30-2485 Limitations on presentation of claims.
30-2485. Limitationson presentation of claims.(a) All claims againsta decedent's estate which arose before the death of the decedent, includingclaims of the state and any subdivision thereof, whether due or to becomedue, absolute or contingent, liquidated or unliquidated, founded on contract,tort, or other legal basis, if not barred earlier by other statute of limitations,are barred against the estate, the personal representative, and the heirsand devisees of the decedent, unless presented as follows:(1) Within two months after the date of the first publicationof notice to creditors if notice is given in compliance with sections 25-520.01and 30-2483, except that claims barred by the nonclaim statute at the decedent'sdomicile before the first publication for claims in this state are also barredin this state. If any creditor has a claim against a decedent's estate whicharose before the death of the decedent and which was not presented withinthe time allowed by this subdivision, including any creditor who did not receivenotice, such creditor may apply to the court within sixty days after the expirationdate provided in this subdivision for additional time and the court, upongood cause shown, may allow further time not to exceed thirty days;(2) Within three years after the decedent's death if noticeto creditors has not been given in compliance with sections 25-520.01 and 30-2483.(b) All claims, other than for costs and expenses of administration as defined in section 30-2487, against a decedent's estate which arise at or after thedeath of the decedent, including claims of the state and any subdivision thereof,whether due or to become due, absolute or contingent, liquidated or unliquidated,founded on contract, tort, or other legal basis, are barred against the estate,the personal representative, and the heirs and devisees of the decedent, unlesspresented as follows:(1) A claim based on a contract with the personal representative,within four months after performance by the personal representative is due;(2) Any other claim, within four months after it arises.(c) Nothing in this section affects or prevents:(1) Any proceeding to enforce any mortgage, pledge, or otherlien upon property of the estate; or(2) To the limits of the insurance protection only, any proceedingto establish liability of the decedent or the personal representative forwhich he or she is protected by liability insurance. SourceLaws 1974, LB 354, § 163, UPC § 3-803; Laws 1991, LB 95, § 1; Laws 2009, LB35, § 20.Annotations1. Scope2. Miscellaneous1. ScopeA claim against a decedent's estate which is excepted from the time limitations of this section remains subject to the statute of limitations governing the underlying claim. Babbitt v. Hronik, 261 Neb. 513, 623 N.W.2d 700 (2001).Claims for reimbursement of medical expenses made pursuant to section 68-1036.02 arise at or after death and, therefore, are subject to the limitations period imposed by subsection (b)(2) of this section. In re Estate of Tvrz, 260 Neb. 991, 620 N.W.2d 757 (2001).Pursuant to subsection (c)(1) of this section, a judgment lien on the proceeds from a sale is not a claim subject to the provisions of the Nebraska Probate Code. A judgment lien is not a claim and is not subject to the provisions of the Nebraska Probate Code. McCook Nat. Bank v. Bennett, 248 Neb. 567, 537 N.W.2d 353 (1995).The purpose of the nonclaim statute is facilitation and expedition of proceedings for distribution of a decedent's estate, including an early appraisal of the respective rights of interested persons and prompt settlement of demands against the estate. In re Estate of Masopust, 232 Neb. 936, 443 N.W.2d 274 (1989).The requirements of this section are mandatory, and where a claim is not filed within the time provided in the statute, it is barred. In re Estate of Masopust, 232 Neb. 936, 443 N.W.2d 274 (1989).The defense of recoupment is not barred by this section. In re Estate of Massie, 218 Neb. 103, 353 N.W.2d 735 (1984).2. MiscellaneousSubsection (a)(1) of this section applies to all creditors who may ask the county court for an extension of time to file a claim, but subsection (a)(2) of this section applies only to creditors who do not receive notice. Therefore, both subsections (a)(1) and (2) of this section apply to creditors who do not receive notice. In re Estate of Emery, 258 Neb. 789, 606 N.W.2d 750 (2000).The creditor bears the burden of proving that it filed a claim within the required period. Katskee v. Nevada Bob's Golf of Neb., 238 Neb. 654, 472 N.W.2d 372 (1991).Good cause within the meaning of subsection (a)(1) of this section envisions a claimant proceeding diligently toward presenting a claim against the decedent's estate, but the presentation of the claim is prevented by fraud, accident, mistake, unavoidable misfortune, or excusable neglect. In re Estate of Feuerhelm, 215 Neb. 872, 341 N.W.2d 342 (1983).A claim by the Department of Health and Human Services Finance and Support for reimbursement of medical assistance benefits pursuant to section 68-1036.02 is one that necessarily falls within the provisions of subsection (b) of this section as arising "at or after" the death of the decedent who is a recipient of those benefits. In re Estate of Tvrz, 9 Neb. App. 98, 608 N.W.2d 226 (2000).Subsection (c) of this section does not provide for a direct action against an insurer, but, rather, an action against the estate of an alleged tort-feasor with the award being limited to the amount of available liability insurance. Robertson v. Motor Club Ins. Assn., 8 Neb. App. 758, 602 N.W.2d 27 (1999).Administration expenses, including attorney fees, are only excepted from the time-bar provisions for bringing claims. Administration expenses may be brought under the probate claims procedure. Kerrigan & Line v. Foote, 5 Neb. App. 397, 558 N.W.2d 837 (1997).Subsection (c)(2) of this section provides an exception to the general time-bar provisions of the probate code, and establishes a potential creditor's right to have an estate reopened for the limited purpose of service of process in a civil action to establish liability and liability insurance coverage, but this section does not authorize a suit against a former personal representative who has already been discharged for the purpose of establishing liability and insurance coverage. Mach v. Schmer, 4 Neb. App. 819, 550 N.W.2d 385 (1996).