Alden Nursing Center-Lakeland, Inc. v. Patla

Case Date: 10/23/2000
Court: 1st District Appellate
Docket No: 1-99-3268 Rel

                                                                                                           FIRST DIVISION
                                                                                                           October 23, 2000

No. 1-99-3268

ALDEN NURSING CENTER-LAKELAND, INC.,
an Illinois Corporation; ALDEN NURSING
CENTER-MORROW, INC., an Illinois
Corporation; ALDEN NURSING CENTER-
POPLAR CREEK, INC., an Illinois
Corporation; OAK PARK CONVALESCENT AND
GERIATRIC CENTER, INC., d/b/a
Metropolitan Center of Oak Park;
EDGEWATER NURSING AND GERIATRIC CENTER,
INC.; CHICAGO RIDGE NURSING CENTER,
INC.; ROYAL ELM CONVALESCENT AND
GERIATRIC CENTER, INC.; ALDEN NURSING
CENTER-WENTWORTH, INC., an Illinois
Corporation; ALDEN PRINCETON
REHABILITATION AND HEALTH CARE, INC.;
and ALDEN HEATHER REHABILITATION AND
HEALTH CARE CENTER, INC.,

                    Plaintiffs-Appellees,

          v.

ANN PATLA, Director of the Department
of Public Aid, and THE DEPARTMENT OF
PUBLIC AID,

                   Defendants-Appellants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Appeal from the
Circuit Court of
Cook County





















Honorable
Aaron Jaffe,
Judge Presiding

JUSTICE McNULTY delivered the opinion of the court:

The Illinois Department of Public Aid (Department) sought to recover overpayments it madeto 10 nursing homes. The nursing homes requested hearings and sought to set off allegedDepartment underpayments against the overpayments. The hearing officers refused to considerevidence the nursing homes presented to show that the Department failed to pay other amounts duewhen it made the overpayments. The Director of the Department adopted the hearing officers'decisions, holding that sovereign immunity precluded the hearing officers from considering theclaims for underpayments. The trial court reversed the Director and ordered the hearing officers toconsider the proffered evidence of underpayment. The Department appeals.

In December 1993 the Department found, through an audit, that it had overpaid Oak ParkConvalescent & Geriatric Center (Oak Park) $218,853.26. In November 1994 the Departmentsought to recover the overpayments, and it gave Oak Park notice of the right to a hearing concerningthe assessment. The Department attached to the notice a list of 166 patients on whose behalf theDepartment made the overpayments, and next to each name the Department indicated the amountit overpaid and the months for which it made the overpayments.

Following two further audits in cooperation with Oak Park, in August 1996 the Departmentreduced to $192,369.59 the amount of the overpayments it sought to recover. Oak Park requesteda hearing. The parties stipulated to the admissibility of the Department's exhibits showing theamounts overpaid for each of the listed patients. Oak Park's attorney said, "We do not dispute thenumbers. *** In fact, we do agree with those numbers." But Oak Park objected that the Departmentdid not take into account the parts of the patient accounts showing a lack of full payment. Oak Parksought to offset all unpaid balances in its patients' accounts against the amount the Departmentsought to recover.

Oak Park tendered several exhibits showing the amounts it believed the Department owed,totaling $184,847.16. The Department objected that the hearing officer lacked jurisdiction to permitthe setoff. The Department did not review the numbers in Oak Park's exhibits or agree to theiraccuracy.

The hearing officer added the exhibits to the record as Oak Park's offer of proof, but heagreed with the Department's argument that the Court of Claims had sole jurisdiction to hear OakPark's claim for amounts it sought to set off against the Department's recovery. Thus, the hearingofficer recommended upholding the decision to recover $192,369.59 from Oak Park. By letter datedNovember 1996, the Director of the Department adopted the hearing officer's recommendation.

Oak Park sued for judicial review of the agency's decision, arguing that the agency shouldhave set off the alleged underpayments against the overpayments. It did not challenge the findingof overpayments amounting to $192,369.59.

The trial court consolidated the case with eight similar cases, all brought by nursing homesagainst the Department for administrative review, where the Director upheld the Department's rightto recover overpayments the nursing homes received, but found the hearing officers lackedjurisdiction to adjudicate the nursing homes' claims for setoff of underpayments. One other casejoined the consolidated litigation prior to the trial court's decision.

Not all cases appeared in precisely the same posture. For example, the Department soughtto recover overpayments of $100,520.89 from Edgewater Nursing & Geriatric Center (Edgewater). Like all of the other respondents in the administrative agency actions, Edgewater admitted theamount of the overpayments on the indicated accounts. But Edgewater claimed $268,278.26 inunderpayments. It asked the trial court to enter a judgment awarding it this amount plus attorneyfees. Several other respondents also expressly sought judgments against the Department for theamount of underpayments, plus attorney fees, minus the overpayments. In those cases therespondents, unlike Oak Park, expressly sought a money judgment against the Department.

The administrative action against Alden Nursing Center - Lakeland (Lakeland) stood in aunique posture. In May 1991, the Department notified Lakeland of the results of an audit whichshowed overpayments of $117,445.17. Lakeland requested a hearing. A second audit reduced theamount sought to $115,224.27. Lakeland's controller gave the Department's auditors records anddocuments to substantiate claims that the Department underpaid Lakeland for some services duringthe audit period. The Department did not take the information into account in arriving at theoverpayment amount.

At the hearing Lakeland sought to introduce evidence of underpayments to offset theoverpayments. The hearing officer held that he lacked jurisdiction to set off the allegedunderpayments against the overpayments. He refused to admit into evidence Lakeland's testimonyand exhibits concerning underpayments. He recommended recovery of $115,224.27 from Lakeland. By letter dated March 15, 1993, the Director announced his decision adopting the hearing officer'srecommendation. Lakeland filed a complaint for administrative review later that month, allegingthat it "did present evidence of a set-off and counter-complaint in the amount of $190,383.95." Atthis point, the Lakeland case had essentially the same posture as all the other cases before the courton this appeal. But following briefing and argument on Lakeland's complaint, the trial court, onFebruary 14, 1994, remanded the cause to the Department for determination of the amountsunderpaid, and with instructions to set off the underpayments against the overpayments. Instead ofseeking immediate appellate review, as the Department did in all the other cases now on appeal, theDepartment proceeded to hold the hearing the trial court ordered.

The hearing officer who heard the case on remand took evidence on nine separate dates fromMay 1994 until March 1995. Lakeland's controller presented the bulk of the evidence. He explainedthat Lakeland kept individual records for each patient, showing all amounts billed for services to thatpatient and amounts received. He created an exhibit showing the unpaid balances for each patient. Lakeland demanded a setoff of the full unpaid amounts shown against the overpayments.

The controller testified that each listed patient qualified for public aid from the Department. He knew this by the coding used on the accounts. Some accounts showed the code PV, meaning thatprivate sources should pay the coded charge; some showed PA, meaning public aid authorized; someshowed PP, meaning public aid pending, and some showed PN, meaning public aid not authorized. Lakeland sought recovery for all unpaid charges coded PA, PP, or PN. Lakeland often used thesecodes interchangeably. Generally, after a patient filed an application for public aid, Lakeland wouldlist the patient as PP, while the Department reviewed the application; later, Lakeland might changethe coding to PN, if Lakeland still needed some document showing the expected entitlement topublic aid. If the Department formally approved the application, Lakeland might code furthercharges as PA.

The controller detailed the accounting process for some patient accounts chosen as examples. One such patient received social security payments. The account showed an unpaid charge, listedsimply as "private miscellaneous." The controller admitted he did not know to what services thecharge pertained. The account showed payments Lakeland received from social security and froma pension for that patient. Lakeland made an adjustment to the account, writing off a balance asuncollectible. Because Lakeland did not recover the full amount it charged for its services to thepatient from the patient's other sources, Lakeland charged the Department for the unpaid balance.

During a break in the hearing, the controller spoke to a Lakeland staff member about theprivate miscellaneous charge. He then testified that Lakeland classified retroactive increases in thedaily rate charged to patients as private miscellaneous charges. He did not know the amount of theincrease in the daily rate or the number of days for which Lakeland sought the retroactive increasefor the specific account. On cross-examination the controller admitted that the Department did nothave a duty to pay private charges, and he could remove such charges from the request for setoff.

The controller explained that every month the Department sent Lakeland a prepayment reportlisting all the accounts and services for which the Department intended to reimburse Lakeland. Lakeland reviewed the report and returned it, with corrections, to the Department. The Departmentthen sent a check and a remittance advice again listing all accounts and services reimbursed by thecheck. When Lakeland found the Department failed to reimburse it for a charge for which Lakelandhad sought payment, a Lakeland employee would call the Department to point out the discrepancy. Lakeland might resubmit a bill for the unpaid services. Sometimes the Department paid andsometimes it did not.

According to the controller, the Department had the right to deny a claim for certain servicesor for an individual not covered by public aid. The Department frequently failed to pay claimswithout formally denying the claim. Sometimes Lakeland called the Department repeatedlyconcerning a claim without getting any final determination and the bill remained unpaid. No codingon the accounts indicated whether the Department denied a request for payment, except that in someinstances Lakeland might write off an unpaid amount as uncollectible following the Department'sdenial of a request for payment.

If a patient qualified for social security, the patient's family received the checks. Somefamilies signed the checks over to Lakeland, but others cashed the checks and paid Lakeland in cash. The Department required use of social security funds, or funds from other outside sources, for thepatient's care. The Department received notice from the Social Security Administration of theamount paid to each patient, and the Department based its payments to Lakeland on that information. If the patient's family withheld part of the social security payment, and the Department made thecorrect payment based on accurate information about the social security, Lakeland would show anunpaid balance in the patient's account. The controller agreed that the Department would not beliable for the unpaid balance. He could not determine from the accounts whether such factsexplained any of the unpaid balances he sought to recover. The Department's attorney led thecontroller through review of many accounts in great detail, including several in which Lakelandapparently sought to recover from the Department amounts of social security the family may havewithheld.

A financial services representative for Lakeland said that she or her supervisor called theDepartment when they found the Department had not sent payments requested in a revisedprepayment report. She continued to pursue the matter with the Department until she learned whyit had not paid that charge. She could not tell from the patient account information in evidencewhether the Department had formally denied a claim or simply left it unpaid without explanation.

A Department employee who handled requests for payments from the nursing homes testifiedthat the account information in evidence lacked data essential for processing claims for payments. The documents lacked recipient identification numbers, dates of service, and description of theservices. The witness could not even determine whether the Department had approved the patient'sapplication for the receipt of public aid. The Department never simply failed to process a requestfor payment or a challenge to the sufficiency of a payment.

The hearing officer, in her 57-page report summarizing the hearing, made very extensive,detailed findings concerning the claims for setoff. She said:

"All of [Lakeland's] underpayment claims are brought to this forum in theform of a counterclaim. [Lakeland] has the burden of proof and must prove, by apreponderance of the evidence, that these underpayment claims are legitimate andowing by the Department. ***

***

*** When the Department auditors audit a provider, they should be able torely on the accuracy and adequacy of [the provider's] records. The Department is thepayor [of] last resort for recipients' room and board charges. If a public aidrecipient's ledger card entry shows a credit balance, the auditors should be able torecord that as an overpayment and the Department should recoup that overpaymentfrom the facility. Should the provider supply additional records which prove to theauditors that its own ledger cards were in error, it can reduce the overpaymentamount. This was done in the first hearing in this matter where a re-audit reducedthe original recovery amount from $117,445.17 to $115,224.27. A credit balanceentry on a ledger card is prima facie evidence of that overpayment which can be andoften is rebutted by that additional documentation.

However, the same cannot be said for an underpayment claim. A debitbalance entry on a ledger card is NOT prima facie evidence of that underpayment. The Department, while the payor of last resort, is not a guarantor of any and alloutside income which facilities, for one reason or another, do not receive. Thetestimony in this matter has made it abundantly evident that there are many situationswhere the existence of a debit does not automatically require a payment by theDepartment. [The controller] said there are legitimate reasons why the Departmentmight not pay on a claim. Both he and [Lakeland's financial services representative]said there is nothing on the ledger card delineating between what they would considera legitimate non-payment and a claim [Lakeland] believed the Department shouldpay."

The hearing officer first considered the many charges for which Lakeland lackeddocumentation showing the nature of the service rendered or the availability of other potentialsources for payment. She recounted testimony concerning five documented accounts for which, aftertestimony, the controller agreed that the Department did not owe the amounts included in Lakeland'srequest as unpaid balances. The hearing officer could not find that Lakeland proved its entitlementto the unpaid balances in accounts for which it lacked full documentation.

For some of the documented accounts, Lakeland sought to recover charges coded as private,or payable by the patient's individual insurance, because the controller concluded that the coding waserroneous. The hearing officer found that the controller failed to prove a coding error by apreponderance of the evidence.

The hearing officer found that the Department may have properly rejected many of the claimsfor payment due to the ineligibility of the patient. She found Lakeland had not presented adequateproof to show for many specific charges that the Department had no such proper basis for rejectingthe claims. The hearing officer rejected as incredible the controller's testimony that all patients hadestablished the right to public aid, including those for whom Lakeland's records showed that publicaid was not authorized, as well as those for whom a public aid application was pending.

With complete recitations of the pertinent evidence for a number of specified charges, thehearing officer explained the insufficiency of the evidence to show the Department's liability. In hersummary, she added that she did not believe that Lakeland's staff had failed to pursue the manycharges it sought to recover, totaling in excess of $190,000, so she concluded that the Departmentmust have provided acceptable reasons for denying many of the claims. She found that Lakelandfailed to prove an entitlement to any setoff. Therefore, she recommended a finding that Lakelandowed the Department $115,224.27 for overpayments it received. In April 1995 the Director adoptedthe hearing officer's recommendation.

Lakeland again sought administrative review of the Director's decision. The trial courtconsolidated the case with the other cases in which nursing homes sought setoffs, despite the factthat in this case, alone, the hearing officer admitted into evidence all testimony and documents bywhich Lakeland sought to prove its entitlement to a setoff, and only in this case did the hearingofficer evaluate the weight and credibility of that evidence to determine whether the nursing homepresented sufficient proof of the right to the amounts claimed.

The parties in the consolidated cases in the trial court briefed and orally argued the issue ofwhether sovereign immunity barred the Department from considering the claims for setoff in all ofthe consolidated cases. The parties did not address the special posture of Lakeland or the hearingofficer's detailed findings on the adequacy of the evidence. The court found that in all theconsolidated cases the Department "erred in refusing to allow Plaintiffs to present evidence ofunderpayments owed to them by the Department." The court included the decision regardingLakeland in the list of decisions reversed, without discussion of the hearing officer's fullconsideration of all evidence Lakeland presented concerning underpayments.

On the Department's motion, the court found no reason to delay appeal of the decision. Wehave jurisdiction to hear the Department's appeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 304(a). 155 Ill.2d R. 304(a).

We review the Director's holdings on questions of law de novo, but we will not disturb afinding of fact unless it is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. Raintree Health CareCenter v. Illinois Human Rights Comm'n, 173 Ill. 2d 469, 479, 672 N.E.2d 1136 (1996). We do notdefer to the circuit court's decision. Pontiac Lodge No. 294 v. Department of Revenue, 243 Ill.App. 3d 186, 192, 611 N.E.2d 62 (1993).

Based on the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the hearing officers disallowed evidencerelating to amounts the Department owed the nursing homes in all the consolidated cases exceptLakeland. Our supreme court explained sovereign immunity in People ex rel. Manning v. Nickerson,184 Ill. 2d 245, 702 N.E.2d 1278 (1998). There, a state agency sued for an injunction to compel thedefendant to remove a building allegedly built on state property and for damages due to thealleged use of state lands. The defendant filed a counterclaim seeking a judicial determinationof the line between his property and the state's property, and he sought money damages for severaltorts, including trespass. Nickerson, 184 Ill. 2d at 247.

The agency argued that the Court of Claims had exclusive jurisdiction over the counterclaim. Our supreme court noted that the Court of Claims Act (705 ILCS 505/8 (West 1996)) expressly gavethe Court of Claims exclusive jurisdiction over all tort claims against the state. Nickerson, 184 Ill.2d at 248-49. Regarding the question of whether a circuit court could hear a counterclaim based intort, our supreme court held:

"On one level, *** fairness seems to dictate that the defendant should be allowed toraise any counterclaim in the circuit court: the state started this fight in the circuitcourt and must live with the consequences. The doctrine of sovereign immunity,however, is not about fairness. The legislature has conferred immunity upon thestate, and the legislature--only the legislature--can determine when and where claimsagainst the state will be allowed." (Emphasis in original.) Nickerson, 184 Ill. 2d at249.

Accordingly, the court concluded that the Court of Claims had exclusive jurisdiction to consider thedefendant's counterclaim for money damages.

But the court distinguished the counterclaim for a determination of the boundary line dividingthe two properties. The court said:

"The central issue in the case is who owns the land in question, and that issue isbefore the circuit court by virtue of the state's complaint. The defendant's responseis that he owns the land--not the state. Thus, the property claims raised by thedefendant are defensive in nature and are asserted for the purpose of defeating thestate's action, and not for the purpose of obtaining an affirmative judgment againstthe state. Because the circuit court has jurisdiction to decide the state's request foran injunction and money damages, and that necessarily involves a determination ofthe defendant's claimed ownership interest, sovereign immunity does not bar thecircuit court from exercising jurisdiction over the defensive, property claims raisedin the counterclaim." Nickerson, 184 Ill. 2d at 249-50.

Thus, the Court of Claims has exclusive jurisdiction over the claims assigned to it by theCourt of Claims Act, even if the claims appear in a counterclaim. But if a decision on an agency'sclaim necessarily involves determination of an issue a defendant raises, then the court oradministrative law judge with jurisdiction to decide the agency's claim also has jurisdiction to decidethe issue, regardless of whether the defendant raises the issue in a counterclaim or as a defenseto the agency's claim.

Here, the Department sought to recover overpayments it made for specified patients atspecified times. The nursing homes sought to set off against the Department's claims amounts theDepartment allegedly owed - sometimes for the same patients - for services other than those forwhich the Department overpaid. The nursing homes' claims are contractual in nature and thereforethe Court of Claims Act gives the Court of Claims exclusive jurisdiction to consider them. 705 ILCS505/8(b) (West 1996); Klopfer v. Court of Claims, 286 Ill. App. 3d 499, 503-04, 676 N.E.2d679 (1997).

All of the nursing homes looked through the Department's specific claims with theDepartment's auditors and persuaded the auditors to reduce the claims on the basis of the accountingrecords. When the Department presented the adjusted claims to the hearing officers, the nursinghomes stipulated to the accuracy of the Department's numbers as correct reflections of the amountsthe Department overpaid for the patients and times specified. Determination of whether theDepartment made the alleged overpayments did not in any manner involve determination of whetherthe Department also at other times underpaid for other services for other patients. Under Nickerson,the hearing officer, the Director, and the circuit court all lacked jurisdiction to consider the nursinghomes' claims. Our legislature, in enacting the Court of Claims Act, granted that court exclusivejurisdiction over all of the nursing homes' claims for underpayments, whether the nursing homessought to raise them by way of defense, counterclaim, or in a separate complaint.

The proceedings on Lakeland's claims show the wisdom of the legislative scheme. In itscomplaint for administrative review of the detailed decision rejecting the set-off claims forinsufficient evidence, Lakeland alleged exactly one ground for overturning the findings: "theidentical documentation was accepted as *** substantiating the Department's claim against thePlaintiff but was not accepted as supporting the Plaintiff's claim against the Department." Lakeland,like all the nursing homes involved in the consolidated litigation, sought to recover all of the unpaidbalances in all accounts of patients who applied for public aid. Lakeland's controller swore thatLakeland billed the Department for all of the unpaid services. When the Department sent paymentsnot including the amounts Lakeland now seeks to set off, a Lakeland employee called theDepartment to learn why it had not included the requested sum. Lakeland's controller admitted thatthe Department could have a number of legitimate reasons for denying a payment request. Thefinancial services representative said that she could not determine, from the records presented at thehearing, whether the Department had provided such an explanation for any or all of the chargesLakeland sought to recover.

The hearing officer perceptively summarized the situation: because the Department is thepayor of last resort, a credit balance in the account of any public aid recipient constitutes prima facieevidence of overpayment. The controllers of the nursing homes conceded as much by stipulatingto the Department's calculations of overpayments. But a debit balance in a patient's account is notprima facie evidence that the Department underpaid, both because other sources may be responsibleand because the Department owes nothing until the nursing home has provided full, acceptabledocumentation for its claim for payment. A Department employee gave uncontradicted testimonythat the documents presented in court did not include all of the information the Department requiredbefore making payments. The complaint for administrative review in Lakeland shows that thenursing homes seek to use the Department's suit as a shortcut to avoid presentation of the proof theDepartment and the Court of Claims require before finding that the Department has wrongly refusedto pay a bill.

Lakeland did not present any evidence concerning the current status of its requests forpayment of the unpaid balances. The process for considering those requests, first by the agencyemployees who handle billing disputes, then by the Court of Claims, should continue. Thelegislature has foreclosed the attempted shortcut through a counterclaim by giving the Court ofClaims exclusive jurisdiction over claims for payments due for the services alleged.

Several of the nursing homes, including Lakeland, offer two further arguments for reversingthe Director's decision. First, Lakeland contends that it has a common law right in equity to set offthe underpayments against the overpayments it must pay the Department. But the equitable rightcannot defeat the legislature's explicit award of exclusive jurisdiction to the Court of Claims. SeeCity of Springfield v. Allphin, 82 Ill. 2d 571, 578, 413 N.E.2d 394 (1980). Moreover, the commonlaw right applies only where the debts are mutually certain and readily ascertainable. Bank ofChicago-Garfield Ridge v. Park National Bank, 237 Ill. App. 3d 1085, 1091, 606 N.E.2d 72(1992). The hearing officer's decision in Lakeland demonstrates in detail why the Department'salleged debts cannot be considered certain and readily ascertainable.

Lakeland further maintains that section 2-608(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure (the Code)(735 ILCS 5/2-608(a) (West 1994)) establishes its right to assert the counterclaim in Departmentproceedings. Although the Code generally does not apply to agency proceedings (Desai v.Metropolitan Sanitary District of Greater Chicago, 125 Ill. App. 3d 1031, 1033, 466 N.E.2d1045 (1984)), the Code may fill a procedural gap if the statutes regulating agency proceedings leavesome matters of procedure unregulated. Opyt's Amoco, Inc. v. Village of South Holland, 209Ill.App. 3d 473, 490-91, 568 N.E.2d 260 (1991). However, an expansion of the agency's jurisdictioncannot qualify as a procedural matter. Trupp v. First Englewood State Bank, 307Ill. App.258, 266, 30 N.E.2d 198 (1940); see Ellegood v. American StatesInsurance Co., 266 Ill. App. 3d 135, 139, 638 N.E.2d 1193 (1994). Accordingly, theCode cannot justify an expansion of the hearing officer's powers to adjudication of the counterclaimhere.

Several other nursing homes, including Oak Park and Edgewater, argue that the circuit courthad jurisdiction over the counterclaim because the nursing homes could have brought an action inmandamus seeking an order directing the Department to consider their claims for payment. Severalof the nursing homes, including Edgewater, expressly prayed for money judgments against theDepartment, and mandamus will not lie against a state agency for such relief. Senn Park NursingCenter v. Miller, 104 Ill. 2d 169, 188-89, 470 N.E.2d 1029 (1984). All of the nursing homes seekto enforce present claims for payment, and not to enjoin the Department's officers from taking futureactions in excess of authority. See Ellis v. Board of Governors of State Colleges & Universities, 102Ill. 2d 387, 394-95, 466 N.E.2d 202 (1984). Because the relief requested is not available inmandamus, the nursing homes' argument must fail.

Finally, Oak Park and several other nursing homes contend that the Department's auditsviolate federal regulations because the Department did not publish its own audit guidelines. Buteach nursing home understood the Department's audit procedures well enough to point out errors inthe precise accounts for which the Department sought reimbursement of overpayments, and thesuccessive audits reduced the amounts the Department claimed. For all such claims presented to thehearing officers, the nursing homes understood audit procedures well enough to agree that theDepartment's exhibits accurately reflected amounts the Department overpaid for specified public aidpatients for services at specified times. The nursing homes had the opportunity to present to thehearing officer evidence of the correct balances, under accounting principles in accord with federalregulations, for the specific patient accounts the Department put at issue. Instead, the nursing homesconceded that the Department presented correct figures for those accounts.

Under Nickerson, the nursing homes can sue only in the Court of Claims to recover sums theDepartment owes for services the nursing homes have rendered to public aid recipients. The agencyproceedings concerning overpayments do not alter this limitation on the jurisdiction of the hearingofficer, the Director, and the circuit court. Because the Director correctly determined that she lackedjurisdiction to consider the nursing homes' claims for underpayments, we reverse the trial court'sdecision and reinstate the decisions of the Director in all of the consolidated cases.

Reversed.

FROSSARD and COHEN, JJ., concur.