policies canceled.

Kemper filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the insurance policiesunambiguously preclude a vanishing premium promise. Kemper asserts that the integrationclause in the policy along with the parol evidence rule preclude consideration of the salesillustration. Moreover, Kemper contends that the sales illustration does not even support theplaintiffs' claim. Finally, Kemper maintains that even if parol evidence was considered here, thefive-year limitation on actions based on oral contracts would bar plaintiffs' claim.

The circuit court found that the contract, consisting of the policy and the application, wasnot ambiguous so that the sales illustration could not be considered. The court further stated thateven if it could properly consider the sales illustration, it did not support the claim that Kemperpromised a vanishing premium. Finally, the circuit court stated that if the plaintiffs relied onparol evidence, their claim would be barred by the five year statute of limitations.

DISCUSSION

We review de novo the dismissal of a complaint pursuant to section 2-619 of the Code ofCivil Procedure. (735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 1998)). Bloom v. Braun, 317 Ill. App. 3d 720, 725,739 N.E.2d 925 928 (2000). A reviewing court must construe the allegations in the light mostfavorable to the plaintiffs and determine whether plaintiffs have alleged sufficient facts toestablish a cause of action on which relief may be granted. Weatherman v. Gary-Wheaton Bankof Fox Valley, 186 Ill. 2d 472, 491, 713 N.E.2d 543 (1999). Furthermore, the reviewing courtmust ascertain whether a genuine issue of material fact existed precluding dismissal or, absent anissue of fact, whether the dismissal was proper as a matter of law. Bloom, 317 Ill. App. 3d at725.

In Illinois, contract interpretation follows the four corners doctrine so that we look only tothe language of the contract to determine if it is susceptible to more than one meaning. AirSafety, Inc. v. Teachers Realty Corp., 185 Ill. 2d 457, 462, 706 N.E.2d 882, 885 (1999).⁽¹⁾ If thelanguage of the contract is facially unambiguous, then the contract is interpreted without the useof parol evidence. Air Safety, Inc., 185 Ill. 2d at 462, citing Farm Credit Bank v. Whitlock, 144Ill.2d 440, 447, 581 N.E.2d 664 (1991). If, however, the court finds that the language of thecontract is susceptible to more than one meaning, then an ambiguity is present and parol evidencemay be admitted to aid the trier of fact in resolving the ambiguity. Air Safety, 185 Ill.2d at 462-63; Whitlock, 144 Ill. 2d at 447.

Insurance contracts are subject to the same rules of construction applicable to other typesof contracts. Hall v. Country Casualty Insurance Co., 204 Ill. App. 3d 765, 773, 562 N.E.2d 640(1990). When construing an insurance contract, it is our duty to ascertain and give effect to theintent of the parties and the best indicator of the parties' intent is the language used in theagreement. Wallis v. Country Mutual Insurance Co., 309 Ill. App. 3d 566, 571, 723 N.E.2d 376(2000). If the terms of the policy are clear and unambiguous, they must be given their plain andordinary meaning. Hartford Insurance Co. of Illinois v. Kelly, 309 Ill. App. 3d 800, 806, 723N.E.2d 288 (1999). An insurance policy is said to be ambiguous if it is subject to more than onereasonable interpretation. Continental Casualty Co v. Roper Corp., 173 Ill. App. 3d 760, 767,527 N.E.2d 998 (1988).

Here, plaintiffs allege that Kemper breached the insurance contract when premiums failedto "vanish." Plaintiffs cannot, however, identify a specific provision of the written policies thatwas breached. Since the plaintiffs cannot show that any express provision of the written policywas breached, their claim is solely predicated upon the alleged oral representations made by thesales agent and the sales illustration used at the point of sale. In order to consider this extrinsicevidence, the plaintiffs argue that the contract is ambiguous because it does not say whetherpremiums will be paid out of the cash value of the policy or by the policyholder. The plaintiffscontend that since an ambiguity as to the source of the premium payment exists, the court mayconsider parol evidence. We are not persuaded by this argument since we specifically find thatthe contract is unambiguous.

A life insurance contract must be construed according to the sense and the meaning of theterms, and if the language is clear it must be taken according to its plain, ordinary and popularsense. Dempsey v. National Life & Accident Insurance Co., 404 Ill. 423, 88 N.E.2d 874 (1949).

Here, the Kemper policy states: "Premiums must be paid while the insured is alive forthe time shown in the Policy Specifications." The policy also states:

"On the fifth policy anniversary, and on each policy anniversary thereafter,[Kemper] may require lower premiums in accordance with the premiumpayment option section of this policy. In such case, you may continue topay the premium shown, and the insured's death benefit may increase inaccordance with the death benefit section of this policy."

The premium payment section of the policy states:

"Premium payments are payable to us at the home office or to anauthorized representative. A receipt for premium payments signed by oursecretary will be furnished if paid to an authorized representative.

Premiums are payable in advance in the amounts and at the intervalsshown in the Policy Specifications. Subject to our minimum, premiumsmay be paid each year, each 6 months, each 3 months or, as we agree eachmonth. You may change the frequency of premium payments by payingthe new premium rate on or before the due date. The entire premium paidon the basis selected is deemed fully earned on the due date."

The premium payment option provision states:

"At the end of the fifth and each later policy year, we will determine whatpremium(s), if any, is (are) required in the following year to maintain thepolicy in force for an amount equal to the initial death benefit. We willnotify you what premium(s), if any, is (are) required for the next policyyear.

The required annual premium may be less than the basic annual premium.Payment of the required annual premium will satisfy your premiumobligation for one annual period. However, you may choose to pay thebasic annual premium."

The Kemper policy also contains an integration clause which states, "This policy and thestatements made in the application attached to this policy constitute the entire contract."

We find no ambiguity concerning the payment of premiums for the Kemper policies. TheKemper policy clearly states that, after the fifth policy year, the premium required each year maychange and the insured would be notified of the minimum amount required to keep the policy ineffect. The policy also clearly states that the insured may elect to pay more than the amountrequired. The policy does not specifically state the source of the premiums due the first fiveyears. We see no reason to find an ambiguity in the policy because it does not specify the sourceof premium payments in the following years.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, we hold that the Kemper policy is unambiguous and that anyenforcement of the alleged promises made at the point of sale would violate the parol evidencerule and must be disregarded. Thus, we conclude that plaintiffs cannot maintain their breach ofcontract claim.⁽²⁾

Affirmed.

COHEN, P.J., and O'MARA FROSSARD, J., concur.

1. The defendant's assertion that Air Safety "categorically 'precludes the consideration ofextrinsic evidence' without regard to whether the extrinsic evidence adds, subtracts, clarifies, orrepeats the integrated writing" is misleading. The issue in Air Safety was whether parol evidencemay be provisionally admitted to show that an ambiguity exists. The Illinois Supreme Court heldthat the four corners rule precludes the consideration of parol evidence where the contract isfacially unambiguous. The Air Safety ourt did not preclude the consideration of parol evidence ifthe contract is found to be ambiguous.

2. We decline to rule on the statute of limitations issue as we have found that plaintiffscannot maintain a cause of action for breach of contract.