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Plaintiff American Service Insurance Company (American) appeals from the trial court'sgranting of defendant Stephen S. Passarelli's motion for summary judgment. At issue is whetherdefendant can seek recovery of damages for bad faith under section 154.6 and attorney fees andcosts under section 155 of the Illinois Insurance Code (the Code) (215 ILCS 5/154.6, 155 (West1996)) as part of the arbitration of his car accident claim. Because we hold that defendant cannotrecover such damages in arbitration, we reverse the trial court's award of summary judgment todefendant and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Defendant was involved in a car accident with an uninsured motorist on August 14, 1995. Defendant had an automobile insurance policy with American, and attempts between defendantand American to settle defendant's claim were unsuccessful. This appeal centers upon the scopeof the language of an exclusion to the uninsured motorist coverage provisions of defendant'spolicy that the policy does not apply to "any claim against the Company where an insured hasfailed to make a written demand for Arbitration."

Defendant filed a demand for arbitration, contending that he should be compensatedunder the uninsured motorist provision of his policy with American. Defendant later filed anamendment to his arbitration demand in which he sought arbitration of his claims againstAmerican for alleged violations of section 154.6 and attorney fees and costs pursuant to section155. In the demand, defendant stated that he sought arbitration of those claims "in light of thedecision of the First District Appellate Court in Marcheschi v. Illinois Farmers Insurance Co.,298 Ill. App. 3d 306, 698 N.E.2d 683 (1998)."

American filed an amended complaint stating that defendant's insurance policy did notcover claims for violations of section 154.6 or section 155 of the Code. American sought adeclaratory judgment that defendant's claims under those two sections could not be arbitrated andasked that the arbitration proceedings be stayed. In defendant's answer to American's complaint,defendant asserted as an affirmative defense that his claims under sections 154.6 and 155 arose"out of and in the context of his demand for settlement of his uninsured motorist claim under theuninsured motorist coverage provisions of his policy" with American. He asserted that thelanguage of American's policy did not limit the types of claims that could be arbitrated to onlyinclude claims made under the policy's uninsured motorist provisions, but that the languageexpanded the basis for making any claim against American dependent on a demand forarbitration for that claim.

American again moved to stay the arbitration proceedings. Defendant moved forsummary judgment pursuant to section 2-1005(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1005(b) (West 1998)), again arguing that under the language of American's policy, he wasrequired to bring his claims for bad faith and attorney fees in the arbitration proceeding. The trialcourt granted defendant's motion based on the language of American's policy, namely, that thepolicy does not apply "to any claim against the Company where an insured has failed to make awritten demand for arbitration." The trial court found that "this language encompassesDefendant's claims for a finding of bad faith and for attorney's fees."

On appeal, American contends that the only issues that can be determined in anarbitration proceeding are the liability of the uninsured motorist and the damages due to theinsured as a result of the uninsured motorist's negligence, citing State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.v. Yapejian, 152 Ill. 2d 533, 605 N.E.2d 539 (1992). American asserts that section 154.6 doesnot allow a private action for bad faith or improper claims practices. American also argues thatthe correct procedure to recover damages for attorney fees under section 155 is for defendant tofile suit in the trial court.

We note that, subsequent to the filing of American's appeal, American filed a motion tostay the arbitration proceeding, which this court denied. In addition, defendant has filed a motionto strike American's reply brief, which we have taken with the case and which we deny.

This court reviews the trial court's award of summary judgment de novo. Jones v.Chicago HMO Ltd., 191 Ill. 2d 278, 291, 730 N.E.2d 1119, 1127 (2000). Summary judgment isproper where the pleadings and other materials on file, when viewed in the light most favorableto the nonmoving party, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that themoving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Jones, 191 Ill. 2d at 291, 730 N.E.2d at1127. Moreover, summary judgment is a drastic remedy that should be allowed only when theright of the moving party is clear and free from doubt. Jones, 191 Ill. 2d at 291, 730 N.E.2d at1127.

Section 143a(1) of the Code requires the arbitration of "any dispute with respect to"uninsured motorist coverage. 215 ILCS 5/143a(1) (West 1998). In State Farm, 152 Ill. 2d at537, 605 N.E.2d at 540-41, the supreme court defined the scope of that language when itreversed an appellate court's ruling that section 143a(1) unambiguously required arbitration of alldisputes relating to uninsured motorist coverage. The court stated that the language could beconstrued broadly, to require arbitration of all matters relating to uninsured motorist coverage, ornarrowly, to limit arbitration of disputes concerning covered claims, once coverage had beenestablished. State Farm, 152 Ill. 2d at 541, 605 N.E.2d at 542. Having reviewed principles ofstatutory construction and the legislative history of section 143a(1), the supreme court concludedthat section 143a(1) should be interpreted narrowly to limit the matters submitted to arbitration,noting that such a limitation would allow the resolution of a number of issues in the courts andcontribute to the body of case law on the subject of uninsured motorist coverage, as opposed tohaving those issues submitted to and resolved via arbitration. State Farm, 152 Ill. 2d at 543-44,605 N.E.2d at 543-44. Based upon the supreme court's interpretation of the scope of section143a, as well as the sections of the Code pertinent to defendant's claim, we conclude that the trialcourt erred in granting defendant's motion for summary judgment.

Section 154.6 lists acts committed by an insurance company that constitute improperclaims practices if, according to section 154.5, they are committed knowingly or "with suchfrequency to indicate a persistent tendency to engage in that type of conduct." 215 ILCS 5/154.5(West 1996). However, section 154.5 et seq. does not give rise to a private remedy or cause ofaction by a policyholder against an insurer but is instead regulatory in nature. Purlee v. LibertyMutual Fire Insurance Co., 260 Ill. App. 3d 11, 31, 631 N.E.2d 433, 448 (1994); Van Vleck v.Ohio Casualty Insurance Co., 128 Ill. App. 3d 959, 961, 471 N.E.2d 925, 927 (1984). Section154.7 vests the State Director of Insurance with the authority to charge a company with improperclaims practices and serve the company with notice of a hearing date. 215 ILCS 5/154.7 (West1998). If a company is found at the hearing to have engaged in improper claims practices, theDirector is required to order the company to cease such practices and has the discretion tosuspend the company's certificate of authority and/or impose a civil penalty of up to $250,000. 215 ILCS 5/154.8 (West 1998). Defendant therefore cannot personally seek damages fromAmerican under section 154.6.

In contrast to section 154.6, a private cause of action does exist under section 155 forrecovery of attorney fees. As the supreme court stated in Cramer v. Insurance Exchange Agency,174 Ill. 2d 513, 520, 675 N.E.2d 897, 900 (1996), section 155 "provides an extracontractualremedy to policyholders whose insurer's refusal to recognize liability and pay a claim under apolicy is vexatious and unreasonable." The supreme court added that an insured plaintiff couldrecover reasonable attorney fees and other costs as part of a breach of contract action to recoupthe proceeds due under the policy. Cramer, 174 Ill. 2d at 520, 675 N.E.2d at 900.

However, defendant's attempt to recover attorney fees under section 155 by way of anarbitration proceeding is flawed. The procedure by which an insured can pursue recovery ofattorney fees is clearly demonstrated in Marcheschi, which defendant has apparentlymisinterpreted to allow arbitration of his claim for attorney fees. In Marcheschi, 298 Ill. App. 3dat 308, 698 N.E.2d at 685, the plaintiff filed a complaint in the trial court seeking recovery undersection 155. This is consistent with the language of section 155(1), which states that "the courtmay allow as part of the taxable costs in the action reasonable attorney fees" and that such anaward is allowable if "it appears to the court that such action or delay is vexatious andunreasonable." (Emphasis added.) 215 ILCS 5/155(1) (West 1998). As stated in McGee v. StateFarm Fire & Casualty Co., 315 Ill. App. 3d 673, 681, 734 N.E.2d 144,151 (2000), the "keyquestion in a section 155 claim is whether an insurer's conduct is vexatious and unreasonable"and that determination is "a matter committed to the trial court's discretion." See also Estate ofPrice v. Universal Casualty Co., No. 1-00-1412 (May 14, 2001); LaGrange Memorial Hospitalv. St. Paul Insurance Co., 317 Ill. App. 3d 863, 873, 740 N.E.2d 21, 30 (2000); PeerlessEnterprise, Inc. v. Kruse, 317 Ill. App. 3d 133, 139, 738 N.E.2d 988, 995 (2000) (in which thiscourt reviewed trial court awards of attorney fees under section 155). Based upon this precedent,it is readily apparent that defendant must bring his claim under section 155 in the trial court.

In summary, because section 154.6 does not provide a private cause of action for aninsurer's bad faith and because defendant's claims under section 155 must be brought by way ofcomplaint in the trial court, the trial court in this case erred in ordering that those damages couldbe sought in an arbitration proceeding.

Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for furtherproceedings consistent with this opinion.

Reversed and remanded.

BUCKLEY and O'BRIEN, JJ., concur.