(a) A person who is charged with murder in the first degree, murder in the second degree, or assault with intent to kill while armed shall be treated in accordance with the provisions of section 23-1321 unless the judicial officer has reason to believe that no one or more conditions of release will reasonably assure that the person will not flee or pose a danger to any other person or to the community. If such a risk of flight or danger is believed to exist, the person may be ordered detained. In any pretrial detention hearing under the provisions of this section, if the judicial officer finds that there is a substantial probability that the person has committed any of the foregoing offenses while armed with or having readily available a pistol, firearm, or imitation firearm, there shall be a rebuttable presumption that no condition or combination of conditions of release will reasonably assure the safety of any other person or the community.
(b) A person who has been convicted of an offense and is awaiting sentence shall be detained unless the judicial officer finds by clear and convincing evidence that he is not likely to flee or pose a danger to any other person or to the property of others. Upon such finding, the judicial officer shall treat the person in accordance with the provisions of section 23-1321.
(c) A person who has been convicted of an offense and sentenced to a term of confinement or imprisonment and has filed an appeal or a petition for a writ of certiorari shall be detained unless the judicial officer finds by clear and convincing evidence that (1) the person is not likely to flee or pose a danger to any other person or to the property of others, and (2) the appeal or petition for a writ of certiorari raises a substantial question of law or fact likely to result in a reversal or an order for new trial. Upon such findings, the judicial officer shall treat the person in accordance with the provisions of section 23-1321.
(d) The provisions of section 23-1324 shall apply to persons detained in accordance with this section, except that the finding of the judicial officer that the appeal or petition for writ of certiorari does not raise by clear and convincing evidence a substantial question of law or fact likely to result in a reversal or order for new trial shall receive de novo consideration in the court in which review is sought.
CREDIT(S)
(July 29, 1970, 84 Stat. 647, Pub. L. 91-358, title II, § 210(a); Sept. 17, 1982, D.C. Law 4-152, §§ 4, 5, 29 DCR 3479; July 28, 1989, D.C. Law 8-19, § 2(b), 36 DCR 2844; May 8, 1990, D.C. Law 8-120, § 2(b), 37 DCR 24; July 3, 1992, D.C. Law 9-125, § 6, 39 DCR 2134; June 12, 2001, D.C. Law 13-310, § 2(c), 48 DCR 1648.)
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES
Prior Codifications
1981 Ed., § 23-1325.
1973 Ed., § 23-1325.
Effect of Amendments
D.C. Law 13-310, in the section heading, inserted “, second degree murder,”; and, in subsec. (a), substituted “murder in the first degree, murder in the second degree” in the first sentence, and substituted “substantial probability that the person has committed any of the foregoing offenses” for “substantial probability that the person has committed murder in the first degree”.
Legislative History of Laws
For legislative history of D.C. Law 4-152, see Historical and Statutory Notes following § 23-1321.
For legislative history of D.C. Law 8-19, see Historical and Statutory Notes following § 23-1322.
For legislative history of D.C. Law 8-120, see Historical and Statutory Notes following § 23-1322.
For legislative history of D.C. Law 9-125, see Historical and Statutory Notes following § 23-1321.
For Law 13-310, see notes following § 13-1321.