


Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.



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**IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA**

IN THE MATTER OF THE TERMINATION)
OF PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP of)
B.A., S.A., and J.D.,)

MINNIE S.,)
Appellant-Respondent,)

vs.)

No. 91A02-0707-JV-575

WHITE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF)
CHILD SERVICES,)
Appellee-Petitioner.)

APPEAL FROM THE WHITE CIRCUIT COURT
The Honorable Robert W. Thacker, Judge
Cause Nos. 91C01-0610-JT-4, 91C01-0610-JT-5 and 91C01-0610-JT-6

January 23, 2008

MEMORANDUM DECISION – NOT FOR PUBLICATION

MATHIAS, Judge

Minnie S. (“Mother”) appeals the termination of her parental rights in White Circuit Court to her children S.A., B.A. Concluding that the trial court did not err in denying Mother’s motion to dismiss and that its judgment terminating Mother’s parental rights to the children was not clearly erroneous, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

Mother is the biological mother of four children, three of whom are the subject of this appeal: S.A., born on September 15, 1996; B.A., born on July 12, 1997; and J.D., born on May 16, 2003.¹ Steven A. is the father of S.A. and B.A. and was married to Mother from June 11, 1997, until the marriage was dissolved in Howard County on October 18, 1998. Mother was awarded custody of S.A. and B.A. Steven A.’s parental rights were terminated at the same time as Mother’s parental rights. Steven A. does not appeal.

Mother subsequently married James D. (“James”), the father of J.D., but the marriage was dissolved in October of 2002, and Mother was awarded custody of J.D. James, who was convicted of sexually molesting S.A. and sentenced to eight years incarceration, voluntarily consented to the termination of his parental rights to J.D. and does not appeal.

On June 3, 2005, Mother contacted the White County Department of Child Services (“WCDCS”) and informed case manager Kimberly Plantenga (“Plantenga”) that she was very depressed and afraid she may harm her two younger children. On that same

¹ D.M., born on January 4, 2003, was placed with his biological father, Allen M., on September 1, 2006. The CHINS case as to D.M. was subsequently dismissed.

day, Plantenga investigated and removed all four children from Mother's care, placing them in foster care. At that time, Plantenga informed Mother that WCDCS would provide family preservation services. The WCDCS thereafter became aware of a 2003 report of neglect as to J.D., as well as the fact Mother had been hospitalized in January 2003 under a mental health commitment and had been convicted of theft and false informing. On June 7, 2005, the trial court entered a detention order stating that the court found probable cause to believe that the children needed care, treatment, or rehabilitation that they were not receiving and that was unlikely to be provided without the coercive intervention of the court and ordered all four children to remain in foster care.

On June 22, 2005, the WCDCS filed a child in need of services ("CHINS") petition as to all four children, alleging that the children's physical or mental condition were seriously impaired or seriously endangered as a result of the inability, refusal, or neglect of the child's parent. The CHINS petition further alleged that Mother lacked the parenting skills necessary to keep the children safe and was unable to financially provide for her children's needs.

On August 4, 2005, Mother admitted the allegations of the CHINS petitions and the children were thereafter adjudged CHINS. The court's dispositional decree found Mother was unemployed, did not have a driver's license, and suffered from manic-depressive disorder with bipolar tendencies and anxiety. The dispositional decree ordered Mother to participate in the plan of care and treatment of her children, to treat her mental health issues, to obtain employment, and to improve her self-sufficiency and ability to care for her children. Likewise, the WCDCS case plans required Mother to

stabilize her mental health issues, continue to take her medication as prescribed, and to participate in home-based family preservation services through Families United. Mother was also ordered to participate in family and home-based services and therapy with Dockside Services, and Mother's medication management was to be handled through Wabash Valley Hospital's outpatient services.

The dispositional decree placed all four children back with Mother on a home trial visit, but the court maintained continued wardship of the children. On September 7, 2005, however, D.M. was returned to foster care at Mother's request because she and her boyfriend could not handle him. D.M. remained in foster care until placed with his father in September 2006, where he has remained ever since.

On September 28, 2005, Mother requested that J.D. be removed from her care and returned to foster care with Gary and Peggy Johns ("the Johnses") because she could not handle him. J.D. has remained in foster care with the Johnses since that date. J.D. suffers from Asbergers Syndrome (a form of autism) and developmental delays requiring special education and treatment. J.D. is subject to emotional outbursts including biting, growling, and profanity. He does not understand boundaries and if left unsupervised would not understand the hazard of running into a street or in front of a moving vehicle. On November 22, 2005, Mother stated in open court at a CHINS review hearing that she wished to terminate her parental rights to J.D. Mother also repeated this request as to both J.D. and D.M. to Plantenga.

S.A. and B.A. remained with Mother, who was participating in intensive family preservation and mental health services through Families United and Dockside Services.

However, on November 30, 2005, Mother called Plantenga saying she was going to kill herself and wanted S.A. and B.A. removed. S.A. and B.A. were again placed in foster care, and Mother was admitted to the hospital overnight. Mother was released from the hospital the following day and S.A. and B.A. were returned to her care.

Five days later, S.A. brought a letter to school written by Mother and addressed to Plantenga saying that she was going to kill herself and wanted the WCDCS to take care of her children. S.A. had been instructed by Mother to give the letter to her teacher to make sure that Plantenga received it. The WCDCS contacted the police and Mother was again hospitalized pursuant to an emergency mental health detention order on December 6, 2005. Mother later testified that she did attempt suicide on this occasion. S.A. and B.A. were removed from Mother's care and returned to foster care where they have remained since December 6, 2005.

Family preservation services were offered to Mother through Families United from July to December 2005. However, due to Mother making inappropriate and suggestive comments to the caseworker and then moving from White County to Kokomo, Indiana, Families United terminated its services to Mother in January of 2006.

In December 2005, Mother started dating Mathew S. ("Mathew"). Mathew has a criminal history including five DUI convictions, three public intoxication convictions and a conviction for battery of a former wife and mother of his son. Mathew was also convicted in 1998 of public indecency resulting from his masturbating while driving an Indianapolis police car, which he was supposed to be repairing, in full view of a woman and her thirteen-year-old daughter. Mathew also admits he is an alcoholic.

In February of 2006, Mother, who was engaged to Mathew, was granted in-home supervised visitation with all the children, with Mathew supervising the visitation. Despite conducting a background check, the WCDCS had not discovered Mathew's criminal history or convictions in Marion County. However on May 11, 2006, Mother learned of Mathew's conviction for public indecency, became very upset, and discussed the matter with Plantenga and WCDCS Director Barbara Bedrich ("Bedrich"). During this discussion, Mother considered not marrying Mathew and mentioned that he had previously abused her. Because of the public indecency conviction, the WCDCS refused to allow any further visitation with the children that was not supervised by the WCDCS and requested Mathew undergo anger management counseling and alcohol counseling before unsupervised visitation would be allowed.

Despite her initial reaction to Mathew's conviction for public indecency, Mother married Mathew nine days later on May 20, 2006, and together they relocated to Indianapolis, Indiana, in July of 2006. Mother initially denied marrying Mathew, however, and did not immediately disclose her marriage, or the fact that she had moved to Indianapolis, to Plantenga.

On October 16, 2006, the WCDCS filed separate petitions to terminate Mother's parental rights to S.A., B.A., and J.D. A combined fact-finding hearing on all three companion cases was held on April 3, 2007. At the hearing, Plantenga testified that, as of October 2006, Mother had not participated in any recommended services, which included home-based services, counseling, and medication management. She also testified that Mother had informed her of Mathew's continued drinking and physical abuse since the

marriage, including an incident when Mother received a black eye in September 2006. Plantenga further testified that the WCDCS records show Mother had twenty-nine different residences between September 1996 and December 2005, and that since the children's removal from her care, Mother moved to two different cities, each time farther from the children. Additionally, Plantenga testified that she did not feel that there had been any positive progress toward reunification since the children were removed.

During the fact-finding hearing, Mother filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4.5(d)(3) alleging that the WCDCS "refuse[d] to offer any home based family services which would be substantial and material in proving that the home environment is a safe home for the children and for implementing a plan to provide a safe home for return of the children if needed." Appellant's App. p. 179. The trial court denied Mother's motion to dismiss; and, on June 4, 2007, the trial court entered its judgment terminating the parent-child relationship between Mother and S.A., B.A. and J.D. This appeal ensued.

I. Motion to Dismiss

Mother asserts that the trial court erred in denying her motion to dismiss. Specifically, Mother argues that the WCDCS "failed to provide any services that were 'substantial and material' to any reunification between the Mother and [J.D.]" pursuant to Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4.5(d)(3). Brief of Appellant at 11.

Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4.5 reads in relevant part as follows:

(a) *This section applies if:*

- (1) a court has made a finding under IC 31-34-21-5.6 that reasonable efforts for family preservation or reunification with respect to a child in need of services are not required; *or*
- (2) a child in need of services;
 - (A) has been placed in:
 - (i) a foster family home . . . ; or
 - (ii) the home of a person related to the child . . . and
 - (B) has been removed from a parent and has been under the supervision of a county office of family and children for not less than fifteen (15) months of the most recent twenty-two (22) months

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4.5(a) (1998 & Supp. 2007) (emphasis added). We have previously explained that the plain language of this statute makes clear that Section 4.5 applies only when a petition to terminate has been filed “because the trial court has determined that reasonable efforts for family preservation or reunification with respect to a child in need of services are not required *or* when a child in need of services has been placed in the home of a related individual, a licensed foster family home, child caring institution, or group home, and when the child has been so placed for not less than fifteen of the most recent twenty-two months.” Everhart v. Scott County Office of Family and Children, 779 N.E.2d 1225, 1229 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied, (emphasis added) (internal quotation omitted). Neither situation is applicable in this case. Here, as in Everhart, the petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights to the children was filed because the children had been removed from Mother’s care “for at least six (6) months under a Dispositional Decree.” Appellant’s App. pp. 22, 38, 51. Because the termination petition was filed based upon a ground to which section 4.5 is not applicable by definition, the grounds for dismissing a petition under section 4.5(d) were also not applicable to the present situation. See id. (concluding that because the termination petition was filed

because the children had been removed from their parents for at least six months pursuant to a dispositional decree, section 4.5 was not applicable by definition and thus the grounds for dismissing a petition under section 4.5(d) were also not applicable). Accordingly, the trial court in the present case did not err in denying Mother's motion to dismiss.

II. Clear and Convincing Evidence

Next, Mother challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court's termination order. We observe that Mother does not challenge the trial court's determination that the children had been removed for more than six months under dispositional decrees, or that the WCDCS had a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the children: namely, adoption. Rather, Mother challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the remaining elements of Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(2).

Initially, we note our standard of review. This court has long had a highly deferential standard of review in cases concerning the termination of parental rights. In re K.S., 750 N.E.2d 832, 836 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). Thus, when reviewing the termination of parental rights, we will not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. In re D.D., 804 N.E.2d 258, 264 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. We consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that are most favorable to the judgment. Id.

In deference to the trial court's unique position to assess the evidence, we will set aside the trial court's judgment terminating a parent-child relationship only if it is clearly erroneous. In re L.S., 717 N.E.2d 204, 208 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied. A

judgment is clearly erroneous only if the findings do not support the trial court's conclusions or the conclusions do not support the judgment thereon. Quillen v. Quillen, 671 N.E.2d 98, 102 (Ind. 1996). If the evidence and inferences support the trial court's decision, we must affirm. L.S., 717 N.E.2d at 208.

Here, the trial court made specific findings and conclusions thereon in its order terminating Mother's parental rights. Where the trial court enters specific findings and conclusions thereon, we apply a two-tiered standard of review. Bester v. Lake County Office of Family of Children, 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005). First, we determine whether the evidence supports the findings, and second we determine whether the findings support the judgment. Id.

"The traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution." In re M.B., 666 N.E.2d 73, 76 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), trans. denied. However, the trial court must subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the child when evaluating the circumstances surrounding the termination. K.S., 750 N.E.2d at 837. Parental rights may be terminated when the parents are unable or unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities. Id. at 836.

In order to terminate a parent-child relationship, the State is required to allege and prove that:

- (A) one (1) of the following exists:
 - (i) the child has been removed from the parent for at least six (6) months under a dispositional decree;

* * *

- (B) there is a reasonable probability that:

- (i) the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied; or
- (ii) the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the child;
- (C) termination is in the best interests of the child; and
- (D) there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the child.

Indiana Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2) (1999 & Supp. 2007). The State must establish each of these allegations by clear and convincing evidence. Egly v. Blackford County Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 592 N.E.2d 1232, 1234 (Ind. 1992).

A. Conditions Will Not be Remedied

Mother first contends that the WDCS failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the conditions that resulted in the removal and continued placement of the children outside of her care were not likely to be remedied. Specifically, Mother asserts that she has “complied with all of the terms of her case plan in getting her mental state under control, getting a [driver’s] license and establishing a financially stable home with her marriage[,]” and that “Mother was never given a meaningful opportunity to prove she could parent her children after their removal and her gaining control of her mental health issues.” Br. of Appellant at 8-9. Our review of the evidence most favorable to the judgment, however, does not support Mother’s contentions.

When determining whether a reasonable probability exists that the conditions justifying a child’s removal and continued placement outside the home will not be remedied, the trial court must judge a parent’s fitness to care for his or her children at the time of the termination hearing, taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions. In re J.T., 742 N.E.2d 509, 512 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied. In so

doing, the trial court may consider the parent's response to the services offered through the department of child services. Lang v. Starke County Office of Family and Children, 861 N.E.2d 366, 372 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied. Additionally, the WCDCS is not required to rule out all possibilities of change; rather, it need establish "only that there is a reasonable probability that the parent's behavior will not change." In re Kay. L., 867 N.E.2d 236, 242 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).

In this case, there is ample evidence to demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability that Mother's behavior will not change; and, consequently, that the conditions resulting in the children's removal from Mother's care will not be remedied. The record reveals that the WCDCS became involved with the family when Mother contacted them stating that she was depressed and afraid she might harm her two younger children. The WCDCS investigated the situation and removed all four children from Mother's care due to her unstable mental state. Mother subsequently admitted to the allegations in the CHINS petitions, including the allegations that she lacked the parenting skills necessary to keep the children safe and that she was unable to financially provide for her children's needs, and was ordered to, among other things, treat her mental health issues, obtain employment and to improve her self-sufficiency and ability to care for her children.

By the time of the termination hearing, however, Mother had failed to make any significant progress in these areas as illustrated by the trial court's findings set forth below:

* * *

21. Between July 20, 2005 and November 9, 2005 Families United Family Preservation Worker visited the Mother's home twenty-

seven times. Families United caseworker's progress report of October 4, 2005, stated:

Depression is my main concern at this time. [Mother] has been on a downhill spiral, and recently talked more and more about not caring about her life or anyone else's. She talks readily about suicide, though she has been quick to add that she would not do it in front of the children.

A November 9, 2005 progress report observed:

For the past several weeks [Mother] has expressed feeling hatred towards [S.A.]. She states [S.A.] acts up at home and is not doing well in school . . . My concern at this time is that [Mother] does not seem to enjoy her time with the children . . . (It is clear that [Mother] still has emotional and psychological needs. My concerns for the family at this time is [Mother's] mental health needs (and how they effect her decision making/ability to parent) and her relationship with her daughters.

22. Families United continued providing services to the Mother through December 2005. However, the Mother repeatedly made inappropriate comments to the caseworker as if she were attempting to have a personal relationship with him. Though he redirected her on a number of occasions and stressed that the relationship was of a professional nature, he could no longer continue providing services due to the Mother's apparent advances and lack of cooperation. The Mother's case was transferred to another Families United caseworker who attempted to make contact with the Mother by telephone and by stopping by her home. However, the Mother did not respond, and the Mother moved from Burnettsville to Kokomo, Indiana. As a result[,] Families United prepared a family termination report in January 2006 stating that:

[Mother] continues to have emotional/psychiatric issues. [Mother] needs to meet regularly with a psychiatrist and consistently take her prescribed medication. [Mother's] emotional state reflects how she acts and treats her children. Reunification is not likely to occur unless [Mother] can successfully stabilize her mental health. Due to [Mother's] moving out of our service area, we are terminating services to this family.

23. The final overall goals assessment dated January 24, 2006 by Families United determined the Mother to have made a "marginal

change (and) did not want to work towards changing” as to Mother’s treatment for her depression, working with Families United to find and implement other support systems, and receiving therapy regarding anger management.

* * *

28. The Mother is unemployed and has remained so during the pendency of the CHINS cases, though she is apparently physically healthy and able to work. She has depended entirely upon public assistance, boyfriends, and now Mathew as her sole source of support.
29. Indiana Family Social Services Agency public assistance records show the Mother has given 29 different addresses between September 1996 and December 2005. During the pendency of the CHINS causes, the Mother moved from Burnettsville to two different addresses in Kokomo, then to Indianapolis where she currently resides.
30. A primary objective of the Dispositional Decree and all case plans throughout the CHINS proceedings has been treatment of the Mother’s depression and other mental health issues. However, except for emergency mental health commitments following suicidal gestures or attempts, the Mother has made only occasional and brief appointments with counselors and denies she is in need of mental health treatment or medication.
31. Since the [children’s] removal on June 3, 2005, the [children have] been reunified with the Mother on a home trial basis twice, each time terminating at the request of the Mother.

* * *

37. In this case, the Mother requested removal of her children in June 2005 due to her depression and resulting suicidal ideation. Her psychiatric issues are well-documented which include three emergency mental health inpatient commitments, numerous suicide attempts or gestures, each of which have resulted in major upheavals in the [children’s] lives. Further she has remained unemployed for nearly two years relying on the homes of live-in boyfriends for herself and four children. The Dispositional Decree of August 4, 2005 provided a clear blueprint for reunification:

Participation by the Mother in the plan of care and treatment of the [children] and in the case plan is needed to treat her mental health issues, obtain employment, and improve her ability to be self-sufficient and care for her children.

Instead, the Mother made no significant effort toward psychiatric treatment, and at trial denied any real need to do so. Relying on various men for support and lodging has resulted in approximately thirty-two different residences since the birth of [S.A.]. Moving from White County to Kokomo and now to Indianapolis has only distanced herself further from her children without achieving significant benefit for herself or improving her ability to care for her children. Further, her poor choice of the men she has married cannot be overlooked. All three have serious psycho/sexual aberrations resulting in [S.A.'s] molestation by one husband and exposure to bisexual cross-dressing from another. Her current husband can best be described as "high risk" for an adolescent step-daughter due to his alcoholism, domestic violence, and apparent sexual perversion issues. Even unsupervised visitation at the Mother's home is clearly not appropriate. The Mother has had nearly two years to demonstrate her willingness and ability to participate in case plans tailored for reunification, without success. Thus, there is clear and convincing evidence that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the [children's] removal from outside the home of the Mother will not be remedied. The [children] can no longer wait for the Mother to catch up.

Br. of Appellant at 7-13.² These findings were supported by the evidence.

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court's ultimate determination that there is a reasonable probability the conditions that led to the removal and continued placement of the children outside of Mother's care would not be remedied is not clearly erroneous.³ "A pattern of unwillingness to deal with parenting problems and to cooperate with those providing social services, in conjunction with unchanged conditions, support a

² The language contained in the specific findings set forth herein are identical in each of the trial court's judgments for all three companion cases. However, the enumeration of the findings in the termination judgment pertaining to J.D. are slightly different.

³ Having determined that the trial court's conclusion regarding the remedy of conditions is not clearly erroneous, we need not address the issue of whether the WCDCS failed to prove that the continuation of the parent-child relationship posed a threat to the children's well being. See L.S., 717 N.E.2d at 209 (explaining that Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) is written in the disjunctive).

finding that there exists no reasonable probability that the conditions will change.” Lang, 861 N.E.2d at 372. We are unwilling to put S.A., B.A., and J.D. “on a shelf” until Mother is capable of caring for them; nearly two years without improvement is long enough. See In re Campbell, 534 N.E.2d 273, 275 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989) (stating the court was unwilling to put child “on a shelf” until her parents were capable of caring for her and that two years was long enough).

B. Best Interests of the Children

Next, Mother asserts the WCDACS failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that termination of the parent-child relationship between Mother and the children was in the children’s best interests. Specifically, Mother argues that the evidence at trial showed that the parent-child relationship between Mother and S.A. and B.A. was strong and that both children did not want to be adopted. She also likens her frequent change of residences to those of military families and argues that her frequent moves do not pose a significant risk to the well-being of the children. Finally, Mother denies that her choice in men jeopardizes the children’s well-being.

The purpose of terminating parental rights is not to punish the parents, but to protect the children involved. K.S., 750 N.E.2d at 836. Thus, in determining the best interests of the children, the trial court must subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the children. McBride v. Monroe County Office of Family and Children, 798 N.E.2d 185, 203 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). Additionally, we are mindful that in determining what is in the best interests of the children, the court is required to look beyond the

factors identified by the office of family and children, and look to the totality of the evidence. Id. at 203.

Here, Mother was given nearly two years to complete services designed to achieve reunification with her children. Unfortunately, Mother failed to make any significant progress during that time. By the time of the termination hearing, Mother was still unemployed, was not taking any prescribed mental health medications and was not participating in court-ordered services. Moreover, Mother had married Mathew despite the fact Mathew had physically abused her on several occasions in the past, had been convicted of public indecency for masturbating in front of a woman and her teenaged daughter, and had admitted to being an alcoholic. Additionally, other than obtaining her driver's license, Plantenga testified that Mother had made no positive progress toward reunification since the children were removed in 2005. In fact, when asked during the termination hearing, "[I]s there any chance this mother, through counseling or through satisfactory marriage, or through hitting the lottery, or through a total remission of depression, will ever have the selflessness that is required to be a parent?" Plantenga responded, "I don't believe so." Tr. pp. 63-64.

The record also reveals that the children, who had been CHINS for approximately two years, needed permanency. We have previously held that the testimony of a child's guardian ad litem regarding the child's need for permanency supports a finding that termination is in the child's best interests. McBride, 798 N.E.2d at 203. Here, the Guardian ad Litem ("GAL"), in his supplemental report to the court, stated that Mother's children "are suffering from her lack of stability" and that "[t]he only chance they have at

experiencing any stability would be through adoption into an appropriate adoptive family.” Appellant’s App. p. 181. The GAL went on to state that Mother “has only minimally acted to take the actions requested by the [WCDCS]” and that while her financial circumstances have improved by marriage “she has made no efforts to address the core problems that led to her repeated surrender of her children to the foster care children.” Id.

Similarly, we have also held that the recommendations of the welfare case worker that parental rights should be terminated also supports a finding that termination is in the child’s best interests. See Campbell, 534 N.E.2d at 276. In the present case, when asked if she had an opinion as to whether or not termination of the parent-child relationship was in the best interests of all three children, Plantenga testified, “I absolutely do believe that it’s in the best interest of each of those children.” Tr. p. 103. Plantenga went on to explain:

[T]he lack of stability and the chaos, moving from place to place to place to place constantly, man to man to man to man constantly, [Mother’s] lack of parenting skills, and [J.D.’s] very special need for structure . . . I mean it would just be destructive to him. It would just be horrible. The girls have been, you know, the moving, moving, moving, moving, boyfriend, husband, husband, boyfriend, husband, you know, . . . they’ve rolled with the punches. I mean, they’re fairly resilient children, . . . and I don’t think they deserve that. I don’t think the kids deserve to be in a home where – with an alcoholic father, and with domestic violence and a mother who has medical or you know, emotional needs that she’s not attending to. You know, I think the girls need to be in a stable home.

Id. at 104. Thus, the WCDCS proved by clear and convincing evidence that termination of the parent-child relationship between Mother and all three children was in the children’s best interests.

“It is undisputed that children require secure, stable, long-term continuous relationships with their parents or foster parents. There is little that can be as detrimental to a child’s sound development as uncertainty.” Baker v. Marion County Office of Family and Children, 810 N.E.2d 1035, 1040 (Ind. 2004) (citing Lehman v. Lycoming County Children’s Servs. Agency, 458 U.S. 502, 513, 102 S.Ct. 3231 (1982)). Mother’s arguments to the contrary set forth previously amount to nothing more than an invitation to reweigh the evidence and to judge the credibility of the witnesses, and this we cannot do. See D.D., 804 N.E.2d at 264. For all these reasons, we conclude that the trial court’s judgment terminating Mother’s parental rights to S.A., B.A., and J.D. is not clearly erroneous.

Affirmed.

FRIEDLANDER, J., and ROBB, J., concur.