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First Division
July 15, 2002

PRESIDING JUSTICE COHEN delivered the opinion of the court:

During the pendency of the mandamus action, plaintiffs filed a motion for a temporaryrestraining order seeking to: (1) require defendants to "honor the appropriations of the GeneralAssembly for the operation of *** Valley View"; (2) enjoin defendants from transferring inmatesfrom Valley View "if the transfer is required by defendants' plan to close Valley View by May 15,2002"; and (3) prohibit the layoff of any employees in connection with the closing. The trial courtdenied plaintiff's motion, finding that the requested temporary restraining order would impermissiblyinfringe on the defendants' statutory authority to close the facility. Plaintiff then filed a petition forinterlocutory appeal as of right in this court pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 307(d). 166 Ill. 2d R.307(d).

A temporary restraining order is a drastic remedy which may issue only in exceptionalcircumstances and for a brief duration. Jurco v. Stuart, 110 Ill. App. 3d 405, 408 (1982). Thepurpose of a temporary restraining order is to preserve the status quo until the court can conduct ahearing to determine whether it should grant a preliminary injunction. Stocker Hinge ManufacturingCo. v. Darnel Industries, Inc., 94 Ill. 2d 535, 541 (1983). To be entitled to temporary injunctiverelief, plaintiffs must demonstrate that they: (1) possess a protectable right; (2) will suffer irreparableharm without the protection of an injunction; (3) have no adequate remedy at law; and (4) are likelyto be successful on the merits of their action. Murges v. Bowman, 254 Ill. App. 3d 1071, 1081(1993). We will reverse the trial court's denial of a temporary restraining order only if the trial courtabused its discretion. C.D. Peters Construction Co. v. Tri-City Regional Port District, 281 Ill. App.3d 41, 47 (1996).

Plaintiffs argue that they have a protectable right to compel defendants to spend the fundsappropriated by the legislature for operation of Valley View through the end of fiscal year 2002. Insupport of this position, plaintiffs rely principally on West Side Organization Health Services Corp.v. Thompson, 73 Ill. App. 3d 179 (1979), rev'd on grounds of mootness, 79 Ill. 2d 503 (1980). InWest Side Organization Health Services Corp., the Illinois General Assembly passed anappropriations bill which included $3,545,000 for use by the Dangerous Drugs Commission (DDC)for the purchase of drug abuse treatment services. Governor Daniel Walker exercised his vetoauthority to reduce that appropriation by $100,000 to $3,445,000. The legislature then overrodeGovernor Walker's veto and the appropriation of $3,545,000 became law. Subsequently, GovernorJames Thompson informed the DDC that no allotment for the purchase of drug abuse services inexcess of $3,445,000 would be approved. The $100,000 amount restored to the appropriation by thelegislature was reserved by the Governor for state budgetary reasons. The plaintiffs sought a writof mandamus to prevent Governor Thompson from interfering with the DDC's use of theappropriated funds. The trial court dismissed the complaint based on the doctrines of separation ofpowers and sovereign immunity, lack of standing, and failure to state a cause of action. West SideOrganization Health Services Corp., 73 Ill. App. 3d at 182.

On appeal, this court reversed. West Side Organization Health Services Corp., 73 Ill. App.3d at 192. In West Side Organization Health Services Corp., we held that a resident-taxpayer hasstanding to sue to challenge an alleged misuse of public funds, rejecting the argument that a taxpayeronly has standing to sue to prevent an increase in government spending. West Side OrganizationHealth Services Corp., 73 Ill. App. 3d at 186-87. We further held that Governor Thompson lackedeither statutory or constitutional authority to reserve a portion of funds that the legislature hadappropriated for use by a state agency, noting that "[t]o imply that the executive possesses inherentpowers which supersede the legislative function of appropriating public funds is to disregard theseparation-of-powers doctrine." West Side Organization Health Services Corp., 73 Ill. App. 3d at191-92.

West Side Organization Health Services Corp. is inapplicable to the instant case. Theplaintiffs in that case alleged that the Governor had interfered with a state agency's use of the fundsappropriated to the agency by the legislature. In contrast, plaintiffs in the case before us allegethat-based on a joint decision of the Governor and the Director of the IDOC to close ValleyView-the IDOC will not spend the full amount appropriated to it for the operation of Valley View.

Plaintiffs have presented neither authority nor argument for the proposition that the IDOClacks authority to close Valley View. Instead, plaintiffs argue as the legislature appropriated fundsfor the operation of Valley View through June 30, 2002, defendants are required to spend those fundson the continued operation of Valley View through June 30, 2002. However, "discretion to spend ornot to spend within the parameters set by the legislature rests with the agency for whose use the fundshave been appropriated." West Side Organization Health Services Corp., 73 Ill. App. 3d at 189. Courts are not to intervene in matters within the discretion of the IDOC. People v. Lego, 212 Ill.App. 3d 6, 8 (1991), citing People v. Fowler, 14 Ill. 2d 252 (1958). Further, Public Act 92-8 cannotbe read to require the continued operation of Valley View as an appropriation bill may not containsubstantive law and may not command the performance of an act (Board of Trustees of CommunityCollege District No. 508 v. Burris, 118 Ill. 2d 465, 481 (1987)).

Because plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate both that they possess a protectable right toprevent defendants from closing Valley View prior to June 30, 2002, and a likelihood of success onthe merits of this case, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff's motionfor a temporary restraining order. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court denying plaintiffs'motion for a temporary restraining order is affirmed.

Affirmed.

McNULTY and COUSINS, JJ., concur.