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JUSTICE REID delivered the opinion of the court:

In this matter, the trial court denied appellant AmericanNational Fire Insurance Co.'s (American) motion for summaryjudgment and granted appellee, National Union Fire InsuranceCompany of Pittsburgh, PA.'s (National) cross-motion for summaryjudgment. On appeal, American argues that the trial court erredwhen it determined that National was not required to providecoverage under the insurance policy at issue because it receivedlate notice and, as a consequence, did not owe anything toAmerican for the costs of the defense and settlement of theunderlying litigation. For the reasons that follow, we affirmthe trial court's decision.

BACKGROUND

Camosy, Inc. (Camosy), was the general contractor on aFederal Aviation Administration construction project (the TraconFacility job), in Elgin, Illinois. On February 5, 1993, Camosyentered into a contract with Zalk-Josephs Fabricators, Inc.(Zalk-Josephs), in which Zalk-Josephs agreed to act as asubcontractor to Camosy for the Tracon Facility job. Thesubcontract agreement required Zalk-Josephs to procure andmaintain insurance coverage including a general liability policy,with Camosy as an additional insured. In accordance with theagreement, Zalk-Josephs procured general liability coverage fromNational with Camosy as an additional insured. Camosy wassubsequently provided with a certificate of insurance regardingthis policy.

Thereafter, Zalk-Josephs subcontracted part of the TraconFacility job to Area Erectors, Inc. (Area Erectors). Americanprovided general liability insurance to Area Erectors. Camosyand Zalk-Josephs qualified as additional insureds under theAmerican policy.

On September 9, 1993, an employee of Area Erectors, MaximoGonzalez, was injured while working at the Tracon Facilityjobsite. On January 13, 1995, Gonzalez filed suit against Camosyseeking damages for his injuries. Gonzalez alleged that he wasinjured as a result of Camosy's: (1) violation of the StructuralWork Act (740 ILCS 150/1 et seq. (West 1994)) and (2) negligence. On May 20, 1996, Gonzalez amended his complaint to add Zalk-Josephs as a defendant.

There were subsequent "targeted tenders" and/or attempted"targeted tenders" downstream to both National and American. Camosy reported the Gonzalez lawsuit to its insurer, ContinentalLoss Adjusting (Continental). In a letter dated February 3,1995, Continental advised Zalk-Josephs that it wished to tenderCamosy's defense in the Gonzalez lawsuit to Zalk-Josephs'insurer, National. In a letter dated February 6, 1995, Zalk-Josephs informed Continental that it was declining Continental'srequest. Zalk-Josephs explained that it was making thisdecision: (1) as a result of the decision reached in Institute ofLondon Underwriters v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., 234 Ill. App.3d 70 (1992), (2) because it desired that the National policy"not be impaired" and (3) due to its expectation that Americanwould defend and indemnify Camosy. Zalk-Josephs then tenderedits defense along with Camosy's to American.

Initially, American refused Camosy's tender of defense asmade by Zalk-Josephs. Thereafter, Camosy requested coverage fromAmerican on its own behalf. Subsequently, American agreed toprovide coverage and assumed Camosy's defense.

Although American had accepted Camosy's tender of defense,Camosy continued to communicate with Zalk-Josephs regarding itsinitial desire that its defense be tendered to National. In aletter dated December 12, 1997, counsel for Camosy requested thatZalk-Josephs answer the following questions: (1) whether Camosyhad coverage with National and (2) assuming that Camosy wascovered by National, why National had refused to tender a defenseto Camosy. On January 7, 1998, Continental also sent similarcorrespondence to Zalk-Josephs. Zalk-Josephs did not respond toeither letter. At no time did Camosy make a direct "targetedtender" to National prior to this lawsuit being filed.

On March 25, 1998, Camosy filed a complaint for declaratoryjudgment against both Zalk-Josephs and National. In thecomplaint, Camosy sought a determination that: (1) National oweda duty to defend and indemnify it with regards to the Gonzalezsuit or, in the alternative, (2) Zalk-Josephs was in breach ofits contractual obligation to provide it with insurance coverage.

On May 5, 1998, American, as the insurer for Camosy andZalk-Josephs, settled the Gonzalez suit. Thereafter, on October13, 1998, American, individually and as the subrogee of Camosy,filed an amended complaint for declaratory judgment againstNational. In the complaint, American sought to be reimbursed forthe costs it incurred regarding the Gonzalez suit. Americanalleged that it: (1) was subrogated to Camosy's rights and thatNational owed a duty to defend and indemnify Camosy with respectto the Gonzales suit or, in the alternative, (2) that it had aright to recover based on the doctrine of equitable contribution. On July 11, 2001, American filed a motion for summaryjudgment. National then filed a cross-motion for summaryjudgment on July 16, 2001. On September 28, 2001, the trialcourt granted National's cross-motion for summary judgment anddenied American's motion.

The issues presented in this case are whether: (1) the trialcourt correctly granted summary judgment when it determined thatNational did not receive proper notice of the Gonzalez suit andtherefore was not required to provide coverage to Camosy, as anadditional insured, under Zalk-Josephs' insurance policy, (2)Camosy made a timely "targeted tender" to National by notifyingZalk-Josephs of its intentions and (3) the self-insured retention(SIR) endorsement in National's insurance policy applies toCamosy.

ANALYSIS

I

Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, depositions,and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact andthat the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter oflaw. 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c)(West 2000); Travelers Insurance Co. v.Eljer Manufacturing, Inc., 197 Ill. 2d 278, 292 (2001). Inappeals from summary judgment rulings, our review is de novo. Travelers, 197 Ill. 2d at 292.

National contends the trial court's decision to grant itscross-motion for summary judgment is proper. Relying on thedecision reached in Institute of London, National maintains thatan insured has the right to elect which of its insurers willdefend it in a lawsuit. National asserts that Zalk-Josephs wasthe named insured under National's policy and was an additionalinsured under American's policy. Accordingly, National arguesthat Zalk-Josephs had the right to make a "targeted tender" andthereby select which insurer it desired to defend and indemnifyit in the Gonzalez suit.

National avers that when an insured makes this designation,the selected insurer is then precluded from being reimbursed bythe other insurers for its costs under a theory of equitablecontribution. The right to equitable contribution arises whenone insurer pays money for the benefit of another insurer. RoyalGlobe Insurance Co. v. Aetna Insurance Co., 82 Ill. App. 3d 1003,1006 (1980). The doctrine of equitable contribution permits aninsurer that has paid the entire loss to be reimbursed by otherinsurers that are also liable for the loss. Liberty MutualInsurance Co. v. Westfield Insurance Co., 301 Ill. App. 3d 49, 52(1998).

Relying further on the rationale of Institute of London,National also maintains that Zalk-Josephs had the right topreserve its coverage with National by "downstreaming" Camosy'stender of defense to American. Consequently, National contendsthat it is not required to reimburse American since Zalk-Josephsand Camosy made "targeted tenders" of their defenses solely toAmerican.

In Institute of London, the court was faced with thequestion of when two insurance policies potentially apply to aloss, may an insured elect which of its insurers is to defend andindemnify the claim by tendering its defense to one insurer andnot the other and thereby foreclose the settling insurer fromobtaining contribution from the nonsettling insurer?

The undisputed facts in Institute of London revealed thatHartford Fire Insurance Company (Hartford) provided comprehensiveliability insurance to Great Lakes Towing Company (Great Lakes). Great Lakes employed Thatcher Engineering Corporation (Thatcher)to perform repairs on its premises. The agreement between theparties required Thatcher to have Great Lakes named as anadditional insured on Thatcher's liability insurance policy. Accordingly, Thatcher caused Great Lakes to be named as anadditional insured on its insurance policy with the Institute ofLondon Underwriters (Institute). The Hartford policy containedan "other insurance" clause which required Hartford to contributeequally to any loss covered by another primary insurer, whileInstitute's policy did not. Institute of London, 234 Ill. App.3d at 71.

Thereafter, a Thatcher employee was killed while working onthe project for Great Lakes. His representative brought suitagainst Great Lakes. Great Lakes then tendered its defense toInstitute. Great Lakes also notified its insurer, Hartford, ofthe suit but never requested that Hartford defend or indemnifyit. Instead, Great Lakes preferred that Institute incur thecosts for its defense and indemnification. Institute of London,234 Ill. App. 3d at 71-72.

A settlement in the suit was reached and Institute, withoutGreat Lakes' instruction or authorization, requested thatHartford contribute half of the settlement. Hartford, asrequested by Great Lakes, refused. On appeal, Hartford arguedthat equitable contribution did not apply because Great Lakesnever tendered its defense to Hartford and Great Lakes neverrequested that Hartford defend or indemnify the claim. Instituteof London, 234 Ill. App. 3d at 73.

The Institute of London court determined that Illinois lawrequires a tender of defense by a sophisticated insured to aninsurer before the insurer is required to defend or indemnify aclaim. Institute of London, 234 Ill. App. 3d at 76. The courtalso found that an insured has the right to choose which policywill apply. Institute of London, 234 Ill. App. 3d at 76. Inreaching this decision, the court stated:

"In the case before us the only request forHartford's participation came from the Institute, notthe insured, ***. *** Hartford was asked only tocontribute to a settlement, not defend the suit. Therefore, in this case, * * * the insured's refusal orfailure to tender the defense of the action to Hartfordexcused Hartford's duty to perform under its policy orto contribute to a settlement procured by a co-insurer." Institute of London, 234 Ill. App. 3d at 76.

In recognizing an insured's right to choose between twoinsurers whose policies provide potential coverage, the courtnoted that Great Lakes had bargained for coverage underInstitute's policy procured by Thatcher. In that regard thecourt stated:

"Great Lakes had bargained with Thatcher to be anadditional insured in its liability policy for theconstruction project Thatcher was to perform on GreatLakes' premises. Great Lakes did not tender itsdefense to Hartford because it concluded it was notresponsible for the accident resulting in the death ofThatcher's employee, Garcia, and that Thatcher'sinsurer, the Institute, was the appropriate carrier torespond to the Garcia claim. Great Lakes may well havefeared that if the loss were attributed to its policywith Hartford the result might be a rise in premiums orcancellation of its policy. This factor alone suggeststhe insured ought to have the right to seek or not toseek an insurer's participation in a claim as theinsured chooses when more than one carrier's policycovers the loss." Institute of London, 234 Ill. App.3d at 78-79.

In Cincinnati Cos. v. West American Insurance Co., 183 Ill.2d 317, 324 (1998), the court considered what is necessary totrigger an insurer's duty to defend and held that the duty ariseswith actual notice of a claim against an insured, regardless ofthe insured's level of sophistication. In reaching that result, the court, relying on Institute of London, stated:

"Where the insured makes such a designation, the dutyto defend falls solely on the selected insurer. Thatinsurer may not in turn seek equitable contributionfrom the other insurers who were not designated by theinsured. Institute of London, 234 Ill. App. 3d at 79. This rule is intended to protect the insured's rightto knowingly forgo an insurer's involvement. Instituteof London, 234 Ill. App. 3d at 79." Cincinnati, 183Ill. 2d at 324.

The Cincinnati court concluded that "an insured may knowinglyforgo the insurer's assistance by instructing the insurer not toinvolve itself in the litigation. The insurer would then berelieved of its obligation to the insured with regard to thatclaim." Cincinnati, 183 Ill. 2d at 326.

Subsequently, in John Burns Construction Co. v. IndianaInsurance Co., 189 Ill. 2d 570 (2000), the court was faced with asimilar question. There, the appellant, John Burns ConstructionCompany (Burns), entered into a subcontract with Sal BarbaAsphalt Paving, Inc. (Barba), to pave a parking lot. Thesubcontract required Barba to maintain liability insurance forBurns. Pursuant to the contract, Barba had Burns added as anadditional insured to its policy with its insurer, IndianaInsurance Company (Indiana). An individual subsequently fell inthe aforementioned parking lot and alleged that his injuriesoccurred as a result of the parking lot being improperly paved. The individual filed suit against Burns. John Burns, 189 Ill. 2dat 571.

Burns initially tendered its defense to Indiana. However,Indiana refused to accept the tender. In response, Burnstendered its defense to it own insurer, Royal Insurance Company(Royal). Thereafter, Burns and Royal filed an action for adeclaratory judgment that Indiana defend and indemnify Burns inthe underlying action. In a counterclaim for declaratoryjudgment, Indiana argued Royal was required to share the defensesince the Indiana policy contained an "other insurance"provision. Indiana requested that Royal contribute equally tothe costs it incurred. John Burns, 189 Ill. 2d at 571-72.

The John Burns court determined that Burns had the right tochoose which insurer would be required to defend and indemnify itin the underlying action and that there was nothing in therelevant policy which limited Burns' right to make this choice. John Burns, 189 Ill. 2d at 574. The court stated that it agreedwith the reasoning of the decisions reached in BituminousCasualty Corp. v. Royal Insurance Co. of America, 301 Ill. App.3d 720 (1998), and Alcan United, Inc. v. West Bend MutualInsurance Co., 303 Ill. App. 3d 72 (1999), which involved "otherinsurance" clauses. Quoting from the Alcan United decision, theJohn Burns court stated:

"'Thus, in accordance with Bituminous Casualty andInstitute of London, we hold an "other insurance"clause in a policy will not automatically reach intocoverages provided under other policies merely becausesuch other policies are in existence. The insuredstill must be given the right to determine whether itwishes to invoke its rights to such other coveragesbefore those coverages become accessible under the"other insurance" provision of a triggered policy.'" John Burns, 189 Ill. 2d at 577-78, quoting AlcanUnited, 303 Ill. App. 3d at 81.

In Alcan United, the court also held that the insured'sright to choose encompasses the right to deactivate coverage withan insurer previously selected for purposes of invoking exclusivecoverage with another insurer. Alcan United, 303 Ill. App. 3d at82. Furthermore, the court in Richard Marker Associates v. PekinInsurance Co., 318 Ill. App. 3d 1137, 1143-44 (2001), relying onthe decision reached in Alcan United, also determined that aninsured, who had tendered his defense to two insurers, had theright to subsequently withdraw his tender from one insurer andforego its coverage. Richard Marker, 318 Ill. App. 3d at 1143-44.

Here, National is correct when it argues that Zalk-Josephshad the right to select which insurer it wanted to defend andindemnify it with regards to the Gonzalez suit. Under thedecision reached in John Burns and its predecessors, Zalk-Josephshad the right to tender its defense to either its primaryinsurer, National, or because Zalk-Josephs was an additionalinsured on the sub-subcontractor Area Erector's policy, Zalk-Josephs could tender its defense to American. However, using thesame rationale, Camosy also had the right as an insured to choosethe insurer of its choice to defend and indemnify it in theGonzalez lawsuit.

Camosy's primary insurer was Continental. Camosy was alsoan additional insured on National's and American's policies. Assuch, Camosy had the right to select either Continental, Nationalor American to defend and indemnify it in the Gonzalez suit. Zalk-Josephs did not have the right to interfere with Camosy'schoice of insurer.

However, that stated, Zalk-Josephs was not National's agent,and consequently, it was Camosy's responsibility to tender itsdefense directly to National and not to Zalk-Josephs. InCincinnati Cos., our supreme court held that an insurer's duty todefend arises with actual notice of a claim against an insured,regardless of the insured's level of sophistication. CincinnatiCos., 183 Ill. 2d at 324, 701 N.E.2d at 502. This court has heldthat when an insurer receives notice of a suit against one oftheir insureds from the attorney for the plaintiffs in that suit,this constitutes "actual notice" under Cincinnati Cos.. Employees Reinsurance Corp. v. E. Miller Insurance Agency, Inc.,332 Ill. App. 3d 326, 339 (2002). Further, in Alcan United, Inc.v. West Bend Mutual Insurance Co., 303 Ill. App. 3d 72, 84(1999), this court held that when an insurer is the recipient ofa "targeted tender" by an additional insured's own insurer, thisalso, constitutes actual notice under Cincinnati Cos. because theinsured was made aware that a defense may be required. Here, itis uncontested that National did not receive any notice untilCamosy filed suit in this declaratory judgment action. However,at this point, Camosy was precluded from tendering its defense toNational as a result of late notice.

It is well settled that when an underlying complaintpresents an issue of potential insurance coverage and the insurerbelieves that the policy does not cover the claim, the insurermay not refuse to defend the insured but must either defend thesuit under a reservation of rights or seek a declaration of nocoverage. Peerless Enterprise, Inc. v. Kruse, 317 Ill. App. 3d133, 145 (2000), citing Mobile Oil Corp. v. Maryland CasualtyCo., 288 Ill. App. 3d 743, 754 (1997). When an insurer fails toact in either fashion and wrongfully denies coverage, the insureris estopped from raising policy defenses to coverage. Peerless,317 Ill. App. 3d at 146, citing Mobile Oil Corp., 288 Ill. App.3d at 754.

This estoppel doctrine applies only where an insurer hasbreached its duty to defend. Thus, a court inquires whether theinsurer had a duty to defend and whether it breached that duty. Employers Insurance of Wausau v. Ehlco Liquidating Trust, 186Ill. 2d 127, 151 (1999), citing Clemmons v. Travelers InsuranceCo., 88 Ill. 2d 469, 475-78 (1981).

Application of the estoppel doctrine is not appropriate ifthe insurer had no duty to defend or if the insurer's duty todefend was not properly triggered. These circumstances includewhere the insurer was given no opportunity to defend; where therewas no insurance policy in existence; and where, when the policyand the complaint are compared, there clearly was no coverage orpotential for coverage. Ehlco, 186 Ill. 2d at 151, citing LaRotunda v. Royal Globe Insurance Co., 87 Ill. App. 3d 446, 452(1980), and McFadyen v. North River Insurance Co., 62 Ill. App.2d 164, 171 (1965).

The notice requirement in the insurance policy between Zalk-Josephs and National states:

"2. Duties in the Event of Occurrence, Claim or Suit. 

a. You must see to it that we are notified as soon as practicable of an 'occurrence' or an offense which may result in a claim. To the extent possible, notice should include:

(1) How, when and where the 'occurrence' or offense took place;

(2) The names and addresses of any injured persons and witnesses; and

(3) The nature and location of any injury or damage arising out of the 'occurrence' or offense.

b. If a claim is made or 'suit' is brought against any insured, you must;

(1) Immediately record the specifics of the claim or 'suit' and the date received; and

(2) Notify us as soon as practicable.

You must see to it that we receive written notice of the claim or 'suit' as soon as practicable.

c. You and any other involved insured must:

(1) Immediately send us copies of any demands, notices, summonses or legal papers received in connection with the claim or 'suit;'

(2) Authorize us to obtain records and other information;

(3) Cooperate with us in the investigation, settlement or defense of the claim or 'suit;' and

(4) Assist us, upon our request, in the enforcement of any right against any person or organization which may be liable to the insured because of injury or damage to which this insurance may also apply.

d. No insureds will, except at their own cost, voluntarily make a payment, assume any obligation, or incur any expense, other than for first aid, without our consent."

National argues that it was not required to provide coverageunder the policy due to Camosy's failure to adhere to the noticeprovisions in sections 2(a) and (b). In response, Americancontends that only the named insured, Zalk-Josephs, was requiredto adhere to the notice requirements of sections 2(a) and (b). In particular, Zalk-Josephs argues that the "you" which appearsin sections 2(a) and (b) refers to the named insured only and notto additional insureds.

The terms "you," "we" and "us" are defined by the insurancepolicy. Specifically, the National policy states:

"Throughout this policy the words 'you' and 'your'refer to the Named Insured shown in the Declarations,and any other person or organization qualifying as aNamed Insured under this policy. The words 'we,' 'us'and 'our' refer to the company providing thisinsurance."

The declaration page of the National policy referencesPettibone Corporation as the named insured. The policy alsoincludes a named insured endorsement designating other entitiesincluding, Zalk-Josephs, as named insureds. Camosy is not namedas a named insured in the endorsement. Consequently, Americanmaintains that Camosy, which qualified as an additional insuredand not a named insured under the policy, had no obligation tocomply with the notice provisions listed in sections 2(a) and(b).

"The construction of an insurance policy is a question oflaw subject to de novo review. American States Insurance Co. v.Koloms, 177 Ill. 2d 473, 479-80 (1997). In construing thelanguage of an insurance policy, a court must ascertain and giveeffect to the intention of the parties as expressed in theiragreement. Koloms, 177 Ill. 2d at 479. To that end, termsutilized in the policy are accorded their plain and ordinarymeaning (Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.,154 Ill. 2d 90, 108 (1992)) unless specifically defined in thepolicy, in which case they will be given the meaning as definedin the policy. In addition, a court must read the policy as awhole and consider the type of insurance purchased, the nature ofthe risks involved, and the overall purpose of the contract. Koloms, 177 Ill. 2d at 479. Provisions that limit or excludecoverage are to be construed liberally in favor of the insuredand most strongly against the insurer. Koloms, 177 Ill. 2d at479; National Union Fire Insurance Co. v. Glenview Park District,158 Ill. 2d 116, 122 (1994). Moreover, all doubts andambiguities in the policy language must be construed in favor ofthe insured. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. WilkinInsulation Co., 144 Ill. 2d 64, 74 (1991)." Brile v. Estate ofBrile, 296 Ill. App. 3d 661, 666 (1998).

American is correct. Sections 2(a) and (b) specificallyrequire "you," which is the named insured, Zalk-Josephs, tonotify National of an occurrence or a claim. Camosy was not anamed insured under the National policy. Consequently, Camosycould not have violated sections 2(a) and (b) of the policy.

However, the trial court's decision to grant National'scross-motion for summary judgment was still proper because thenotice provisions in sections 2(c)(1) and 2(d) were violated. Although National did not argue that Camosy violated sections2(c)(1) and 2(d) in its motion for summary judgment, this courtmay affirm a grant of summary judgment on any basis in therecord. Fabiano v. City of Palos Hills, 336 Ill. App. 3d 635,641 (2002).

The notice provision found in section 2(c)(1) of the policywas violated as a result of Camosy's failure to immediately sendNational copies of any demands, notices, summonses or legalpapers it received in connection with the Gonzalez suit. In anaffidavit dated November 19, 1999, Douglass Dully, a claimdirector of AIG Claim Services, Inc., the authorizedrepresentative of National, stated that National's first noticeof the Gonzalez suit occurred on or about April 9, 1998, whenNational was served with Camosy's complaint for declaratoryjudgment. Douglass' assertion is undisputed. Consequently,National received notice of the Gonzalez suit a little more thanthree years after the suit was filed. This is clearly latenotice under the policy.

Section 2(c)(1) requires the named insured and "any otherinsured" to adhere to the notice provision. Zalk-Josephs is notNational's agent. Although, Camosy notified Zalk-Josephs of theGonzalez suit and attempted to have Zalk-Josephs tender itsdefense to National, this was insufficient under the policy. Camosy had an obligation to contact National directly to adviseit of Camosy's "targeted tender" and immediately provide it withthe relevant documents. Camosy notified everyone except forNational.

Camosy was provided with a certificate of insurance whichset forth the coverage which National was extending to Zalk-Josephs and to it as an additional insured. With thisinformation, Camosy could have easily notified National of itsrequest for a defense together with the specifics of the Gonzalesclaim. Camosy failed to do so and its actions clearly violatedthe notice provision in section 2(c)(1).

Furthermore, the notice provision in section 2(d) of thepolicy was violated when American unilaterally decided to settlethe Gonzalez suit. Section 2(d) states "no insured will, exceptat their own cost, voluntarily make a payment, assume anyobligation, or incur any expense, other than for first aid,without our consent." American, which assumed Camosy's defense,settled the Gonzalez suit without National's consent. Thisaction clearly violated section 2(d) of the policy.

Nevertheless, American contends that National is estoppedfrom raising its coverage defense. We do not agree withAmerican's assertion. Instead, we find that National is notestopped from asserting its coverage defenses because its duty todefend was never triggered.

On January 13, 1995, Gonzalez filed suit. On February 3,1995, Camosy through Continental informed Zalk-Josephs of theGonzalez suit and its desire that Camosy's defense be tendered toNational. Three years later, National was given its first noticeof the Gonzalez suit when it was served with the complaint inthis declaratory judgment action, on April 9, 1998. Less than amonth later, on May 5, 1998, American settled the Gonzalez suit. Consequently, National's duty to defend was never triggeredbecause it was not given an opportunity to participate in theGonzalez suit. As such, the estoppel doctrine is inapplicable inthis matter and the trial court's decision is proper. NorthernInsurance Co. of New York v. City of Chicago, 325 Ill. App. 3d1086, 1094-96 (2001)(city's 2