154.60—Evaluating continued security eligibility.
(a) General.
A personnel security determination is an effort to assess the future trustworthiness of an individual in terms of the likelihood of the individual preserving the national security. Obviously it is not possible at a given point to establish with certainty that any human being will remain trustworthy. Accordingly the issuance of a personnel security clearance or the determination that a person is suitable for assignment to sensitive duties cannot be considered as a final personnel security action. Rather, there is the clear need to assure that, after the personnel security determination is reached, the individual's trustworthiness is a matter of continuing assessment. The responsibility for such assessment must be shared by the organizational commander or manager, the individual's supervisor and, to a large degree, the individual himself. Therefore, the heads of DoD Components shall establish and maintain a program designed to evaluate on a continuing basis the status of personnel under their jurisdiction with respect to security eligibility. This program should insure close coordination between security authorities and personnel, medical, legal and supervisory personnel to assure that all pertinent information available within a command is considered in the personnel security process.
(b) Management responsibility.
(1)
Commanders and heads of organizations shall insure that personnel assigned to sensitive duties (or other duties requiring a trustworthiness determination under the provisions of this part) are initially indoctrinated and periodically instructed thereafter on the national security implication of their duties and on their individual responsibilities.
(2)
The heads of all DoD components are encouraged to develop programs designed to counsel and assist employees in sensitive positions who are experiencing problems in their personal lives with respect to such areas as financial, medical or emotional difficulties. Such initiatives should be designed to identify potential problem areas at an early stage so that any assistance rendered by the employing activity will have a reasonable chance of precluding long term, job-related security problems.
(c) Supervisory responsibility.
Security programs shall be established to insure that supervisory personnel are familiarized with their special responsibilities in matters pertaining to personnel security with respect to personnel under their supervision. Such programs shall provide practical guidance as to indicators that may signal matters of personnel security concern. Specific instructions should be disseminated concerning reporting procedures to enable the appropriate authority to take timely corrective action to protect the interests of national security as well as to provide any necessary help to the individual concerned to correct any personal problem which may have a bearing upon the individual's continued eligibility for access.
(1)
In conjunction with the submission of PRs stated in § 154.19, and paragraph 5, appendix A, supervisors will be required to review an individual's DD Form 398 to ensure that no significant adverse information of which they are aware and that may have a bearing on subject's continued eligibility for access to classified information is omitted.
(2)
If the supervisor is not aware of any significant adverse information that may have a bearing on the subject's continued eligibility for access, then the following statement must be documented, signed and dated, and forwarded to DIS with the investigative package.
I am aware of no information of the type contained at Appendix D, 32 CFR part 154, relating to subject's trustworthiness, reliability, or loyalty that may reflect adversely on his/her ability to safeguard classified information.
(3)
If the supervisor is aware of such significant adverse information, the following statement shall be documented, signed and dated and forwarded to DIS with the investigative package, and a written summary of the derogatory information forwarded to DIS with the investigative package:
I am aware of information of the type contained in Appendix D, 32 CFR part 154, relating to subject's trustworthiness, reliability, or loyalty that may reflect adversely on his/her ability to safeguard classified information and have reported all relevant details to the appropriate security official(s).
(4)
In conjunction with regularly scheduled fitness and performance reports of military and civilian personnel whose duties entail access to classified information, supervisors will include a comment in accordance with paragraphs (c) (2) and (3) of this section as well as a comment regarding an employee's discharge of security responsibilities, pursuant to their Component guidance.
(d) Individual responsibility.
(1)
Individuals must familiarize themselves with pertinent security regulations that pertain to their assigned duties. Further, individuals must be aware of the standards of conduct required of persons holding positions of trust. In this connection, individuals must recognize and avoid the kind of personal behavior that would result in rendering one ineligible for continued assignment in a position of trust. In the final analysis, the ultimate responsibility for maintaining continued eligibility for a position of trust rests with the individual.
(2)
Moreover, individuals having access to classified information must report promptly to their security office:
(i)
Any form of contact, intentional or otherwise, with individuals of any nationality, whether within or outside the scope of the employee's official activities, in which:
(e) Co-worker responsibility.
Co-workers have an equal obligation to advise their supervisor or appropriate security official when they become aware of information with potentially serious security significance regarding someone with access to classified information or employed in a sensitive position.