Sec. 53a-111. Arson in the first degree: Class A felony.
Sec. 53a-111. Arson in the first degree: Class A felony. (a) A person is guilty of
arson in the first degree when, with intent to destroy or damage a building, as defined
in section 53a-100, he starts a fire or causes an explosion, and (1) the building is inhabited
or occupied or the person has reason to believe the building may be inhabited or occupied; or (2) any other person is injured, either directly or indirectly; or (3) such fire or
explosion was caused for the purpose of collecting insurance proceeds for the resultant
loss; or (4) at the scene of such fire or explosion a peace officer or firefighter is subjected
to a substantial risk of bodily injury.
(b) Arson in the first degree is a class A felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 113; P.A. 79-570, S. 3; P.A. 80-229, S. 1; P.A. 82-290, S. 1.)
History: P.A. 79-570 restated Subsec. (a) in greater detail, replacing general language re actor's awareness that person
is in or near building or his lack of knowledge or indifference as to whether another is in or near building; P.A. 80-229
clarified Subsec. (a), adding reference to "building" definition of Sec. 53a-100 and replacing reference to peace officer's
or firefighter's closeness to building with reference to their being at the scene of a fire or explosion; P.A. 82-290 amended
Subsec. (a) to include fire or explosion caused for the purpose of collecting insurance proceeds.
See also annotations to part V.
Cited. 172 C. 298. Cited. 174 C. 135. Cited. 178 C. 67. Cited. 194 C. 279. Cited. 197 C. 158. Cited. 198 C. 92. Cited.
200 C. 685. Cited. 204 C. 4; Id., 769. Cited. 210 C. 519. Cited. 216 C. 678. Cited. 219 C. 605. Cited. 220 C. 796. Cited.
222 C. 469. Cited. 227 C. 829. Cited. 235 C. 679. Cited. 236 C. 31. Cited. 237 C. 694. Cited. 238 C. 828.
Cited. 8 CA 581. Cited. 12 CA 32. Cited. 35 CA 527; Id., 714. Cited. 36 CA 454. Cited. 40 CA 789. Cited. 46 CA 350.
Provisions applicable to firefighters on truck injured in accident en route to fire. Injuries not required to be substantial or
foreseeable. 59 CA 507.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 183 C. 1. Subdiv. (1) cited. 187 C. 109. Subdiv. (2) cited. Id. Cited. Id., 513. Subdiv. (1) cited. 191 C. 412. Cited.
Id., 636. Subdiv. (2) cited. 199 C. 1. Cited. 200 C. 30. Trial court's failure to consider a suspended sentence violated equal
protection because it resulted in a harsher penalty for a defendant who acted with less culpable intent and caused a less
serious result than arson murder. Id., 268. Cited. 202 C. 93. Subdiv. (1) cited. 204 C. 377; 205 C. 201. Cited. 207 C. 118.
Subdiv. (1) cited. 213 C. 161; 214 C. 161; Id., 752; 215 C. 1. Subdiv. (2) cited. 216 C. 585; 218 C. 747. Subdiv. (1) cited.
221 C. 713. Subdiv. (3) cited. 227 C. 1. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id. Subdiv. (3) cited. 229 C. 10. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id.; 240 C.
708. Subdiv. (3) cited. 241 C. 57. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id. Motive not an ultimate issue or element of Sec. 53a-111(a)(4),
therefore state is not collaterally estopped from admitting evidence of insurance despite earlier acquittal of Sec. 53a-111(a)(3). Evidence supported finding that firefighters were exposed to risk of substantial injury. 243 C. 282.
Cited. 10 CA 147. Subdiv. (2) cited. 12 CA 343. Cited. 28 CA 9. Subdivs. (3) and (4) cited. 30 CA 164; judgment
reversed, see 229 C. 10. Subdiv. (1) cited. 34 CA 823; 36 CA 753. Subdiv. (3) cited. 37 CA 360. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id.
Subdiv. (3) cited. 39 CA 800. Subdiv. (4) cited. Id. Defendant was not deprived of right to fair trial for violation of section
because evidence was sufficient to establish that she possessed requisite intent. Although the prosecutor improperly asked
defendant to comment on other witnesses' veracity, the questioning occurred just once and was not prejudicial; prosecutor's
closing statements, even if found improper, were isolated and not prejudicial. 75 CA 163. Jury instructions were proper. Id.