16.101—Exemption of U.S. Marshals Service Systems—limited access, as indicated.
(a)
The following system of records is exempt from 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(c) (3) and (4), (d), (e) (1), (2) and (3), (e)(4) (G) and (H), (e)(5), (e)(8), (f) and (g):
Code of Federal Regulations
Code of Federal Regulations
365
(1)
From subsection (c)(3) because the release of disclosure accounting for disclosure made pursuant to subsection (b) of the Act, including those permitted under routine uses published for this system of records would permit a person to determine whether he is the subject of a criminal investigation, and to determine whether a warrant has been issued against him, and therefore present a serious impediment to law enforcement.
(2)
From subsection (c)(4) since an exemption is being claimed for subsection (d) of the Act, this section is inapplicable.
(3)
From subsection (d) because access to records would inform a person for whom a federal warrant has been issued of the nature and scope of information obtained as to his activities, of the identity of informants, and afford the person sufficient information to enable the subject to avoid apprehension. These factors would present a serious impediment to law enforcement in that they would thwart the warrant process and endanger lives of informants etc.
(4)
From subsections (e)(1) and (e)(5) because the requirements of these subsections would present a serious impediment to law enforcement in that it is impossible to determine in advance what information collected during an investigation will be important or crucial to the apprehension of Federal fugitives. In the interest of effective law enforcement, it is appropriate in a thorough investigation to retain seemingly irrelevant, untimely, or inaccurate information which, with the passage of time, would aid in establishing patterns of activity and provide investigative leads toward fugitive apprehension and assist in law enforcement activities of other agencies.
(5)
From subsection (e)(2) because the requirement that information be collected to the greatest extent practical from the subject individual would present a serious impediment to law enforcement because the subject of the investigation or prosecution would be placed on notice as to the existence of the warrant and would therefore be able to avoid detection or apprehension.
(6)
From subsection (e)(3) because the requirement that individuals supplying information be provided with a form stating the requirements of subsection (e)(3) would constitute a serious impediment to law enforcement in that it could compromise the existence of a confidential investigation or reveal identity of confidential informants.
(7)
From subsections (e)(4) (G) and (H) since an exemption is being claimed for subsections (f) and (d) of the Act, these subsections are inapplicable.
(8)
From subsection (e)(8) because the individual notice requirement of this subsection would present a serious impediment to law enforcement in that it would give persons sufficient warning to avoid warrants, subpoena, etc.
(9)
From subsection (f) because procedures for notice to an individual pursuant to subsection (f)(1) as to existence of records pertaining to him dealing with warrants must be exempted because such notice to individuals would be detrimental to the successful service of a warrant. Since an exemption is being claimed for subsection (d) of the Act the rules required pursuant to subsections (f) (2) through (5) are inapplicable to this system of records.
(10)
From subsection (g) since an exemption is being claimed for subsection (d) and (f) this section is inapplicable and is exempted for the reasons set forth for these subsections.
(c)
The following system of records is exempt from 5 U.S.C. 552a (c) (3) and (4), (d), (e) (2) and (3), (e)(4) (G) and (H), (e)(8), (f)(2) and (g):
Code of Federal Regulations
(1)
From subsection (c)(3) because the release of the disclosure accounting for disclosures made pursuant to subsection (b) of the Act including those permitted under routine uses published for this system of records would hamper the effective functioning of the Witness Security Program which by its very nature requires strict confidentiality vis-a-vis the records.
(3)
From subsection (d) because the U.S. Marshals Service Witness Security Program aids efforts of law enforcement officials to prevent, control or reduce crime. Access to records would present a serious impediment to effective law enforcement through revelation of confidential sources and through disclosure of operating procedures of the program, and through increased exposure of the program to the public.
(4)
From subsection (e)(2) because in the Witness Security Program the requirement that information be collected to the greatest extent possible from the subject individual would constitute an impediment to the program, which is sometimes dependent on sources other than the subject witness for verification of information pertaining to the witness.
(8)
From subsection (f)(2) since an exemption is being claimed for subsection (d) of the Act the rules required pursuant to subsection (f) (2) through (5) are inapplicable to this system of records.
(e)
The following system of records is exempt from 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3) and (4), (d), (e)(1), (2) and (3), (e)(4)(G) and (H), (e)(5), (e)(8), (f) and (g).
(1)
Internal Affairs System (JUSTICE/USM-002)—Limited access. These exemptions apply only to the extent that information in this system is subject to exemption pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2), (k)(2) or (k)(5). Where compliance would not interfere with or adversely affect the law enforcement process, the USMS may waive the exemptions, either partially or totally.
(1)
From subsections (c)(3) and (d) to the extent that release of the disclosure accounting may impede or interfere with civil or criminal law enforcement efforts, reveal a source who furnished information to the Government in confidence, and/or result in an unwarranted invasion of the personal privacy of collateral record subjects or other third party individuals.
(3)
From subsection (e)(1) to the extent that it is necessary to retain all information in order not to impede, compromise, or interfere with civil or criminal law enforcement efforts, e.g., where the significance of the information may not be readily determined and/or where such information may provide leads or assistance to Federal and other law agencies in discharging their law enforcement responsibilities.
(4)
From subsection (e)(2) because the requirement that information be collected to the greatest extent practicable from the subject individual would present a serious impediment to law enforcement because the subject of the investigation or prosecution would be placed on notice as to the existence of the investigation and would therefore be able to compromise the investigation and avoid detection or apprehension.
(7)
From subsection (e)(5) because in the collection of information for law enforcement purposes it is impossible to determine in advance what information is accurate, relevant, timely and complete. With the passage of time, seemingly irrelevant or untimely information may acquire new significance and the accuracy of such information can only be determined in a court of law. The restrictions imposed by subsection (e)(5) would restrict the ability to collect information for law enforcement purposes and interfere with the preparation of a complete investigative report or otherwise impede effective law enforcement.
(8)
From subsection (e)(8) because the individual notice requirement of this subsection would present a serious impediment to law enforcement in that the subject of the investigation would be alerted as to the existence of the investigation and therefore be able to compromise the investigation and avoid detection, subpoena, etc.
(9)
From subsection (f) because procedures for notice to an individual pursuant to subsection (f)(1) as to the existence of records dealing with investigations of criminal or civil law violations would enable the individual to compromise the investigation and evade detection or apprehension. Since an exemption is being claimed for subsection (d) of the Act, the rules required pursuant to subsections (f)(2) through (f)(5) are not applicable to this system.
(g)
The following system of records is exempt from 5 U.S.C. 552a(c) (3) and (4), (d), (e)(1), (2) and (3), (e)(4) (G) and (H), (e)(5), (e)(8), (f) and (g):
Code of Federal Regulations
(1)
From subsection (c)(3) because to release the disclosure accounting would permit a person to determine whether he or she has been identified as a specific threat to USMS protectees and to determine the need for countermeasures to USMS protective activities and thereby present a serious impediment to law enforcement.
(2)
From subsection (c)(4) because it is inapplicable since an exemption is being claimed for subsection (d).
(3)
From subsection (d) because to permit access to records would inform a person of the nature and scope of information obtained as to his or her threat-related activities and of the identity of confidential sources, and afford the person sufficient information to develop countermeasures to thwart protective arrangements and endanger lives of USMS protectees, informants, etc. To permit amendment of the records would interfere with ongoing criminal law enforcement and impose an impossible administrative burden requiring criminal investigations to be continuously reinvestigated.
(4)
From subsections (e) (1) and (5) because the collection of investigatory information used to assess the existence, extent and likelihood of a threat situation necessarily includes material from which it is impossible to identify and segregate information which may not be important to the conduct of a thorough assessment. It is often impossible to determine in advance if all information collected is accurate, relevant, timely and complete but, in the interests of developing effective protective measures, it is necessary that the U.S. Marshals Service retain this information in order to establish patterns of activity to aid in accurately assessing threat situations. The restrictions of subsections (e) (1) and (5) would impede the protective responsibilities of the Service and could result in death or serious injury to Marshals Service protectees.
(5)
From subsection (e)(2) because to collect information from the subject individual would serve notice that he or she is identified as a specific threat to USMS protectees and would enable the subject individual to develop countermeasures to protective activities and thereby present a serious impediment to law enforcement.
(6)
From subsection (e)(3) because to inform individuals as required by this subsection would enable the subject individual to develop countermeasures to USMS protective arrangements or identify confidential sources and thereby present a serious impediment to law enforcement.
(7)
From subsections (e)(4) (G) and (H) because they are inapplicable since an exemption is being claimed for subsections (d) and (f) of the Act.
(8)
From subsection (e)(8) because to serve notice would give persons sufficient warning to develop countermeasures to protective arrangements and thereby present a serious impediment to law enforcement through compromise of protective procedures, etc.
(9)
From subsection (f) because this system of records is exempt from the provisions of subsection (d).
(10)
From subsection (g) because it is inapplicable since an exemption is being claimed for subsections (d) and (f).
Code of Federal Regulations
(1)
From subsection (c)(3) only to the extent that release of the disclosure accounting would reveal the identity of a confidential source.
(2)
From subsection (d) only to the extent that access to information would reveal the identity of a confidential source.
(k)
The following system of records is exempt from 5 U.S.C. 552a(c) (3) and (4), (d), (e)(1), (2) and (3), (e)(4) (G) and (H), (e)(5), (e)(8), (f) and (g):
Code of Federal Regulations
(l)
Because this system contains Department of Justice civil and criminal law enforcement, investigatory records, exemptions from the particular subsections are justified for the following reasons:
(1)
From subsection (c)(3) because to release the disclosure accounting would permit the subject of an investigation to obtain valuable information concerning the existence and nature of the investigation and present a serious impediment to law enforcement.
(2)
From subsection (c)(4) because that portion of this system which consists of investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes is being exempted from the provisions of subsection (d), rendering this provision not applicable.
(3)
From subsection (d) because to permit access to investigatory records would reveal the identity of confidential sources and impede ongoing investigative or law enforcement activities by the premature disclosure of information related to those efforts. To permit amendment of the records would interfere with ongoing criminal law enforcement and impose an impossible administrative burden by requiring criminal investigations to be continuously reinvestigated.
(4)
From subsections (e) (1) and (5) because it is often impossible to determine in advance if investigatory records contained in this system are accurate, relevant, timely and complete but, in the interests of effective law enforcement, it is necessary to retain this information to aid in establishing patterns of activity and provide leads in criminal investigations.
(5)
From subsection (e)(2) because to collect information from the subject individual would serve notice that he or she is the subject of criminal investigative or law enforcement activity and thereby present a serious impediment to law enforcement.
(6)
From subsection (e)(3) because to inform individuals as required by this subsection would enable the subject individual to identify confidential sources, reveal the existence of an investigation, and compromise law enforcement efforts.
(7)
From subsections (e)(4) (G) and (H) because they are inapplicable since an exemption is being claimed for subsections (d) and (f) for investigatory records contained in this system.
(8)
From subsection (e)(8) because to serve notice would give persons sufficient warning to evade law enforcement efforts.
(9)
From subsection (f) because investigatory records contained in this system are exempt from the provisions of subsection (d).
(10)
From subsection (g) because it is inapplicable since an exemption is being claimed for subsections (d) and (f).
(m)
The following system of records is exempt from 5 U.S.C. 552a(c) (3) and (4), (d), (e) (2) and (3), (e)(4) (G) and (H), (e)(8), (f) and (g):
(1)
U.S. Marshals Service Administrative Proceedings, Claims and Civil Litigation Files (JUSTICE/USM-013).
Code of Federal Regulations
(1)
From subsection (c)(3) because to release the disclosure accounting for disclosures pursuant to the routine uses published for this system would permit the subject of a criminal or civil case or matter under investigation, or a case or matter in litigation, or under regulatory or administrative review or action, to obtain valuable information concerning the nature of that investigation, case or matter, and present a serious impediment to law enforcement or civil legal activities, or reveal a confidential source.
(2)
From subsection (c)(4) because the exemption claimed for subsection (d) will make this section inapplicable.
(3)
From subsection (d) because to permit access to records contained in this system would provide information concerning litigation strategy, or case development, and/or reveal the nature of the criminal or civil case or matter under investigation or administrative review, or in litigation, and present a serious impediment to law enforcement or civil legal activities, or reveal a confidential source.
(4)
From subsection (e)(2) because effective legal representation, defense, or claim adjudication necessitates collecting information from all individuals having knowledge of the criminal or civil case or matter. To collect information primarily from the subject individual would present a serious impediment to law enforcement or civil legal activities.
(5)
From subsection (e)(3) because to inform the individuals as required by this subsection would permit the subject of a criminal or civil matter under investigation or administrative review to compromise that investigation or administrative review and thereby impede law enforcement efforts or civil legal activities.
(6)
From subsections (e)(4) (G) and (H) because these provisions are inapplicable since this system is exempt from subsections (d) and (f) of the Act.
(7)
From subsection (e)(8) because to serve notice would give persons sufficient warning to compromise a criminal or civil investigation or administrative review and thereby impede law enforcement of civil legal activities.
(8)
From subsection (f) because this system of records is exempt from the provisions of subsection (d).
(9)
From subsection (g) because it is inapplicable since an exemption is claimed for subsections (d) and (f).
(o)
The following system of records is exempt from 5 U.S.C. 552a(c) (3) and (4), (d), (e) (1), (2), (5) and (g):
These exemptions apply only to the extent that information in this system is subject to exemption pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2).
(1)
From subsection (c)(3) where the release of the disclosure accounting for disclosures made pursuant to subsection (b) of the Act would reveal a source who furnished information to the Government in confidence.
(3)
From subsection (d) because access to records would reveal the names and other information pertaining to prisoners, including sensitive security information such as the identities and locations of confidential sources, e.g., informants and protected witnesses; and disclose access codes, data entry codes and message routing symbols used in law enforcement communications systems to schedule and effect prisoner movements. Thus, such a compromise of law enforcement communications systems would subject law enforcement personnel and other prisoners to harassment and possible danger, and present a serious threat to law enforcement activities. To permit amendment of the records would interfere with ongoing criminal law enforcement and impose an impossible administrative burden by requiring that information affecting the prisoner's security classification be continuously reinvestigated when contested by the prisoner, or by anyone on his behalf.
(4)
From subsections (e) (1) and (5) because the security classification of prisoners is based upon information collected during official criminal investigations; and, in the interest of ensuring safe and secure prisoner movements it may be necessary to retain information the relevance, necessity, accuracy, timeliness, and completeness of which cannot be readily established, but which may subsequently prove useful in establishing patterns of criminal activity or avoidance, and thus be essential to assigning an appropriate security classification to the prisoner. The restrictions of subsection (e) (1) and (5) would impede the information collection responsibilities of the USMS, and the lack of all available information could result in death or serious injury to USMS and other law enforcement personnel, prisoners in custody, and members of the public.
(5)
From subsection (e)(2) because the requirement to collect information from the subject individual would impede the information collection responsibilities of the USMS in that the USMS is often dependent upon sources other than the subject individual for verification of information pertaining to security risks posed by the individual prisoner.
(q)
The following system of records is exempt from 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3) and (4), (d), (e)(1), (2), (3), (e)(5) and (e)(8) and (g):
Code of Federal Regulations
(1)
From subsection (c)(3) because to release the disclosure accounting would permit the subject of a criminal proceeding to determine the extent or nature of law enforcement authorities' knowledge regarding his/her alleged misconduct or criminal activities. The disclosure of such information could alert the subject to devise ways in which to conceal his/her activities and/or prevent law enforcement from learning additional information about his/her activities, or otherwise inhibit law enforcement efforts. In addition, where the individual is the subject of an ongoing or potential inquiry/investigation, such release could reveal the nature thereof prematurely, and may also enable the subject to determine the identity of witnesses and informants. Such disclosure could compromise the ongoing or potential inquiry/investigation, endanger the lives of witnesses and informants, or otherwise impede or thwart law enforcement efforts.
(3)
From subsection (d) because to permit unlimited access would permit the subject of a criminal proceeding to determine the extent or nature of law enforcement authorities' knowledge regarding his/her alleged misconduct or criminal activities. The disclosure of such information could alert the subject to devise ways in which to conceal his/her activities and/or prevent law enforcement from learning additional information about his/her activities, or otherwise inhibit law enforcement efforts. Disclosure would also allow the subject to obtain sensitive information concerning the existence and nature of security measures and jeopardize the safe and secure transfer of the prisoner, the safety and security of other prisoners, informants and witnesses, law enforcement personnel, and the public. In addition, disclosure may enable the subject to learn prematurely of an ongoing or potential inquiry/investigation, and may also permit him/her to determine the identities of confidential sources, informants, or protected witnesses. Such disclosure could compromise the ongoing or potential inquiry/investigation, endanger the lives of witnesses and informants, or otherwise impede or thwart law enforcement efforts. Disclosure may also constitute an unwarranted invasion of the personal privacy of third parties. Further, disclosure would reveal access codes, data entry codes and message routing symbols used in law enforcement communications systems. Access to such codes and symbols would permit the subject to impede the flow of law enforcement communications and compromise the integrity of law enforcement information, and thus present a serious threat to law enforcement activities. To permit amendment of the records would expose security matters, and would impose an impossible administrative burden by requiring that security precautions, and information pertaining thereto, be continuously reevaluated if contested by the prisoner, or by anyone on his or her behalf. Similarly, to permit amendment could interfere with ongoing or potential inquiries/investigations by requiring that such inquiries/investigations be continuously reinvestigated, or that information collected (the relevance and accuracy of which cannot readily be determined) be subjected to continuous change.
(4)
From subsections (e)(1) and (5) because the system may contain investigatory information or information which is derived from information collected during official criminal investigations. In the interest of effective law enforcement and litigation, of securing the prisoner and of protecting the public, it may be necessary to retain information the relevance, necessity, accuracy, timeliness and completeness of which cannot be readily established. Such information may nevertheless provide investigative leads to other Federal or law enforcement agencies, or prove necessary to establish patterns of criminal activity or behavior, and/or prove essential to the safe and secure detention (and movement) of prisoners. Further, the provisions of (e)(1) and (e)(5) would restrict the ability of the USMS in exercising its judgment in reporting information during investigations or during the development of appropriate security measures, and thus present a serious impediment to law enforcement efforts.
(5)
From subsection (e)(2) because the requirement to collect information from the subject individual would impede the information collection responsibilities of the USMS which is often dependent upon sources other than the subject individual for verification of information pertaining to security risks posed by the individual prisoner, to alleged misconduct or criminal activity of the prisoner, or to any matter affecting the safekeeping and disposition of the individual prisoner.
(6)
From subsection (e)(3) because to inform individuals as required by this subsection could impede the information gathering process, reveal the existence of an ongoing or potential inquiry/investigation or security procedure, and compromise law enforcement efforts.
(7)
From subsection (e)(8) because to serve notice would give persons sufficient warning to compromise an ongoing or potential inquiry/investigation and thereby evade and impede law enforcement and security efforts.
(s)
The following system of records is exempt from 5 U.S.C. 552a(c) (3) and (4), (d), (e) (1), (2), (3), (e) (5) and (e) (8) and (g):
(t)
These exemptions apply only to the extent that information in the system is subject to exemption pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2). Where compliance would not interfere with or adversely affect the law enforcement process, the USMS may waive the exemptions, either partially or totally. Exemption from the particular subsections are justified for the following reasons:
(1)
From subsections (c)(3) and (d) to the extent that access to records in this system of records may impede or interfere with law enforcement efforts, result in the disclosure of information that would constitute and unwarranted invasion of the personal privacy of collateral record subjects or other third parties, and/or jeopardize the health and/or safety of third parties.
(2)
Where access to certain records may be appropriate, exemption from the amendment provisions of subsection (d)(2) in necessary to the extent that the necessary and appropriate justification, together with proof of record inaccuracy, is not provided, and/or to the extent that numerous, frivolous requests to amend could impose an impossible administrative burden by requiring agencies to continuously review booking and arrest data, much of which is collected from the arrestee during the arrest.
(3)
From subsection (e)(1) to the extent that it is necessary to retain all information in order not to impede, compromise, or interfere with law enforcement efforts, e.g., where the significance of the information may not be readily determined and/or where such information may provide leads or assistance to Federal and other law enforcement agencies in discharging their law enforcement responsibilities.
(4)
From subsection (e)(2) because, in some instances, the application of this provision would present a serious impediment to law enforcement since it may be necessary to obtain and verify information from a variety of sources other than the record subject to ensure safekeeping, security, and effective law enforcement. For example, it may be necessary that medical and psychiatric personnel provide information regarding the subject's behavior, physical health, or mental stability, etc. To ensure proper care while in custody, or it may be necessary to obtain information from a case agent or the court to ensure proper disposition of the subject individual.
(5)
From subsection (e)(3) because the requirement that agencies inform each individual whom it asks to supply information of such information as is required by subsection (e)(3) may, in some cases, impede the information gathering process or otherwise interfere with or compromise law enforcement efforts, e.g., the subject may deliberately withhold information, or give erroneous information.
(6)
From subsection (e)(5) because in the collection of information for law enforcement purposes it is impossible to determine in advance what information is accurate, relevant, timely and complete. With the passage of time, seemingly irrelevant or untimely information may acquire new significance and the accuracy of such information can only be determined in a court of law. The restrictions imposed by subsection (e)(5) would restrict the ability to collect information for law enforcement purposes and may prevent the eventual development of the necessary criminal intelligence or otherwise impede effective law enforcement.
(7)
From subsection (e)(8) to the extent that such notice may impede, interfere with, or otherwise compromise law enforcement and security efforts.
(8)
From subsection (g) to the extent that this system is exempt from the access and amendment provisions of subsection (d).
(u)
Consistent with the legislative purpose of the Privacy Act of 1974, the United States Marshals Service will grant access to nonexempt material in records which are maintained by the Service. Disclosure will be governed by the Department's Privacy Regulations, but will be limited to the extent that the identity of confidential sources will not be compromised; subjects of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal, civil or regulatory violation will not be alerted to the investigation; the physical safety of witnesses, informants and law enforcement personnel will not be endangered; the privacy of third parties will not be violated; and that the disclosure would not otherwise impede effective law enforcement. Whenever possible, information of the above nature will be deleted from the requested documents and the balance made available. The controlling principle behind this limited access is to allow disclosures except those indicated above. The decisions to release information from these systems will be made on a case-by-case basis.