515 - Exercise of powers generally.

     § 515.  Exercise of powers generally.        (a)  General rule.--In discharging the duties of their     respective positions, the board of directors, committees of the     board and individual directors of a domestic corporation may, in     considering the best interests of the corporation, consider to     the extent they deem appropriate:            (1)  The effects of any action upon any or all groups        affected by such action, including shareholders, members,        employees, suppliers, customers and creditors of the        corporation, and upon communities in which offices or other        establishments of the corporation are located.            (2)  The short-term and long-term interests of the        corporation, including benefits that may accrue to the        corporation from its long-term plans and the possibility that        these interests may be best served by the continued        independence of the corporation.            (3)  The resources, intent and conduct (past, stated and        potential) of any person seeking to acquire control of the        corporation.            (4)  All other pertinent factors.        (b)  Consideration of interests and factors.--The board of     directors, committees of the board and individual directors     shall not be required, in considering the best interests of the     corporation or the effects of any action, to regard any     corporate interest or the interests of any particular group     affected by such action as a dominant or controlling interest or     factor. The consideration of interests and factors in the manner     described in this subsection and in subsection (a) shall not     constitute a violation of section 512 (relating to standard of     care and justifiable reliance).        (c)  Specific applications.--In exercising the powers vested     in the corporation, and in no way limiting the discretion of the     board of directors, committees of the board and individual     directors pursuant to subsections (a) and (b), the fiduciary     duty of directors shall not be deemed to require them to act as     the board of directors, a committee of the board or an     individual director solely because of the effect such action     might have on an acquisition or potential or proposed     acquisition of control of the corporation or the consideration     that might be offered or paid to shareholders or members in such     an acquisition.        (d)  Presumption.--Absent breach of fiduciary duty, lack of     good faith or self-dealing, any act as the board of directors, a     committee of the board or an individual director shall be     presumed to be in the best interests of the corporation. In     assessing whether the standard set forth in section 512 has been     satisfied, there shall not be any greater obligation to justify,     or higher burden of proof with respect to, any act as the board     of directors, any committee of the board or any individual     director relating to or affecting an acquisition or potential or     proposed acquisition of control of the corporation than is     applied to any other act as a board of directors, any committee     of the board or any individual director. Notwithstanding the     preceding provisions of this subsection, any act as the board of     directors, a committee of the board or an individual director     relating to or affecting an acquisition or potential or proposed     acquisition of control to which a majority of the disinterested     directors shall have assented shall be presumed to satisfy the     standard set forth in section 512, unless it is proven by clear     and convincing evidence that the disinterested directors did not     assent to such act in good faith after reasonable investigation.        (e)  Definition.--The term "disinterested director" as used     in subsection (d) and for no other purpose means:            (1)  A director of the corporation other than:                (i)  A director who has a direct or indirect            financial or other interest in the person acquiring or            seeking to acquire control of the corporation or who is            an affiliate or associate, as defined in section 2552            (relating to definitions), of, or was nominated or            designated as a director by, a person acquiring or            seeking to acquire control of the corporation.                (ii)  Depending on the specific facts surrounding the            director and the act under consideration, an officer or            employee or former officer or employee of the            corporation.            (2)  A person shall not be deemed to be other than a        disinterested director solely by reason of any or all of the        following:                (i)  The ownership by the director of shares of or a            membership in the corporation.                (ii)  The receipt as a holder of shares of or as a            member of any class or series of any distribution made to            all owners of shares of or members of that class or            series.                (iii)  The receipt by the director of director's fees            or other consideration as a director.                (iv)  Any interest the director may have in retaining            the status or position of director.                (v)  The former business or employment relationship            of the director with the corporation.                (vi)  Receiving or having the right to receive            retirement or deferred compensation from the corporation            due to service as a director, officer or employee.        (f)  Cross reference.--See section 511(b) (relating to     alternative provisions).        Cross References.  Section 515 is referred to in sections     511, 517, 1711 of this title.