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FIFTH DIVISION

September 30, 2002

JUSTICE BUCKLEY delivered the opinion of the court:

In October 1999, plaintiff Hawthorne Race Course (Hawthorne)filed a complaint against defendants Illinois State Treasurer JudyBaar Topinka, the Department of Revenue (Department), and theIllinois Racing Board (Racing Board) seeking an injunction anddeclaratory judgment. Hawthorne alleged that a 1999 amendment tothe Illinois Horse Racing Act of 1975 (Racing Act) (230 ILCS 5/1through 55 (West Supp. 1999)) creating a pari-mutuel tax credit wasavailable to racetracks beginning in the year 1999. In December1999, plaintiffs Balmoral Racing Club (Balmoral) and Maywood ParkTrotting Association (Maywood) filed a complaint similar toHawthorne's complaint. The parties agreed to consolidate the twocases. In April 2000, plaintiffs filed motions for summaryjudgment in their respective cases, and in May 2000, defendantsfiled a motion for summary judgment. In August 2000, the circuitcourt granted summary judgment to plaintiffs.

Defendants appeal, arguing that the circuit court erred ingranting summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs. We affirm.

On June 25, 1999,the Illinois General Assembly enacted PublicAct 91-40, an act relating to gambling. Pub. Act 91-40, eff. June25, 1999 (1999 Ill. Laws 1184-1257). Contained in the act wereseveral amendments to the Racing Act. Two such amendments includedthe addition of section 27(a-5), which imposed a "pari-mutuel tax"to begin January 1, 2000, and changes to section 27(a), which wasamended to add the termination of the "privilege tax" on December31, 1999. Pub. Act 91-40, eff. June 25, 1999 (1999 Ill. Laws 1219-20). Another amendment was the addition of section 32.1, whichprovided for a pari-mutuel tax credit for racetracks awarded liveracing dates during a given year. Pub. Act 91-40, eff. June 25,1999 (1999 Ill. Laws 1234-35) (adding 230 ILCS 5/32.1).

In 1999, Hawthorne was licensed to and did conduct a thorough-bred race meeting at its race course in Stickney, Illinois. Alsoin 1999, Balmoral and Maywood were licensed to and did conductharness racing in Balmoral Park, Illinois, and Maywood Park,Illinois, respectively.

Following the effective date of Public Act 91-40, each of theplaintiffs advised the Racing Board that since it had been awardedlive racing dates in 1999, it were entitled to a credit against itsprivilege tax in 1999, as established by section 32.1. 230 ILCS5/32.1 (West Supp. 1999). The Racing Board denied plaintiffs'requests, and plaintiffs' proceeded to make a payment of theprivilege tax under protest pursuant to section 2(a) of the StateEmployees and Money Disposition Act. 30 ILCS 230/2(a) (West 1998).

In October 1999, Hawthorne filed a complaint in the circuitcourt against defendants seeking an injunction and declaratoryjudgment. It alleged that in 1998 it paid $1,229,048.44 in realestate taxes. Hawthorne alleged that section 32.1 of the RacingAct provided a pari-mutuel tax credit, which the General Assemblyintended to be available in 1999 and, thus, it was entitled to a50% credit against its 1999 privilege tax. Hawthorne also soughta temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction toprohibit transfer of funds paid under protest. In December 1999,Balmoral and Maywood filed a complaint alleging the same use of thepari-mutuel tax credit as Hawthorne. Balmoral and Maywood paid in1998 real estate taxes in the amounts of $163,317.02 and$766,186.56, respectively. The circuit court issued temporaryrestraining orders in both cases. The parties filed an agreedmotion to consolidate both cases, which the court granted. InFebruary 2000, the court granted a preliminary injunction.

In April 2000, plaintiffs filed motions for summary judgmentin their respective cases, and in May 2000, defendants filed amotion for summary judgment. In August 2000, the circuit courtgranted plaintiffs' motions for summary judgment, finding:

"1. Plaintiffs, by virtue of 230 ILCS5/32.1, are entitled to receive, in 1999, acredit against taxes assessed on pari-mutuelhandle under 230 ILCS 5/27(a) in the year1999;

2. Plaintiffs have made payments of taxesunder protest pursuant to 30 ILCS 230/2(a);

3. There is no genuine issue of materialfact and [p]laintiffs are entitled to summaryjudgment as a matter of law."

The court entered judgment in favor of plaintiffs and awarded$614,529.22 to Hawthorne, $81,658.51 to Balmoral, and $383,093.28to Maywood, plus interest. In September 2000, a modified order forsummary judgment was entered, noting that the interest was to runfrom the date of deposit of the disputed funds into the protestfund.

This appeal followed.

On appeal, defendants argue that the trial court erred ingranting summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs. Specifically,defendants assert that the pari-mutuel tax credit provided bysection 32.1 first became available in the 2000 tax year, which isthe same tax year that section 27(a-5) first imposed the pari-mutuel tax. We disagree.

The standard of review in this case is de novo for two reasons. Since "the question presented is one of law, a reviewing courtdetermines it independently of the trial court's judgment." In reLawrence M., 172 Ill. 2d 523, 526 (1996). Additionally, we reviewa circuit court's grant of summary judgment de novo. Ragan v.Columbia Mutual Insurance Co., 183 Ill. 2d 342, 349 (1998). Sum-mary judgment is appropriate where "the pleadings, depositions, andadmissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show thatthere is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that themoving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." 735ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 1998).

Ordinarily, the taxing authority has the burden of proofregarding a taxpayer's liability to the government. Balla v.Department of Revenue, 96 Ill. App. 3d 293, 295 (1981). However,when a taxpayer claims that he is exempt from a particular tax, orwhere he seeks to take advantage of deductions or credits allowedby statute, the burden of proof is on the taxpayer. Statutesgranting such privileges are to be strictly construed in favor oftaxation. Balla, 96 Ill. App. 3d at 295. In this case, plaintiffscarry the burden of proof because they are seeking to take advan-tage of a tax credit.

Public Act 91-40 added section 32.1, which imposed a creditfor pari-mutuel taxes as follows:

"In order to encourage new investment inIllinois racetrack facilities and mitigatediffering real estate tax burdens among allracetracks, the licensees affiliated orassociated with each racetrack that has beenawarded live racing dates in the current yearshall receive an immediate pari-mutuel taxcredit in an amount equal to the greater of(i) 50% of the amount of the real estate taxespaid in the prior year attributable to thatracetrack, or (ii) the amount by which thereal estate taxes paid in the prior year

attributable to that racetrack exceeds 60% ofthe average real estate taxes paid in theprior year for all racetracks awarded livehorse racing meets in the current year.

Each year, regardless of whether theorganization licensee conducted live racing inthe year of certification, the [Racing] Boardshall certify in writing, prior to December31, the real estate taxes paid in that yearfor each racetrack and the amount of thepari-mutuel tax credit that each organizationlicensee, intertrack wagering licensee, andintertrack wagering location licensee thatderives its license from such racetrack isentitled in the succeeding calendar year. Thereal estate taxes considered under this[s]ection for any racetrack shall be thosetaxes on the real estate parcels and relatedfacilities used to conduct a horse racemeeting and inter-track wagering at suchracetrack under this Act. In no event shallthe amount of the tax credit under this[s]ection exceed the amount of pari-mutueltaxes otherwise calculated under this Act. Theamount of the tax credit under this [s]ectionshall be retained by each licensee and shallnot be subject to any reallocation or furtherdistribution under this Act. The [Racing]Board may promulgate emergency rules toimplement this [s]ection." 230 ILCS 5/32.1(West Supp. 1999).

Plaintiffs assert that the legislature intended for the pari-mutuel tax credit to be available for use directly after theeffective date in June 1999 while defendants contend that thecredit was to be available beginning in the 2000 tax year. Weagree with plaintiffs.

The cardinal rule of statutory interpretation, to which allother rules are subordinate, is to ascertain and give effect to theintent of the legislature. People v. Maggette, 195 Ill. 2d 336,348 (2001). In determining the legislative intent, a court shouldfirst consider the statutory language. This is the best means ofdetermining the legislative intent. Maggette, 195 Ill. 2d at 348. A court must consider the entire statute and interpret each of itsrelevant parts together. If legislative intent can be ascertainedfrom the statute's plain language, that intent must prevail withoutresort to other interpretive aids. Paris v. Feder, 179 Ill. 2d173, 177 (1997).

Plaintiffs contend that section 32.1 is ambiguous in its useof the words "current year" and "immediate." They claim that thereference to "current year" meant the year the statute becameeffective; in this case, 1999, "immediate" meant that the qualify-ing racetracks were entitled to the credit immediately upon thestatute's effective date. Defendants argue that "current year"does not mean 1999 but, rather, should be read that beginning in2000, "current year" means the current calendar year. Defendantsalso assert that "immediate" means without intervention, and inthis context it means that the tax credit will be available as soonas the tax obligation arises.

A statute is ambiguous when it is capable of being understoodby reasonably well-informed persons in two or more differentsenses, thus warranting the consideration of other sources toascertain the legislative intent. Advincula v. United BloodServices, 176 Ill. 2d 1, 18 (1996). In this case, the context inwhich "current year" and "immediate" are used creates an ambiguity. The trial court resolved this ambiguity by determining that thelegislature's use of these words reflected its intent for the taxcredit to be available in the 1999 tax year. We agree.

In reading section 32.1 in its entirety, defendants' interpre-tation would render the statute redundant because the secondparagraph details the same function that defendants claim the firstparagraph outlines. Statutes should be construed, if possible, sothat no term is rendered superfluous or meaningless. Bonaguro v.County Officers Electoral Board, 158 Ill. 2d 391, 397 (1994). Wewill not interpret the statute in a manner that creates aredundancy.

This intention by the legislature is further supported by thefact that the legislature, in drafting section 32.1, did not indi-cate an effective date other than the effective date for Public Act91-40, which was June 25, 1999. In several additions and amend-ments, the legislature incorporated an effective date of January 1,2000. The most significant example is the inclusion of a January1, 2000, effective date for section 27(a-5), which imposed thepari-mutuel tax. Clearly, the legislature did not intend for thepari-mutuel tax credit to apply only to the pari-mutuel tax when itspecifically stated the pari-mutuel tax was not to become effectiveuntil January 1, 2000, but did not make any such date restrictionson the pari-mutuel tax credit. We decline the invitation urged bydefendants to stray from the clear statutory language.

Additionally, the trial court found that the use of the words"pari-mutuel tax" did not demonstrate that the legislative intentbehind the credit was for it to be unavailable during the "currentyear" of 1999. In support of its finding, the court pointed outseveral instances where the legislature used the terms "privilegetax" and "pari-mutuel tax" interchangeably in legislation and indebate.

In resolving the ambiguity in the statutory language, we lookto extrinsic sources to ascertain the legislative intent. Where astatute is unclear, a court may consider legislative history inorder to establish legislative intent. Such extrinsic sources aslegislative debates may be relevant to the inquiry. People v.Lowe, 153 Ill. 2d 195, 203 (1992).

The legislative debates over Public Act 91-40 provide guidanceas to the legislative intent. Senator Dillard discussed the jobsinvolved in this industry and the tax burdens upon it: "So,[49,500] jobs are at stake, with over four billion dollars a yearin economic activity, for better or worse, coming from thisparticular industry. Illinois has the highest pari-mutuel tax inthe United States of America, and we are more than twice thenational average." 91st Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, May25, 1999, at 8 (statements of Senator Dillard). RepresentativeCross discussed the change in tax, in that the bill "reduces thepari-mutuel tax, from 3 to 1.5%, *** which is about the nationalaverage." 91st Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, May 21, 1999,at 205 (statements of Representative Cross). He also stated aspecific goal of the bill was to "provide a substantial infusion ofnew revenue into the industry with the hope and the intention ofboth preserve and enhance [sic] quality of horse racing in Illinois." 91st Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, May 21, 1999, at 205(statements of Representative Cross).

Based on these debates, we find that the legislative intentwas to provide instant help to the horse racing industry byreducing the tax burden on this struggling entity. The GeneralAssembly's paramount goal was to help the industry with the lowertax rate and the tax credit. Also, the statements of both SenatorDillard and Representative Cross refer to the pari-mutuel tax in acontext where the privilege tax was the actual tax in existence. These statements help to show that the legislature did consider the"privilege tax" and the "pari-mutuel tax" to be the same tax. Also, we note that both taxes are a privilege tax on pari-mutuelhandle, which is all monies bet at the race track from all sources,including off track and simulcast betting. The change of the namefrom a privilege tax to a pari-mutuel tax does not change the factthat the tax is a privilege tax on the privilege of conductinghorse racing.

Another extrinsic tool to aid in the interpretation of anambiguous statute is to construe in pari materia with other statutesrelating to like subjects. The trial court conducted this analysisto help determine legislative intent and found that the legislaturefor many years used the terms "pari-mutuel" and "privilege"interchangeably and intended the same tax with either term. Specifically, the court considered section 8.25e(a) of the StateFinance Act (30 ILCS 105/1 through 36 (West 1998)), where itstated:

"The State Comptroller and the StateTreasurer shall automatically transfer on thefirst day of each month, beginning February 1,1988, from the General Revenue Fund to each ofthe funds supplemented by the pari-mutuel tax,pursuant to [s]ection 28 of the [Racing Act],an amount equal to (i) the amount of pari-mutueltax deposited into such fund during the monthin fiscal year 1986 which corresponds to themonth preceding such transfer, minus (ii) theamount of pari-mutuel tax deposited into such fundduring the month preceding such transfer ***." (Emphasis added.) 30 ILCS 105/8.25e(a) (West1998).

This section refers to a pari-mutuel tax imposed by the RacingAct. However, at the time section 8.25e was drafted, the RacingAct did not contain a pari-mutuel tax, but instead had a privilegetax. According to defendants' interpretation, the 86th GeneralAssembly was referring to a tax that did not exist. Rather, weagree with the conclusion of the trial court and consider this asfurther evidence that the legislature intended for "pari-mutueltax" and "privilege tax" to refer to the same tax. Accordingly, wefind that the legislature intended the pari-mutuel tax credit toapply to the privilege tax in 1999.

Based on the foregoing analysis, we affirm the decision of thetrial court.

Affirmed.

CAMPBELL, P.J., and REID, J., concur.