

STATE OF MICHIGAN  
COURT OF APPEALS

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In the Matter of JOSEPH ALLEN MANSOUR,  
JOHNATHAN ALEXANDER MANSOUR, and  
DANIEL MANSOUR, Minor.

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DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, f/k/a  
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,

UNPUBLISHED  
July 25, 2006

Petitioner-Appellee,

v

SUSAN MARIE MANSOUR,

No. 267196  
Wayne Circuit Court  
Family Division  
LC No. 03-420867-NA

Respondent-Appellant,

and

JAMES WELDON,

Respondent.

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Before: Neff, P.J., and Bandstra and Zahra, JJ.

MEMORANDUM.

Respondent-appellant appeals as of right from the trial court order terminating her parental rights to the minor children under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and (j). We affirm.

The trial court did not clearly err in finding that the statutory grounds were established by clear and convincing evidence. MCR 3.977(J); *In re Sours Minors*, 459 Mich 624, 633; 593 NW2d 520 (1999). The father, James Weldon suffered from bipolar disorder and posttraumatic stress syndrome and refused to consistently take his psychotropic medication. Moreover, Weldon did not regularly treat with his psychiatrist and the relationship with his therapist had completely broken down. The children came into care because one child was nearly starved to death and the physical environment was deplorable, unfit for human habitation. At the time of termination, the children had been in care for over two years. Even after services were offered for this substantial period, the conditions that led to adjudication continued to exist. Respondent-appellant, while she was participating and somewhat benefiting from the treatment plan and services, was not benefiting in one critical respect: she had not adequately dealt with her dependent personality disorder. This is most profoundly illustrated by the fact that, at the time of

termination, she was continuing to plan jointly with Weldon, notwithstanding Weldon's failure to care for himself and his failure to attempt to comply with the treatment plan. Respondent-appellant understood that the return of her children was dependent upon Weldon's compliance with the treatment plan and reunification would rise or fall based upon his success. Yet respondent-appellant continued to entwine her fate with that of an unstable man. Clearly, respondent-appellant had not sufficiently benefited from the services offered. Because there was clear and convincing evidence to support termination of respondent-appellant's parental rights pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g) and (j), we find no error.

The trial court also did not clearly err in its best interests determination. MCL 712A.19b(5); *In re Trejo*, 462 Mich 341, 353; 612 NW2d 407 (2000). Because the children would be at risk if returned to their mother's care and they were at an age where permanency was critical, there did not exist evidence that termination would not be in the children's best interests.

Affirmed.

/s/ Janet T. Neff  
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra  
/s/ Brian K. Zahra