Sec. 51-183b. (Formerly Sec. 51-29). Judgments in civil actions. Time limit.
Sec. 51-183b. (Formerly Sec. 51-29). Judgments in civil actions. Time limit.
Any judge of the Superior Court and any judge trial referee who has the power to render
judgment, who has commenced the trial of any civil cause, shall have power to continue
such trial and shall render judgment not later than one hundred and twenty days from
the completion date of the trial of such civil cause. The parties may waive the provisions
of this section.
(1949 Rev., S. 7706; 1959, P.A. 28, S. 80; 1963, P.A. 209; P.A. 74-183, S. 22, 291; P.A. 76-436, S. 55, 681; P.A. 77-576, S. 26, 65; P.A. 81-52; P.A. 83-295, S. 6; P.A. 96-37, S. 7.)
History: 1959 act applied provisions to judges of newly created circuit court; 1963 act removed circuit court judges
from purview of previously existing provisions and added provision specifically applicable to circuit court judges; P.A.
74-183 deleted provision requiring that judgment be rendered within 90 days of the conclusion of a civil trial in the circuit
court, reflecting transfer of circuit court functions to court of common pleas, effective December 31, 1974; P.A. 76-436
removed common pleas court judges from purview of section, reflecting transfer of common pleas court functions to
superior court, effective July 1, 1978; P.A. 77-576 replaced provision which had allowed continuance of trial and rendering
of judgment after expiration of term or session at which trial commenced but required end of trial and judgment before
the close of the next term or session with requirement that judgment be rendered not later than 8 months from trial's
commencement and added provision allowing parties to waive provisions of section, effective July 1, 1978; Sec. 51-29
transferred to Sec. 51-183b in the 1977 Court Reorganization Supplement; P.A. 81-52 changed the requirement that judgment be rendered not later than 8 months from the commencement of the trial to not later than 120 days from the completion
of the trial; P.A. 83-295 applied provisions to any state trial referee who has the power to render judgment; P.A. 96-37
changed "state trial referee" to "judge trial referee".
Annotations to former section 51-29:
A court has control over its judgments only during the term in which they are rendered. 47 C. 429; 108 C. 282. A judge
has power to retain a case for consideration and decision after the close of the term. 47 C. 579. Amending memo of judgment
at subsequent term. 74 C. 23. Violation may be waived. 76 C. 305; 86 C. 560. Violation of this section makes judgment
erroneous, not void. 97 C. 556. This statute expressly authorizes a judge to finish a trial and render judgment therein at
any time prior to the close of the next succeeding term or session. 107 C. 383. Judgment must be rendered and trial ended
before close of next term or session. 109 C. 54; But see 123 C. 15. In construing this statute as to superior court, the word
"term" is the equivalent of the word "session". 109 C. 54. If no timely and appropriate advantage of delay is taken, consent
of parties will be assumed. 112 C. 154. Cited. 115 C. 623. Judgment erroneous if not rendered during next session after
that at which trial commenced, where no act or omission of the parties constitutes consent, waiver or estoppel. 117 C. 639,
645. When too late for court to render judgment, case may be claimed for trial as though no hearing had been held. 118
C. 418. Cited. 123 C. 583. Lack of jurisdiction after time expires does not pertain to subject matter but to the parties;
subsequent filing of pleadings and participation in hearings held waiver. 132 C. 438. Cited. 134 C. 183. A judge must
decide a case before the end of the session of court next succeeding the session at which it is tried, and a judgment rendered
after that time is erroneous. 139 C. 263. On date of rendering, judgment was valid as in compliance with statute in effect
while action was pending. 157 C. 434. Cited. Id., 525. Cited. 162 C. 534. Not applicable to state trial referees. Prior
constructions restated. History. 164 C. 360. Statute applies only to cases tried to the court and not to cases tried to a jury.
Id., 554. Judge not continuing a trial to its end before close of next session of circuit court, lost jurisdiction. Case properly
determined by another judge sitting fifteen months later. 168 C. 74. Cited. Id., 560.
Cited. 13 CS 121. Section not applicable to proceedings before state trial referee. 33 CS 560.
Order vacating judgment rendered by circuit court seventeen months after completion of trial and ordering new trial
was interlocutory and not a final judgment from which appeal lies. 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 474, 475.
Annotations to present section:
Civil cause should be construed to encompass administrative appeals. 179 C. 415. Cited. 192 C. 484. Determination
of "the completion date" discussed; availability of all elements directly or indirectly to be considered in rendering a decision
included. Id., 601. Cited. 194 C. 187. Cited. 195 C. 174. Cited. 208 C. 21. Cited. 213 C. 813. Cited. 214 C. 801. Cited. 215
C. 435. Initial refusal to consent to late judgment rendered judgment void; judgment of appellate court in Waterman v.
United Caribbean, Inc., 20 CA 283, reversed. 215 C. 688. Cited. 220 C. 86. Cited. 233 C. 153. Cited. 234 C. 1. Cited. 237
C. 378. As long as order of trial court is issued within one hundred twenty days after completion of trial, order constitutes
timely judgment within meaning of statute regardless of whether order is accompanied by memorandum of decision
explaining legal and factual basis for order. 243 C. 495. Order of trial court constituted a "judgment" within meaning of
this section where order resolved the dispute and determined appeal in favor of plaintiff. 246 C. 251.
Cited. 2 CA 689. Cited. 3 CA 531. Cited. 7 CA 136. Cited. 12 CA 702. Cited. 20 CA 283; judgment reversed; Id., 425.
Cited. 21 CA 545. Cited. 26 CA 426. Cited. 28 CA 745. Does not violate separation of powers provision of Article second
of the Connecticut Constitution (now Article XVIII of the Amendments to the Connecticut Constitution) 29 CA 157. Cited.
30 CA 204. Absent waiver of provisions of statute, a judgment rendered by a court beyond the time period permitted lacks
personal jurisdiction over defendants. 39 CA 635. Cited. 40 CA 89; Id., 374. Cited. 44 CA 542. Cited. 45 CA 626. Court's
order that parties submit their positions on release of judgment lien constituted request for briefs which, when filed, began
120-day period. 72 CA 692. Court, by ordering defendant attorney and Statewide Grievance Committee to appear at a
subsequent hearing on the issue of sanctions against defendant, implicitly opened the case, which was within its province
within the one hundred twenty days after trial's completion. 74 CA 464. Statutory time period runs from completion date
of trial, not from time of filing of briefs on motion for judgment of dismissal. 82 CA 483. General Assembly did not intend
to include within definition of "trial", for purposes of the 120-day rule, arguments on motions addressed to whether plaintiff
is precluded from an evidentiary hearing or trial because of prior trial on the same or similar issues between the same
parties. 88 CA 795. Section does not apply to timeliness of judgment rendered following short calendar proceeding. 95
CA 713. Where court sent notice extending commencement of period to issue decision, express consent by parties not
required for extension. 99 CA 367.
Cited. 44 CS 312.