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SIXTH DIVISION
December 2, 2005

No. 1-03-3708

The trial court held appellants in contempt for disobeyingan order for the corporate appellant to turn over certain fundsto a receiver. The court later denied appellants' motion topurge the contempt. On appeal from denial of the motion to purgeappellants seek review of the original turnover order and thecontempt order, as well as the finding that they failed to purgethe contempt.

We hold that we lack jurisdiction to review the merits ofthe turnover order and the contempt order. We find that thetrial court had jurisdiction to order the corporation to turnover the funds, and it had jurisdiction to hold corporateofficers in contempt for disobeying the order. However, thetrial court lacked jurisdiction to hold in contempt an appellantwho no longer served as an officer of the corporation at the timethe court ordered the corporation to turn over the funds atissue. The evidence at the purge hearing supported the court'sfinding that the corporate appellant and its officers failed topurge the contempt. Thus, we affirm the judgment in part and wevacate the judgment in part.

Urban Investment Trust sought to purchase a commercialdevelopment called the Honeywell property. To facilitate thetransaction it created a corporation it named Master Dundee 53 toserve as the property's master tenant. Tenants of the propertypaid rent and property taxes to the master tenant. The mastertenant forwarded the sums it collected to Urban. Urban and themaster tenant failed to pay the property taxes for 2000 and theyallowed property insurance to lapse. In March 2002 theplaintiffs, tenants of the Honeywell property, sued Urban and themaster tenant for mismanaging the property. The trial courtappointed a receiver to manage the property during proceedings onthe complaint. The court gave the receiver responsibility forcollecting and paying taxes and purchasing insurance for theproperty.

In July 2002 the receiver moved for an order compellingUrban to turn over to the receiver more than $4 million Urbanreceived in connection with the Honeywell property. At a hearingin July 2002, Roxanne Gardner testified that she had beenpresident of Urban until November 2001, when she resigned. Sheadmitted that CenterPoint Properties, a tenant at the Honeywellproperty, bought out its obligation under its lease for $2.5million. CenterPoint paid $1.5 million directly to Urban, andthe balance of more than $1 million cancelled a promissory notereflecting a personal debt John Terzakis owed to CenterPoint.

Terzakis testified at a further hearing in August 2002 thatonly Gardner, Rudy Mulder and he, who served as Urban's officers,had authority to sign checks disbursing Urban's funds. The samethree persons owned Master Dundee 53, and Master Dundee 53 hadcontractual responsibility for paying taxes on the Honeywellproperty. Terzakis admitted that when Urban received fundsspecifically from the Honeywell property, it put the funds intoits own account, mixed with funds for operating many otherproperties.

A witness for plaintiffs testified that plaintiffs wired toMaster Dundee 53 more than $700,000 for payment of property taxesfrom September 2000 through December 2001.

On December 12, 2002, the trial court ordered "Urban andits[] officers *** to transfer *** funds, in the amount of$3,336,423.01, to the Receiver." The court amended the December12 order on January 3, 2003, to identify "John Terzakis, RudyMulder and Roxanne Gardner as the officers of Urban to whom the[turnover] Order applies." Urban filed a notice of appeal fromthe December 12 order, but this court, on Urban's motion,dismissed the appeal.

The receiver, on January 7, 2003, moved for a rule to showcause why Urban and its officers should not be held in contemptfor violating the December 12 order. The trial court issued therule on January 13, 2003, and set the matter for hearing on theallegations of contempt. Urban filed its answer to the rule onJanuary 16, 2003, and presented Terzakis as its first witness onthat date. Terzakis testified that Urban had no money with whichto pay the turnover amount.

On January 24, 2003, plaintiffs filed an amended complaintthat added CenterPoint and others as new defendants. Terzakisand Gardner testified further in the contempt proceedings onJanuary 29, 2003. The court continued the matter to permitMulder to testify on March 5, 2003.

Before completion of the testimony in the contemptproceeding, CenterPoint and other parties filed motions forsubstitution of judge as of right.

The court completed the hearing on the rule to show cause inMarch, and on March 31, 2003, the court entered an order in whichit held that it retained jurisdiction to complete the contempthearing, despite CenterPoint's motion for substitution of judge. In the order the court said:

"[T]he court finds Urban and its[] officers, Mr.Terzakis, Mr. Mulder and Ms. Gardner in contempt ofcourt. Accordingly, upon the entry of this order theaforementioned individuals shall be fined in the amountof $2500 each per day until such time that they eithercomply with the turnover order and tender the funds tothe Receiver or provide the court with a detailedfinancial history of the turnover funds, which thecourt accepts.

*** The defendants are ordered to comply with thisorder immediately and the imposition of the $2500 fineshall begin to accrue as of April 8, 2003."

In the same order the court recounted Gardner's testimonythat she "relinquished her position with Urban." The courtcommented that it "believe[d] that Ms. Gardner left because shefelt Mr. Terzakis and Mr. Mulder were pushing her towardsimpending legal action, such as this matter." On April 8, 2003,the court amended the March 31 order to state explicitly itsfinding that "Roxanne Gardner was formerly a principal of Urban."

On April 7, 2003, Urban, Terzakis and Gardner filed a noticeof appeal from the contempt order. Two weeks later the trialcourt granted their motion to dismiss voluntarily the notice ofappeal. Terzakis moved to vacate the contempt order as void. Although the record on appeal does not include Gardner's motionto vacate the contempt order, the record does include her replyin support of her motion to vacate.

The trial court heard the two motions to vacate in May andon May 22, 2003, the court denied both motions. The court added:

"[T]here will be an evidentiary hearing at 1:30 p.m. onMay 29, 2003[,] on contemnors' oral Motion to PurgeContempt."

The record on appeal does not include a transcript of the May 22proceedings, so we do not know the precise language of the oralmotion to purge the contempt. No party appealed from denial ofthe motion to vacate the contempt order.

At the hearing on the motion to purge, Urban's accountantadmitted that the master tenant had its own bank account,entirely separate from Urban's bank accounts. The money tenantspaid for taxes went first to the master tenant and then to Urban. Gardner testified that Urban put all such funds in its ownaccounts for "ease of accounting." She admitted that she couldnot tell from the books of account what happened to the moneyUrban received when CenterPoint bought out its obligations underits lease for part of the Honeywell property. She also could nottell what happened to the money Urban received from the mastertenant when the tenants paid their property taxes.

Urban's accountant testified that during March 2001, themonth Urban received $1.5 million from CenterPoint for the buyoutof its lease, Urban received a total of more than $11 millionfrom all its sources. Urban used the $1.5 million as part of itsgeneral accounts, and it paid it out as part of its expendituresfor that month. The expenditures that month exceeded $11million.

The accountant listed for the court all of the payees of the$11 million in expenses, although he did not often specify theamount of each payment. Urban paid Mulder more than $70,000 thatmonth; the books of account did not explain the payment. Thebooks showed several entries simply as "funding" for otherentities Urban controlled, much the way it controlled the mastertenant for the Honeywell property. Urban paid Terzakis $55,000,and it separately funded a number of "entit[ies] that Johnny[Terzakis] owned and/or managed." The accountant admitted formany payments he did not "know what that's actually for." Urbanpaid $208,000 to Illinois Petroleum, "a company that Johnnyowns." The accountant could not determine the purpose of thepayment to Illinois Petroleum. Urban used some of the funds formortgage payments for other properties it owned, and it made somepolitical contributions.

Due to scheduling difficulties the hearing on the motion topurge extended over six hearing dates from May 2003 to September2003. On November 26, 2003, the court entered its order findingthat Urban, Terzakis and Gardner failed to purge the contempt. Because Mulder filed a bankruptcy petition, the court reservedall issues related to him, pending resolution of the bankruptcyproceedings. The court summarized the testimony and addressedthe motion:

"So we now must ask the questions. Was the orderof contempt purged? Did the contem[n]ors turn over, tothe receiver the funds that Urban was given whichproceeds were to be used for taxes, mortgage paymentsand expenses of the Honeywell property? Was the Courtshown that the funds were used for purposes intendedunder the *** cont[r]acts? Was the court told whyUrban had control of the Honeywell funds? The answerto all of the above questions is a resounding 'No.'

*** What is given the court is the answer thatthey do not have the ability to pay what the courtordered them to turn[]over.

That does not purge the contempt. What it does isconcede and admit to the court that theymisappropriated millions of dollars for their ownpurposes. They admit that they violated theirfiduciary obligations to the Honeywell tenants incommon and appropriated funds for uses of their own. John Terzakis, Rudy Mulder and Roxanne Gardnercommingled assets of different entities that they ownedand controlled. Corporate identities meant nothing tothem.

*** [T]he parties concede that theymisappropriated funds and used them for their ownpurpose. They do not explain what the money was usedfor. They treat it as their own.

*** All that is shown is that Urban was depletedfor their own benefit. While they are so acting theHoneywell property was put on the brink of being lost. Mortgages and taxes were not paid and the plaintiffswere and are in serious danger of losing theirproperty. ***

Therefore the court finds that the contempt hasnot been purged by any party ***.

***

*** As to John Terzakis the Court finds that thecontempt order is not purged. Further, the court findsthe contempt to be willful and malicious. *** Insteadof coming forth and being honest with the court,Terzakis sends forth his underlings in an attempt tomislead the court.

*** It is hereby Ordered *** that judgment beentered against John Terzakis in favor of the plaintiffs and receiver in the amount of $572,500.00for 229 days pursuant to the contempt of court order,which represents the amount of the daily assessmentstimes the number of days that order has presently beenpending and is in default.

*** As to Roxanne Gardner, the court finds thatthe contempt order is not purged. *** She knowinglyfronts for John Terzakis and Rudy Mulder. It isfurther ordered *** that judgment is entered againstRoxanne Gardner for $572,500.00 for 229 days pursuantto the contempt order."

Urban, Terzakis and Gardner filed a notice of appeal onDecember 15, 2003. They sought review of the original turnoverorder dated December 12, 2002, the order dated January 3, 2003,that identified Terzakis, Mulder and Gardner as Urban's officers,the January 13 order for a rule to show cause, the contempt orderdated March 31, 2003, the denial of the motions to vacate thecontempt by order dated May 22, 2003, and the order of November26, 2003, in which the court found that Urban, Terzakis andGardner failed to purge the contempt.

Plaintiffs filed a motion to dismiss the appeal as untimelyinsofar as appellants attempted to challenge any order other thanthe order dated November 26, 2003. This court denied the motionto dismiss the appeal. The parties briefed issues concerning allof the orders listed in the notice of appeal.

Urban moved to strike from plaintiffs' brief the statementof facts. We took the motion with the case.

We first address the motion to strike the statement of factsfrom plaintiffs' brief. We agree with appellants thatplaintiffs' brief includes many purported statements of factwithout proper supporting citations to the record. See 188 Ill.2d R. 341(e)(6). Plaintiffs cite to their own complaints assupport for many statements of fact regarding the transactionsbetween plaintiffs, the master tenant, and Urban. Allegations ina complaint do not qualify as evidence of the facts alleged. SeeGabriel v. Columbia National Bank of Chicago, 228 Ill. App. 3d240, 247 (1992).

However, this court will not strike a party's statement offacts unless it includes such flagrant improprieties that ithinders our review of the issues. Lock 26 Constructors v.Industrial Comm'n, 243 Ill. App. 3d 882, 886 (1993). We findthat the improprieties here do not significantly hinder ourreview. Thus, we will not strike plaintiffs' statement of facts,but we will disregard any inappropriate or unsupportedstatements. See Lock 26 Constructors, 243 Ill. App. 3d at 886.

Although this court has denied plaintiffs' motion to dismissparts of the appeal, "the denial of a motion to dismiss an appealprior to briefing and argument is not final and may be revised atany time before the disposition of the appeal. [Citations.] This court has an obligation to consider its jurisdiction at anytime and should dismiss an appeal if jurisdiction is lacking."Hwang v. Tyler, 253 Ill. App. 3d 43, 45 (1993).

Urban argues that the original turnover order dated December12, 2002, has the effect of a mandatory preliminary injunction. See Electronic Design & Manufacturing, Inc. v. Konopka, 272 Ill.App. 3d 410, 415 (1995). Urban filed a timely notice of appealfrom the turnover order, but this court later granted Urban'smotion to dismiss the appeal.

In Battaglia v. Battaglia, 231 Ill. App. 3d 607 (1992), thetrial court similarly entered a preliminary injunction and thedefendant filed a timely notice of appeal. The appellate courtdismissed the appeal when the defendant chose not to pursue it. The defendant later moved the trial court for dissolution of theinjunction. When the court denied the motion, the defendantfiled a new notice of appeal. On appeal he argued that the trialcourt erred when it entered the preliminary injunction. Battaglia, 231 Ill. App. 3d at 614. The appellate court heldthat it lacked jurisdiction to consider the argument. Battaglia,231 Ill. App. 3d at 616. The court said:

"[A]lthough he had the opportunity to appeal thecircuit court's grant of the preliminary injunction,[the defendant] neglected to perfect that appeal.Accordingly, he cannot now assert those issues andarguments which he failed to pursue in his firstappeal. Rather, he is confined to whatever issues werepresented to the circuit court in his motion todissolve the preliminary injunction." Battaglia, 231Ill. App. 3d at 615-16.

See also Busey Bank v. Salyards, 304 Ill. App. 3d 214, 218 (1999)(on review of judgment holding defendants in contempt for failureto turn over funds, failure to appeal turnover order leftappellate court without jurisdiction to review merits of turnoverorder).

Urban, Terzakis and Gardner counter that this court hasjurisdiction to review the turnover order as a procedural stepleading to the appealable order finding that they failed to purgethe contempt. In Maggio v. Zeitz, 333 U.S. 56, 92 L. Ed. 476, 68S. Ct. 401 (1948), the Court similarly faced an appeal from afinal order in a contempt proceedings where the trial court foundthat the appellants failed to comply with a turnover order. TheCourt said:

"The question now arises as to whether, in thiscontempt proceeding, the Court may inquire into thejustification for the turnover order itself. It isclear however that the turnover proceeding is aseparate one and, when completed and terminated in afinal order, it becomes res judicata ***.

*** The procedure to enforce a court's ordercommanding or forbidding an act should not be soinconclusive as to foster experimentation withdisobedience. Every precaution should be taken thatorders issue, in turnover as in other proceedings, onlyafter legal grounds are shown and only when it appearsthat obedience is within the power of the party beingcoerced by the order. But when it has become final,disobedience cannot be justified by re-trying theissues as to whether the order should have issued inthe first place." Maggio, 333 U.S. at 68-69, 92 L.Ed.2d at 486-87, 68 S. Ct. at 407-08.

See also In re Amdur, 137 F.2d 708, 710 (3d Cir. 1943) (turnoverorder is res judicata in subsequent contempt proceeding based onviolation of turnover order).

We find the reasoning of Maggio applicable here. Under thatreasoning, and following Battaglia, we find that we lackjurisdiction to review the original turnover order on its meritsbecause defendants failed to pursue a timely appeal from thatorder.

Urban, Terzakis and Gardner also failed to pursue timelyappeals from the order of January 3, 2003, which modified theturnover order. We lack jurisdiction to consider the merits ofthat order.

Next, Urban, Terzakis and Gardner challenge the rule to showcause entered on January 13, 2003, and the subsequent order ofMarch 31, 2003, finding them in contempt of court. The March 31order imposed fines and provided that Urban and its officerscould purge the contempt by complying with the turnover order orby supplying a detailed financial history of the turnover funds. Again, appellants filed a timely notice of appeal from thecontempt order, but they voluntarily dismissed the appeal. Instead they pursued timely postjudgment motions to vacate thecontempt order. But following denial of the motions to vacate onMay 22, 2003, they filed no timely notice of appeal.

Appellants argue that their oral motion to purge thecontempt, presented in court on May 22, 2003, extends the timefor appeal from the contempt judgment. We disagree. To extendthe time for appeal, a party must file a postjudgment motion"directed against the judgment." 155 Ill. 2d R. 303(a). Appellants' motions to vacate the judgment qualified aspostjudgment motions directed against the judgment, but theyfiled no appeal from denial of those motions. In hearings on thesubsequent motion to purge, they attempted to prove that theycomplied with the court's order. A motion in which the partyclaims that it has abided by the judgment is not a motiondirected against the judgment. Lewis v. Loyola University, 149Ill. App. 3d 88, 92 (1986). The oral motion to purge thecontempt did not extend the time for appealing from the contemptjudgment.

"[A]n order finding a person in contempt and imposing amonetary or other penalty is immediately appealable. *** Contemptcitations *** must be appealed within 30 days of their entry orbe barred." Revolution Portfolio, LLC v. Beale, 341 Ill. App. 3d1021, 1025 (2003). The failure to file a timely appeal from thecontempt order imposing sanctions deprives this court ofjurisdiction to review the merits of the contempt order of March31, 2003, the denial of the motion to vacate the contempt, datedMay 22, 2003, and the initial rule to show cause entered January13, 2003. See Longo v. Globe Auto Recycling, Inc., 318 Ill. App.3d 1028, 1036 (2001); Davis v. Bughdadi, 120 Ill. App. 3d 236,240 (1983).

Appellants filed a notice of appeal within 30 days of theorder in which the court found that appellants failed to purgethe contempt. Nothing remains for the trial court to doconcerning the contempt against appellants except to enforce itsjudgment. Therefore the order qualifies as a final judgmentconcluding the separate contempt proceedings against theseparties, and we have jurisdiction to review that judgment. SeePeople ex rel. Scott v. Silverstein, 87 Ill. 2d 167, 172 (1981);United States v. Brumfield, 188 F.3d 303, 306-07 (5th Cir. 1999).

Although we lack jurisdiction over the attempted directappeals from the turnover order and the contempt order, thetimely appeal from denial of the motion to purge gives usauthority to consider some of appellants' arguments concerningthe prior orders. In this respect the case bears similarity toIn re Estate of Pinckard, 94 Ill. App. 3d 34 (1981). In thatcase the trial court ordered several lawyers to turn over certainfunds to an estate, and the lawyers filed a notice of appeal fromthe turnover orders, but they abandoned it. The court later heldthe attorneys in contempt for failing to turn over the funds. Onappeal from the contempt order the court said that the turnoverorders, "being final orders, cannot now be attacked as beingimproper or wrong in substance but can only be attacked onlimited grounds such as the trial court's lack of jurisdiction toenter them." Pinckard, 94 Ill. App. 3d at 44. Accordingly, onthis appeal we have authority to address appellants' argumentsthat the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter the orders ofDecember 12, 2002, January 3, 2003, January 13, 2003, March 31,2003, and May 22, 2003.

A trial court has jurisdiction to decide any case over whichit has subject matter jurisdiction, as long as it obtainspersonal jurisdiction over the parties. Steinbrecher v.Steinbrecher, 197 Ill. 2d 514, 530-31 (2001). The parties heredo not contest the trial court's jurisdiction over the subjectmatter of the case. Urban admits that the trial court obtainedpersonal jurisdiction over it prior to December 2002. Therefore,the trial court had jurisdiction to order Urban to turn over tothe receiver the funds it received in connection with theHoneywell property.

"It is well settled that corporate officers are obligated toobey judicial orders directed at their corporations." City ofChicago v. Air Auto Leasing Co., 297 Ill. App. 3d 873, 879(1998). In the order dated December 12, 2002, the trial courtdirected "Urban and its[] officers" to turn over certain funds. The trial court had jurisdiction to enter the turnover order ofDecember 12, 2002.

Gardner and Terzakis claim that the court lackedjurisdiction to enter the order dated January 3, 2003,identifying them as officers of Urban, because the court had notobtained jurisdiction over them as individuals. However, thecourt had jurisdiction to enter orders against Urban, and therebyto obligate Urban's officers to comply with the orders. Theidentification of the officers so bound did not exceed thecourt's jurisdiction. The court's inherent authority to enforceits orders gave it jurisdiction to enter the rule to show cause,again directed against Urban and its officers. See Sanders v.Shephard, 163 Ill. 2d 534, 540 (1994).

Appellants claim that the trial court lacked jurisdiction toenter the contempt order dated March 31, 2003, becauseCenterPoint and others, in February 2003, filed motions forsubstitution of judge as of right. In general, the court mustgrant any timely filed petition for substitution of judge as ofright, and the court lacks authority to enter any other order inthe proceeding in which the party presented the petition. In reDominique F., 145 Ill. 2d 311, 324 (1991).

CenterPoint presented its petition for substitution of judgeonly in the underlying proceedings here, and not in theindependent, collateral contempt proceedings. See In re Marriageof Alush, 172 Ill. App. 3d 646, 650 (1988). None of the orderslisted in the notice of appeal apply to CenterPoint or any otherparty who filed a motion for substitution of judge as of right. Moreover, CenterPoint filed its motion for substitution of judgeafter the court had begun evidentiary hearings on the rule toshow cause. Usually, the trial court should hear and dispose ofmotions in the order in which the parties filed them. DominiqueF., 145 Ill. 2d at 324. We find that CenterPoint's motion forsubstitution of judge did not deprive the trial court ofjurisdiction to complete the proceedings it had already commencedagainst other parties on the contempt allegations.

Next, appellants argue that the contempt order is voidbecause it is too vague and it lacks a sufficient statement ofsupporting facts. Appellants cite no authority for theproposition that such defects make the order void. By failing tocite authority appellants waived the issue. See Charter Bank v.Eckert, 223 Ill. App. 3d 918, 929 (1992). Moreover, the courtorder includes extensive findings of fact, and we see nothingvague about the order directing Urban's officers to pay $2,500 aday until they purge themselves of contempt, either bytransferring from Urban to the receiver $3,336,423.01, or byproviding a detailed history of the funds Urban received for theHoneywell property. See Doe v. Lutz, 253 Ill. App. 3d 59, 65-66(1993).

Appellants contend that the use of the phrase "that thecourt accepts" in the contempt order renders the order too vaguefor enforcement. We disagree. With virtually all court orders,the court retains jurisdiction to determine whether the partieshave complied. Smithberg v. Illinois Municipal Retirement Fund,192 Ill. 2d 291, 297-98 (2000). A party's purported compliancewith any order will not discharge its responsibility unless thecourt finds the compliance acceptable. For example, in Armstrongv. Guccione, 351 F. Supp. 2d 167 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), the courtordered Armstrong, a corporate officer, to turn over certaincorporate assets in his possession. Armstrong turned over someof the assets and testified that he gave others as gifts andtransferred some to business associates. Armstrong, 351 F. Supp.2d at 170. The court found Armstrong's explanation inadequate. Armstrong, 351 F. Supp. 2d at 170. Acceptability to the court ofthe contemnor's performance of purging conditions is an implicitcomponent of any contempt order. The inclusion of superfluoussurplusage in the trial court's order here did not make it vague,and it did not invalidate the order. Godfrey v. Brown, 81 Ill.App. 2d 453, 455 (1967).

Terzakis argues that the court lacked jurisdiction to holdhim in contempt for Urban's violation of the December 2002 order.

"'A command to the corporation is in effect a commandto those who are officially responsible for the conductof its affairs. If they, apprised of the writ directedto the corporation, prevent compliance or fail to takeappropriate action within their power for theperformance of the corporate duty, they, no less thanthe corporation itself, are guilty of disobedience andmay be punished for contempt.'" People v. Rezek, 410Ill. 618, 628 (1951), quoting Wilson v. United States,221 U.S. 361, 55 L. Ed. 771, 31 S. Ct. 538, 543 (1911).

Thus, the court had jurisdiction to hold Urban's officers,including Terzakis, in contempt for violation of the turnoverorder.

Gardner separately challenges the court's jurisdiction toenter the contempt order against her. In that order the courtrecounted Gardner's testimony that she relinquished her positionas an officer of Urban, and the court found that "Gardner left"Urban. The court later amended the contempt order to stateexplicitly that "Gardner was formerly a principal of Urban." Thecourt had jurisdiction over Urban at the time it entered theturnover order dated December 12, 2002, but this jurisdictionextended only to Urban and its officers. The court'sjurisdiction did not extend to former officers who lackedauthority to act on behalf of Urban at the time the court enteredthe turnover order. Cf. Rezek, 410 Ill. at 628-29.

Plaintiffs point to evidence in the record that Gardnerremained an officer of Urban throughout the proceedings, as sheadmitted her continuing close ties to Terzakis and hiscorporations. While we agree that the record includes suchevidence, the trial court unequivocally accepted contraryevidence that Gardner had resigned from Urban as of November2001. On this record, with contradictory evidence, we will notdisturb the trial court's finding of fact that Gardner hadresigned before the court entered its first order in this case. Because the contempt order on its face compelled Gardner to acton behalf of a corporation for which she no longer served as anofficer, we find the contempt order void as applied to Gardner. See JoJan Corp. v. Brent, 307 Ill. App. 3d 496, 507 (1999). Accordingly, we vacate the sanctions imposed against Gardner.

At last we reach the only issue before us for direct review. Terzakis and Urban filed a timely appeal from the trial court'sjudgment entered on its finding that Terzakis and Urban failed topurge themselves of contempt. We review the decision on a motionto purge for abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of Wassom, 165Ill. App. 3d 1076, 1079 (1988).

Terzakis and Urban presented evidence that after theyreceived more than $700,000 for payment of property taxes and$1.5 million from a lease buyout, and after cancellation ofTerzakis's personal debt of more than $1 million to CenterPoint,all in connection with the Honeywell property, Urban and Terzakisfailed to pay the property taxes and they allowed insurance tolapse. During the month in which Urban received the $1.5million, it received in excess of $11 million in income and itspent more than $11 million. Many of its payments went tovarious other projects Terzakis sought to pursue. The Urbanaccountant who testified could not tell the purpose of theexpenditures, except that they "fund[ed]" Terzakis's preferredprojects. The court asked what Urban and Terzakis did with moneythey received from the Honeywell tenants, especially funds fortaxes. Terzakis and Urban answered, in effect, that they hid itunder other shells Terzakis operated. On this evidence we cannotsay that the trial court abused its discretion by holding thatTerzakis and Urban failed to purge themselves of contempt. SeeArmstrong, 351 F. Supp. 2d at 170.

Finally, Terzakis contends that the trial court abused itsdiscretion by imposing a fine of $2,500 per day for 229 daysbecause the trial court delayed proceedings on the motion topurge. Terzakis cites no authority in support of the argument. Accordingly, we find the argument waived. See In re Marriage ofHunter, 223 Ill. App. 3d 947, 955 (1992).

The trial court had jurisdiction to enter the orderdirecting Urban and its officers to turn over to the receiverfunds Urban received for the Honeywell property. The court alsohad jurisdiction to hold Urban and its officers in contempt forfailing to obey the turnover order. Because the court, in thecontempt order as amended, expressly found that Gardner no longerserved as an officer of Urban, the order shows that the courtlacked jurisdiction to hold her in contempt for Urban's failureto comply with the turnover order. We lack jurisdiction toreview the turnover order and the contempt order on their meritsbecause Urban and Terzakis failed to pursue appeals from thoseorders. We review on the merits only the order in which thecourt held that Urban and Terzakis failed to purge themselves ofcontempt. The trial court did not abuse its discretion inholding that they failed to purge the contempt. Therefore, weaffirm the judgment against Terzakis and Urban, and we vacate thejudgment against Gardner.

Affirmed in part and vacated in part.

FITZGERALD-SMITH and O'MALLEY, JJ., concur.

JUSTICE McNULTY delivered the supplemental opinion of the court:

Urban and Terzakis raise several issues, including a newchallenge to the trial court's jurisdiction, on petition forrehearing. First, they seek to appeal from an order datedDecember 19, 2002, that identified Terzakis and Mulder as theofficers of Urban to whom the order dated December 12, 2002,applied. We did not discuss this order previously because Urbanand Terzakis did not list the order in their notice of appeal. We see no need to review the order now, because the trial courton January 3, 2003, entered an order that superceded the December19 order. The order of January 3, 2003, discussed in ouroriginal opinion, identified Terzakis, Mulder and Gardner as theofficers of Urban ordered to comply with the December 12 order. Because the December 19 order had no effect on the disposition ofthe contempt charge, we will not review that order. See Simmonsv. Garces, 198 Ill. 2d 541, 566-67 (2002).

Urban and Terzakis also contend that we should haveconsidered the merits of the argument that the trial court abusedits discretion by fining them for the 229 days the court took tocomplete the hearing on the petition to purge the contempt. Wedeclined to review the issue because Urban and Terzakis failed tocite any pertinent authority. On petition for rehearing theycite Marsh v. Lake Forest Hospital, 166 Ill. App. 3d 70, 74-75(1988), as authority for the proposition that they need not citelegal authority in support of some arguments.

In Marsh the appellant cited a statute, but no case law, forone argument. The appellee moved to strike that portion of theappellant's brief for failure to cite pertinent authority. Thecourt noted that the statute itself constituted pertinentauthority. Marsh, 166 Ill. App. 3d at 75. Because no court hadpreviously interpreted the statute, the court held that thefailure to cite case law did not waive the issue. The court inMarsh did not disturb consistent authority holding that thefailure to cite any pertinent authority in support of an argumentforfeits review of the issue. See Eisenberg v. IndustrialComm'n, 337 Ill. App. 3d 373, 383 (2003).

Next, Urban and Terzakis claim that they challenged thetrial court's subject matter jurisdiction in their originalbriefs on appeal. They refer us to pages on which they arguedthat the use of the phrase "which the court accepts" in thecontempt order rendered the order too vague for enforcement. Theoriginal briefs do not mention, let alone attack, the trialcourt's subject matter jurisdiction.

Nonetheless, we still have an obligation to vacate any orderthe trial court entered without subject matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, we will now address the new challenge to thatjurisdiction. Urban and Terzakis claim that Urban never had ares subject to the turnover order, and therefore the court lackedjurisdiction to order them to enter the turnover order. Theycite Maggio, 333 U.S. 56, 92 L. Ed. 476, 68 S. Ct. 401, asauthority.

In Maggio the trial court ordered the bankrupt petitioner toturn over certain merchandise, and the court held him in contemptwhen he failed to deliver the specified merchandise. Theappellate court affirmed the contempt finding, although the courtapparently believed the petitioner no longer possessed themerchandise at issue. On a further appeal, the Supreme Courtheld that the trial and appellate courts misapplied thepresumption that possession by a party at a given time provescontinued possession until the party explains how he lostpossession. The Court emphasized that evidence may rebut thepresumption and the courts have a duty not to enforce a turnoverorder when the evidence shows the person so ordered cannotcomply. Maggio, 333 U.S. at 65-67, 92 L. Ed. at 484-86, 68 S.Ct. at 406-07. The Court reiterated the general rule that "itmay be permissible, in resolving the unknown from the known, toreach the conclusion of present control from proof of previouspossession." Maggio, 333 U.S. at 65-66, 92 L. Ed. at 485, 68 S.Ct. at 406. The Court remanded the case for the trial court toconsider all of the evidence to determine whether to use itscontempt power to enforce the turnover order.

Notably, the Supreme Court did not say that proof of lack ofpossession would leave the trial court without jurisdiction toenter the contempt. Thus, Maggio does not support thejurisdictional argument Urban and Terzakis make here.

Moreover, the trial court here properly applied thepermissible presumption of continuing possession. The trialcourt heard evidence that Urban received funds for operation ofthe Honeywell property, and Urban transferred its funds toTerzakis and to various entities Urban and Terzakis controlled. Urban and Terzakis presented no evidence of the purpose of thetransfers, as their witness candidly admitted he did not knowthose purposes. As the court found, "All that is shown is that

Urban was depleted for [Terzakis's] own benefit." In this case,as in Armstrong, the evidence sufficed to show that the corporateofficer retained control over the funds, and the court had theauthority to use its contempt powers to enforce its turnoverorder.

Finally, Urban and Terzakis protest our decision to resolvethis case without oral argument. We lack jurisdiction toconsider almost all of the substantive arguments the partiesraised on this appeal. We believe that appellate attorneys andthis court should devote scarce time to substantial matters thiscourt has jurisdiction to decide. Accordingly, we deny thepetition for rehearing.

FITZGERALD-SMITH and O'MALLEY, JJ., concur.