CFR > Title 31 - Money and Finance: Treasury > SUBTITLE A—Office of the Secretary of the Treasury > PART 1—DISCLOSURE OF RECORDS > SUBPART C—Privacy Act (§1.20 to §1.36) > 1.36—Systems exempt in whole or in part from provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a and this part.

1.36—Systems exempt in whole or in part from provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a and this part.

(a) In General. In accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552a(j) and (k) and § 1.23(c), the Department of the Treasury hereby exempts the systems of records identified below from the following provisions of the Privacy Act for the reasons indicated.
(b) Authority. These rules are promulgated pursuant to the authority vested in the Secretary of the Treasury by 5 U.S.C. 552a (j) and (k) and pursuant to the authority of § 123(c).
(c) General exemptions under (1) Under 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2), the head of any agency may promulgate rules to exempt any system of records within the agency from certain provisions of the Privacy Act of 1974 if the agency or component thereof that maintains the system performs as its principal function any activities pertaining to the enforcement of criminal laws. Certain components of the Department of the Treasury have as their principal function activities pertaining to the enforcement of criminal laws and protective service activities which are necessary to assure the safety of individuals protected by the Department pursuant to the provisions of 18 U.S.C. 3056. This paragraph applies to the following systems of records maintained by the Department of the Treasury:
(i) Departmental Offices:
Number System name
DO .190 Investigation Data Management System.
DO .221 SIGTARP Correspondence Database.
DO .222 SIGTARP Investigative MIS Database.
DO .223 SIGTARP Investigative Files Database.
DO .224 SIGTARP Audit Files Database.
DO .303 TIGTA General Correspondence.
DO .307 TIGTA Employee Relations Matters, Appeals, Grievances, and Complaint Files.
DO .308 TIGTA Data Extracts.
DO .309 TIGTA Chief Counsel Case Files.
DO .310 TIGTA Chief Counsel Disclosure Section Records.
DO .311 TIGTA Office of Investigations Files.
(ii) Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau.
(iii) Comptroller of the Currency:
Number System name
CC .110 Reports of Suspicious Activities
CC .120 Bank Fraud Information System
CC .500 Chief Counsel's Management Information System.
CC .510 Litigation Information System
(iv) U.S. Customs Service:
Number System name
CS .053 Confidential Source Identification File.
CS .127 Internal Affairs Records System.
CS .129 Investigations Record System.
CS .171 Pacific Basin Reporting Network.
CS .213 Seized Assets and Case Tracking System (SEACATS).
CS .244 Treasury Enforcement Communications System (TECS).
CS .270 Background-Record File of Non-Customs Employees.
CS .285 Automated Index to Central Enforcement Files.
(v) Bureau of Engraving and Printing.
(vi) Federal Law Enforcement Training Center.
(vii) Financial Management Service.
(viii) Internal Revenue Service:
Number System name
IRS 46.002 Case Management and Time Reporting System, Criminal Investigation Division.
IRS 46.003 Confidential Informants, Criminal Investigation Division.
IRS 46.005 Electronic Surveillance Files, Criminal Investigation Division.
IRS 46.009 Centralized Evaluation and Processing of Information Items (CEPIIs), Criminal Investigation Division.
IRS 46.015 Relocated Witnesses, Criminal Investigation Division.
IRS 46.016 Secret Service Details, Criminal Investigation Division.
IRS 46.022 Treasury Enforcement Communications System (TECS).
IRS 46.050 Automated Information Analysis System.
IRS 90.001 Chief Counsel Criminal Tax Case Files.
(ix) U.S. Mint
(x) Bureau of the Public Debt
(xi) U.S. Secret Service:
Number System name
USSS .003 Criminal Investigation Information System.
USSS .006 Non-Criminal Investigation Information System.
USSS .007 Protection Information System.
(xii) Office of Thrift Supervision:
Number System name
OTS .001 Confidential Individual Information System.
OTS .004 Criminal Referral Database
(xiii) Financial Crimes Enforcement Network:
Number Name of System
FinCEN .001 FinCEN DataBase.
FinCEN .002 Suspicious Activity Reporting System.
FinCEN .003 Bank Secrecy Act Reports System.
(2) (H) artment hereby exempts the systems of records listed in paragraphs (c)(1)(i) through (xiii) of this section from the following provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2): 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3) and (4), 5 U.S.C. 552a(d)(1), (2), (3), (4), 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(1), (2) and (3), 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(4)(G) , (H), and (I), 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(5) and (8), 5 U.S.C. 552a(f), and 5 U.S.C. 552a(g).
(d) Reasons for exemptions under (1) 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(4)(G) and (f)(l) enable individuals to inquire whether a system of records contains records pertaining to them. Application of these provisions to the systems of records would give individuals an opportunity to learn whether they have been identified as suspects or subjects of investigation. As further described in the following paragraph, access to such knowledge would impair the Department's ability to carry out its mission, since individuals could:
(i) Take steps to avoid detection;
(ii) Inform associates that an investigation is in progress;
(iii) Learn the nature of the investigation;
(iv) Learn whether they are only suspects or identified as law violators;
(v) Begin, continue, or resume illegal conduct upon learning that they are not identified in the system of records; or
(vi) Destroy evidence needed to prove the violation.
(2) 5 U.S.C. 552a(d)(1), (e)(4)(H) and (f)(2), (3) and (5) grant individuals access to records pertaining to them. The application of these provisions to the systems of records would compromise the Department's ability to provide useful tactical and strategic information to law enforcement agencies.
(i) Permitting access to records contained in the systems of records would provide individuals with information concerning the nature of any current investigations and would enable them to avoid detection or apprehension by:
(A) Discovering the facts that would form the basis for their arrest;
(B) Enabling them to destroy or alter evidence of criminal conduct that would form the basis for their arrest; and
(C) Using knowledge that criminal investigators had reason to believe that a crime was about to be committed, to delay the commission of the crime or commit it at a location that might not be under surveillance.
(ii) Permitting access to either on-going or closed investigative files would also reveal investigative techniques and procedures, the knowledge of which could enable individuals planning crimes to structure their operations so as to avoid detection or apprehension.
(iii) Permitting access to investigative files and records could, moreover, disclose the identity of confidential sources and informers and the nature of the information supplied and thereby endanger the physical safety of those sources by exposing them to possible reprisals for having provided the information. Confidential sources and informers might refuse to provide criminal investigators with valuable information unless they believed that their identities would not be revealed through disclosure of their names or the nature of the information they supplied. Loss of access to such sources would seriously impair the Department's ability to carry out its mandate.
(iv) Furthermore, providing access to records contained in the systems of records could reveal the identities of undercover law enforcement officers who compiled information regarding the individual's criminal activities and thereby endanger the physical safety of those undercover officers or their families by exposing them to possible reprisals.
(v) By compromising the law enforcement value of the systems of records for the reasons outlined in paragraphs (d)(2)(i) through (iv) of this section, permitting access in keeping with these provisions would discourage other law enforcement and regulatory agencies, foreign and domestic, from freely sharing information with the Department and thus would restrict the Department's access to information necessary to accomplish its mission most effectively.
(vi) Limitation on access to the material contained in the protective intelligence files is considered necessary to the preservation of the utility of intelligence files and in safeguarding those persons the Department is authorized to protect. Access to the protective intelligence files could adversely affect the quality of information available to the Department; compromise confidential sources, hinder the ability of the Department to keep track of persons of protective interest; and interfere with the Department's protective intelligence activities by individuals gaining access to protective intelligence files.
(vii) Many of the persons on whom records are maintained in the protective intelligence suffer from mental aberrations. Knowledge of their condition and progress comes from authorities, family members and witnesses. Many times this information comes to the Department as a result of two party conversations where it would be impossible to hide the identity of informants. Sources of information must be developed, questions asked and answers recorded. Trust must be extended and guarantees of confidentiality and anonymity must be maintained. Allowing access to information of this kind to individuals who are the subjects of protective interest may well lead to violence directed against an informant by a mentally disturbed individual.
(viii) Finally, the dissemination of certain information that the Department may maintain in the systems of records is restricted by law.
(3) 5 U.S.C. 552a(d)(2), (3) and (4), (e)(4)(H), and (f)(4) permit an individual to request amendment of a record pertaining to him or her and require the agency either to amend the record, or to note the disputed portion of the record and to provide a copy of the individual's statement of disagreement with the agency's refusal to amend a record to persons or other agencies to whom the record is thereafter disclosed. Since these provisions depend on the individual's having access to his or her records, and since these rules exempt the systems of records from the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a relating to access to records, for the reasons set out in paragraph (d)(2) of this section, these provisions should not apply to the systems of records.
(4) 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3) requires an agency to make accountings of disclosures of a record available to the individual named in the record upon his or her request. The accountings must state the date, nature, and purpose of each disclosure of the record and the name and address of the recipient.
(i) The application of this provision would impair the ability of law enforcement agencies outside the Department of the Treasury to make effective use of information provided by the Department. Making accountings of disclosures available to the subjects of an investigation would alert them to the fact that another agency is conducting an investigation into their criminal activities and could reveal the geographic location of the other agency's investigation, the nature and purpose of that investigation, and the dates on which that investigation was active. Violators possessing such knowledge would be able to take measures to avoid detection or apprehension by altering their operations, by transferring their criminal activities to other geographical areas, or by destroying or concealing evidence that would form the basis for arrest. In the case of a delinquent account, such release might enable the subject of the investigation to dissipate assets before levy.
(ii) Moreover, providing accountings to the subjects of investigations would alert them to the fact that the Department has information regarding their criminal activities and could inform them of the general nature of that information. Access to such information could reveal the operation of the Department's information-gathering and analysis systems and permit violators to take steps to avoid detection or apprehension.
(iii) The release of such information to the subject of a protective intelligence file would provide significant information concerning the nature of an investigation, and could result in impeding or compromising the efforts of Department personnel to detect persons suspected of criminal activities or to collect information necessary for the proper evaluation of persons considered to be of protective interest.
(5) 5 U.S.C. 552(c)(4) requires an agency to inform any person or other agency about any correction or notation of dispute that the agency made in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552a(d) to any record that the agency disclosed to the person or agency if an accounting of the disclosure was made. Since this provision depends on an individual's having access to and an opportunity to request amendment of records pertaining to him or her, and since these rules exempt the systems of records from the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a relating to access to and amendment of records, for the reasons set out in paragraph (f)(3) of this section, this provision should not apply to the systems of records.
(6) 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(4)(I) requires an agency to publish a general notice listing the categories of sources for information contained in a system of records. The application of this provision to the systems of records could compromise the Department's ability to provide useful information to law enforcement agencies, since revealing sources for the information could:
(i) Disclose investigative techniques and procedures;
(ii) Result in threats or reprisals against informers by the subjects of investigations; and
(iii) Cause informers to refuse to give full information to criminal investigators for fear of having their identities as sources disclosed.
(7) 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(1) requires an agency to maintain in its records only such information about an individual as is relevant and necessary to accomplish a purpose of the agency required to be accomplished by statute or executive order. The term “maintain,” as defined in 5 U.S.C. 552a(a)(3), includes “collect” and “disseminate.” The application of this provision to the systems of records could impair the Department's ability to collect and disseminate valuable law enforcement information.
(i) At the time that the Department collects information, it often lacks sufficient time to determine whether the information is relevant and necessary to accomplish a Treasury Department purpose.
(ii) In many cases, especially in the early stages of investigation, it may be impossible to immediately determine whether information collected is relevant and necessary, and information that initially appears irrelevant and unnecessary often may, upon further evaluation or upon collation with information developed subsequently, prove particularly relevant to a law enforcement program.
(iii) Compliance with the records maintenance criteria listed in the foregoing provision would require the periodic up-dating of the Department's protective intelligence files to insure that the records maintained in the system remain timely and complete.
(iv) Not all violations of law discovered by the Department fall within the investigative jurisdiction of the Department of the Treasury. To promote effective law enforcement, the Department will have to disclose such violations to other law enforcement agencies, including State, local and foreign agencies, that have jurisdiction over the offenses to which the information relates. Otherwise, the Department might be placed in the position of having to ignore information relating to violations of law not within the jurisdiction of the Department of the Treasury when that information comes to the Department's attention during the collation and analysis of information in its records.
(8) 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(2) requires an agency to collect information to the greatest extent practicable directly from the subject individual when the information may result in adverse determinations about an individual's rights, benefits, and privileges under Federal programs. The application of this provision to the systems of records would impair the Department's ability to collate, analyze, and disseminate investigative, intelligence, and enforcement information.
(i) Most information collected about an individual under criminal investigation is obtained from third parties, such as witnesses and informants. It is usually not feasible to rely upon the subject of the investigation as a source for information regarding his criminal activities.
(ii) An attempt to obtain information from the subject of a criminal investigation will often alert that individual to the existence of an investigation, thereby affording the individual an opportunity to attempt to conceal his criminal activities so as to avoid apprehension.
(iii) In certain instances, the subject of a criminal investigation is not required to supply information to criminal investigators as a matter of legal duty.
(iv) During criminal investigations it is often a matter of sound investigative procedure to obtain information from a variety of sources to verify information already obtained.
(9) 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(3) requires an agency to inform each individual whom it asks to supply information, on the form that it uses to collect the information or on a separate form that the individual can retain, of the agency's authority for soliciting the information; whether disclosure of information is voluntary or mandatory; the principal purposes for which the agency will use the information; the routine uses that may be made of the information; and the effects on the individual of not providing all or part of the information. The systems of records should be exempted from this provision to avoid impairing the Department's ability to collect and collate investigative, intelligence, and enforcement data.
(i) Confidential sources or undercover law enforcement officers often obtain information under circumstances in which it is necessary to keep the true purpose of their actions secret so as not to let the subject of the investigation or his or her associates know that a criminal investigation is in progress.
(ii) If it became known that the undercover officer was assisting in a criminal investigation, that officer's physical safety could be endangered through reprisal, and that officer may not be able to continue working on the investigation.
(iii) Individuals often feel inhibited in talking to a person representing a criminal law enforcement agency but are willing to talk to a confidential source or undercover officer whom they believe not to be involved in law enforcement activities.
(iv) Providing a confidential source of information with written evidence that he or she was a source, as required by this provision, could increase the likelihood that the source of information would be subject to retaliation by the subject of the investigation.
(v) Individuals may be contacted during preliminary information gathering, surveys, or compliance projects concerning the administration of the internal revenue laws before any individual is identified as the subject of an investigation. Informing the individual of the matters required by this provision would impede or compromise subsequent investigations.
(vi) Finally, application of this provision could result in an unwarranted invasion of the personal privacy of the subject of the criminal investigation, particularly where further investigation reveals that the subject was not involved in any criminal activity.
(10) 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(5) requires an agency to maintain all records it uses in making any determination about any individual with such accuracy, relevance, timeliness, and completeness as is reasonably necessary to assure fairness to the individual in the determination.
(i) Since 5 U.S.C. 552a(a)(3) defines “maintain” to include “collect” and “disseminate,” application of this provision to the systems of records would hinder the initial collection of any information that could not, at the moment of collection, be determined to be accurate, relevant, timely, and complete. Similarly, application of this provision would seriously restrict the Department's ability to disseminate information pertaining to a possible violation of law to law enforcement and regulatory agencies. In collecting information during a criminal investigation, it is often impossible or unfeasible to determine accuracy, relevance, timeliness, or completeness prior to collection of the information. In disseminating information to law enforcement and regulatory agencies, it is often impossible to determine accuracy, relevance, timeliness, or completeness prior to dissemination, because the Department may not have the expertise with which to make such determinations.
(ii) Information that may initially appear inaccurate, irrelevant, untimely, or incomplete may, when collated and analyzed with other available information, become more pertinent as an investigation progresses. In addition, application of this provision could seriously impede criminal investigators and intelligence analysts in the exercise of their judgment in reporting results obtained during criminal investigations.
(iii) Compliance with the records maintenance criteria listed in the foregoing provision would require the periodic up-dating of the Department's protective intelligence files to insure that the records maintained in the system remain timely and complete.
(11) 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(8) requires an agency to make reasonable efforts to serve notice on an individual when the agency makes any record on the individual available to any person under compulsory legal process, when such process becomes a matter of public record. The systems of records should be exempted from this provision to avoid revealing investigative techniques and procedures outlined in those records and to prevent revelation of the existence of an ongoing investigation where there is need to keep the existence of the investigation secret.
(12) 5 U.S.C. 552a(g) provides for civil remedies to an individual when an agency wrongfully refuses to amend a record or to review a request for amendment, when an agency wrongfully refuses to grant access to a record, when an agency fails to maintain accurate, relevant, timely, and complete records which are used to make a determination adverse to the individual, and when an agency fails to comply with any other provision of 5 U.S.C. 552a so as to adversely affect the individual. The systems of records should be exempted from this provision to the extent that the civil remedies may relate to provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a from which these rules exempt the systems of records, since there should be no civil remedies for failure to comply with provisions from which the Department is exempted. Exemption from this provision will also protect the Department from baseless civil court actions that might hamper its ability to collate, analyze, and disseminate investigative, intelligence, and law enforcement data.
(e) Specific exemptions under (1) Under 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(1), the head of any agency may promulgate rules to exempt any system of records within the agency from certain provisions of the Privacy Act to the extent that the system contains information subject to the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(1). This paragraph applies to the following systems of records maintained by the Department of the Treasury:
(i) Departmental Offices:
Number System name
DO .120 Records Related to Office of Foreign Assets Control Economic Sanctions.
(ii) Financial Crimes Enforcement Network:
Number System name
FinCEN .001 FinCEN Database.
(2) The Department of the Treasury hereby exempts the systems of records listed in paragraph (e)(1) of this section from the following provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a , pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(1): 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3), 5 U.S.C. 552a(d)(1), (2), (3), and (4), 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(1), 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(4)(G), (H), and (I), and 5 U.S.C. 552a(f).
(f) Reasons for exemptions under The reason for invoking the exemption is to protect material authorized to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy pursuant to Executive Orders 12958, 13526, or successor or prior Executive Orders.
(g) Specific exemptions under (1) Under 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(2), the head of any agency may promulgate rules to exempt any system of records within the agency from certain provisions of the Privacy Act of 1974 if the system is investigatory material compiled for law enforcement purposes and for the purposes of assuring the safety of individuals protected by the Department pursuant to the provisions of 18 U.S.C. 3056. This paragraph applies to the following systems of records maintained by the Department of the Treasury:
(i) Departmental Offices:
Number System name
DO .120 Records Related to Office of Foreign Assets Control Economic Sanctions.
DO .144 General Counsel Litigation Referral and Reporting System.
DO .190 Investigation Data Management System.
DO .220 SIGTARP Hotline Database.
DO .221 SIGTARP Correspondence Database.
DO .222 SIGTARP Investigative MIS Database.
DO .223 SIGTARP Investigative Files Database.
DO .224 SIGTARP Audit Files Database.
DO .303 TIGTA General Correspondence.
DO .307 TIGTA Employee Relations Matters, Appeals, Grievances, and Complaint Files.
DO .308 TIGTA Data Extracts.
DO .309 TIGTA Chief Counsel Case Files.
DO .310 TIGTA Chief Counsel Disclosure Section Records.
DO .311 TIGTA Office of Investigations Files.
(ii) Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau:
Number Name of system
TTB .001 Regulatory Enforcement Record System.
(iii) Comptroller of the Currency
Number System name
CC .100 Enforcement Action Report System
CC .110 Reports of Suspicious Activities
CC .120 Bank Fraud Information System
CC .220 Section 914 Tracking System
CC .500 Chief Counsel's Management Information System.
CC .510 Litigation Information System
CC .600 Consumer Complaint Inquiry and Information System
(iv) U.S. Customs Service:
Number System name
CS .021 Arrest/Seizure/Search Report and Notice of Penalty File.
CS .022 Attorney Case File.
CS .041 Cartmen or Lightermen.
CS .043 Case Files (Associate Chief Counsel—Gulf Custom Management Center).
Code of Federal Regulations 60
CS .046 Claims Case File.
CS .053 Confidential Source Identification File.
CS .057 Container Station Operator Files.
CS .058 Cooperating Individual Files.
CS .061 Court Case File.
CS .069 Customhouse Brokers File (Chief Counsel).
CS .077 Disciplinary Action, Grievances and Appeal Case Files.
CS .098 Fines, Penalties, and Forfeitures Records.
CS .099 Fines, Penalties, and Forfeiture Files (Supplemental Petitions).
CS .100 Fines, Penalties, and Forfeiture Records (Headquarters).
CS .122 Information Received File.
CS .125 Intelligence Log.
CS .127 Internal Affairs Records System.
CS .129 Investigations Record System.
CS .133 Justice Department Case File.
CS .138 Litigation Issue Files.
CS .159 Notification of Personnel Management Division when an employee is placed under investigation by the Office of Internal Affairs.
CS .171 Pacific Basin Reporting Network.
CS .186 Personnel Search.
CS .190 Personnel Case File.
CS .197 Private Aircraft/Vessel Inspection Reporting System.
CS .206 Regulatory Audits of Customhouse Brokers.
CS .212 Search/Arrest/Seizure Report.
CS .213 Seized Assets and Case Tracking System (SEACATS).
CS .214 Seizure File.
CS .224 Suspect Persons Index.
CS .232 Tort Claims Act File.
CS .244 Treasury Enforcement Communications System (TECS).
CS .258 Violator's Case Files.
CS .260 Warehouse Proprietor Files.
CS .270 Background-Record File of Non-Customs Employees.
CS .271 Cargo Security Record System.
CS .285 Automated Index to Central Investigative Files.
(v) Bureau of Engraving and Printing:
Number System name
BEP .021 Investigative files.
(vi) Federal Law Enforcement Training Center
(vii) Financial Management Service
(viii) Internal Revenue Service:
Number System name
IRS 00.002 Correspondence File-Inquiries about Enforcement Activities.
IRS 00.007 Employee Complaint and Allegation Referral Records.
IRS 00.334 Third Party Contact Reprisal Records
IRS 22.061 Wage and Information Returns Processing (IRP).
IRS 26.001 Acquired Property Records.
IRS 26.006 Form 2209, Courtesy Investigations.
IRS 26.008 IRS and Treasury Employee Delinquency.
IRS 26.011 Litigation Case Files.
IRS 26.012 Offer in Compromise (OIC) Files.
IRS 26.013 One-hundred Per Cent Penalty Cases.
IRS 26.016 Returns Compliance Programs (RCP).
IRS 26.019 TDA (Taxpayer Delinquent Accounts).
IRS 26.020 TDI (Taxpayer Delinquency Investigations) Files.
IRS 26.021 Transferee Files.
IRS 26.022 Delinquency Prevention Programs.
IRS 34.020 IRS Audit Trail Lead Analysis System.
IRS 34.037 IRS Audit Trail and Security Records System.
IRS 37.007 Practitioner Disciplinary Records.
IRS 37.009