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Plaintiff, American Service Insurance Company, appeals the trial court's finding that it oweddefendant, Leslaw Olszewski, a duty to defend and to indemnify him in two lawsuits. On December31, 1997, defendant was involved in a motor vehicle accident. Defendant had purchased motorvehicle insurance from plaintiff and sought coverage under that policy. Plaintiff responded that thepolicy had lapsed, without renewal, prior to the accident. Plaintiff denied coverage and brought thisdeclaratory action. Following a bench trial, the trial court found that defendant had renewed theinsurance policy prior to the accident and that plaintiff's agent had received notice of this renewal. On appeal, plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in: (1) allowing defendant to call a witness thathe had not disclosed; (2) finding an agency relationship between plaintiff and an insurance produceror broker with which plaintiff did business; (3) asking the attorneys questions during closingargument; and (4) denying plaintiff's posttrial motion. We reverse and remand.

I. BACKGROUND

Defendant purchased motor vehicle insurance with plaintiff through an insurance broker. The insurance broker, Midwest Competent & Insurance Agency, Inc. (Midwest), placed defendantwith an insurance producer, M.E. Pritikin, that directly dealt with plaintiff. Erica Cwan, a seniorlitigation specialist for plaintiff, testified that in 1997, M.E. Pritikin was an independent producerthat solicited business for defendant. According to Cwan, an insurance policy becomes effective or"bound" on the date and time that plaintiff receives the policy from M.E. Pritikin. Cwan testifiedthat in June 1997, defendant purchased a six-month insurance policy that expired on December 8,1997. Defendant paid his premiums to Midwest, which, in turn, paid M.E. Pritikin. Plaintiff thenreceived the premium from M.E. Pritikin. Cwan testified that M.E. Pritikin was its "producer" andthat Midwest was defendant's agent. Cwan testified that plaintiff did not receive notice thatdefendant intended to renew his insurance until January 5, 1998, when plaintiff received a fax noticefrom Pritikin of a renewal. Therefore, plaintiff argues that defendant's policy was not in effectbetween December 8, 1997, the date defendant's insurance policy expired, and January 5, 1998. When plaintiff received notice that defendant was involved in a motor vehicle accident on December31, 1997, plaintiff determined that defendant was not insured at the time of the accident because ofdefendant's failure to renew the policy until January 5, 1998.

Defendant testified that, through Midwest, he first purchased insurance with plaintiff in June1996. He then renewed the policy every six months, including December 1997. Each timedefendant renewed the policy, he paid Midwest a down payment and then made three installmentpayments to Midwest to satisfy the premium. Midwest provided him with insurance cards. Afterthe accident on December 31, 1997, defendant went to Midwest's office the following Monday andinformed them that he had been in an accident.

Defendant additionally called as a witness Robert Mikolajczyk, who worked for Midwest asan insurance broker. Plaintiff moved to bar this witness, citing defendant's failure to disclose thiswitness in his answer to Rule 213 interrogatories. 177 Ill. 2d R. 213. Denying this motion, the trialcourt noted that Mikolajczyk would only testify to facts and that, because of the nature of the case,plaintiff could not claim any surprise.

Mikolajczyk testified that on June 7 or 8, 1997, he met with defendant and that defendantrenewed his motor vehicle insurance with plaintiff for an additional six months. Mikolajczykreceived the premium payments from plaintiff, forwarded this money to M.E. Pritikin, and issueddefendant an insurance card. Mikolajczyk met with defendant again in December 1997 for thepurpose of another six-month renewal. Plaintiff made a down payment and Mikolajczyk issued himanother insurance card. Mikolajczyk sent the payment to M.E. Pritikin and faxed notice of renewalto M.E. Pritikin on December 6, 1997. Defendant eventually paid the entire premium for theinsurance and Mikolajczyk sent this money to M.E. Pritikin. When defendant reported the motorvehicle accident in January 1998, Mikolajczyk notified both M.E. Pritikin and plaintiff of the claim. Mikolajczyk testified that he "usually" helps his customers with "setting up the claims" and "fillingout the policy parts." With respect to defendant's claim, the owner of M.E. Pritikin told Mikolajczykthat M.E. Pritikin would handle the claim. At the time of the trial in 2000, Mikolajczyk testified thatdefendant continued to be insured with plaintiff.

The trial court found significant the December 6, 1997, fax from Midwest to M.E. Pritikin,notifying it of a renewal. The court believed that this fax was "sufficient to bind and estop the carrierfrom denying renewal." The court determined that, as a matter of law, the insurance policy was ineffect on the date of the accident and entered judgment in favor of the defendant. Following trial,a different judge was assigned to this case and denied plaintiff's posttrial motion. This appealfollowed.

Defendant initially requests that we dismiss the appeal because plaintiff's brief containsan incomplete statement of facts. Supreme Court Rule 341(e)(6) requires the appellant's brief toinclude a statement of facts, which should recite "the facts necessary to an understanding of thecase." 177 Ill. 2d R. 341(e)(6). Here, plaintiff's statement of facts mainly focuses on the proceduralhistory of the case, i.e., when the lawsuit was filed, the proceedings before the trial court, and thepositions of the parties during the lawsuit. In articulating the parties' contentions, plaintiff'sstatement of facts identifies the relevant and necessary facts that underlie the insurance coveragedispute. We therefore find compliance with Rule 341(e)(6) and deny defendant's request to dismissthe appeal.

II. RULE 213(f) VIOLATION

We now turn to plaintiff's argument that defendant violated the disclosure requirements ofSupreme Court Rule 213. 177 Ill. 2d R. 213(f). Subsections (f) and (i) of Supreme Court Rule 213provide as follows:

"(f) Identity and Testimony of Witnesses. Upon written interrogatory, a party must furnish the identity and location ofwitnesses who will testify at trial, together with the subject of theirtestimony.

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(i) Duty to Supplement. A party has a duty to seasonablysupplement or amend any prior answer or response whenever new oradditional information subsequently becomes known to that party." (Emphasis added.) 177 Ill. 2d Rs. 213(f), (i).

The goal of the discovery process in Illinois is full disclosure. Buehler v. Whalen, 70 Ill. 2d51, 67 (1977). Supreme court rules on discovery are mandatary, and both counsel and courts mustfollow these rules of procedure. Seef v. Ingalls Memorial Hospital, 311 Ill. App. 3d 7, 21 (1999). "Discovery is not a tactical game; rather, it is intended to be a mechanism for the ascertainment oftruth, for the purpose of promoting either a fair settlement or a fair trial." Boland v. KawasakiMotors Manufacturing Corp., USA, 309 Ill. App. 3d 645, 651 (2000). Courts, therefore, should notallow parties to avoid the plain language of Rule 213 because such conduct defeats the purpose ofthe rule and encourages tactical gamesmanship. Department of Transportation v. Crull, 294 Ill. App.3d 531, 537 (1998). Moreover, the committee comments to Rule 213(f) state that this paragraphrequires "a party to serve the identity and location of witnesses who will testify at trial, together withthe subject of their testimony." 177 Ill. 2d R. 213(f), Committee Comments. The trial court's rulingregarding Rule 213 will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. Crull, 294 Ill. App. 3d at 537.

In this case, defendant's answer to plaintiff's Rule 213 interrogatories identified no testifyingwitnesses. Plaintiff's Rule 213(f) interrogatory requested the following: "Pursuant to Supreme CourtRule 213(f), please identify the name, current address and current phone number of each and everywitness who will testify at trial on these parties' behalf and the subject of each individual'stestimony." Defendant in response to plaintiff's Rule 213(f) interrogatory indicated "None at thistime." That answer did not disclose Robert Mikolajczyk as a witness, identify his location or providethe subject matter of his testimony. Therefore, when plaintiff sought to call Mikolajczyk as awitness, he was in violation of the plain language of Rule 213(f). Plaintiff failed to identifyMikolajczyk as a witness he planned to call to testify at trial as required by Rule 213(f).

The trial court, however, determined that no Rule 213(f) violation occurred because thiswitness offered no "opinions" and plaintiff could not claim surprise. By referring to opiniontestimony, the trial court seemed to be addressing Rule 213(g), which requires the disclosure ofopinion witnesses, their conclusions, the bases for their conclusions, and their qualifications. 177Ill. 2d R. 213(g). But while Rule 213(g) limits its disclosure requirements to witnesses who willoffer any opinion testimony at trial, Rule 213(f) has no such limitations. Rule 213(f) mandates thata party disclose the identity of witnesses the party plans to testify at trial regardless of whether thewitnesses will offer an opinion. 177 Ill. 2d R. 213(f). Rule 213(f) also mandates that a partydisclose the subject of the witness testimony. Rule 213(f) requires that, "Upon written interrogatory,a party must furnish the identity and location of witnesses who will testify at trial, together with thesubject of their testimony." 177 Ill. 2d R. 213 (f). Moreover, litigants and their attorneys arerequired to update that information. Supreme Court Rule 213(i), which imposes upon litigants andtheir attorneys the duty to supplement, provides that, "A party has a duty to seasonably supplementor amend any prior answer or response whenever new or additional information subsequentlybecomes known to that party." 177 Ill. 2d R. 213 (i). In this case, defendant's failure to disclose anywitnesses in his answer to Rule 213 interrogatories informed plaintiff's counsel and the trial courtthat he did not intend to call any witnesses at trial.

Litigants have a right to rely, not only on the plain language of discovery rules, but also onthe fact that courts will enforce that language. Supreme Court Rule 201(a) (166 Ill. 2d R. 201(a))and its related discovery provisions "form a comprehensive scheme for fair and efficient discoverywith judicial oversight to protect litigants from harassment." Kunkel v. Walton, 179 Ill. 2d 519, 531(1997). To that end, a party should be allowed to rely on an opposing party's answer to Rule 213(f)interrogatories and expect that only those witnesses disclosed pursuant to Rule 213(f) will in fact becalled to testify at trial regarding the subject disclosed. Rule 213 is intended to provide litigants witha degree of certainty and predictability in the trial process and prevent trial by "ambush." Copelandv. Stebco Products Corp., 316 Ill. App. 3d 932, 946 (2000).

A critical issue in this case was whether the insurance policy was in effect on the date of theaccident. Mikolajczyk provided essential information regarding that issue. In this case, plaintiff mayhave known that Mikolajczyk, a Midwest employee, had knowledge about whether defendant soughtto renew his insurance in December 1997. However, when defendant did not disclose this witnessin his answer to the Rule 213(f) interrogatories, plaintiff had every right to believe that Mikolajczykwould not be called as a witness.

The trial court knew that Mikolajczyk had not been disclosed and recognized defendant'sfailure to comply with Rule 213. However, the witness was allowed to testify because the trial courtconcluded "He's not a surprise." Based on the mandatory requirements of Supreme Court Rule213(f), we reject defendant's argument that the burden of disclosing a lay witness is not justified assuch witness is not likely to cause unfair surprise. Such disclosure requirements are not a burden,but a mechanism to promote a fair trial process. Moreover, disclosure is mandatory. A party isrequired under Supreme Court Rule 213(f) to name and identify trial witnesses "together with thesubject of their testimony." 177 Ill. 2d R. 213(f). The rule is not limited to requiring witnessdisclosure only of those witnesses who may cause unfair surprise.

Here, based on defendant's answer to plaintiff's interrogatories, plaintiff prepared its case notknowing Mikolajczyk was to be called as a witness. Failure to disclose this witness gave plaintiffno opportunity to schedule a discovery deposition. Failure to disclose this witness gave plaintiff noopportunity to prepare for cross-examination prior to trial and no opportunity to arrange for a rebuttalwitness. Moreover, when defendant called Mikolajczyk as a witness during trial the trial court didnot give plaintiff any additional time to prepare. Mikolajczyk provided essential informationregarding the main issue in the case as to whether the insurance policy was in effect on the date ofthe accident. Defendant's failure to disclose this critical witness substantially prejudiced plaintiffand denied plaintiff a fair trial. We therefore find the trial court abused its discretion in finding noviolation of Rule 213(f). The prejudicial effect of this ruling warrants a new trial.

III. CONCLUSION

Having found that plaintiff is entitled to a new trial, we need not address the other issues thatplaintiff raises. For the reasons previously discussed, we reverse the trial court's judgment andremand for a new trial.

Reversed and remanded for a new trial.

McNULTY, P.J., and COHEN, J., concur.