Statutes > Illinois Statutes > CHAPTER 720 CRIMINAL OFFENSES > 720 ILCS 5/ Criminal Code of 1961. > Article 9 - Homicide

Article 9 - Homicide


      (720 ILCS 5/Art. 9 heading)
ARTICLE 9. HOMICIDE

    (720 ILCS 5/9‑1)(from Ch. 38, par. 9‑1)
    Sec. 9‑1. First degree Murder ‑ Death penalties ‑ Exceptions ‑ Separate Hearings ‑ Proof ‑ Findings ‑ Appellate procedures ‑ Reversals.
    (a) A person who kills an individual without lawful justification commits first degree murder if, in performing the acts which cause the death:
        (1) he either intends to kill or do great bodily harm
     to that individual or another, or knows that such acts will cause death to that individual or another; or
        (2) he knows that such acts create a strong
     probability of death or great bodily harm to that individual or another; or
        (3) he is attempting or committing a forcible felony
     other than second degree murder.
    (b) Aggravating Factors. A defendant who at the time of the commission of the offense has attained the age of 18 or more and who has been found guilty of first degree murder may be sentenced to death if:
        (1) the murdered individual was a peace officer or
     fireman killed in the course of performing his official duties, to prevent the performance of his official duties, or in retaliation for performing his official duties, and the defendant knew or should have known that the murdered individual was a peace officer or fireman; or
        (2) the murdered individual was an employee of an
     institution or facility of the Department of Corrections, or any similar local correctional agency, killed in the course of performing his official duties, to prevent the performance of his official duties, or in retaliation for performing his official duties, or the murdered individual was an inmate at such institution or facility and was killed on the grounds thereof, or the murdered individual was otherwise present in such institution or facility with the knowledge and approval of the chief administrative officer thereof; or
        (3) the defendant has been convicted of murdering two
     or more individuals under subsection (a) of this Section or under any law of the United States or of any state which is substantially similar to subsection (a) of this Section regardless of whether the deaths occurred as the result of the same act or of several related or unrelated acts so long as the deaths were the result of either an intent to kill more than one person or of separate acts which the defendant knew would cause death or create a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to the murdered individual or another; or
        (4) the murdered individual was killed as a result of
     the hijacking of an airplane, train, ship, bus or other public conveyance; or
        (5) the defendant committed the murder pursuant to a
     contract, agreement or understanding by which he was to receive money or anything of value in return for committing the murder or procured another to commit the murder for money or anything of value; or
        (6) the murdered individual was killed in the course
     of another felony if:
            (a) the murdered individual:
                (i) was actually killed by the defendant, or
                (ii) received physical injuries personally
             inflicted by the defendant substantially contemporaneously with physical injuries caused by one or more persons for whose conduct the defendant is legally accountable under Section 5‑2 of this Code, and the physical injuries inflicted by either the defendant or the other person or persons for whose conduct he is legally accountable caused the death of the murdered individual; and
            (b) in performing the acts which caused the death
         of the murdered individual or which resulted in physical injuries personally inflicted by the defendant on the murdered individual under the circumstances of subdivision (ii) of subparagraph (a) of paragraph (6) of subsection (b) of this Section, the defendant acted with the intent to kill the murdered individual or with the knowledge that his acts created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to the murdered individual or another; and
            (c) the other felony was an inherently violent
         crime or the attempt to commit an inherently violent crime. In this subparagraph (c), "inherently violent crime" includes, but is not limited to, armed robbery, robbery, predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, aggravated criminal sexual assault, aggravated kidnapping, aggravated vehicular hijacking, aggravated arson, aggravated stalking, residential burglary, and home invasion; or
        (7) the murdered individual was under 12 years of age
     and the death resulted from exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty; or
        (8) the defendant committed the murder with intent to
     prevent the murdered individual from testifying or participating in any criminal investigation or prosecution or giving material assistance to the State in any investigation or prosecution, either against the defendant or another; or the defendant committed the murder because the murdered individual was a witness in any prosecution or gave material assistance to the State in any investigation or prosecution, either against the defendant or another; for purposes of this paragraph (8), "participating in any criminal investigation or prosecution" is intended to include those appearing in the proceedings in any capacity such as trial judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, investigators, witnesses, or jurors; or
        (9) the defendant, while committing an offense
     punishable under Sections 401, 401.1, 401.2, 405, 405.2, 407 or 407.1 or subsection (b) of Section 404 of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act, or while engaged in a conspiracy or solicitation to commit such offense, intentionally killed an individual or counseled, commanded, induced, procured or caused the intentional killing of the murdered individual; or
        (10) the defendant was incarcerated in an institution
     or facility of the Department of Corrections at the time of the murder, and while committing an offense punishable as a felony under Illinois law, or while engaged in a conspiracy or solicitation to commit such offense, intentionally killed an individual or counseled, commanded, induced, procured or caused the intentional killing of the murdered individual; or
        (11) the murder was committed in a cold, calculated
     and premeditated manner pursuant to a preconceived plan, scheme or design to take a human life by unlawful means, and the conduct of the defendant created a reasonable expectation that the death of a human being would result therefrom; or
        (12) the murdered individual was an emergency medical
     technician ‑ ambulance, emergency medical technician ‑ intermediate, emergency medical technician ‑ paramedic, ambulance driver, or other medical assistance or first aid personnel, employed by a municipality or other governmental unit, killed in the course of performing his official duties, to prevent the performance of his official duties, or in retaliation for performing his official duties, and the defendant knew or should have known that the murdered individual was an emergency medical technician ‑ ambulance, emergency medical technician ‑ intermediate, emergency medical technician ‑ paramedic, ambulance driver, or other medical assistance or first aid personnel; or
        (13) the defendant was a principal administrator,
     organizer, or leader of a calculated criminal drug conspiracy consisting of a hierarchical position of authority superior to that of all other members of the conspiracy, and the defendant counseled, commanded, induced, procured, or caused the intentional killing of the murdered person; or
        (14) the murder was intentional and involved the
     infliction of torture. For the purpose of this Section torture means the infliction of or subjection to extreme physical pain, motivated by an intent to increase or prolong the pain, suffering or agony of the victim; or
        (15) the murder was committed as a result of the
     intentional discharge of a firearm by the defendant from a motor vehicle and the victim was not present within the motor vehicle; or
        (16) the murdered individual was 60 years of age or
     older and the death resulted from exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty; or
        (17) the murdered individual was a disabled person
     and the defendant knew or should have known that the murdered individual was disabled. For purposes of this paragraph (17), "disabled person" means a person who suffers from a permanent physical or mental impairment resulting from disease, an injury, a functional disorder, or a congenital condition that renders the person incapable of adequately providing for his or her own health or personal care; or
        (18) the murder was committed by reason of any
     person's activity as a community policing volunteer or to prevent any person from engaging in activity as a community policing volunteer; or
        (19) the murdered individual was subject to an order
     of protection and the murder was committed by a person against whom the same order of protection was issued under the Illinois Domestic Violence Act of 1986; or
        (20) the murdered individual was known by the
     defendant to be a teacher or other person employed in any school and the teacher or other employee is upon the grounds of a school or grounds adjacent to a school, or is in any part of a building used for school purposes; or
        (21) the murder was committed by the defendant in
     connection with or as a result of the offense of terrorism as defined in Section 29D‑14.9 of this Code.
     (c) Consideration of factors in Aggravation and Mitigation.
    The court shall consider, or shall instruct the jury to consider any aggravating and any mitigating factors which are relevant to the imposition of the death penalty. Aggravating factors may include but need not be limited to those factors set forth in subsection (b). Mitigating factors may include but need not be limited to the following:
        (1) the defendant has no significant history of prior
     criminal activity;
        (2) the murder was committed while the defendant was
     under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance, although not such as to constitute a defense to prosecution;
        (3) the murdered individual was a participant in the
     defendant's homicidal conduct or consented to the homicidal act;
        (4) the defendant acted under the compulsion of
     threat or menace of the imminent infliction of death or great bodily harm;
        (5) the defendant was not personally present during
     commission of the act or acts causing death;
        (6) the defendant's background includes a history of
     extreme emotional or physical abuse;
        (7) the defendant suffers from a reduced mental
     capacity.
    (d) Separate sentencing hearing.
    Where requested by the State, the court shall conduct a separate sentencing proceeding to determine the existence of factors set forth in subsection (b) and to consider any aggravating or mitigating factors as indicated in subsection (c). The proceeding shall be conducted:
        (1) before the jury that determined the defendant's
     guilt; or
        (2) before a jury impanelled for the purpose of the
     proceeding if:
            A. the defendant was convicted upon a plea of
         guilty; or
            B. the defendant was convicted after a trial
         before the court sitting without a jury; or
            C. the court for good cause shown discharges the
         jury that determined the defendant's guilt; or
        (3) before the court alone if the defendant waives a
     jury for the separate proceeding.
    (e) Evidence and Argument.
    During the proceeding any information relevant to any of the factors set forth in subsection (b) may be presented by either the State or the defendant under the rules governing the admission of evidence at criminal trials. Any information relevant to any additional aggravating factors or any mitigating factors indicated in subsection (c) may be presented by the State or defendant regardless of its admissibility under the rules governing the admission of evidence at criminal trials. The State and the defendant shall be given fair opportunity to rebut any information received at the hearing.
    (f) Proof.
    The burden of proof of establishing the existence of any of the factors set forth in subsection (b) is on the State and shall not be satisfied unless established beyond a reasonable doubt.
    (g) Procedure ‑ Jury.
    If at the separate sentencing proceeding the jury finds that none of the factors set forth in subsection (b) exists, the court shall sentence the defendant to a term of imprisonment under Chapter V of the Unified Code of Corrections. If there is a unanimous finding by the jury that one or more of the factors set forth in subsection (b) exist, the jury shall consider aggravating and mitigating factors as instructed by the court and shall determine whether the sentence of death shall be imposed. If the jury determines unanimously, after weighing the factors in aggravation and mitigation, that death is the appropriate sentence, the court shall sentence the defendant to death. If the court does not concur with the jury determination that death is the appropriate sentence, the court shall set forth reasons in writing including what facts or circumstances the court relied upon, along with any relevant documents, that compelled the court to non‑concur with the sentence. This document and any attachments shall be part of the record for appellate review. The court shall be bound by the jury's sentencing determination.
    If after weighing the factors in aggravation and mitigation, one or more jurors determines that death is not the appropriate sentence, the court shall sentence the defendant to a term of imprisonment under Chapter V of the Unified Code of Corrections.
    (h) Procedure ‑ No Jury.
    In a proceeding before the court alone, if the court finds that none of the factors found in subsection (b) exists, the court shall sentence the defendant to a term of imprisonment under Chapter V of the Unified Code of Corrections.
    If the Court determines that one or more of the factors set forth in subsection (b) exists, the Court shall consider any aggravating and mitigating factors as indicated in subsection (c). If the Court determines, after weighing the factors in aggravation and mitigation, that death is the appropriate sentence, the Court shall sentence the defendant to death.
    If the court finds that death is not the appropriate sentence, the court shall sentence the defendant to a term of imprisonment under Chapter V of the Unified Code of Corrections.
    (h‑5) Decertification as a capital case.
    In a case in which the defendant has been found guilty of first degree murder by a judge or jury, or a case on remand for resentencing, and the State seeks the death penalty as an appropriate sentence, on the court's own motion or the written motion of the defendant, the court may decertify the case as a death penalty case if the court finds that the only evidence supporting the defendant's conviction is the uncorroborated testimony of an informant witness, as defined in Section 115‑21 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963, concerning the confession or admission of the defendant or that the sole evidence against the defendant is a single eyewitness or single accomplice without any other corroborating evidence. If the court decertifies the case as a capital case under either of the grounds set forth above, the court shall issue a written finding. The State may pursue its right to appeal the decertification pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 604(a)(1). If the court does not decertify the case as a capital case, the matter shall proceed to the eligibility phase of the sentencing hearing.
    (i) Appellate Procedure.
    The conviction and sentence of death shall be subject to automatic review by the Supreme Court. Such review shall be in accordance with rules promulgated by the Supreme Court. The Illinois Supreme Court may overturn the death sentence, and order the imposition of imprisonment under Chapter V of the Unified Code of Corrections if the court finds that the death sentence is fundamentally unjust as applied to the particular case. If the Illinois Supreme Court finds that the death sentence is fundamentally unjust as applied to the particular case, independent of any procedural grounds for relief, the Illinois Supreme Court shall issue a written opinion explaining this finding.
    (j) Disposition of reversed death sentence.
    In the event that the death penalty in this Act is held to be unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of the United States or of the State of Illinois, any person convicted of first degree murder shall be sentenced by the court to a term of imprisonment under Chapter V of the Unified Code of Corrections.
    In the event that any death sentence pursuant to the sentencing provisions of this Section is declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of the United States or of the State of Illinois, the court having jurisdiction over a person previously sentenced to death shall cause the defendant to be brought before the court, and the court shall sentence the defendant to a term of imprisonment under Chapter V of the Unified Code of Corrections.
    (k) Guidelines for seeking the death penalty.
    The Attorney General and State's Attorneys Association shall consult on voluntary guidelines for procedures governing whether or not to seek the death penalty. The guidelines do not have the force of law and are only advisory in nature.
(Source: P.A. 96‑710, eff. 1‑1‑10.)

    (720 ILCS 5/9‑1.2)(from Ch. 38, par. 9‑1.2)
    Sec. 9‑1.2. Intentional Homicide of an Unborn Child.
    (a) A person commits the offense of intentional homicide of an unborn child if, in performing acts which cause the death of an unborn child, he without lawful justification:
        (1) either intended to cause the death of or do great
    bodily harm to the pregnant woman or her unborn child or knew that such acts would cause death or great bodily harm to the pregnant woman or her unborn child; or
        (2) knew that his acts created a strong probability
    of death or great bodily harm to the pregnant woman or her unborn child; and
        (3) knew that the woman was pregnant.
    (b) For purposes of this Section, (1) "unborn child" shall mean any individual of the human species from fertilization until birth, and (2) "person" shall not include the pregnant woman whose unborn child is killed.
    (c) This Section shall not apply to acts which cause the death of an unborn child if those acts were committed during any abortion, as defined in Section 2 of the Illinois Abortion Law of 1975, as amended, to which the pregnant woman has consented. This Section shall not apply to acts which were committed pursuant to usual and customary standards of medical practice during diagnostic testing or therapeutic treatment.
    (d) Penalty. The sentence for intentional homicide of an unborn child shall be the same as for first degree murder, except that:
        (1) the death penalty may not be imposed;
        (2) if the person committed the offense while armed
    with a firearm, 15 years shall be added to the term of imprisonment imposed by the court;
        (3) if, during the commission of the offense, the
    person personally discharged a firearm, 20 years shall be added to the term of imprisonment imposed by the court;
        (4) if, during the commission of the offense, the
    person personally discharged a firearm that proximately caused great bodily harm, permanent disability, permanent disfigurement, or death to another person, 25 years or up to a term of natural life shall be added to the term of imprisonment imposed by the court.
    (e) The provisions of this Act shall not be construed to prohibit the prosecution of any person under any other provision of law.
(Source: P.A. 96‑1000, eff. 7‑2‑10.)

    (720 ILCS 5/9‑2)(from Ch. 38, par. 9‑2)
    Sec. 9‑2. Second degree murder.
    (a) A person commits the offense of second degree murder when he or she commits the offense of first degree murder as defined in paragraph (1) or (2) of subsection (a) of Section 9‑1 of this Code and either of the following mitigating factors are present:
        (1) at the time of the killing he or she is acting
     under a sudden and intense passion resulting from serious provocation by the individual killed or another whom the offender endeavors to kill, but he or she negligently or accidentally causes the death of the individual killed; or
        (2) at the time of the killing he or she believes the
     circumstances to be such that, if they existed, would justify or exonerate the killing under the principles stated in Article 7 of this Code, but his or her belief is unreasonable.
    (b) Serious provocation is conduct sufficient to excite an intense passion in a reasonable person.
    (c) When evidence of either of the mitigating factors defined in subsection (a) of this Section has been presented, the burden of proof is on the defendant to prove either mitigating factor by a preponderance of the evidence before the defendant can be found guilty of second degree murder. The burden of proof, however, remains on the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt each of the elements of first degree murder and, when appropriately raised, the absence of circumstances at the time of the killing that would justify or exonerate the killing under the principles stated in Article 7 of this Code.
    (d) Sentence. Second degree murder is a Class 1 felony.
(Source: P.A. 96‑710, eff. 1‑1‑10.)

    (720 ILCS 5/9‑2.1) (from Ch. 38, par. 9‑2.1)
    Sec. 9‑2.1. Voluntary Manslaughter of an Unborn Child. (a) A person who kills an unborn child without lawful justification commits voluntary manslaughter of an unborn child if at the time of the killing he is acting under a sudden and intense passion resulting from serious provocation by another whom the offender endeavors to kill, but he negligently or accidentally causes the death of the unborn child.
    Serious provocation is conduct sufficient to excite an intense passion in a reasonable person.
    (b) A person who intentionally or knowingly kills an unborn child commits voluntary manslaughter of an unborn child if at the time of the killing he believes the circumstances to be such that, if they existed, would justify or exonerate the killing under the principles stated in Article 7 of this Code, but his belief is unreasonable.
    (c) Sentence. Voluntary Manslaughter of an unborn child is a Class 1 felony.
    (d) For purposes of this Section, (1) "unborn child" shall mean any individual of the human species from fertilization until birth, and (2) "person" shall not include the pregnant woman whose unborn child is killed.
    (e) This Section shall not apply to acts which cause the death of an unborn child if those acts were committed during any abortion, as defined in Section 2 of the Illinois Abortion Law of 1975, as amended, to which the pregnant woman has consented. This Section shall not apply to acts which were committed pursuant to usual and customary standards of medical practice during diagnostic testing or therapeutic treatment.
(Source: P.A. 84‑1414.)

    (720 ILCS 5/9‑3)(from Ch. 38, par. 9‑3)
    Sec. 9‑3. Involuntary Manslaughter and Reckless Homicide.
    (a) A person who unintentionally kills an individual without lawful justification commits involuntary manslaughter if his acts whether lawful or unlawful which cause the death are such as are likely to cause death or great bodily harm to some individual, and he performs them recklessly, except in cases in which the cause of the death consists of the driving of a motor vehicle or operating a snowmobile, all‑terrain vehicle, or watercraft, in which case the person commits reckless homicide. A person commits reckless homicide if he or she unintentionally kills an individual while driving a vehicle and using an incline in a roadway, such as a railroad crossing, bridge approach, or hill, to cause the vehicle to become airborne.
    (b) (Blank).
    (c) (Blank).
    (d) Sentence.
        (1) Involuntary manslaughter is a Class 3 felony.
        (2) Reckless homicide is a Class 3 felony.
    (e) (Blank).
    (e‑2) Except as provided in subsection (e‑3), in cases involving reckless homicide in which the offense is committed upon a public thoroughfare where children pass going to and from school when a school crossing guard is performing official duties, the penalty is a Class 2 felony, for which a person, if sentenced to a term of imprisonment, shall be sentenced to a term of not less than 3 years and not more than 14 years.
    (e‑3) In cases involving reckless homicide in which (i) the offense is committed upon a public thoroughfare where children pass going to and from school when a school crossing guard is performing official duties and (ii) the defendant causes the deaths of 2 or more persons as part of a single course of conduct, the penalty is a Class 2 felony, for which a person, if sentenced to a term of imprisonment, shall be sentenced to a term of not less than 6 years and not more than 28 years.
    (e‑5) (Blank).
    (e‑7) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (e‑8), in cases involving reckless homicide in which the defendant: (1) was driving in a construction or maintenance zone, as defined in Section 11‑605.1 of the Illinois Vehicle Code, or (2) was operating a vehicle while failing or refusing to comply with any lawful order or direction of any authorized police officer or traffic control aide engaged in traffic control, the penalty is a Class 2 felony, for which a person, if sentenced to a term of imprisonment, shall be sentenced to a term of not less than 3 years and not more than 14 years.
    (e‑8) In cases involving reckless homicide in which the defendant caused the deaths of 2 or more persons as part of a single course of conduct and: (1) was driving in a construction or maintenance zone, as defined in Section 11‑605.1 of the Illinois Vehicle Code, or (2) was operating a vehicle while failing or refusing to comply with any lawful order or direction of any authorized police officer or traffic control aide engaged in traffic control, the penalty is a Class 2 felony, for which a person, if sentenced to a term of imprisonment, shall be sentenced to a term of not less than 6 years and not more than 28 years.
    (e‑9) In cases involving reckless homicide in which the defendant drove a vehicle and used an incline in a roadway, such as a railroad crossing, bridge approach, or hill, to cause the vehicle to become airborne, and caused the deaths of 2 or more persons as part of a single course of conduct, the penalty is a Class 2 felony.
    (e‑10) In cases involving involuntary manslaughter or reckless homicide resulting in the death of a peace officer killed in the performance of his or her duties as a peace officer, the penalty is a Class 2 felony.
    (e‑11) In cases involving reckless homicide i