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JUSTICE GORDON delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff, Khalid J. Bajwa (plaintiff), administrator of the estate of Muhammad Cheema,brought a wrongful death action against Metropolitan Life Insurance Company (defendant or MetLife) alleging that Met Life's negligent issuance of an insurance policy on the life of MuhammadCheema (decedent), designating Muhammad U. Cheema (Cheema) as the policy beneficiary,proximately caused the decedent's death. Plaintiff's fourth amended complaint, which is thesubject of the instant appeal, contained four separate counts of negligence against Met Life.⁽¹⁾ Thetrial court granted defendant's motion to dismiss counts IV through VI of plaintiff's complaint,

and also granted defendant's motion for summary judgment on count VII.⁽²⁾ Plaintiff now appealsthe trial court's judgments. We affirm in part, reverse in part and remand.

BACKGROUND

In December 1992, Cheema approached Imtiaz Sheik (Sheik), a Met Life accountrepresentative, and filled out an application for a life insurance policy on the life of the decedent. Cheema, whose name is nearly identical to the decedent's, represented himself as the decedent'sson and provided Sheik with personal information about the decedent necessary for the policyapplication. Cheema also designated himself as the beneficiary of the policy and arranged for thepolicy premiums to be automatically deducted from his bank account, but listed the decedent asthe "owner" of the policy on the application. Cheema then told Sheik that he would take theapplication to his "father" and obtain his "father's" signature, and Sheik agreed to this arrangementeven though Met Life company procedure required that an insurance agent personally meet withthe insured and witness the insured sign the policy application. Cheema returned the applicationto Sheik with a signature bearing the decedent's name. Although plaintiff asserts that Cheemaforged the decedent's signature on the application, there is no evidence in the record whichaffirmatively refutes or supports this assertion. The record does, however, provide evidencewhich indicates that much of the information provided by Cheema on the policy application wasincorrect. For example, the decedent's home address, occupation, years of employment, annualincome, current insurance status and medical information were misstated. Further, the applicationwrongly indicated that Cheema was the decedent's son.

As part of the application process, the insured was required to submit to a medicalexamination conducted by EMSI, a paramedical company hired by Met Life. An individual whoidentified himself as the decedent was examined by EMSI in relation to the instant policyapplication. The individual, whom plaintiff now asserts was not the decedent, produced a State ofIllinois identification card which identified him as the decedent. A Met Life investigatorcontacted the Secretary of State's office and confirmed that an identification card was issued to anindividual with the same name as the decedent. Notably, the individual examined by the EMSIparamedic was listed in the report as standing 5 feet 11 inches tall and weighing 195 pounds. Atthe time of his death, less than a year after the paramedical examination, the decedent stood 5 feet8 inches tall and weighed 213 pounds.

The insurance application in question, including the parts containing the paramedicalexaminer's certification, were submitted to a Met Life underwriter prior to issuance of the policy. The underwriter noticed anomalies in the policy application which required further investigation. Specifically, the underwriter questioned why Cheema, rather than the insured's wife, was thepolicy beneficiary and why the beneficiary, rather than the insured, was paying the monthly policypremiums. The underwriter also questioned why the policy amount was $200,000 when thedecedent's income, pursuant to Met Life financial guidelines, qualified him for a policy in theamount of $150,000. The underwriter confronted Sheik with these discrepancies and was toldthat the son was the beneficiary because the wife lived in Pakistan and foreign beneficiaries werediscouraged by the company. Sheik also advised the underwriter that, despite information in theapplication suggesting otherwise, the insured would be paying the policy premiums with someassistance from his son. Sheik also explained that the increase in the policy amount was necessarybecause the decedent was supporting his wife and children in Pakistan and would be buried inPakistan upon his death. Based on these explanations, the underwriter decided that theapplication was acceptable and issued the policy. The underwriter never asked Sheik if hepersonally met with the decedent. Notably, the policy application indicated, albeit dishonestly,that Sheikh had properly met with the decedent and certified the signing of the insuranceapplication.

A policy insuring the life of the decedent in the amount of $200,000 was issued in January1993. A note in the record indicates that, on February 19, 1993, an individual purporting to be theinsured called Met Life four times with questions concerning potential coverage on possible deathclaims relating to the decedent's policy. Met Life's notations concerning these calls revealed thatthe caller asked whether the policy would pay if he was injured in a car accident in anothercountry, returned to this country and then died. The caller was advised that an affirmativeresponse could not be given because different factors would influence the decision to pay on thepolicy. Another notation indicated that a call was received wherein the caller asked "detailedquestions about if he goes to Pakistan and dies will we [Met Life] pay the claim." The notationfurther indicated that the caller "had specific hypothetical situations that he wanted to know if wewould pay or not." The caller was given the number to the death claims division. Another callwas received in which the caller asked whether Met Life would pay if he was in a car accident orhis house was robbed and he was killed in Pakistan. Met Life responded by explaining theinsurance contestability provision to the caller. During another call, the caller stated that he didnot speak much English and put an individual on the phone whom he identified as his girlfriend. The policy conditions were then explained to the girlfriend.

A memorandum written to the vice president of the Mid-America head office who appearsto have been involved in the investigation of the policy after the decedent's death refered to thesecalls and states:

"Barb Gardener called. They received four calls on the case you inquired about. All of them came in on 2/19. They werestrange enough that the case found its way into the Consulting Services area and they noted the file. They thought there'd be adisappearing act in Pakistan."

Six days after these calls were made to Met Life, the decedent was stabbed and beaten todeath in his apartment. Cheema is the suspected murderer; however, he has never been convictedof this offense. The facts establish that he fled to Pakistan after the decedent's murder and has avoided extradition thus far.

Plaintiff filed his initial complaint in this matter in February 1995 and alleged that MetLife negligently issued an insurance policy on the life of the decedent. He subsequently filed first,second and third amended complaints, all of which were dismissed for insufficiency of thepleadings pursuant to defense motions filed under section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 1994). Plaintiff then filed his fourth amended complaint. Count IV ofthe complaint alleged in relevant part that Met Life: (a) negligently and carelessly issued a lifeinsurance policy on the life of the decedent without investigating the veracity of the informationon the insurance application or personally meeting the insured; (b) issued a policy in favor of abeneficiary who did not possess an insurable interest in the life of the insured; (c) improperlyrelied on misrepresentations made by its agent in underwriting the policy; (d) failed to warn thedecedent of suspicious phone calls which suggested that he was in imminent danger; and (e)provided a motivation and temptation for the murder of the decedent by the designatedbeneficiary. Count V alleged gross negligence for the same acts or omissions as they related toMet Life's agent, Sheik. Count VI alleged that Met Life negligently supervised Sheik. Count VIIalleged that Met Life possessed actual knowledge of the following information: (a) the decedenthad no knowledge of the life insurance policy taken out on his life; (b) Cheema signed theapplication for the policy posing as the decedent; (c) Cheema was not related to the decedent andwas specifically not the decedent's son; (d) that an imposter took the physical examinationrequired by the policy; (e) Cheema intended to murder the decedent to collect the policy benefits;and (f) Cheema did in fact murder the decedent after the policy was officially issued.

In a written order, the trial court granted defendant's section 2-615 motion to dismisscounts IV through VI of the fourth amended complaint on grounds of insufficient pleadings,stating that "[t]hese counts were previously dismissed by prior court order, and there are no newallegations contained in the Fourth Amended Complaint which would alter the court's priordismissal." The trial court, however, denied defendant's motion to dismiss count seven of thecomplaint because plaintiff pled actual knowledge on the part of Met Life. Defendantsubsequently filed a motion for summary judgment on count seven, and the trial court granted themotion, reasoning that "[t]he facts, as presented by both parties in the cross-motions, fail tosupport these allegations [of actual knowledge], or to establish an issue of fact as between theseparties."

Plaintiff now appeals the trial court's dismissal of counts IV through VI of his complaintand the summary judgment order related to count VII. Plaintiff asserts that the pleadings weresufficient to state a cause of action against defendant and that a question of fact exists as towhether Met Life breached its duty of reasonable care when it issued an insurance policy in favorof a beneficiary with no insurable interest on the life of the insured, failed to verify that theinsured was aware of and consented to the policy, failed to investigate discrepancies and errors inthe life insurance application and failed to warn the insured of suspicious phone calls regardingthe payout of policy benefits.

ANALYSIS

To state a cause of action for negligence, a plaintiff must allege facts in his complaintwhich establish that defendant owed plaintiff a duty, that defendant breached that duty and thatplaintiff sustained an injury as a result of the breach. Doe v. Calumet City, 161 Ill. 2d 374, 384,641 N.E.2d 498, 503 (1994). Whether a sufficient duty exists to support a negligence claim is aquestion of law properly subject to de novo review by this court. Colombo v. Wal-Mart Stores,Inc., 303 Ill. App. 3d 932, 933-34, 709 N.E.2d 301, 302 (1999).

The primary issue presented by this case is whether an insurer could ever be held liable forthe murder of the insured, under a theory of negligence, where the policy sold provided theincentive to the beneficiary to kill the insured. The parties agree that this is an issue of firstimpression in Illinois. However, similar causes of action have been raised in other states, andbecause Illinois is devoid of statutes or case law in this area, we look to the decisions of severalother state courts for guidance.

At the outset, we note that state courts have increasingly recognized wrongful death claimsresulting from the negligent issuance of life insurance policies. See, e.g., Life Insurance asMotive for Murder, 29 Tort & Ins. L.J. 761 (1994). Several state courts have formally recognizedthat such actions may proceed under the common law of negligence. See Liberty National LifeInsurance Co. v. Weldon, 267 Ala. 171, 100 So. 2d 696 (1957); Life Insurance Co. v. Lopez, 443So. 2d 947 ( Fla. 1983); Ramey v. Carolina Life Insurance Co., 244 S.C. 16, 135 S.E.2d 362(1964); Williams v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co., 718 S.W.2d 611 (Mo. 1986); see,e.g., Insurer's Tort Liability for Wrongful or Negligent Issuance of Life Policy, 37 A.L.R.4th 972(1985). We also note that the parties have not indicated that any states have prohibited recoveryor have rejected any duty by the insurer in actions of this type. Accordingly, we are not inclinedto reject out of hand the recognition of a duty by the insurer to use reasonable care so as not toprovide an incentive to murder through the issuance of its life insurance policies.

The case law of other jurisdictions has recognized the validity of such claims on threedifferent grounds which may lead to carrier liability for wrongful death in the event that themurder of the insured is committed by someone who receives the benefits of a life insurancepolicy. The first is where the insurance company should have known that the individual whoprocured and owned the policy, and named herself as the beneficiary, had no insurable interest inthe life of the insured. See Weldon, 267 Ala. 171, 100 So. 2d 696. The second is where theinsurance company had knowledge that the insured was unaware and did not consent to thepolicy. See Ramey, 244 S.C. 16, 135 S.E.2d 362; Williams, 718 S.W.2d 611. The third factualpredicate is where the insurance company had actual knowledge of the beneficiary's intent tomurder the insured and failed to take action. Lopez, 443 So. 2d 947. Liability has also beensupported by the cumulative impact of more than one of these factual predicates. See, e.g.,Ramey, 244 S.C. 16, 135 S.E. 2d 362. In our case, the plaintiff's complaint alleges that each ofthese factual predicates was present and that each, in itself, as well as cumulatively, is sufficient toform a basis for insurer liability. Plaintiff contends that each of these grounds was sufficientlypled in his complaint and must, for the purposes of a section 2-615 pleadings motion, be held toexist in this case.⁽³⁾ We therefore address the sufficiency of each of these grounds in turn. Insurable Interest

First, plaintiff contends that counts IV through VII of his complaint sufficiently pled factsestablishing that Met Life owed a duty of reasonable care "not to issue a policy of life insurance infavor of a beneficiary who has no interest in the continuation of the life of the insured." For thisproposition, plaintiff relies on the leading and often cited Alabama case of Liberty National LifeInsurance Co. v. Weldon. In Weldon, an aunt-in-law obtained several life insurance policies onher 2