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JUSTICE COHEN delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff, Earl Bailey, filed a first amended complaint against defendants AllstateDevelopment Corporation and Allstate Insurance Company (hereinafter referred to collectively asAllstate or defendants) seeking damages for injuries sustained when plaintiff fell from a ledge whilewashing windows at Allstate's corporate office building in Northbrook, Illinois. The trial courtgranted summary judgment in favor of defendants on the grounds that plaintiff's original complaintwas filed more than two years after the occurrence and thus outside the statute of limitations periodgenerally applicable to personal injury claims. 735 ILCS 5/13-202 (West 1998). The trial courtrejected plaintiff's argument that his cause of action was governed by the extended four-year statuteof limitations period set forth in the construction section of the Limitations Act (Act) (735 ILCS5/13-214(a) (West 1998)). In ruling, the trial court did not address plaintiff's argument that a priorjudge's denial of defendants' motion to dismiss precluded a subsequent grant of summary judgmenton the same issue. We affirm the circuit court and find that: (1) a successor judge's grant ofsummary judgment is proper, absent a change in facts or circumstances, when a prior judge's order denying a defendant's motion to dismiss was not a ruling on the merits, and (2)plaintiff's cause of action is governed by the two-year statute of limitations generally applicable topersonal injury claims because, as a matter of law, the performance of window washing servicesdoes not constitute the "construction of an improvement to real property" within the meaning of theLimitations Act (735 ILCS 5/13-214(a) (West 1998)).

I. BACKGROUND

On July 11, 1991, Earl Bailey sustained severe injuries when he fell from the window ledgeof an Allstate corporate office building. At the time of the accident, plaintiff was employed byStandard Window Cleaning Company/Millard Maintenance Service (Millard), which had contractedwith defendants to perform window washing services on certain buildings owned and operated bydefendants in Northbrook, Illinois. In order to perform his work, plaintiff was required to wet downwindows while standing on an outdoor ledge. After the window was wet, plaintiff's coworkersqueegeed the window to remove the water. Neither plaintiff nor his coworker was wearing a safetybelt at the time of the accident. Defendants specifically required safety belts to be worn by allpersons performing window washing work on outdoor ledges.

Plaintiff's original complaint was filed in 1995, almost four years after plaintiff was injured. On May 4, 1995, plaintiff filed a first amended complaint against defendants which alleged aviolation of the Structural Work Act (740 ILCS 150/0.01 et seq. (West 1994)) in Count I andnegligence in count II. Specifically, plaintiff alleged that safety belts, owned by defendants, wereavailable on the Allstate premises but that defendants failed to provide workers with adequateaccess to them. Plaintiff further alleged that defendants knowingly allowed workers to stand onoutdoor ledges while washing building windows without using any safety equipment.

On July 10, 1995, defendants filed a motion to dismiss count II of plaintiff's first amendedcomplaint on the pleadings. In their motion, defendants argued that plaintiff's negligence action wastime-barred pursuant to section 13-202 of the Limitations Act because it was filed after the two-yearstatute of limitations had expired. 735 ILCS 5/13-202 (West 1998). In response, plaintiff assertedthat his first amended complaint alleged a cause of action arising out of a construction-relatedactivity and was therefore governed by the four-year statute of limitations set forth in theconstruction section of the Act (735 ILCS 5/13-214(a) (West 1998)). Defendants replied that thefour-year statute of limitations did not apply to plaintiff's cause of action because the construction-related activities outlined in section 13-214(a) do not encompass the performance of windowwashing services. 735 ILCS 5/13-214 (a) (West 1998). Neither party cited any case law or reliedon affidavits or other evidentiary material in support of its arguments. On September 15, 1995, theassigned motion judge denied defendants' motion to dismiss and directed defendants to file ananswer to plaintiff's first amended complaint within 28 days.

On January 26, 1996, the motion judge granted defendants' motion for leave to file ananswer to plaintiff's first amended complaint and affirmative defenses instanter. Defendants' firstaffirmative defense asserted, "[p]laintiff's complaint is barred by the statute of limitations." OnFebruary 6, 1996, plaintiff filed a answer which denied, generally, the allegations contained indefendants' first affirmative defense. On September 13, 1999, defendants filed an amended motionfor summary judgment in which they argued that the activities governed by section 13-214(a) of theLimitations Act do not include the performance of window washing services under Illinois case law. Plaintiff filed a response to defendants' motion for summary judgment asserting that the phrase"construction of improvement to real property" has been liberally construed under Illinois case lawand that this statutory provision should be read broadly to include plaintiff's window washingactivities. Plaintiff also filed a surreply alleging that the motion judge's order denying defendants'motion to dismiss could not be reversed by the successor judge granting a motion for summaryjudgment, absent a change in facts or circumstances that would warrant a reversal of the court's priorposition.

On December 15, 1999, the successor judge hearing the summary judgment motion entered awritten decision and order granting defendants' motion on the grounds that the applicable two-yearstatute of limitations was expired at the time plaintiff filed his original complaint. The successorjudge found, as a matter of law, that window washing is not within the realm of construction-relatedactivities contemplated by section 13-214(a) of the Limitations Act. 735 ILCS 13-214(a) (West1998). The successor judge's decision did not address plaintiff's argument that the motion judge'sorder denying defendants' motion to dismiss precluded a successor judge from granting summaryjudgment on the same issue, absent a change in facts or circumstances. This appeal followed.

II. ANALYSIS

The issue on appeal is whether the successor judge erred in granting summary judgment infavor of Allstate. Although summary judgement is considered a drastic remedy, it is a propermethod of disposing of a cause if the pleadings, depositions, admissions on file and any affidavitsshow that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as amatter of law. Smith v. Allstate Insurance Co., 312 Ill. App. 3d 246, 251 (1999); 735 ILCS5/2-1005(c) (West 1998). A triable issue of fact exists only where there is a dispute as to a materialfact or where, although the facts are not in dispute, reasonable minds might differ in drawinginferences from those facts. Petrovich v. Share Health Plan of Illinois, Inc., 188 Ill. 2d 17, 31(1999). In determining whether a genuine issue of fact exists or whether the trial court erredin its application of the law, all evidence is construed strictly against the movant and liberally infavor of the respondent. Barnett v. Zion Park District, 171 Ill. 2d 378, 385 (1996). Because thepropriety of the trial court's order granting summary judgment involves a question of law, thestandard of review is de novo. Barnett, 171 Ill. 2d at 385.

A. MOTION JUDGE'S DENIAL OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS

Plaintiff's first argument on appeal is that the successor judge erred in granting defendants'summary judgment motion because she did not take into consideration the fact that the motion judgehad previously denied defendants' motion to dismiss, although both motions raised the statute oflimitations as a defense. Plaintiff concedes that the successor judge was not required to follow theoriginal motion judge's ruling. However, plaintiff argues that the successor judge was not at libertyto ignore the motion judge's order because this ruling had already disposed of the statute oflimitations issue. In support of this argument, plaintiff cites several cases which hold that asuccessor judge should not reverse the discretionary ruling of a prior judge unless there is a changeof circumstances or additional facts which warrant such action. W.R. Grace & Co. v. BekerIndustries, Inc., 128 Ill. App. 3d 215, 222 (1984), citing Balciunas v. Duff, 94 Ill. 2d. 176, 188(1983); People ex rel. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Gitchoff, 65 Ill. 2d 249, 257 (1976). Accordingly,plaintiff argues that the successor judge's ruling should be reversed because defendants' summaryjudgment motion did not raise any new facts or case law that would warrant modification of the trialcourt's previous position on the statute of limitations issue. Plaintiff further notes that a circuitjudge who simply disregards the order of a prior circuit judge "diminishe[es] respect for and publicconfidence in our judiciary." Phillips Petroleum, 65 Ill. 2d at 257.

Defendants respond that the successor judge's summary judgment ruling was appropriatebecause the motion judge's ruling on their motion to dismiss was not on the merits. Defendants'motion to dismiss did not specify whether relief was sought pursuant to section 2-615 or 2-619 ofthe Illinois Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-615, 2-619 (West 1998)). However,defendants note that, although the statute of limitations constitutes affirmative matter which istypically raised in a section 2-619 motion, there was no affidavit or other evidentiary material reliedupon and that their motion only attacked the sufficiency of the complaint. 735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West1998). Accordingly, defendants contend that the motion judge's order denying their motion todismiss could not have been on the merits.

Defendants further argue that the procedural history of the case demonstrates that neitherthe parties nor the court considered the motion judge's September 15, 1995, order a ruling on themerits. First, defendants note that, on January 26, 1996, without any objection from plaintiff, themotion judge granted defendants leave to file their affirmative defenses instanter, which raised thestatute of limitations as a defense. Also, on February 6, 1996, plaintiff filed an answer todefendants' affirmative defenses as opposed to filing a motion to strike defendants' first affirmativedefense, which raised the statute of limitations as a bar to plaintiff's action. We agree withdefendants' arguments.

In Makowski v. City of Naperville, 249 Ill. App. 3d 110, 118 (1993), plaintiff argued onappeal that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment based on certain affirmative defensesbecause the trial court had previously denied a motion to dismiss that raised the same affirmativedefenses. The reviewing court rejected plaintiff's argument and held that the trial court's denial of amotion to dismiss that is not an adjudication on the merits does not preclude a defendant fromraising the same affirmative defense in a subsequent motion for summary judgment. The courtbased its holding on the following provisions of section 2-619(d) of the Code:"The raising of any ofthe foregoing matters by motion under this [s]ection does not preclude the raising of themsubsequently by answer unless the court has disposed of the motion on its merits; and a failure toraise any of them by motion does not preclude raising them by answer." 735 ILCS 5/2-619(d) (West1998).

The Makowski court also relied on the fact that the trial court's order denying defendant'smotion to dismiss did not expressly state that it was a ruling on the merits. The Makowski courtdeclined to accept plaintiff's argument that, if silent, the reviewing court must assume that the trialcourt's ruling was on the merits. The appellate court stated:

"Here, the record does not indicate whether the trial court disposed of defendant'ssection 2-619 motion to dismiss on the merits. Because a court may deny such amotion without reaching the merits, such as when it cannot determine withreasonable certainty that the alleged defense exists or because it concludes themotion may involve disputed factual issues [citation], we conclude that the denial ofsuch a motion, without more, does not show that the court disposed of the motion onits merits." Makowski, 249 Ill. App. 3d at 118.

In the case at bar, the motion judge's September 15, 1995, order does not indicate whether itwas a ruling on the merits. Based on our review of the record, it is unlikely that a ruling on theapplicability of the four-year statute of limitations in section 13-214(a) of the Limitations Act wascontemplated by the parties or the trial court. Significantly, defendants' motion to dismiss made noreference to section 13-214(a) and made no arguments regarding the proper scope of this section. Defendants' motion merely asserted that plaintiff's complaint sounded in negligence and that thetwo-year statute of limitations prescribed for negligence claims had expired.

In light of the limited issue raised in defendants' motion to dismiss and the parties' failure tocite any case law in support of their respective positions, we hold that the motion judge's rulingdetermined only whether plaintiff's complaint sufficiently alleged that his accident arose out of aconstruction-related activity. Although plaintiff referenced section 13-214(a) in his response anddefendants briefly attempted to distinguish this section in their reply, the record is devoid of anyindication that the motion judge conducted a substantive analysis of the statutory provisions insection 13-214(a), which would be required for a ruling on the merits. See 735 ILCS 5/13-214(a)(West 1998). Therefore, pursuant to section 2-619(d) of the Code, we hold that defendants werenot precluded from raising the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense in a subsequentmotion for summary judgment as the motion judge's September 15, 1995, order was not a ruling onthe merits.

Plaintiff further argues that Makowski is not applicable in "the special situation of one judgesitting in review of another judge's determination." Plaintiff's argument is misplaced. Section 2-619(d) makes it clear that a defendant is entitled to raise affirmative defenses in a motion forsummary judgment if a prior motion to dismiss brought pursuant to section 2-619 was not decidedon the merits. See 735 ILCS 5/2-619(d) (West 1998). Logically sound, section 2-619(d) recognizesthat when a prior judge's ruling is not on the merits, the issue is technically left "unconsidered" and"undecided." People v. Rowe, 291 Ill. App. 3d 1018, 1023 (1997), citing People v. Giles, 230 Ill.App. 3d 730, 733 (1992). As such, an order entered by a successor judge that disposes of asubstantive issue does not amount to a "reversal" of the prior judge's order. In these circumstances,the cases cited by plaintiff that address a successor judge's modification of a prior judge'sdiscretionary rulings are simply not applicable. See Ericksen v. Village of Willow Springs, 279 Ill.App. 3d 210, 215 (1995) (successor judge's dismissal of plaintiff's action on statute or limitationsgrounds did not revise or modify order entered by prior judge because statute of limitations issue was left undecided by prior judge).

It should be noted that, even if this court determined that the motion judge's order whichdenied defendants' motion to dismiss was a ruling on the merits, the result would be the same. Thetrial court's denial of a section 2-619 motion to dismiss is an interlocutory order that is not final andappealable. Ericksen, 279 Ill. App. 3d at 214. An interlocutory order may be modified or revised bya successor court at any time prior to final judgment. Ericksen, 279 Ill. App. 3d at 214, citing Townsv. Yellow Cab Co., 73 Ill. 2d 113 (1978); Balciunas v. Duff, 94 Ill. 2d 176, 185 (1983). However, incircumstances where the interlocutory order involved the exercise of a prior judge's discretion, thesuccessor judge may overturn the order only where new facts or circumstance warrant such actionand there is no evidence of "judge shopping." Lake County Riverboat, L.P. v. Illinois GamingBoard, 313 Ill. App. 3d 943, 950 (2000), citing McClain v. Illinois Central Gulf R.R. Co., 121 Ill. 2d278, 287 (1988). A noteworthy exception to this rule exists where the successor judge finds that theprevious interlocutory order is erroneous as a matter of law. In such a case, the successor judge hasthe power to correct the previous order regardless of the existence of new matter. Lake County, 313Ill. App. 3d at 950, citing Towns v. Yellow Cab Co., 73 Ill. 2d 113, 121 (1978).

The record reveals that there were no new facts or circumstances presented by defendantsthat would warrant modification of the motion judge's order. Thus, assuming the motion judge'sdenial of defendants' motion to dismiss was a ruling on the merits, modification by the successorjudge would only be appropriate if the motion judge's order was legally erroneous. Plaintiffcontends that the successor judge erred because, in ruling, she did not discuss either defendant'searlier motion to dismiss or the motion judge's September 15, 1995, order denying that motion. Essentially, plaintiff's argument assumes that the successor judge's failure to make an express finding that the motion judge's order was erroneous as a matter of law is grounds forreversal. Plaintiff's argument fails.

In determining whether the trial court erred in entering judgment as a matter of law, thetrial court's reasoning for its decision is not binding on this court as we must conduct a de novoreview of the record. Dowd & Dowd, Ltd. v. Gleason, 181 Ill. 2d 460, 483 (1998). Furthermore,although not an ideal circumstance for effective appellate review, it is not reversible error for a trialcourt to omit findings of fact or law when ruling on a motion for summary judgment. Makowski,249 Ill. App. 3d at 115. "While such a failure can leave the nonprevailing party in a quandary as toexactly why the trial court ruled as it did, it is the ruling [that] is being appealed, not the reasons forthe ruling." Makowski, 249 Ill. App. at 115. Accordingly, we hold that the successor judge's failureto specifically mention the motion judge's September 15, 1995, order in her summary judgmentruling is not itself grounds for reversal.

Despite the successor judge's failure to mention the motion judge's prior order in herdecision, summary judgment must be upheld if the original motion judge's order was, in fact,erroneous as a matter of law. See Lake County, 313 Ill. App. 3d 943, 950-52 (2000) (successorjudge's reconsideration of venue ruling upheld where court ultimately determined that prior judge'sruling on venue issue was legally erroneous). Thus, our focus turns to the ultimate issue on appeal:Was plaintiff engaged in a "construction-related" activity when he was injured, thus affordingplaintiff the benefit of the extended four-year statute of limitations in section 13-214(a) of theLimitations Act (735 ILCS 5/13-214(a) (West 1998)).

B. STATUTES OF LIMITATION

Under the Limitations Act, as set forth in the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure (Code), thestatute of limitations for personal injury claims requires that causes of action arising from suchinjuries be commenced within two years of the date on which the cause of action accrued. 735 ILCS5/13-202 (West 1998). However, section 13-214(a) of the Act provides an extended four-yearlimitations period when a cause of action arises from an act or omission "in the design, planning,supervision, observation or management of construction, or construction of an improvement to realproperty." 735 ILCS 5/13-214(a) (West 1998).

Our supreme court has held that "'[w]here there are two statutory provisions, one of which isgeneral and designed to apply to cases generally, and the other is particular and relates to only onesubject, the particular provision must prevail.'" Hernon v. E.W. Corrigan Construction Co., 149 Ill.2d 190, 195 (1992), quoting Bowes v. City of Chicago, 3 Ill. 2d 175, 205 (1954). Accordingly,where plaintiff's personal injury claim arises out of a construction-related activity, the more specificfour-year limitations provision in section 13-214(a) of the Limitations Act will control andplaintiff's case will not be time-barred for failure to file within the two-year period set forth insection 13-202 of the Act. Hernon, 149 Ill. 2d at 196, 200; 735 ILCS 5/13-202, 13-214(a) (West1998). Thus, the issue on appeal narrows. The question becomes whether plaintiff was engaged inthe "construction of an improvement to real property"within the scope of section 13-214(a) suchthat his cause of action is governed by the extended four-year limitations period. Estate ofHerington v. County of Woodford, 250 Ill. App. 3d 870, 873-75 (1993).

C. CONSTRUCTION NEGLIGENCE STATUTE/SECTION 13-214(a)

Whether plaintiff's performance of window washing services qualifies as the "constructionof an improvement to real property" within the meaning of section 13-214(a) of Limitations Act is aquestion of statutory interpretation. The standard of review is de novo. King v. Industrial Comm'n.,189 Ill. 2d 167, 171 (2000). The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and giveeffect to the true meaning and intent of the legislature. Paris v. Feder, 179 Ill. 2d 173, 177 (1997). When construing a disputed statutory provision, the court must first consider the statutory language. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Yapejian, 152 Ill. 2d 533, 541 (1992). Where the languageemployed by the legislature is clear and unambiguous "a court is not at liberty to depart from theplain language and meaning of the statute by reading into it exceptions, limitations or conditionsthat the legislature did not express." Kraft, Inc. v. Edgar, 138 Ill. 2d 178, 189 (1990). Further, inascertaining the meaning of a statutory provision, courts should avoid an interpretation that wouldrender any particular word or phrase superfluous or meaningless. Kraft, 138 Ill. 2d at 189.

Plaintiff argues that the successor judge's summary judgment ruling was erroneous becauseshe performed an incomplete analysis and failed to consider all of the relevant factors whenapplying the law to the present case. Plaintiff contends that a proper analysis of whether an activityis an "improvement" under section 13-214(a) must take into consideration each of the factorsoutlined in St. Louis v. Rockwell Graphic Systems, Inc., 153 Ill. 2d 1 (1992). In St. Louis, oursupreme court stated:

"Relevant criteria for determining what constitutes an 'improvement to real property'include: whether the addition was meant to be permanent or temporary, whether itbecame an integral component of the overall system, whether the value of theproperty was increased, and whether the use of the property was enhanced." St. Louis, 153 Ill. 2d at 4-5.

Plaintiff notes that the trial court must also take into consideration Black's Law Dictionary'sdefinition of "improvement," adopted by the supreme court in St. Louis, which provides that an"improvement" is "[a] valuable addition made to property (usually real estate) or an amelioration inits condition, amounting to more than mere repairs or replacement, costing labor or capital, andintended to enhance its value, beauty or utility or to adapt it for new or further purposes." St. Louis,153 Ill. 2d at 4, citing Black's Law Dictionary 682 (5th ed. 1979).

Plaintiff further argues that the successor judge's decision neglected to mention either StateFarm Mutual Auto Insurance Co. v. W.R. Grace & Co.--Conn., 24 F.3d 955 (7th Cir. 1994) orKrueger v. A.P. Green Refractories Co., 283 Ill. App. 3d 300 (1996), which "were arguably themost important cases for the court to consider." Plaintiff contends that these two cases, when readtogether, establish that the factors set forth in St. Louis, 153 Ill. 2d 1 (1992), have been so liberallyconstrued that window washing activities are properly within the realm of the statute's application. See Krueger, 283 Ill. App. 3d at 305 (criticizing State Farm court's refusal to follow St. Louisdespite the fact that State Farm court conceded spray-on fireproofing material was an"improvement" under the supreme court's definition in St. Louis).

Plaintiff also contends that certain findings in the successor judge's decision wereinconsistent with controlling case law. Specifically, plaintiff argues that the successor judge'sdetermination that window washing is not an "improvement" under section 13-214(a), despite herfinding that "clean windows make a building more attractive," was erroneous because the definitionof "improvement" in St. Louis includes "ameliorations in the condition of real property, intended toenhance the beauty of the property."

Defendants respond that a commonsense analysis of the activity of window washingdemonstrates that the successor judge's summary judgment ruling was proper. First, defendantsargue that the phrase "construction of an improvement to real property" in section 13-214(a) mustbe read together as a whole and not separately as construction or improvement. Defendants assertthat when the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, it should be given its plain andordinary meaning. Hernon, 149 Ill. 2d at 194-195. Defendants note that Black's Law Dictionarydefines "construct" as:

"'[t]o build; erect; put together; make ready for use. To adjust and joinmaterials, or parts of, as to form a permanent whole. *** Construct is distinguishablefrom maintain which means to keep up, to keep from change, to preserve." Black'sLaw Dictionary 312 (6th ed. 1990).

Defendants argue that application of the plain meaning of "construct" as distinguished from"maintenance," along with application of the "improvement" factors outlined in St. Louis, 153 Ill.2d. at 4-5, indicates that window washing is merely a maintenance activity that is not within thescope of construction-related activities contemplated by the legislature in section 13-214(a). Again,we agree with defendants' arguments.

In St. Louis, the supreme court held that whether an activity constitutes an "improvement toreal property" is a question of law. St. Louis, 153 Ill. 2d at 3. Although its resolution is grounded infact, where there are no material facts in dispute, summary judgment on this issue is proper. St.Louis, 153 Ill. 2d at 3-5; Bank of Ravenswod v. City of Chicago, 307 Ill. App. 3d 161, 166-167(1999) (summary judgment affirmed because construction and installation of a subway system werenot "construction of an improvement to real property" within the meaning of section 13-214(a)).

The undisputed facts in this case are that plaintiff's injury occurred while performing routinewindow washing services at an Allstate corporate office building in Northbrook, Illinois. Plaintiffwas not engaged in washing windows as part of a construction project. Rather, plaintiff's employer,Millard, had contracted with defendants to clean both the exterior and interior of all the windows onthe stated office buildings at least once a month. Pursuant to this agreement, Millard was to providedefendants with weekly reports detailing the work done and the areas cleaned in a given week. When cleaning interior windows, Millard employees were required to take care not to spill any dirtywater on drapes, carpet or furniture.

Our analysis begins with reference to the definition of "improvement" adopted by thesupreme court in St. Louis. A commonsense, practical application of the law indicates that theperformance of window washing services is not "[a] valuable addition made to property ." See St.Louis, 153 Ill. 2d at 4. Defendants correctly assert that the phrase "addition made to property"necessarily implicates the definition of "construct," which means "to build," "to erect" or "to puttogether." Black's Law Dictionary 312 (6th ed. 1990). As no materials or products are being"added" to the building or structure, we conclude that window washing cannot be a "valuableaddition made to property."

We next determine whether window washing is "an amelioration in [the building's]condition, amounting to more than mere repairs or replacement." St. Louis, 153 Ill. 2d at 4. Becausewindow washing can reasonably be considered an "amelioration" of the dirty condition of abuilding, the question becomes whether this activity is "more than mere repairs." To "repair" is to"restore to a sound or good state." Black's Law Dictionary 1298 (6th ed. 1990). The performance ofrepairs contemplates "an existing structure or thing which has become imperfect, and means tosupply in the original existing structure that which is lost or destroyed, and thereby restore it to thecondition in which it originally existed." Black's Law Dictionary 1298 (6th ed. 1990). In this case,defendants contracted with Millard to restore Allstate's building windows to the clean condition inwhich they originally existed. Applying the plain and unambiguous language adopted by thesupreme court in defining "improvement" to the facts of this case, we hold that window washing isonly a "repair" or "maintenance," nothing more.

Further support for our interpretation that window washing does not amount to an"improvement" lies in the fact that many of the relevant criteria set forth in St. Louis cannot berationally applied to the performance of window washing services. See St. Louis, 153 Ill. 2d 1, 4-5(1992). Even plaintiff concedes that window washing, by its nature, is "temporary" as illustrated bythe parties' contract for monthly window washing service. Plaintiff further concedes that windowwashing does not become an "integral component of an overall system" because, as noted above, nomaterials or products are being added to the building. It is clear that any "increase in the value" to acorporate office building by virtue of having clean windows is de minimis, at best. Finally, the "useof the property" is not enhanced. Common sense dictates that clean windows do not have anappreciable impact on the conduct of corporate business transactions. Therefore, after a thoroughanalysis, we hold that plaintiff's cause of action is governed by the two-year statute of limitationsgenerally applicable to personal injury claims (735 ILCS 5/13-202 (West 1998)) because, as amatter of law, the performance of window washing services does not constitute the "construction ofan improvement to real property" within the meaning of the Limitations Act (735 ILCS 5/13-214(a)(West 1998)).

Plaintiff's additional argument that questions of fact remain regarding whether windowwashing is an "improvement" within the meaning of section 13-214(a) is without merit. Plaintiffcontends that "window washing might increase the value or utility of a building, depending on howcontaminated the windows were; with what substances they were contaminated; and the use towhich the building was being put." Plaintiff argues that summary judgment is inappropriate becausethese facts are not disclosed by the record. One can only wonder why these "facts" are not of recordif plaintiff is relying on them. Nevertheless, it is clear from the record that the buildings in questionare office buildings located in Northbrook, Illinois, from which Allstate conducts its corporatebusiness. As such, we find plaintiff's speculations unpersuasive and, indeed, patently ridiculous. We note that to rule otherwise would be to invite an absurd situation whereby all routine"maintenance" and "repair" activities (such as waxing floors, changing light fixtures and mowinglawns) would be considered "construction-related" activities within the ambit of section 13-214(a)and thereby governed by an extended four-year statute of limitations. Nothing in the language ofsection 13-214(a) indicates that the legislature intended such a bizarre, comprehensive andexpansive result. 735 ILCS 5/13-214(a) (West 1998).

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Circuit Court of Cook County's order grantingAllstate's summary judgment motion.

Affirmed.

McNULTY, P.J., and O'MARA FROSSARD, J., CONCUR.