STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

In the Matter of CAMERON MAURICE CHESTER, Minor.

DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,

Petitioner-Appellee,

V

EVELYN CHESTER,

Respondent-Appellant.

UNPUBLISHED May 22, 2007

No. 276011 Oakland Circuit Court Family Division LC No. 06-718341-NA

Before: White, P.J., and Saad and Murray, JJ.

MEMORANDUM.

Respondent appeals from the trial court's order terminating her parental rights to the minor child pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i), (b)(ii), (g), (i), (j), and (l). We affirm.

Respondent says that the trial court erred in terminating her parental rights because she had made significant improvements since her prior terminations and the department failed to offer services to her. We disagree. Respondent pleaded no contest to the allegations in the petition to establish both jurisdiction and the statutory basis for termination. She has claimed no error involved in the taking of her plea and has stated no basis upon which this Court should withdraw her no-contest plea. Thus, she has abandoned this issue. Wilson v Taylor, 457 Mich 232, 243; 577 NW2d 100 (1998); People v Kevorkian, 248 Mich App 373, 389; 639 NW2d 291 (2001); Thompson v Thompson, 261 Mich App 353, 356; 683 NW2d 250 (2004). In addition, the department was not required to offer services to respondent. MCR 3.977(E)(1) and (3); In re Terry, 240 Mich App 14, 26, n 4; 610 NW2d 563 (2000). When the original petition seeks termination of parental rights because parental rights to a sibling have previously been terminated, reunification efforts are not required. See MCR 3.965(D)(2)(c) and MCL 712A.19b(3)(i) and (l).

Also, we find that trial court did not clearly err in its best interests determination. MCL 712A.19b(5); *In re Trejo*, 462 Mich 341, 354-355; 612 NW2d 407 (2000). We find that the evidence does not support respondent's claim that she had greatly improved her life and was prepared to care for her child. She left the minor child in the care of another woman when he was two weeks old and had not seen him since that time. Thus, her claim of a bond between her and her son is totally without merit. The woman with whom she left the child was unrelated, had

lost her foster care license, and was an inappropriate person to care for the infant. Although respondent testified that she would be ready to care for the child within six months, her savings and income were not sufficient to support suitable housing. She was living with her mother, a known drug abuser who had abused respondent as a child and had abused one of respondent's children. The mother's home would not be suitable or safe for the child. Respondent was still on probation for an assault. The rights to three of her older children had been involuntarily terminated. She had never complied with any of the requirements of her previous parent/agency agreement. She did not accept responsibility for the loss of her three older children or for her assault conviction. The child needed a stable home and permanence. There was no indication that respondent would be able to provide care and custody for the child within a reasonable time, if ever.

Affirmed.

/s/ Helene N. White

/s/ Henry William Saad

/s/ Christopher M. Murray