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SECOND DIVISION

August 7, 2001

Respondents appeal from an order of the circuit court of Cook County reversing thedecision of the Board of Review of the Illinois Department of Employment Security (the Board). The Board ruled that petitioner, Ernesto Acevedo, was ineligible for unemploymentcompensation benefits because he voluntarily left his employment without good causeattributable to his employer, Standard Window Cleaning Company (Standard). Respondentsclaim that the denial of benefits was supported by the manifest weight of the evidence and thatthe decision of the circuit court should be reversed. Petitioner has not filed a brief in response. We may consider the issue raised under the standards set forth in First Capitol Mortgage Corp. v.Talandis Construction Corp., 63 Ill. 2d 128, 133, 345 N.E.2d 493, 495 (1976). We reverse thetrial court and remand with directions.

The record shows that petitioner was employed by Standard as a window washer and waspaid at the hourly rate of $13.90. He worked for that company about six months and claimed thathe left when his supervisor, Richard Fiore, told him that he had no work for him and reduced hishours from 40 per week to 13 to 20 hours.

Petitioner filed a claim for benefits under the Illinois Unemployment Insurance Act (Act)(820 ILCS 405/100 et seq. (West 1998)). Standard, through its representative, questionedpetitioner's eligibility for benefits under section 601(A) of the Act (820 ILCS 405/601 (A) (West1998)), which relates to voluntary leaving without good cause attributable to the employing unit. The claims adjudicator found that petitioner left work because he was laid off, that his voluntaryleaving was with good cause and that he was eligible for benefits.

Standard appealed that determination, claiming that petitioner had refused an offer ofwork and did not report for work from August 3 through August 5, 1998. The referee heardtestimony on the matter in the course of a hearing conducted by telephone on November 17,1998. Standard's representative presented the testimony of Fiore by telephone. Petitioner did notappear.

Fiore testified that defendant last worked for him on July 29, 1998, and did not report orcall in from July 29 through July 31, 1998. Fiore explained that for a short period of time thecompany was changing computers and work tickets, that work was not being scheduled as itwanted, and that it was working slowly to ensure that all of its customers were served. Fiorestated that there was work for petitioner on the days he was absent and that he tried to contacthim at home. He also asked other employees about petitioner and was told that petitioner mightbe working for another company. Fiore asked these employees to aid in his retrieval of $1,000worth of company equipment from petitioner, but it was never returned. Fiore further testifiedthat he continued to put petitioner's name on the work schedule and reported him as a "no call"and "no show" for three consecutive days. Fiore kept petitioner's partner working without him.

The referee found that petitioner had voluntarily left his job on July 28, 1998, when hestopped reporting to work. The referee noted that Standard had no subsequent contact withpetitioner, despite efforts to locate him, and that there was work available for petitioner when heleft. The referee found the testimony of the employer to be credible and concluded that petitionerhad left his job voluntarily and without good cause attributable to the last employing unit. Thereferee further concluded that there was no evidence showing that the work was unsuitable orthat a permissible exception applied, and imposed the disqualification of benefits set out insection 601(A) of the Act.

Petitioner appealed that decision to the Board of Review. He argued that he did not quit,but was laid off because there was no work for him to do. After reviewing the entire record, theBoard found that the referee's decision was supported by evidence in the record and the law andaffirmed the denial of benefits.

Petitioner then filed a pro se complaint for administrative review of the Board's decision,and after a hearing, the circuit court issued a written order reversing the Board's decision. In itsorder, the court noted that petitioner's working hours had been reduced from 40 to 20 hours perweek and that it was understandable that he was unable to support himself and his family aftersuch a dramatic reduction. The court further noted that neither the referee nor the Board foundthat the reduction was temporary, and stated that an employee should not be expected to workindefinitely at drastically reduced hours for fear of jeopardizing his unemployment benefit rights. The court then held that since the employer had 40 hours of work for two full-time employees, itshould be required to maintain the hours of one worker and lay off the other so that he couldcollect unemployment benefits while undertaking a job search. The court also ruled that aninterpretation of the Act that would allow employers to avoid its effect by "drastically reducingwork hours in the hope that an employee will voluntarily leave and become ineligible for benefitsshould not be countenanced."

Respondents have appealed.

Under the Act, a person may receive unemployment benefits provided that he meets theeligibility requirements of section 500 and is not subject to the exemptions or disqualificationsset out in the statute. Caterpillar, Inc. v. Doherty, 299 Ill. App. 3d 338, 342, 701 N.E.2d 1163,1166 (1998). The burden of proving eligibility rests with the claimant. The Act is to be liberallyconstrued to favor the awarding of benefits to accomplish the primary purpose of alleviatingeconomic distress caused by involuntary unemployment. Chicago Transit Authority v. Doherty,291 Ill. App. 3d 909, 912-13, 684 N.E.2d 867, 870 (1997).

The Board of Review is the trier of fact in a case involving a claim for unemploymentbenefits, and its findings of fact are considered prima facie true and correct. Chicago TransitAuthority v. Didrickson, 276 Ill. App. 3d 773, 776, 659 N.E.2d 28, 31 (1995). The function ofthe reviewing court is limited to ascertaining whether the decision of the Board is against themanifest weight of the evidence. Hoffmann v. Lyon Metal Products, Inc., 217 Ill. App. 3d 490,497, 577 N.E.2d 514, 518-19 (1991). That an opposite conclusion may be reasonable isinsufficient. Jackson v. Department of Labor, 168 Ill. App. 3d 494, 499, 523 N.E.2d 5, 8 (1988).

Here, the Board found that the referee's decision was supported by the record and the lawand incorporated that decision in affirming the denial of benefits. The denial of benefits wasbased on section 601(A) of the Act, which provides in part that a claimant "shall be ineligible forbenefits for the week in which he has left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to theemploying unit." 820 ILCS 405/601 (A) (West 1998). "Good cause" for leaving has, in turn,been interpreted as that which justifies an employee to leave the ranks of the employed and jointhose of the unemployed. Grant v. Board of Review of the Illinois Department of EmploymentSecurity, 200 Ill. App. 3d 732, 734, 558 N.E.2d 438, 440 (1990). A substantial and unilateralchange in employment may render employment unsuitable so that good cause for voluntarytermination is established; but, generally, claimant's dissatisfaction with neither his hours nor hiswages constitutes good cause to leave for purposes of entitlement to unemploymentcompensation. Collier v. Department of Employment Security, 157 Ill. App. 3d 988, 992, 510N.E.2d 623, 626 (1987).

Petitioner claimed in his application for benefits that he had been laid off. He alsoexpressed dissatisfaction with the reduction in his working hours. At the administrative hearing, Standard denied petitioner's lay-off claim and explained that working hours had been cut for aperiod when the company was changing the way it scheduled work. Petitioner failed to appear atthe hearing and the referee found Standard's witness to be credible. The Board concluded, afterreview of the record and evidence that was presented at the hearing, that petitioner had left hisemployment without good cause attributable to the employer and so was subject to thedisqualification of benefits under section 601(A) of the Act.

The Board's decision finds support in the evidence that petitioner voluntarily left his jobwhen there was work available and failed to report for work on the specified days. In addition,we observe that no evidence was presented to show that the work was unsuitable or that one ofthe exceptions applied. There was also no evidence showing that petitioner's duties had changedwhen his hours were reduced to support a finding of a unilateral change in employmentconditions due to his employer, or that the hourly rate of pay had changed. Collier, 157 Ill. App.3d at 994-95, 157 N.E.2d at 627. Under these facts and circumstances, it is clear that petitionerfailed to establish good cause for his voluntary leaving to entitle him to the relief requested, andthe findings and decision of the Board to that effect cannot be deemed contrary to the manifestweight of the evidence. Collier, 157 Ill. App. 3d at 994-95, 157 N.E.2d at 627.

The circuit court, upon administrative review, held otherwise. The record does notcontain a transcript of the administrative review hearing before the trial court or an acceptablesubstitute (166 Ill. 2d R. 323). But we find the record adequate for review (see Skrypek v.Mazzochi, 227 Ill. App. 3d 1, 5, 590 N.E.2d 990, 993 (1992)), since a court on administrativereview is limited to a consideration of the evidence submitted in the administrative hearing andmay not hear additional evidence (735 ILCS 5/3-110 (West 1998)) or conduct a hearing de novo.Jackson, 168 Ill. App. 3d at 499-500, 523 N.E.2d at 9. We have the entire administrative recordbefore us.

The written order of the trial court shows that it construed the reduction in petitioner'shours as a constructive lay-off, which left petitioner unable to support himself or his family. Thecourt distinguished this case from Collier, largely on the difference in the percent of thereduction. The court also observed that neither the Board nor the referee had found that thereduction was temporary. Collier, however, did not turn on these factors. In reversing the circuitcourt, which had deemed the 25% reduction in hours a unilateral and substantial change inclaimant's employment, the court in Collier found that the conditions of employment remainedthe same, save for the reduction in hours, and that petitioner's domestic finances were notattributable to the employer. Collier, 157 Ill. App. 3d at 993-95, 157 N.E.2d at 626-28. Thesesame factors are present in this case and do not warrant a different result.

The trial court's determination that the reduction in hours constituted a constructive lay-off does not, on this record, comport with the statutory definition of an "unemployed individual,"i.e., one whose wages for work performed under the reduced hours are less than the weeklybenefit he would have received if he had not worked. 820 ILCS 405/239 (West 1998). Ifpetitioner's wages had fallen below that mark, he could have filed a claim for partial benefits. See Rodgers v. Department of Employment Security, 186 Ill. App. 3d 194, 199, 542 N.E.2d 168,171 (1989). Contrary to the court's conclusion, petitioner would not have jeopardized a claim forunemployment benefits by continuing to work at the reduced hours. Finally, the court'scomments on the policy considerations attendant to statutory eligibility for unemploymentbenefits and the manner in which Standard should have handled the distribution of 40 hours ofwork between its employees to ensure eligibility for one fell outside the narrow scope ofadministrative review and do not support reversal of the Board's decision. Jackson, 168 Ill App.3d at 500, 523 N.E.2d at 9.

In light of the above and our review of the administrative record, we cannot say thedecision of the Board was against the manifest weight of the evidence. The judgment of thecircuit court of Cook County is reversed and the case is remanded with directions to reinstate theorder of the Board of Review.

Reversed and remanded with directions.

GORDON and COUSINS, JJ., concur.