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SIXTH DIVISION
December 30, 2004

Nos. 1-04-0994 & 1-04-0995 (cons.)

The Chicago Tribune (Tribune) appeals the denial of its motions to unseal documents andthe court files in case Nos. 02 CH 16157 and 03 CH 13908, arguing the files are public under thecommon law, the Clerks of Courts Act (705 ILCS 105/16(6) (West 2002)), and the firstamendment. The sealed case files involve the issue of whether certain minor and unborn childrenof the Pritzker family should be joined to a private, confidential settlement agreement alreadynegotiated and signed by adult family members (the Family Agreement). The trial court allowedthe parties to file their complaints under seal and later entered an agreed protective order thatmaintained confidentiality of all documents filed with the court and required the parties to file alldocuments under seal. Subsequently, the Tribune was allowed to intervene for the limitedpurpose of challenging the sealing of the court files, but its motions to unseal were denied,precipitating this appeal.

The order denying the Tribune's motions to unseal was in the nature of injunctive relief,and, therefore, this court possesses the necessary jurisdiction to entertain the Tribune'sinterlocutory appeal. 188 Ill. 2d R. 307(a)(1); Skolnick v. Altheimer & Gray, 191 Ill. 2d 214,221-22 (2000).

In this consolidated appeal, we reverse the trial court's orders sealing the court files, returnthe circuit court record to the trial court in its sealed condition, and remand the cause for furtherproceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. BACKGROUND

In 2001, members of the Pritzker family entered the Family Agreement, which wasdesigned to avoid litigation with respect to certain grievances and settle certain of the family'spersonal and financial affairs. The Family Agreement was not the product of litigation or anyother public process.

In September 2002, petitioners M.E.E., T.J.P., and A.R.W., trustees of multiple Pritzkerfamily trusts, filed a verified petition for declaratory relief, seeking, in accordance with section 19-8 of the Probate Act of 1975 (Probate Act) (755 ILCS 5/19-8 (West 2002)), the entry of an orderdeclaring that the Family Agreement was in the best interests of respondents, minor and unbornbeneficiaries. The Family Agreement was not attached to the petition but would be provided tothe court for in camera review and to any guardians ad litem appointed by the court after theentry of a protective order.

Petitioners simultaneously filed an emergency motion for leave to file the petition underseal, contending it contained private, detailed information regarding the family trusts and businessunits, including specific plans and strategies for certain business units. Further, the petitionerscontended that public disclosure of the terms of the petition would have an adverse effect on thefamily members and businesses, that public disclosure at this time might expose the parties'interests to significant harm, and that by sealing the record, confidential family businessinformation would be protected from disclosure to the public at large. The trial court grantedpetitioners' motion, ordering that the petition and "all further pleadings in this matter shall be filedunder seal pending further order" of the court. The trial court also granted the motion forappointment of guardians ad litem for the minor and unborn beneficiaries.

In November 2002, the trial court granted the parties' agreed protective order to, interalia, (1): maintain confidentiality of all documents produced by petitioners to respondents, allbriefs, memoranda or any writings filed with the court and any exhibits thereto, and all discoverymaterials and deposition transcripts; and (2) file under seal "all documents, discovery responsesand deposition transcripts filed with the Court and any pleading or other paper."

In January 2003, the trial court granted the motion of the guardians ad litem to file theirjoint response to the petition and ordered that "[a]ll pleadings and documents shall be filed underseal until further order of the Court."

In June 2003, the court granted petitioners' motion to file an amended verified petition fordeclaratory relief, which sought to clarify issues raised in the original petition. According to theamended petition, the Family Agreement not only resolved disputes about the past administrationof the trusts, but also established a new administrative structure, which was intended to minimizethe possibility that disputes would arise again in the future and to avoid the risks and costs ofpublic litigation. The trustees and adult beneficiaries determined that the resolution effected bythe Family Agreement was in the best interests of all trust beneficiaries, but noted that suchdetermination might not be conclusive if the minor and unborn beneficiaries could, years hence,raise their own claims against the trustees. Although the minor and unborn beneficiaries lackedthe legal capacity to join the Family Agreement on their own, they could be joined by courtdecree, which was what petitioners sought in the present suit. According to the amended petition,copies of the Family Agreement were provided to the court under seal and delivered to theguardians ad litem. The Family Agreement was incorporated in the amended petition by referencewithout being attached thereto; however, a schedule of the Family Agreement was attached to theamended petition as exhibit A.

In June 2003, certain adult beneficiary signatories to the Family Agreement and their adultchildren moved to intervene in case No. 02 CH 16157. The trial court subsequently granted thatmotion.

In August 2003, certain adult and minor trust beneficiaries filed a complaint (No. 03 CH13908) solely to prevent the passage of time from barring their claims against defendants (trusteesand others), but with the expectation that those claims would be extinguished by the court'sapproval of the Family Agreement in related case No. 02 CH 16157. Those plaintiffs filed anemergency motion for leave to file the complaint under seal so as not to undermine the purposesof the court's seal in No. 02 CH 16157. Plaintiffs argued that allowing the complaint to be filedunder seal and sealing the record as long as the Family Agreement remained in effect wouldpreserve the privacy and confidentiality of the Family Agreement and proceedings surrounding it,and preserve and protect both familial relationships and the interests of various family businesses. The trial court granted plaintiffs' motion to seal and ordered that the complaint and all furtherpleadings be filed under seal pending further order of the court. In February 2004, the courtentered an agreed order voluntarily dismissing case No. 03 CH 13908 without prejudice.

In February 2004, the Tribune filed petitions to intervene in both cases and motions tounseal the court files. The trial court granted the Tribune leave to intervene as a matter of rightfor the limited purpose of petitioning the court to unseal the court files. The trial court orallyrequired the Tribune to file its briefs under seal and denied the Tribune's oral request for a copy ofeither the papers supporting the motion to seal the files or the orders sealing the entire files. TheTribune filed a motion for leave to file its briefs publicly and for copies of the briefs and courtorders concerning sealing the files. The trial court orally denied that motion on March 9, 2004. After briefing and oral argument, the court issued on March 19, 2004, a memorandum opinionand order denying the Tribune's motion to unseal the court files. The Tribune appealed both theMarch 9 and March 19, 2004 orders.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Timeliness of Appeal

Appellees contend the Tribune failed to timely appeal the trial court's March 9, 2004 oralorder within 30 days where the Tribune filed its notice of interlocutory appeal April 14, 2004. Appellees argue the Tribune should not "bootstrap" the appeal of its motion to file public papersand for copies of the briefs and court orders concerning sealing of the files onto the "unrelated"motion to unseal the court files. We disagree. The March 9 oral ruling was directly related to thetrial court's March 19, 2004 written order keeping the trial court files sealed. If the trial courtunsealed the files on March 19, the March 9 ruling would have been overturned and the briefs andorders relating to the earlier sealing would have been made public. The March 9 oral rulingbecame final and appealable when the related March 19 order was entered denying the Tribune'smotion to unseal the files. Thus, the Tribune timely appealed the trial court's March 9 and March19, 2004 orders.

Moreover, as discussed below, we find that the trial court abused it discretion by requiringthe Tribune to file its briefs, which challenged the seal, under seal; by sealing the court's originalorders sealing the files; and by sealing the appellees' motions for leave to file all documents underseal.
 

B. Unsealing of Court Files

1. Presumption of Public Access

Judicial proceedings in the United States are open to the public--in criminal cases byconstitutional command, and in civil cases by force of tradition. Press-Enterprise Co. v. SuperiorCourt, 478 U.S. 1, 10, 92 L. Ed. 2d 1, 11, 106 S. Ct. 2735, 2741 (1986); Nixon v. WarnerCommunications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597-99, 55 L. Ed. 2d 570, 579-80, 98 S. Ct. 1306, 1311-13(1978). Certain jurisdictions have recognized a constitutional right of access to civil court filesand records. See, e.g., In re Continental Illinois Securities Litigation, 732 F.2d 1302, 1308(7th Cir. 1984) (determining that the policy reasons for granting public access to criminalproceedings also applied to civil cases); Skolnick, 191 Ill. 2d at 230-32 (noting parallel rights ofaccess to court records embodied in common law and the first amendment). An order denying amotion to unseal a court file or document is reviewed for an abuse of discretion, regardless ofwhether a purported right of access is based on the common law or the first amendment. Skolnick, 191 Ill. 2d at 231-33.

The United States Supreme Court acknowledged the existence of a common lawpresumption that allows the public to " 'inspect and copy public records and documents, includingjudicial records and documents.' " Skolnick, 191 Ill. 2d at 230, quoting Nixon, 435 U.S. at 597,55 L. Ed. 2d at 579, 98 S. Ct. at 1312. The common law right of access to court records isessential to the proper functioning of a democracy; it ensures the public's ability to monitor thefunctioning of their courts and to form educated and knowledgeable opinions about their judicialsystem. Skolnick, 191 Ill. 2d at 230. The legislature codified the public's right to review judicialrecords in section 16(6) of the Clerks of Courts Act, which provides:

"All records, dockets and books required by law to be kept by such clerks shall bedeemed public records, and shall at all times be open to inspection without fee orreward, and all persons shall have free access for inspection and examination tosuch records, docket and books, and also to all papers on file in the differentclerks' offices and shall have the right to take memoranda and abstracts thereto." 705 ILCS 105/16(6) (West 2002).

Skolnick, 191 Ill. 2d at 231. However, the common law right of access is not absolute; everycourt has supervisory power over its own records and files, and access may be denied where courtfiles might become a vehicle for improper purposes. Skolnick, 191 Ill. 2d at 231. The right toaccess, however, may not be evaded by the wholesale sealing of court files; the court must besensitive to the rights of the public in determining whether any particular document or class ofdocuments is appropriately filed under seal. United States v. Corbitt, 879 F.2d 224, 228 (7th Cir.1989).

The parallel right of access to court records embodied in the first amendment to theUnited States Constitution presumes a right to inspect where (1) court records have historicallybeen open to the public and (2) access would further the court proceeding at issue. Skolnick,191 Ill. 2d 232; see also Press-Enterprise Co., 478 U.S. at 8, 92 L. Ed. 2d at 10, 106 S. Ct. at2740 (explaining the second prong of this test as "whether public access plays a significantpositive role in the functioning of the particular process in question"). The presumption ofaccess can be rebutted by demonstrating that suppression "is essential to preserve higher valuesand is narrowly tailored to serve that interest." Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S.501, 510, 78 L. Ed. 2d 629, 638, 104 S. Ct. 819, 824 (1984); Skolnick, 191 Ill. 2d at 232-33.

Whether we proceed under the common law or constitutional standards, the documentsin this case became part of the court file once the trial court granted leave to file the pleading. Atthat point, the presumption of a right of public access to the filed documents attached. Skolnick,191 Ill. 2d at 232.

2. Review of the Trial Court's Orders

The record indicates that the trial court merely acquiesced with the parties' requests tofile all their pleadings and documents under seal. The initial orders allowing the parties to fileunder seal do not contain specific findings supporting the seal and do not indicate that the trialcourt conducted an in camera review prior to issuing those orders. Similarly, the broadprotective order, which was drafted by the parties and sealed all documents, pleadings and "otherpaper" filed with the court, is devoid of any reference to an in camera review or specific findingsregarding confidentiality. The trial judge himself did not conclude that legitimate interests inconfidentiality required every part of the file to be confidential--at least he did not explain whysecrecy was vital. The parties agreed on a broad confidentiality order, and the trial judge wentalong without an independent discussion of the need for or propriety of restrictions on thepublic's access. See Pepsico, Inc. v. Redmond, 46 F.3d 29, 31 (7th Cir. 1995). The judge, as theprimary representative of the public interest in the judicial process, should not rubber stamp astipulation to seal a record. Citizens First National Bank of Princeton v. Cincinnati InsuranceCo., 178 F.3d 943, 945 (7th Cir. 1999).

The requests seeking the orders to seal were not accompanied by an affidavit to supportthe very general conclusory assertions that a seal was necessary to protect confidential familybusiness information. Cf., In re Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, 773 F.2d 1325,1326 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (party supported request for a protective order with an affidavitdescribing in general terms the negative effect disclosure would have on its business andcompetitive position in shipping, and that it would be impractical to go through documentsindividually during the discovery process to determine whether they contained any confidentialinformation); May Centers, Inc., v. S.G. Adams Printing & Stationery Co., 153 Ill. App. 3d1018, 1020 (1987) (shopping center offered testimony to support the opinion it would sustainfinancial damages from disclosure of pretrial discovery information regarding the nature oftenants' share of expenses for maintaining common areas); In re Estate of Hearst, 67 Cal. App.3d 777, 781, 136 Cal. Rptr. 821, 822-23 (1977) (newspaper clippings reporting threats to livesof members of a wealthy and well-known family supported request whereby court could exerciseits limited power to seal portions of court records on a temporary basis). We recognize that, insome instances, the content of a document itself may constitute sufficient evidence to justify aprotective order. However, our review of the sealed record establishes that specific businessplans and strategies, and private, detailed information regarding family trusts and businesses arenot contained within the pages of each and every pleading, brief, document and paper filed withthe circuit court.

After the Tribune intervened to contest the seal of the court files, the parties briefed theissue, and the trial court heard oral argument. In a written order, the trial court, without makingspecific findings, justified sealing the court files as an appropriate use of discretion to protectfinancial privacy and the privacy of minors and families. The court stated that excising the namesof minors would not protect them because their identities were otherwise ascertainable. The trialcourt, however, did not address the option of sealing portions of the record as opposed to all thefiles. Beyond the conclusory statements that courts may exercise discretion to protect family,minor and financial privacy, the trial court failed to further specify the basis for its conclusions orgive findings tied to a document or class of documents to support the decision to seal the courtfiles. Cf., Dittrich v. Gibbs, 31 Media L. Rep. 1570 (June 19, 2002) (Will County circuit courtconducted an in camera review of all documents impounded in the court file; identified thecontents of the sealed envelopes; and determined whether the names and identifiers of individualswould be redacted, and whether a document, exhibit or certain portions thereof would beunsealed or redacted).

A closure order should both articulate the privacy interest involved and be accompaniedby a statement of reasons "specific enough that a reviewing court can determine whether theclosure order was properly entered." Press-Enterprise Co., 464 U.S. at 510, 78 L. Ed. 2d at638, 104 S. Ct. at 824. We agree with the trial court's general propositions regarding financial,minor, and family privacy, but without specific findings, we cannot adequately review whetherthe blanket application of those propositions justified sealing the court files in this case. Adequate findings relieve the appellate courts of having to grope through the record todetermine whether some combination of credible evidentiary items could support some line offactual and legal conclusions that would support the trial court's ultimate decision.

Our own review of the sealed record establishes that the trial court abused its discretionby sealing the court files. The contents of the files do not justify the conclusion that release ofany part of them would be highly detrimental to minor, family or financial privacy interests. Certainly, orders of the court are public documents and should not be kept under seal. Judicialopinions are not the litigants' property; they belong to the public, which underwrites the judicialsystem that produces them. Pepsico, Inc., 46 F.3d at 31. Judges should accommodate thecompeting interests of any legitimate privacy concerns and public access by keeping theconfidential matters themselves under seal and referring to them only indirectly in an opinion. Our review of the trial court's orders confirms that those orders in no way revealed any matterremotely confidential.

Furthermore, pleadings are not protected like much of the information that surfacesduring pretrial discovery. The pleadings, motions and other papers filed with the court assumethe presumption of public access. Skolnick, 191 Ill. 2d at 236. Because litigation is a publicenterprise and consumes public resources, it follows that in all but the most extraordinary cases(like weighty national security matters) complaints must be public. Skolnick, 191 Ill. 2d at 236-37. Allegations of a complaint are, by their very nature, likely to be critical in some fashion ofthe litigant named in the pleading, but such a basis of alleged harm is too commonplace towarrant sealing a pleading. Skolnick, 191 Ill. 2d at 235. The mere fact that a person may sufferembarrassment or damage to his reputation as a result of allegations in a pleading does not justifysealing a court file. Skolnick, 191 Ill. 2d at 234. See also In re Krynicki, 983 F.2d 74, 78(7th Cir. 1992) (media interest in the events underlying the litigation was neither unusual nordeplorable, and judicial proceedings were not closed whenever the details were titillating, andopen only when the facts were so boring that no one other than the parties cared about them).

The initial petition that invoked the trial court's jurisdiction did name the minor and adultbeneficiaries but did not reveal any detailed business plans or private financial information. Although the subsequent course of the proceedings may have involved documents or reports thatdid reveal more detailed business plans or private financial information, not every documentcontained in the record (which is not voluminous) was continually and intimately linked tominors' privacy, confidential business plans, or private financial information. Thus, it is possibleas a practical matter to disclose information such as judicial determinations, the nature of theallegations and defenses contained in the pleadings, the identity of adult parties, matters ofscheduling and appearances, and motions, briefs and argument concerning legal issues likesubject matter jurisdiction and public access to court files, without disclosing information thatmay legitimately be kept confidential. See In re Krynicki, 983 F.2d at 77 (in rejecting a wealthyentrepreneur's request to seal a brief based on his concerns for family and financial privacy andthe safety of his children, the court noted that he did not specify what additional informationlurked in the sealed transcripts). We conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in sealingthe entire court files in this matter.

3. Presumption of Access to Court Proceedings Involving Minors and Settlement

Appellees argue that the presumption of access does not apply to these proceedings,asserting that the issue here is unique to its facts and circumstances. Appellees state that thisproceeding merely asks the court to determine whether a private settlement agreement is in thebest interests of the minor and unborn beneficiaries; the court is not asked to adjudicate a disputeor interpret or reform documents.

Appellees fail to convince us that the presumption of access does not apply to the trialcourt proceedings at issue here. Section 19-8 of the Probate Act provides:

"By leave of court *** a representative may compound or compromiseany claim or any interest of the ward *** in any personal estate *** upon suchterms as the court directs." 755 ILCS 5/19-8 (West 2002).

Courts of equity may authorize a compromise of a minor's litigation where the evidence showsthat the compromise was proper and for the best interest of the minor. Wolf v. Uhlemann, 325Ill. 165, 185 (1927). Great care should be exercised by the court, the minor being a ward of thecourt and entitled to its tenderest considerations. Matthews v. Doner, 292 Ill. 592, 595 (1920). The best interest determination must be made within the atmosphere of an adversarial processand within the rules of procedure and evidence. Ott v. Little Co. of Mary Hospital, 273 Ill. App.3d 563, 573 (1995). In making that determination, the court may review the parties' positions,analyze their potential strengths and weaknesses and estimate probabilities of liability anddamage award. Ott, 273 Ill. App. 3d at 573.

The statute requires the government, through a judge, to act in this situation to protectthe minors' best interests. What happens in the halls of government is presumptively open topublic scrutiny. In re Krynicki, 983 F.2d at 75. Declaratory judgment actions, proceedingsunder the Probate Act, and judicial determinations regarding minors' best interests concern issuesin which the public has an interest, but the public cannot monitor judicial performance adequatelyif entire court files of such proceedings are kept secret. Public scrutiny over the court systempromotes community respect for the rule of law, provides a check on the activities of judges andlitigants, and fosters more accurate fact finding. Grove Fresh Distributors, Inc. v. EverfreshJuice Co., 24 F.3d 893, 897 (7th Cir. 1994).

Appellees contend that this is not an adversarial lawsuit, but that assertion is not entirelyaccurate. The trustees' declaratory judgment action forces the minor and unborn beneficiaries topursue their claims now. The trustees essentially seek a declaration that their past conduct inadministering the trusts and their more recent decision to enter into and implement the FamilyAgreement cannot be subject to later litigation by the minor and unborn beneficiaries. Furthermore, section 19-8 of the Probate Act did not "thrust" the minor and unborn beneficiariesinto the public court system. The parties determined the terms of their private settlementagreement, and the trustees apparently were not content to settle potential claims with the adultsignatories of the Family Agreement without a release with respect to any claims the minors andunborns might have based on the trustees' conduct.

The appellees cite Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Schumacher, 392 N.W.2d 197(Minn. 1986), to support their argument that there is no presumption of access in thisproceeding. Their reliance on Schumacher, however, is misplaced; that case does not supportthe broad proposition that a court may seal an entire court file involving the settlement of aminor's litigation. In Schumacher, which involved wrongful death suits against an airline after aplane crash, the trial court sealed the court files after the litigants reached stipulated settlements. Schumacher, 392 N.W.2d at 200. Statutes mandated that the trial court approve the distributionof the settlement funds among the various heirs and approve the settlement figure in one suitinvolving a minor child. Schumacher, 392 N.W.2d at 200 n.1. The litigants sought the seal toprevent impeding the settlement of other suits involving the same air crash and to protect thefamilies of the deceased crash victims from public intrusion into their private lives. Schumacher,392 N.W.2d at 200. The families believed public access to the settlement distributions couldresult in thefts, exploitation, trespass, and physical injury to them. Schumacher, 392 N.W.2d at200.

Thereafter, the trial court denied the media's request for access to the files, and the mediaappealed. Schumacher, 392 N.W.2d at 201. However, while the appeal was pending, the trialcourt amended the original order, which sealed entire court files, to seal only the settlement anddistribution papers and the transcripts of the settlement hearings. Schumacher, 392 N.W. 2d at201 n.3. The rest of the files were opened to the public. Schumacher, 392 N.W.2d at 201 n.3. Thus, the state supreme court reviewed (and affirmed) only the narrow issue of restricting accessto the settlement documents or transcripts contained in the court files. Schumacher, 392N.W.2d at 203. The state supreme court's decision to overlook the jurisdictional irregularity ofthe trial court's late order unsealing the court files (Schumacher, 393 N.W.2d at 201 n.3) actuallyundermines the assertions of appellees here that there is no presumption of access to the courtfiles in the instant proceeding.

Certain appellees also argue that they have a significant vested interest in the privacy ofthe information already filed based on the trial court's protective order. They cite Grove FreshDistributors, Inc. v. John LaBatt Ltd., 888 F. Supp. 1427, 1432 (N.D. Ill. 1995), for theproposition that the trial court refused to unseal documents because parties may have relied onthe existence of the seal in filing certain material. Grove Fresh Distributors, Inc., however, doesnot support the proposition asserted by appellees. Rather, the trial judge recounted how, onappeal of his 1992 refusal to unseal documents based on the parties' reliance on a protectiveorder, the appellate court remanded the matter to him in 1994 to elaborate for the record hisrationale for the seal. Grove Fresh Distributors, Inc., 888 F. Supp. at 1432-33. The trial courtthen engaged in a document-by-document review of all the sealed materials and, in 1995, orderedthe file unsealed. Grove Fresh Distributors, Inc., 888 F. Supp. at 1435. However, the trialcourt's in camera inspection revealed that continued confidentiality for some materials wasappropriate, so the court ordered particularized redactions of certain words, phrases and names,while allowing public access to most of the documents. Grove Fresh Distributors, Inc., 888 F.Supp. at 1435.

4. Rebutting the Presumption of Access

Having concluded that the presumption of access applies to this proceeding, we nextweigh the public interest underlying that presumption against appellees' interest in confidentiality. Appellees have identified several factors on its side of the balance: (1) harm to minor children ifmedia attention is cast on their financial situation; (2) harm to the parties and their businessinterests if sensitive financial, trade, and business information is disclosed; (3) that unsealing thecourt file will jeopardize the Family Agreement and undermine the public policy favoring suchagreements; and (4) that unsealing the record may have a chilling effect on the court's ability toreview the most complete record possible if the trustees and parents limit the evidence theypresent to avoid compromising other interests by disclosure. As discussed above, these concernsmay warrant the sealing of particular documents, but they do not justify the extreme action ofsealing entire court files where not every document therein implicates these concerns.

The gist of appellees' arguments to maintain the seal of the court files centers on thedesirability to prevent the disclosure of the details of the Family Agreement, a documentapparently supplied to the trial court at some point but not contained in this record on review. Consequently, we cannot assess on review whether sealing the Family Agreement, or othersimilar documents and reports, would serve to protect the interests identified by the appellees.

Courts do consider the issue of public access to a document or class of documentsseparate and apart from public access to the court proceeding. In order to find that a documentis subject to a first amendment right of access, the court must consider whether the document hashistorically been available to the public and whether public access would promote the properfunctioning of the government agency producing or considering the document. Settlementagreements have not generally been available to the public and disclosure of the details ofsettlement agreements would not likely serve to help the trial court in making its best interestsdetermination. See Schumacher, 392 N.W.2d at 205-06. An analysis under the common lawright of access is somewhat different. If the Family Agreement is in the trial court's possession,the common law presumption of access attaches to this document. However, the court shouldcarefully examine the agreement in camera in order to determine whether public disclosure of thematerial might result in it becoming a vehicle for improper purposes. Even then, however, thecourt should limit sealing orders to particular documents or portions thereof which are directlyrelevant to the legitimate interest in confidentiality.

We recognize that the public's particularized interest in the details contained within asettlement agreement is of a different order than the public's general interest in monitoring acourt's ultimate determination that a settlement would be in a minor's best interest. The latterinterest in the functioning of the trial court would ordinarily be insufficient to justify disclosure oflegitimate confidential material; the public generally must be satisfied with the informationdisclosed during open court hearings, in the open pleadings in the record, and in the court'spublic decision. However, we do not undertake to decide whether particular documents in theinstant case should be maintained under seal. The determination regarding sealing a particulardocument (like a private settlement agreement involving minors) is properly left to the trial courtin the first instance. This case will be remanded for that purpose. We emphasize that the circuitcourt record will be returned in its sealed condition so that the trial court may decide the mostexpeditious procedure to determine whether certain documents should be sealed or portionsthereof redacted.

5. Vacating the Seal

In this case, vacating the seal presents the trial court with a peculiar set of problems. Inreliance on the seal, the parties may have filed documents that otherwise would not be part of thepublic record. Where there are legitimate concerns of confidentiality, the burden should shift tothe parties to itemize for the court's approval which documents have been introduced into thepublic court record. See Grove Fresh Distributors, Inc., 24 F.3d 893 at 898.

In camera review is an appropriate procedure and is routinely used when a judicialdecision concerns information claimed to be covered by some rule of confidentiality or privilege. The procedure consists generally of two parts. First, the parties present a general outline of theirrespective positions supported by nonconfidential or nonprivileged evidence. Then, the partiesidentify the specific confidential or privileged evidence for in camera review. Courts areauthorized to receive the contested data under seal, to review it privately, to decide the extentand nature of any lawful disclosure, and to tell the disappointed party that the claim ofconfidentiality has been sustained in whole or part, as the case may be. The court then preservesthe in camera record for later appellate review.

We return the circuit court record to the trial court in its sealed condition so that the trialcourt may determine the most expeditious procedure for identifying and sealing particulardocuments.

5. The Identity of the Parties

The petitioners, adult intervenors, and minor beneficiaries are identified by name in thebody of the petition for declaratory relief, but they have proceeded in this matter underdesignation by initials. The privilege of suing or defending under pseudonyms should not beassumed or granted automatically even if an opposing party does not object. The use ofpseudonyms is disfavored, and the judge has an independent duty to determine whetherexceptional circumstances justify such a departure from the normal method of proceeding incourts. 735 ILCS 5/2-401(e) (West 2002) ("Upon application and for good cause shown theparties may appear under fictitious names"). Section 2-401 of the Code of Civil Procedure, inproviding that a "party shall set forth in the body of his or her pleading the names of all partiesfor and against whom relief is sought," represents the principle that civil judicial proceedings areto be conducted in public. 735 ILCS 5/2-401(c) (West 2002). Identifying the parties to aproceeding is an important dimension of publicness; the public has a right to know who isutilizing the courts that its tax dollars support. Coe v. County of Cook, 162 F.3d 491, 498(7th Cir. 1998); Doe v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wisconsin, 112 F.3d 869, 872(7th Cir. 1997). There are exceptions; fictitious names are allowed when necessary to protectthe privacy of children, rape victims, and other particularly vulnerable parties or witnesses.

In discussing the option of redacting the minors' names instead of sealing the court files,the trial court concluded that redaction would not protect them because their identities wouldstill be ascertainable, but failed to state why that would be so. Perhaps their status as contingenttrust beneficiaries would result in disclosure if the identities of their parents, the adultbeneficiaries, were disclosed. We will not, however, speculate on possible arguments or unstatedfindings the trial court could have relied upon to support its sealing order. See Skolnick, 191 Ill.2d at 237. In any event, redacting the names of the adult and minor beneficiaries could serve toprotect the minors' privacy interests without resorting to the overly broad measure of sealingentire documents or concealing the identities of other adult parties. On remand, the trial courtmay determine that protection of the minor and unborn beneficiaries may warrant the use ofinitials or pseudonyms by the minor and adult beneficiaries.

III. CONCLUSION

We hold that the trial court abused its discretion by sealing the entire court files. Wereverse the orders of the trial court sealing the court files and remand this cause and return thesealed circuit court record for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Reversed and remanded with directions.

McNULTY and O'MARA FROSSARD, JJ., concur.