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Article 103 - Rights Of Accused

      (725 ILCS 5/Art. 103 heading)ARTICLE 103. RIGHTS OF ACCUSED

(725 ILCS 5/103‑1) (from Ch. 38, par. 103‑1)     Sec. 103‑1. Rights on arrest. (a) After an arrest on a warrant the person making the arrest shall inform the person arrested that a warrant has been issued for his arrest and the nature of the offense specified in the warrant.     (b) After an arrest without a warrant the person making the arrest shall inform the person arrested of the nature of the offense on which the arrest is based.     (c) No person arrested for a traffic, regulatory or misdemeanor offense, except in cases involving weapons or a controlled substance, shall be strip searched unless there is reasonable belief that the individual is concealing a weapon or controlled substance.     (d) "Strip search" means having an arrested person remove or arrange some or all of his or her clothing so as to permit a visual inspection of the genitals, buttocks, anus, female breasts or undergarments of such person.     (e) All strip searches conducted under this Section shall be performed by persons of the same sex as the arrested person and on premises where the search cannot be observed by persons not physically conducting the search.     (f) Every peace officer or employee of a police department conducting a strip search shall:     (1) Obtain the written permission of the police commander or an agent thereof designated for the purposes of authorizing a strip search in accordance with this Section.     (2) Prepare a report of the strip search. The report shall include the written authorization required by paragraph (1) of this subsection (f), the name of the person subjected to the search, the names of the persons conducting the search, and the time, date and place of the search. A copy of the report shall be provided to the person subject to the search.     (g) No search of any body cavity other than the mouth shall be conducted without a duly executed search warrant; any warrant authorizing a body cavity search shall specify that the search must be performed under sanitary conditions and conducted either by or under the supervision of a physician licensed to practice medicine in all of its branches in this State.     (h) Any peace officer or employee who knowingly or intentionally fails to comply with any provision of this Section is guilty of official misconduct as provided in Section 103‑8; provided however, that nothing contained in this Section shall preclude prosecution of a peace officer or employee under another section of this Code.     (i) Nothing in this Section shall be construed as limiting any statutory or common law rights of any person for purposes of any civil action or injunctive relief.     (j) The provisions of subsections (c) through (h) of this Section shall not apply when the person is taken into custody by or remanded to the sheriff or correctional institution pursuant to a court order. (Source: P.A. 81‑1509.)

(725 ILCS 5/103‑2) (from Ch. 38, par. 103‑2)     Sec. 103‑2. Treatment while in custody.     (a) On being taken into custody every person shall have the right to remain silent.     (b) No unlawful means of any kind shall be used to obtain a statement, admission or confession from any person in custody.     (c) Persons in custody shall be treated humanely and provided with proper food, shelter and, if required, medical treatment. (Source: Laws 1963, p. 2836.)

    (725 ILCS 5/103‑2.1)
    Sec. 103‑2.1. When statements by accused may be used.
    (a) In this Section, "custodial interrogation" means any interrogation during which (i) a reasonable person in the subject's position would consider himself or herself to be in custody and (ii) during which a question is asked that is reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.
    In this Section, "place of detention" means a building or a police station that is a place of operation for a municipal police department or county sheriff department or other law enforcement agency, not a courthouse, that is owned or operated by a law enforcement agency at which persons are or may be held in detention in connection with criminal charges against those persons.
    In this Section, "electronic recording" includes motion picture, audiotape, or videotape, or digital recording.
    (b) An oral, written, or sign language statement of an accused made as a result of a custodial interrogation at a police station or other place of detention shall be presumed to be inadmissible as evidence against the accused in any criminal proceeding brought under Section 9‑1, 9‑1.2, 9‑2, 9‑2.1, 9‑3, 9‑3.2, or 9‑3.3 of the Criminal Code of 1961 or under clause (d)(1)(F) of Section 11‑501 of the Illinois Vehicle Code unless:
        (1) an electronic recording is made of the custodial

interrogation; and

(2) the recording is substantially accurate and not

intentionally altered.

(c) Every electronic recording required under this Section must be preserved until such time as the defendant's conviction for any offense relating to the statement is final and all direct and habeas corpus appeals are exhausted, or the prosecution of such offenses is barred by law.     (d) If the court finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant was subjected to a custodial interrogation in violation of this Section, then any statements made by the defendant during or following that non‑recorded custodial interrogation, even if otherwise in compliance with this Section, are presumed to be inadmissible in any criminal proceeding against the defendant except for the purposes of impeachment.     (e) Nothing in this Section precludes the admission (i) of a statement made by the accused in open court at his or her trial, before a grand jury, or at a preliminary hearing, (ii) of a statement made during a custodial interrogation that was not recorded as required by this Section, because electronic recording was not feasible, (iii) of a voluntary statement, whether or not the result of a custodial interrogation, that has a bearing on the credibility of the accused as a witness, (iv) of a spontaneous statement that is not made in response to a question, (v) of a statement made after questioning that is routinely asked during the processing of the arrest of the suspect, (vi) of a statement made during a custodial interrogation by a suspect who requests, prior to making the statement, to respond to the interrogator's questions only if an electronic recording is not made of the statement, provided that an electronic recording is made of the statement of agreeing to respond to the interrogator's question, only if a recording is not made of the statement, (vii) of a statement made during a custodial interrogation that is conducted out‑of‑state, (viii) of a statement given at a time when the interrogators are unaware that a death has in fact occurred, or (ix) of any other statement that may be admissible under law. The State shall bear the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that one of the exceptions described in this subsection (e) is applicable. Nothing in this Section precludes the admission of a statement, otherwise inadmissible under this Section, that is used only for impeachment and not as substantive evidence.     (f) The presumption of inadmissibility of a statement made by a suspect at a custodial interrogation at a police station or other place of detention may be overcome by a preponderance of the evidence that the statement was voluntarily given and is reliable, based on the totality of the circumstances.     (g) Any electronic recording of any statement made by an accused during a custodial interrogation that is compiled by any law enforcement agency as required by this Section for the purposes of fulfilling the requirements of this Section shall be confidential and exempt from public inspection and copying, as provided under Section 7 of the Freedom of Information Act, and the information shall not be transmitted to anyone except as needed to comply with this Section. (Source: P.A. 93‑206, eff. 7‑18‑05; 93‑517, eff. 8‑6‑05; 94‑117, eff. 7‑5‑05.)

(725 ILCS 5/103‑3) (from Ch. 38, par. 103‑3)     Sec. 103‑3. Right to communicate with attorney and family; transfers.     (a) Persons who are arrested shall have the right to communicate with an attorney of their choice and a member of their family by making a reasonable number of telephone calls or in any other reasonable manner. Such communication shall be permitted within a reasonable time after arrival at the first place of custody.     (b) In the event the accused is transferred to a new place of custody his right to communicate with an attorney and a member of his family is renewed. (Source: Laws 1963, p. 2836.)

(725 ILCS 5/103‑4) (from Ch. 38, par. 103‑4)     Sec. 103‑4. Right to consult with attorney.     Any person committed, imprisoned or restrained of his liberty for any cause whatever and whether or not such person is charged with an offense shall, except in cases of imminent danger of escape, be allowed to consult with any licensed attorney at law of this State whom such person may desire to see or consult, alone and in private at the place of custody, as many times and for such period each time as is reasonable. When any such person is about to be moved beyond the limits of this State under any pretense whatever the person to be moved shall be entitled to a reasonable delay for the purpose of obtaining counsel and of availing himself of the laws of this State for the security of personal liberty. (Source: Laws 1963, p. 2836.)

    (725 ILCS 5/103‑5)(from Ch. 38, par. 103‑5)
    Sec. 103‑5. Speedy trial.)
    (a) Every person in custody in this State for an alleged offense shall be tried by the court having jurisdiction within 120 days from the date he was taken into custody unless delay is occasioned by the defendant, by an examination for fitness ordered pursuant to Section 104‑13 of this Act, by a fitness hearing, by an adjudication of unfitness to stand trial, by a continuance allowed pursuant to Section 114‑4 of this Act after a court's determination of the defendant's physical incapacity for trial, or by an interlocutory appeal. Delay shall be considered to be agreed to by the defendant unless he or she objects to the delay by making a written demand for trial or an oral demand for trial on the record. The provisions of this subsection (a) do not apply to a person on bail or recognizance for an offense but who is in custody for a violation of his or her parole or mandatory supervised release for another offense.
    The 120‑day term must be one continuous period of incarceration. In computing the 120‑day term, separate periods of incarceration may not be combined. If a defendant is taken into custody a second (or subsequent) time for the same offense, the term will begin again at day zero.
    (b) Every person on bail or recognizance shall be tried by the court having jurisdiction within 160 days from the date defendant demands trial unless delay is occasioned by the defendant, by an examination for fitness ordered pursuant to Section 104‑13 of this Act, by a fitness hearing, by an adjudication of unfitness to stand trial, by a continuance allowed pursuant to Section 114‑4 of this Act after a court's determination of the defendant's physical incapacity for trial, or by an interlocutory appeal. The defendant's failure to appear for any court date set by the court operates to waive the defendant's demand for trial made under this subsection.
    For purposes of computing the 160 day period under this subsection (b), every person who was in custody for an alleged offense and demanded trial and is subsequently released on bail or recognizance and demands trial, shall be given credit for time spent in custody following the making of the demand while in custody. Any demand for trial made under this subsection (b) shall be in writing; and in the case of a defendant not in custody, the demand for trial shall include the date of any prior demand made under this provision while the defendant was in custody.
    (c) If the court determines that the State has exercised without success due diligence to obtain evidence material to the case and that there are reasonable grounds to believe that such evidence may be obtained at a later day the court may continue the cause on application of the State for not more than an additional 60 days. If the court determines that the State has exercised without success due diligence to obtain results of DNA testing that is material to the case and that there are reasonable grounds to believe that such results may be obtained at a later day, the court may continue the cause on application of the State for not more than an additional 120 days.
    (d) Every person not tried in accordance with subsections (a), (b) and (c) of this Section shall be discharged from custody or released from the obligations of his bail or recognizance.
    (e) If a person is simultaneously in custody upon more than one charge pending against him in the same county, or simultaneously demands trial upon more than one charge pending against him in the same county, he shall be tried, or adjudged guilty after waiver of trial, upon at least one such charge before expiration relative to any of such pending charges of the period prescribed by subsections (a) and (b) of this Section. Such person shall be tried upon all of the remaining charges thus pending within 160 days from the date on which judgment relative to the first charge thus prosecuted is rendered pursuant to the Unified Code of Corrections or, if such trial upon such first charge is terminated without judgment and there is no subsequent trial of, or adjudication of guilt after waiver of trial of, such first charge within a reasonable time, the person shall be tried upon all of the remaining charges thus pending within 160 days from the date on which such trial is terminated; if either such period of 160 days expires without the commencement of trial of, or adjudication of guilt after waiver of trial of, any of such remaining charges thus pending, such charge or charges shall be dismissed and barred for want of prosecution unless delay is occasioned by the defendant, by an examination for fitness ordered pursuant to Section 104‑13 of this Act, by a fitness hearing, by an adjudication of unfitness for trial, by a continuance allowed pursuant to Section 114‑4 of this Act after a court's determination of the defendant's physical incapacity for trial, or by an interlocutory appeal; provided, however, that if the court determines that the State has exercised without success due diligence to obtain evidence material to the case and that there are reasonable grounds to believe that such evidence may be obtained at a later day the court may continue the cause on application of the State for not more than an additional 60 days.
    (f) Delay occasioned by the defendant shall temporarily suspend for the time of the delay the period within which a person shall be tried as prescribed by subsections (a), (b), or (e) of this Section and on the day of expiration of the delay the said period shall continue at the point at which it was suspended. Where such delay occurs within 21 days of the end of the period within which a person shall be tried as prescribed by subsections (a), (b), or (e) of this Section, the court may continue the cause on application of the State for not more than an additional 21 days beyond the period prescribed by subsections (a), (b), or (e). This subsection (f) shall become effective on, and apply to persons charged with alleged offenses committed on or after, March 1, 1977.
(Source: P.A. 94‑1094, eff. 1‑26‑07.)

(725 ILCS 5/103‑6) (from Ch. 38, par. 103‑6)     Sec. 103‑6. Waiver of jury trial. Every person accused of an offense shall have the right to a trial by jury unless (i) understandingly waived by defendant in open court or (ii) the offense is an ordinance violation punishable by fine only and the defendant either fails to file a demand for a trial by jury at the time of entering his or her plea of not guilty or fails to pay to the clerk of the circuit court at the time of entering his or her plea of not guilty any jury fee required to be paid to the clerk. (Source: P.A. 86‑1386.)

(725 ILCS 5/103‑7) (from Ch. 38, par. 103‑7)     Sec. 103‑7. Posting notice of rights.     Every sheriff, chief of police or other person who is in charge of any jail, police station or other building where persons under arrest are held in custody pending investigation, bail or other criminal proceedings, shall post in every room, other than cells, of such buildings where persons are held in custody, in conspicuous places where it may be seen and read by persons in custody and others, a poster, printed in large type, containing a verbatim copy in the English language of the provisions of Sections 103‑2, 103‑3, 103‑4, 109‑1, 110‑2, 110‑4, and sub‑parts (a) and (b) of Sections 110‑7 and 113‑3 of this Code. Each person who is in charge of any courthouse or other building in which any trial of an offense is conducted shall post in each room primarily used for such trials and in each room in which defendants are confined or wait, pending trial, in conspicuous places where it may be seen and read by persons in custody and others, a poster, printed in large type, containing a verbatim copy in the English language of the provisions of Sections 103‑6, 113‑1, 113‑4 and 115‑1 and of subparts (a) and (b) of Section 113‑3 of this Code. (Source: Laws 1965, p. 2622.)

(725 ILCS 5/103‑8) (from Ch. 38, par. 103‑8)     Sec. 103‑8. Mandatory duty of officers.     Any peace officer who intentionally prevents the exercise by an accused of any right conferred by this Article or who intentionally fails to perform any act required of him by this Article shall be guilty of official misconduct and may be punished in accordance with Section 33‑3 of the "Criminal Code of 1961" approved July 28, 1961, as heretofore and hereafter amended. (Source: Laws 1963, p. 2836.)

(725 ILCS 5/103‑9) (from Ch. 38, par. 103‑9)     Sec. 103‑9. Bail bondsmen. No bail bondsman from any state may seize or transport unwillingly any person found in this State who is allegedly in violation of a bail bond posted in some other state. The return of any such person to another state may be accomplished only as provided by the laws of this State. Any bail bondsman who violates this Section is fully subject to the criminal and civil penalties provided by the laws of this State for his actions. (Source: P.A. 84‑694.)